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European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation (ERPL) 
A 60 month European Research Council grant has been awarded to Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz for 
the project “European Regulatory Private Law: the Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation” (ERPL). 
The focus of the socio-legal project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self-
sufficient European private legal order in its interaction with national private law systems. The project 
aims at a new–orientation of the structures and methods of European private law based on its 
transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. It suggests the 
emergence of a self-sufficient European private law, composed of three different layers (1) the 
sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general principles – provisionally termed competitive contract 
law – and (3) common principles of civil law. It elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and 
national private law systems around four normative models: (1) intrusion and substitution, (2) conflict 
and resistance, (3) hybridisation and (4) convergence. It analyses the new order of values, enshrined in 
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This working paper collects the contributions to the first external workshop within the ERPL project 
that took place on 4 and 5 May 2012 at the EUI.  The workshop aimed to clarify the key parameters to 
be used for analysing the claimed transformation process of European Private Law from ‘Autonomy to 
Functionalism in Competition and Regulation’.  Apart from the papers describing the features of the 
transformation process, separate sessions examined the four parameters (or possible scenarios) around 
which the project is conceptualised, (1) conflict and resistance, (2) substitution and intrusion, (3) 
hybridization and (4) convergence. These parameters were examined from a theoretical perspective, 
but also for their more specific implications for the project design and for testing the hypothesis of the 
emergence of a self-sufficient or self-standing European Private Law. Apart from the presentation of 
the project members’ research, contributions from eminent scholars in European private law provided 
an outsider’s view on the parameters.  Finally, the working paper also includes some of the comments 
offered at a round table that critically examined the project design. 
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Hans-W. Micklitz* & Yane Svetiev** 
 
The research project, of which this is the first working paper, proposes to chart the emergence of a 
European regulatory private law order and to examine its relationship with the national private law 
legal orders in the EU Member States.  As such, the research comes at a time where the futures of both 
EU private law and national private law (as traditionally understood) are at a crossroads.  At the EU 
level, the project for the codification of a European version of the national civil codes does not appear 
to have gained much traction and even more modest projects for an optional sales law instrument are 
facing opposition including from some unexpected circles, leaving the future of that project in the 
haze.  At the national level, lawyers trained in the traditional categories and performing the routine 
disciplines of private law might often miss the fundamental ways in which the private law framework 
has been reshaped and transformed by forces beyond the nation state (invoking here Unger’s 
distinction between formative frameworks and formed routines1).  This is not least because lawyers 
are trained to appropriate new phenomena into existing categories given that stability and legal 
certainty are among the values that the legal system cherishes and seeks to promote. 
Traditional national private law had already to some extent faced challenges within its domain over 
the course of the last century, with the growth of mandatory protective rules for various groups and the 
emergence of differentiated regulatory spheres undermining both the horizontal and the autonomy-
protecting logics of private law.  This led, for instance, both common law and civilian scholars to 
declare in various terms the end or the death of contract or private law2.  While increasing economic 
integration and interdependence produces growing calls (or at least a need) for integrated solutions and 
instruments, the fragmentation of interests and social knowledge proceeds unabated and makes it very 
unlikely that a European response will take the traditional shape.   
In the contributions to this working paper, we begin an exploration of the question whether the 
European version of what would have been called private law is already taking shape, often 
imperceptibly even if before our very eyes. European private law is a mixture of traditional private 
law, this means rules on contract and tort and regulatory private law. Regulatory private law first and 
foremost served the purpose of completing the internal market. This is most visible in the 
instrumentalisation of labour and consumer law and in the vast set of rules governing regulated 
markets, such as telecommunications, postal services, electricity, gas, transport and last but not least 
financial services. Such law is complemented by an ever growing set of ECJ case law not only to 
interpret and give shape to the secondary law, but also indirectly via the decisions on the economic 
freedoms, on competition and on state aids.  The result might be viewed as an assemblage of 
capabilities and instruments developed not only at Member State level and at EU level3, but also from 
the various problem-solving and normative regimes that have emerged in the interstices of national, 
EU and international law and law-making. If the claim about this new legal assemblage is apposite, the 
novel legal phenomenon needs to be recognised, described and eventually evaluated. 
                                                     
* Professor of Economic Law, EUI. 
** Research Fellow, EUI. 
1 Unger, 2004, Social Theory:  Its situation and its task (Verso), pp. 3-4 (for eg). 
2 Eg, Gilmore, 1985, The Death of Contract, 2nd ed (Ohio State); Atiyah, 1979, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
(Clarendon); Wieacker, 1995, A History of Private Law in Europe (Clarendon, transl. by T. Weir). 
3 See Sassen, 2006, Territory-Authority-Rights:  From Medieval to Global Assemblages (Princeton). 
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The specific purpose of the working paper is to present the first steps in the research that seeks to 
understand and describe the phenomenon or phenomena of European regulatory private law together 
with a number of contributions that provide an external perspective on the conceptualisation of those 
phenomena beyond the standard categories of EU/Member State competence and harmonisation.  
Therefore, the starting point of all contributions is the premise that the landscape is much richer than is 
generally assumed, that it covers traditional private law matters, such as contract and tort, but that it 
encompasses also remote areas of regulatory private law and that, as a result, there are many different 
gardeners tending and cultivating the garden.   
The contributions of the members of the research team point to the places in which we look for the 
phenomenon of European regulatory private law, i.e. the various sources of normativity that shape or 
even purport to control individual interactions and relationships in the economic sphere.  These 
sources of normativity are often not the traditional ones (i.e., the Member States’ or EU institutions) 
and they operate through non-traditional channels and instruments.  These are precisely the 
phenomena that will ultimately call for characterisation and evaluation. 
The external contributions by contrast were given the task of providing a conceptual analysis of the 
four “parameters” that might be used to characterise those phenomena.  The idea was to provide an 
outsiders’ perspective on these (hypothesised) parameters unaffected by the way in which they are 
used in the project outline or by the project members.  After all, these are terms that are widely used 
both in debates about EU law and in various scholarly traditions, such as legal theory and philosophy, 
comparative law, new governance, experimentalist governance etc.  The word “parameters” is 
sufficiently broad and neutral to convey the idea that the processes of characterisation and evaluation 
are quite distinct.  European private law might emerge and be shaped by hybridisation, convergence, 
intrusion and substitution or conflict and resistance; it might be characterised as self-sufficient or 
dependent on national law and institutions.  During the workshop, it was suggested that these might 
also be treated as alternative scenarios, which could be either mutually consistent (and co-exist) or 
mutually exclusive, or have a more complex dynamic relationship. 
Ultimately, as foreshadowed in the last substantive part of the working paper, both the hypothesized 
emergence of the European private law and the conceptual framework will have to be tested on the 
ground.  The work of the researchers points to some of the corners of the vast garden that will be 
explored in the course of the project, including Europeanised local remedies, standardisation as a 
source of normativity and the creation (the word is used deliberately4) of the new utilities markets, 
such as telecommunications or electronic communications more broadly.  In all three areas, we can 
detect various degrees of blending of private and public, national and European, as well as 
administrative, contractual and legal instruments. This blending is precisely what makes the 
phenomena of European regulatory private law immanent and more difficult to grasp. Yet this is the 
task that stands before the project research team. 
In the final section, the working paper includes some of the comments upon the research hypotheses, 
parameters and the overall research design offered at a roundtable concluding the workshop by the 
members of the scientific advisory committee and other invited participants..  This provided another 
set of constructive suggestions and contributions, again from an outsiders’ perspective, though more 
focused on the questions of research design and research methodologies.  Precisely when the field is 
not well understood and is under-elaborated, the fraught question of the appropriate methodologies of 
legal research in a (substantively and intellectually) post-doctrinal world can be both liberating and a 
source of anxiety.  It is liberating to the extent that there is no accepted corpus and therefore it is easier 
to avoid assuming away the distinction between context-shaping frameworks and within-context 
                                                     
4 Invoking the idea of markets as constructed, as attributed to some Ordoliberals.  Eg, Joerges, 2006, ‘La constitution 
économique européenne en processus et en procès’, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique XX(3): 253.  See also 
Colliat, 2012, ‘A Critical Genealogy of European Macroeconomic Governance’, European Law Journal 18(1): 6, 7-8. 
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routines (again following Unger5).  It is a source of anxiety precisely because there is no research 
script to follow; these first steps may be the foundations of the corpus even if, as always in research 
and scholarship, we stand on the shoulders of giants. 
 
                                                     




Section I: CONCEPTS 
A SELF-SUFFICIENT EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW – A VIABLE CONCEPT? 
 
Hans-W. Micklitz* 
I. Introduction and Explanation 
This paper is composed of two parts: under (II.) I have reprinted the two decisive parts of the grant 
application for the project a) the overall hypothesis of the project and b) the methodology applied to 
test the hypothesis. 
The European Union – this is the overall idea - is establishing its own private legal order referred to as 
‘a self-sufficient legal order’, largely distinct from national private legal orders.  This presupposes a 
particular understanding of private law as regulatory law. I am therefore less concerned with the 
attempts of the European Union to adopt a European Civil Code or a Common European Sales Law 
(CESL). Instead my attention is devoted to the regulations and directives the EU has adopted in the 
last decades in seemingly remote areas of private law, such as sector related rules on 
telecommunication, energy, transport, financial services and the like or on new forms of contract 
governance such as standardization of services contracts. Here, so the arguments goes, the European 
Union is building its own legal orders, as sectorial orders, separated from national private law.  
The methodology aims at testing the hypothesis of self-standing European private legal order around 
four parameters: hybridization, self-sufficiency, convergence, and conflict and resistance. Each 
parameter requires a clarification of its meaning and a deeper reflection on its theoretical grounding 
and implication. Each parameter will be tested in a particular sub-project. This is what the workshop 
was all about. We – means the Research Group – aimed to receive  
a critical feedback on the overall research question – the leading hypothesis, 
on the four parameters used to test the hypothesis, and on 
the sub-projects assigned to the four parameters. 
Under (III.) I will lay down my first thoughts on the relationship between national private legal 
orders and what I call European regulatory private law and to give shape to the parameters in linking 





                                                     




II. Summary of Grant Application 
 
a) State-of-the-Art and Objectives: The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law (ERPL) 
- The Transformation from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation 
 
1. The hypothesis: ERPL a Self-sufficient Private Legal Order Enshrining a New Order of 
Values 
There is a strong coincidence between ideological preconceptions of European constitution building 
and European private legal order building through the DCFR. The dictate at the moment seems to 
convey, more than ever, a quest to embark on constitutional pluralism and private law pluralism, 
bearing different headings in the private law discourse: “Private Law and the Many Cultures of 
Europe” (Wilhelmsson/E. Paunio/A. Phjolainen), “Private Law Beyond the State” (Michaels/Jansen), 
or “Open Method of Co-Ordination” (van Gerven). However, outside political and academic debates, 
European constitution building and European private law construction steadily continues via 
secondary law making with the support of the Member States and via by the ECJ and national courts. 
My project focuses on ERPL beyond the boundaries of autonomy and freedom of contract guided 
national private legal orders (L. Raiser, H. Collins). I start from the following hypotheses: 
• ERPL is developing through regulation and new modes of governance in subject matters usually 
regarded as being beyond traditional private law, for example consumer and anti-discrimination 
law, regulated markets, private competition law, state aids, public procurement, property rights 
and unfair commercial practices, risk regulation and standardisation of services, 
• ERPL is striving for self-sufficiency, it is EU made and EU enforced, via old and new modes of 
governance, 
• ERPL yields its own order of values, enshrined in the concept of access justice 
(Zugangsgerechtigkeit). 
The focus of this socio-legal project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self 
sufficient European private legal order in its interaction with national private law systems.  
• It aims at a new–orientation of the structures and methods of European private law based on its 
transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. 
• It suggests the emergence of a self sufficient European private law, composed of three different 
layers (1) the sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general principles – provisionally termed 
competitive contract law – and (3) common principles of civil law.   
• It elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and national private law systems around four 




In the overall project I will demonstrate (1) the transformation of European private law from 
autonomy to regulation and competition and (2) the emergence of a new order of values enshrined in 
the concept of access justice/Zugangsgerechtigkeit. This twofold shift produces tensions between the 
alleged market bound European private law and the state bound national private legal systems.  
In a first step I will sketch four normative models on the relationship between the two legal orders – 
conflict and resistance – intrusion and substitution – hybridisation – convergence and their theoretical 
grounding in legal theory and institutional economics. These four normative models constitute the 
A Self-Sufficient European Private Law – A Viable Concept? 
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areas in which socio-legal research needs to be undertaken. In a second step I will link the four 
normative models to particular types of institutions: – conflict and resistance to differing orders of 
values, – intrusion and substitution to regulated markets, – hybridisation to remedies and – 
convergence to co/self-regulation. This allows me to transform the overall theoretical frame into a 
concrete research design around the four normative models and their particular links to European 
regulatory private law. Based on the findings in the four sub-projects, in the third step, I will give 
shape to the suggested transformation process, from autonomy to regulation and competition and to 
the emergence of a new order of values. 
(1) Step 1 – Four normative models and their theoretical grounding: The four normative models are 
intended to capture the set of variants available in the relationship between European regulatory 
private law and national private law. They reflect my current analysis of what I have termed European 
regulatory private law. 
Conflict and resistance: This is suggested as one of the possible reactions of the Member States. The 
perspective is that the Member States do not give way to the intruding European regulatory private 
law. Instead, they provoke a clash between the European regulatory private law and the national law 
and set limits to where the intruding law ends and where the national laws begin.  
Intrusion and substitution: This is suggested to be the perspective of the current EU law-making and 
law enforcement strategies, enshrined in the idea of a self-sufficient order composed of three major 
elements: (1) the horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (2) the general principles enshrined in the 
horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (3) the general principles of civil law.  
Hybridisation: This is suggested to be an overall normative model of a composite legal order, within 
which the European and the national legal orders both play their part in some sort of a merged 
European-national private legal order. Hybridisation means that the legal character of the respective 
rule is neither European nor national. It bears elements of both legal orders and is therefore supposed 
to be hybrid.  
Convergence:  This is suggested to be a process of mutual approximation of the two different legal 
orders. They are not merged like in the concept of hybridisation, they still exist side by side, but they 
are drawing nearer to each other. Convergence is not bound to mandatory standards and default rules. 
It instead enshrines in particular the new modes of governance, co-regulation and self-regulation, 
which are enhanced by limited and limiting state powers. 
A common theoretical background  
The four categories share a common theoretical background. I intend to incorporate in my analysis 
legal theories on the transformation of private law into economic law (L. Raiser) with theories 
analysing private law beyond the state (Michaels/Jansen). In order to fully grasp the change in 
paradigm I will draw on institutional economics as an analytic framework. The concept of 
‘institutions’1  that I intend to use in order to get to grips with the ‘substance’ of European regulatory 
private law – understood as the rules regulating the structure of human interaction, composed of 
formal (legal) and informal (social) constraints and their enforcement – complies with the institutional 
design of legal orders, notwithstanding their origin, be it European or national. In this light, legal 
theories help to understand and to explain the transformation process on a more abstract theoretical 
level. The insights of institutional economics allow for an analysis of how exactly the transformation 
process of the two legal orders occurs or in the language of institutional economics how the 
‘institutional change’ reaching beyond national political economies manifests itself. 
                                                     
1 “Institutions: The rules of the game: the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.  They are made up of 
formal constraints (such as rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of behaviour, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics”, http://www.coase.org/nieglossary.htm. 
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The strong sometimes even static association of a particular type of national political economy does 
not leave much room for the interpenetration of different political economies. In such a perspective, 
the non-convergence thesis of legal orders defended by P. Legrand and the categorisation of the 
varieties of capitalism developed by Hall/Soskice share a common origin. This variant will have to be 
analysed under the category ‘conflict and resistance’. National political economies, just as national 
legal orders, stand side by side. The different ‘autonomies’ enshrined in Member States’ private legal 
orders would then have to be mobilised against European regulatory intrusion. National legal orders, 
being understood as institutions, are suggested to build barriers against the incoming tide of European 
regulatory private law – to paraphrase the famous word of Lord Denning.2  
Just as private law theory is becoming increasingly involved with the debate on private law beyond the 
state, research in institutional economics is reaching further and further beyond the boundaries of 
national political economies, thereby emphasising ‘institutional change’ and/or ‘institutional 
flexibility’ (Lane/Wood) The more radical strand of the new research in institutional economics yields 
the question whether private legal orders would have to be understood as institutions, disconnected 
from the nation states and organised around markets, not around states. Particularly telling are the 
findings on regional and sectoral varieties of capitalism (Crouch/Schröder/Voelzkow). This comes near 
to observed trends in European regulatory private law striving for normative self-sufficiency, here 
captured in the model of ‘intrusion and substitution’.   
Somewhere in the middle lies the task of combining an emphasis on institutional flexibility with 
retention of the idea that there exits distinctive types of political economy, resulting from the country’s 
history, enshrined in the common knowledge and the common culture (Hall/Soskice). The combined 
approach, the so-called historical institutionalism, introduced two categories into the debate – 
hybridisation and convergence (W. Streek/K. Thelen, in legal theory N. Reich, v. Gerven) – which have 
become fashionable in legal doctrine, often without disclosing its origin in institutional economics. In 
institutional economics both hybridisation and convergence imply the need to look at the formal 
constraints, the informal constraints and the enforcement characteristic in order to get a full picture of 
the institutional change. Both concepts seem to be well suited in catching the compartimentalised 
character of European regulatory private law, whilst insisting on the genuine national character of 
private legal orders, thereby yielding hybrid institutions or provoking convergence of inherently 
different institutions.  
(2) Step 2 – The four normative models (conflict – intrusion – hybridisation – convergence) and their 
impact on the different subject matters: Combining legal theory and institutional economics allows for 
building correlations between the relationship between intrusion – conflict – hybridisation – 
convergence and the different areas of European regulatory private law: 
• conflict and resistance: value conflicts between different forms of capitalism are suggested to 
emerge in consumer, anti discrimination, unfair commercial practices law, private competition, 
state aids and public procurement law, thereby confirming the static assumptions of particular 
forms of capitalism to which Member States belong,  
• intrusion and substitution: self-sufficiency might succeed, if at all, in regulated markets (energy, 
telecom, financial services), thereby overruling and out-ruling national private legal orders 
• hybridisation: remedies in consumer, anti-discrimination, private competition, state aids, public 
procurement might be developed out of European regulatory private law and national private 
law, thereby leading to a truly integrated legal device, 
• convergence: co-regulation in risk regulation and standardisation of services, self-regulation in 
those areas where party autonomy/freedom of contract/autonomie de la volonté still prevails, 
                                                     
2 ...when we come to matters with a European element, the treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up 
the rivers. It cannot be held back.. (1974) 2 AII E.R. 1226, 1231. 
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thereby maintaining the specificities of the European and the national legal orders, but bringing 
them more closely together. 
III. Thoughts on the Relationship between National and European Private Law3 
A Short Narrative on two Grand Projects and the Consequences of their Failures 
The Berlin wall fell in 1989, exactly 200 years after the French Revolution. In 1992 the old Member 
States decided to offer the Middle and Eastern European Countries the opportunity to join the 
European Community, as it then was.4 This decision triggered two large but strongly interconnected 
political and legal debates: the making of a Constitution for the United States of Europe and the 
establishment of a European Civil Code. The assumption behind this debate was that the new 
European legal order, composed of these two grand legal projects – the constitution and the civil code 
– should be modelled after the institutional pattern of the nation state. We all know what happened.  
The European Constitution, if it ever deserved the title ‘constitution’, was rejected by the referenda in 
France and the Netherlands and then turned into what became the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The 
European Civil Code project so forcefully promoted by the European Parliament since the early 1990s 
led to the so-called Academic Draft Frame of Reference in 20085 and now to the Draft Regulation on a 
Common European Sales Law in 2011.6 The two projects yielded a wealth of legal thought ranging 
from doctrinal analysis to deep theoretical and philosophical reflections on the nature of a constitution 
and the character of a civil code in the early 21st century. The contra-punctual reply to monistic 
concepts of a supranational constitutional order was constitutional pluralism (Maduro, Walker),7 
challenging the idea and the ideology of a monistic legal political order for Europe whereby the 
European Treaties could substitute the national constitutions.  
It took more than ten years before the debate on pluralism reached the minds of private lawyers in 
Europe. This might be due to the fact that the constitutional debate started already in the 1990s 
whereas the civil law codification project needed the publication of the 2001 Communication of the 
European Commission8 in order to raise broad academic and political awareness. Until 2001 European 
private law had not raised much attention among civil law scholars of the Member States, apart from 
debates regarding the adoption of the Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms and of Directive 
                                                     
3 The following will be published under the heading of ‘Monistic ideology vs pluralistic reality – on the search of a 
normative design for European private law’, in L. Niglia (ed.) Pluralism in European Private Law, Hart Publishing, 
forthcoming 2012 
4 In order to avoid the always awkward reference to one’s own texts, I will limit myself to those of direct relevance: The 
Maastricht Treaty, the Principle of Subsidiarity and the Theory of Integration, LAKIMIES, The periodical of the 
Association of Finnish lawyers, Special Issue on European Integration, 4/1993, 508; The concept of competitive contract 
law, Penn State International Law Review, The Dickinson School of Law of the University of Pennsylvania 23 (2005), 
549; The Visible Hand of European Private Law, in Yearbook of European Law 2009, volume 28, P. Eeckhout/T. 
Tridimas (eds.), 2010, 3; Failure or Ideological Preconceptions? Thoughts on Two Grand Projects: the European 
Constitution and the European Civil Code, in K. Tuori and Suvi Sankari (ed.), The Many Constitutions of Europe, 
Ashgate 2010, 109; (ed.), The Many Faces of Social Justice in Private Law, Elgar 2011; The ECJ between the individual 
citizen and the Member States – A plea for a judge-made European law on remedies, in: B. de Witte/H.-W. Micklitz 
(eds.), The ECJ and the Autonomy of the Member States, Intersentia 2012, 349. 
5 Online edition 2008. 
6 COM (2011) 635 final of 11.10.2011. 
7 M. Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is As Good As It Gets?, in Marlene Wind and Joseph Weiler (eds), 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 74; N. Walker )ed.) Sovereignty in 
Transition, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), same author, Out of Place and Out of time: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates, 14 
Edinburgh L. Rev. 2010, 13. 
8 COM(2001) 398 final 11.7.2001 Communication on European Contract Law. 
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99/44/EC on Consumer Sales.9 European private law was perceived as being either a domain of 
consumer law or of international private law within the Brussels and the Rome Convention, both from 
1980. The 2001 Communication set an abrupt end to the long deep sleep into which national private 
law academia had fallen, largely disregarding the developments in European private law making since 
the midst of the 1980s. The reactions that have followed bear similarity to the famous discourse 
between Savigny and Thibaut10 on the use and usability of a private legal order for the building of a 
supranational state. For a decade now, the legal political world in Europe can be divided in two camps. 
On the one hand, those who ‘believe’ in the codification project as a building block for a united 
Europe. On the other hand those who ‘defend’ the necessity of national private legal orders within a 
united Europe. Sometimes the debate bears a strong ideological flavour.11 Perhaps an open discussion 
about any relevant political and democratic aspects could contribute to overcome this shortcoming.12  
The proponents of the codification project live their rather techno-bureaucratic dream very much in 
line with the German Professorenmodell of the late 19th century, relying on an alliance between the 
private law professors across Europe and the European Commission.13 The opponents do not hesitate 
to use nationalistic arguments in order to save their respective national private legal order against an 
ever stronger intrusion via Brussels.14 It is in this heated intellectual environment that the debate about 
pluralism in private law and private legal orders is about to take place.  
On the surface, it is very much a debate about who should enjoy formal authority (Jansen15)---the 
Member States or the European Union. This is due to the overall design, which has triggered and 
shaped the debate – the construction of the post-1989 European legal order in the institutional design 
of the nation state. This does not mean that the legal discourse is restricted to the formal authority of 
law making. Quite the contrary is true. Just as in constitutional law, the pluralistic perspective 
(Smits16) has initiated deeper reflections and has revitalised a much older discourse on ‘pluralism’ in 
private law. Using again Jansen, the common denominator that unites those who remained outside the 
ideological-loaded pro/contra European codification project is the growing interest in the ‘informal 
authority’ of private law making and mixed forms where the formal and the informal come together in 
new forms of co-regulation. The distinction between formal, informal and mixed forms of authority 
very much insists on pluralism in legal sources. However, pluralism in sources leads to pluralism of 
legal systems, of legal actors and of legal norms.17 Seen this way, it might be possible to unite those 
who think of European private law under that umbrella; be it as a new form of international private 
                                                     
9 St. Grundmann/D. Medicus/W. Roland (Hrsg.) Europäisches Kaufgewährleistungsrecht - Reform und Internationalisierung 
des deutschen Schuldrechts, Köln (Heymanns) 2000. 
10 A. F. J. Thibaut/F. C. v. Savigny, Ihre programmatischen Schriften, mit einer Einfüh¬rung von Hans Hattenhauer, 1973. 
11 E.g. F Yves Leqeutte, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code civil européen de Monsieur von Bar, Recueil 
LeDalloz 2002, 2202-14; Bénedicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il un code civil européen?, Revue Trimestrielle De Droit 
Civil 2002, 463; also, Droit européen des contracts: première réaction au plan dáction de la Commission, Receuil le 
Dalloz 2003, 1171; Ph. Malinvaud, Réponse-hors délai- à la Commission européene: à propos d’un code européen des 
contracts, Receuil La Dalloz 2002, 2542-51; Jean Heut, Nous faut-il un ‘euro’ droit civil? Receuil La Dalloz 2002, 2611-
14; P. Legrand, Antivonbar, Journal of Comparative Law 1 2006, 13. 
12 M. W. Hesselink, The Politics of a European Civil Code, 10 European Law Journal 2004, pp. 675-697 
13 H. Schepel, (2007), ‘The European Brotherhood of Lawyers: The Reinvention of  Legal Science in the Making of 
European Private Law’, Law and Social Inquiry, 32 (1), 183- 199. 
14 G. Comparato, Nationalism and Private Law in Europe, phd thesis University of Amsterdam 2012. 
15 Legal Pluralism in Europe, National Laws, European Legislation, and Non-Legislative Codifications, in L. Niglia (ed.), 
Pluralism and European Private Law, 2012 forthcoming. 
16 A Radical View of Legal Pluralism, in L. Niglia (ed.), Pluralism and European Private Law, 2012 forthcoming. 
17 D. Halberstam, Systems Pluralism and Institutional Pluralism in Constitutional Law: National, Supranational, and Global 
Governance. University of Michigan Public Law Working Paper, no. 229. Working Paper. 
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law (Joerges,18Michaels19), as reaching beyond the state (Michaels/Jansen20), as a governance design 
(Cafaggi/Muir-Watt21) or as a hybrid legal order (Reich22). There is not yet much clarity as to what is 
at stake when private lawyers use constitutional language and start speaking of pluralism in European 
private law. The contributions to this volume provide ample evidence of the variety of approaches. 
The distinction between formal and informal authority might serve as a starting point to get to grips 
with the diversity of approaches.  
In this paper I will take 1989 or perhaps the late 1980s as a starting point to re-think the interrelation 
between the reasons for the failure of the two grand projects and what I call the emerging European 
private law as a self-sufficient legal order. Not the sole but one possible explanation for the failure lies 
in the changing patterns of the nation state. The European Constitution and the European Civil Code 
were conceived at a time in history where the nation state entered a new historical arena, the one of the 
market state. The design of the market state and its impact on the European Union in its constitutional 
and its private law design is part of a bigger and more long term project I am engaged in with my 
colleague Dennis Patterson.23 In a nutshell, we argue that the European Union must be understood as 
a blueprint for understanding the EU market state as an enabling state.24 The 1986 Single European 
Act constitutes the break-even point in the development of European integration. The 1985 White 
Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market25 provided the necessary legitimacy for the European 
legislator to use and to instrumentalise law as a means to open up and to shape markets. This is where 
the birth of the EU as a market state can be located. Private law is submitted to the overall objective of 
the Internal Market. This private law is not the private law enshrined in the big codifications of the 
19th century that characterise the state nation and later the nation state. Instead, it is what I call 
regulatory private law. The overall hypothesis is that the transformation of the nation state private 
legal orders into a market state European private legal order produces a diversification of private law 
regimes. On the one hand are the nation state private legal orders that loose importance in practice 
and, concomitantly, as a source of inspiration for the new regulatory design. On the other hand is the 
market state European private legal order in statu nascendi as a self-standing legal order which unites 
the ‘formal’ and the ‘informal authority’ of private law making; the making of private law through the 
EU legislator via regulations and directives in combination and in co-operation with non-state actors; 
the yielding of a new pattern of justice – access justice (Zugangsgerechtigkeit).  
                                                     
18 A New Type of Conflicts Law as the Legal Paradigm of the Postnational Constellation, in Christian Joerges & Josef Falke 
(eds.), Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets, 2011, 000 in 2011 with Hart 
Publishing, Oxford-Portland. 
19 Dogmatising Non-legislative Cofications: Non-legislative Reference texts in Europen Legal Discourse in R. 
Brownsword/H.-W.Micklitz/N. Niglia/St. Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law,  Hart Publishing 
2011, 31. 
20 R. Michaels/N. Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, (54) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 2006, p. 843; N. Jansen/R. Michaels, Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law, 
Mohr/Siebeck 2008. 
21 Cafaggi/Muir Watt, F. Cafaggi/H. Muir Watt (eds.), Making European Private Law, 2008; same authors The Regulatory 
Functions of European Private Law, 2010. 
22 N. Reich Horizontal Liability in EC Law  – Hybridisation of Remedies for Compensation in Case of Breach of EC Rights, 
CMLR 2007 (44) 704. 
23 H.-W. Micklitz/D. Patterson, From the Nation State to the Market: The Evolution of EU Private Law, EUI Working Paper 
2012/000. 
24 With a view to regulatory integration the main features of the EU market state are the following: the shift from private into 
public – the State outsources its regulatory functions, the shift from law and Regulation to regulation & outsourcing 
privatisation, such as can be observed in the area of  utilities, transportation, healthcare. The bottom line: sovereignty 
loses its nation state force as the state shifts away from providing top-down regulatory and entitlements welfare to 
fostering and preserving market conditions for the maximization of economic opportunity. 
25 COM (1985) 310 final. 
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I will develop my arguments in two steps. I will first clarify my understanding of private law as 
economic law. Only such a broadening of perspective allows for understanding the full picture of the 
development of European private law as regulatory private law. The current debate on the appropriate 
next step towards the envisaged and promoted adoption of a European Civil Code suffers very much 
from its narrow understanding of private law as contract and tort law, socially upgraded with 
consumer and anti-discrimination law but neglecting the much deeper and more fundamental changes 
to private law in the 20th century.26 This is a characteristic way of thinking that follows nation-state 
based patterns. The counterpart to the nation state pattern of private law is European regulatory private 
law to be conceived as a self-standing legal order, which is going to be developed from the making of 
the law via its substance to its enforcement. Such a broadening of perspective, that is, here the nation 
states private legal orders and there the self-standing European regulatory law, is crucial for a deeper 
analysis of the inter-relationship between nation state private legal orders and EU market state private 
law, between the formal and the informal authority of the private law in the making and the 
enforcement. This constitutes the second step of my analysis. Four parameters - conflict and 
resistance, intrusion and substitution, hybridisation and convergence – shall serve to get a clear picture 
of the multiplicity of legal regimes and the way in which the nation state private legal orders and the 
EU market state private legal order interact.  
Traditional Nation State Private Law vs. Modern European, Market State Private Law 
There is a constitutional link between the changing patterns of statecraft from nation to market state 
and the function and purpose of the private legal order. This assumption requires clarifications with 
regard to what I understand by European Constitution and by private law.  I start from the underlying 
distinction between the constitutional charter, in the words of the ECJ,27 and the private legal order as 
two distinct though inter-related fields that altogether form the European legal order. The link comes 
clear in the role and function of constitutional competences for the adoption of a European private 
legal order. Private law is being understood as economic law,28 covering not only contract and tort or 
systematically speaking the continental codifications but also public and private regulation of the 
economy. This needs to be developed.  
The broad concept of private law is crucial for the development of a deeper understanding of the 
ongoing transformation process of nation states to market states as well as the particular role and 
function of the European Union. The traditional national private legal orders with their focus on 
contract and tort represent the state-nation and later the nation-state variant of private law. They have 
emerged and they are deeply rooted in the state nation and nation state building process of the 18th and 
19th century in continental Europe. The starting point is private autonomy, freedom of contract, la 
liberté de la volonté. The actors are private individuals, private economic actors originally and largely 
operating within the territorial boundaries of the state. The states claim the authority to adopt private 
legal rules in their territory. Local law and droit commun should no longer be applicable side by side. 
Private law became nationalised. The grand codifications of the early 19th and late 19th century were 
meant to overcome the informal authority of private law as it stood in the 17th and 18th century. The 
result was an enormous gain in economic efficiency and legal coherence. Legal pluralism, as diffuse it 
might be, challenges this progress and might bring Europe back to the Middle Ages.29 In the early 19th 
century, international private law constituted the conceptual answer to the building of national private 
                                                     
26 See for an account of the debate, H. Micklitz/F. Cafaggi, Introduction, in: H.-W. Micklitz/F. Cafaggi (eds.), The European 
Private Law after the Common Frame of Reference, 2010, iv-xlvi. 
27 Since ECJ 26 September 1984, Case 294/83 – Les Verts [1986] ECR 1339 at 23. 
28 Assmann/G. Brüggemeier/D. Hart/Ch. Joerges, Zivilrecht als Teil des Wirtschaftsrechts, 1980. 
29 See the distinctively different positions of N. Jansen (stressing the risk of legal pluralism) and J. Smits (promoting the 
disconnection of jurisdiction and applicable law) in L. Niglia (ed.), Pluralism and European Private Law, 2012 
forthcoming. 
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legal orders as means and technique to decide on the applicable law in cross-border transactions. 
Today, international private law is again at the forefront in the search for handling the growing 
pluralism of private law in Europe and the world.  
European, I should more correctly say, European Union private law is different. As is well known, the 
European Union is not a state, at least not a nation state or a state of nations, neither a ‘United States 
of Europe’. What makes the discourse on the European Constitution with a big or a small ‘c’30 so 
difficult is the fact that, the conceptual design of the EU legal order is so deeply entrenched in nation 
state constitutional patterns, overlooking the potential of the ongoing transformation process.31 The 
now more than ten years old debate about the feasibility of a European Civil Code32 fits neatly into 
such a strangely distorted perspective. The discussion on the feasibility of a European Civil Code 
provides a mirror image of the constitutional debate. Constitutional pluralism paved the way for taking 
a fresh look at the constitutionality of the EU, at its particularities, which makes them distinct from a 
national constitution.33 A change in perspective is needed to free from old patterns of legal thought. I 
will demonstrate the narrow-minded approach of the current mainstream European private law 
discourse in looking into the EU competence on private law making, and the design of European 
private law, as it shows up in the 2001 Communication which has shaped the debate until today.  
EU Competence as a Conflict over the Design of EPL  
As it is well known, the EU has no genuine competence in the field of private law,  comparable to the 
competence that you may find in the Federal German Constitution. The competence for the adoption 
of private law measures had to be ‘borrowed’ from Art. 100 a EEC, later Art. 95 EC/EU and today 
Art. 114 TFEU---a regulatory technique which the ECJ has accepted so far.34 Interestingly enough, 
even the boldest draft of a European Constitution left private law competences unaffected. I do not 
recall any attempt in the last twenty years to transfer competences of the Member States to the EU in 
order to empower the EU to craft a European Civil Code. Why is that so? H. Collins35 argues in favour 
of a European private law to be developed bottom up out of the emerging European civil society and 
he is not the only one. Walter van Gerven36 with the Ius Commune Project and Jan Smits37 promoting 
Law 2.0. have taken a similar position. Although each of the three starts from different premises, they 
are united in the conviction that the European private law making is not a matter of competence. On 
the other end of the spectrum are the EU organs which cannot act without competence. The missing 
explicit competence might help to understand why the European Commission did not get into these 
questions when it launched its 2001 Communication. The European Commission never was an 
amateur of the European Civil Code so forcefully promoted by the European Parliament. It was 
dragged into the project by the European Parliament, who advocated a European Civil Code for a 
United Europe in the Thibaut sense.   
 
                                                     
30 N. Walker, ‘Big ‘C’ or small ‘c’’, (2006) 12 ELJ 12-14. 
31 J. Habermas, Zur Verfassung Europas, Ein Essay, 2011, Edition suhrkamp. 
32 The official start might be dated back to the Communication of the European Commission, although the European 
Parliament had been advocating for a European Civil Code already since the early 1990s. 
33 M. Maduro, Europe and the Constitution: What If This Is As Good As It Gets?, in Marlene Wind and Joseph Weiler (eds), 
Constitutionalism Beyond the State, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) pp. 74-102. 
34 With the exception of Case C-436/03 EP v Council [2006] ECR I-3733. 
35 The European Civil Code, the Way Forward, 2008. 
36 The different Casebooks on Tort Law, Private Law, Consumer Law, Anti-discrimination Law. 




What matters in our context is the link between the issues of competences and the design of the 
European private law: Digging deeper into competence could have yielded the necessity to reflect on 
the particularities of a European private legal order which is not nation state bound, but market bound. 
It would have meant to engage into a discourse of the relationship between the constitutional character 
of the EU and a European private legal order that would take into account the particularities of the EU. 
I think that the European Commission was aware of the fact that a competence debate could have 
produced counterproductive effects. It would have brought to light the degree to which the EU had 
already interfered into national private legal orders, outside traditional contract and tort law issues. I 
do not argue that the European Commission deliberately decided to gear the discussion into a direction 
which was less dangerous for its overall aim to complete the Internal Market. But the European 
Commission (DG Sanco?) might have recognised that concentrating on regulatory private law, would 
allow her to continue its work independently from the much more political discussion on a fully 
fledged European Civil Code. European private law making outside contract and tort could thereby be 
‘shielded’ against politicisation through academics and politicians. With CESL, however, the issue of 
competence is back on the agenda, politically through the seven Member States which raised the 
subsidiarity complaint, academically via the question whether CESL can be based on Art. 114 TFEU 
or must be based on Art. 352 TFEU. The ongoing debate might very well affect EU private law 
making outside the core areas of nation state private legal order, the genuine field of European 
regulatory private law. This could lead to a drawback of the evolution of a genuine European private 
legal order – as I understand it. 
The 2001 Communication Translated into the Struggle over the Design of EPL 
By now it suffices to insist on one point: that the discussion triggered by the 2001 Communication, the 
work of the study group and of the acquis group, the merging of the two initiatives, the development 
of the DCFR in 2008/2009 and later the CFR in 2011 under the auspices of Commissioner Redding – 
also called FS Feasibility Study, all of this took place in a constitutional competence vacuum. The 
debate was framed by the European Commission. The European Commission sets the tone, defines the 
agenda and supervises the activities. The already existing European private law rules, the so called 
private law acquis communautaire, formed the major source of inspiration. In essence, the 2001 
document of the European Commission enumerated European international private law and consumer 
contract law directives. The first category is conceptually speaking no more than a European variant of 
long lasting attempts at the international level to agree on common standards on how the applicable 
law should be determined. Consumer law had raised more awareness, being the gateway for the 
European Union to instrumentalize consumer contract law for completing the Internal Market, long 
before the discussion on a European Civil Code started. Translated into the narrative of the nation state 
vs the market state, the Communication is very much designed along the line of a nation state private 
legal order. Two major areas are missing which obviously belong to the acquis but which are not 
mentioned. The first is the impact of primary community law, in particular the market freedoms on 
national private law,38 but also the impact of fundamental rights on national private law and, since 
2009, on secondary Community law.39 Opening the debate over the acquis, also resulting from the 
ECJ case-law in these areas, would have given the codification project a totally different direction. It 
would have paved the way for building a link between the European Constitution and the European 
Civil Code, it would have shed a different light on how the rules might look like that could be 
enshrined into a European Civil Code. The second is the large set of rules the EU has adopted in the 
                                                     
38 E. Steindorff, EG Vertrag und Privatrecht, 1996; Ch. Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts durch die 
Europäische Union, 2010. 
39 V. Kosta Internal Market Law and the Private Law of the Member States. The Impact of Fundamental Rights, in: 
Geschwandtner/Kosta/Schebesta/Verbrüggen, The Impact of the Internal Market on Private Law of the Member 
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field of services in order to build a European market (financial services) or to transform public 
services into competitive markets (energy, telecommunication, postal services, transport, health care, 
education). Although the narrow approach has been criticised right from its beginning, neither the 
European Commission nor the acquis group which was established to execute the mandate 
demonstrated any preparedness to change or to enlarge the working programme.  
It is hard to understand why the narrow approach chosen in 2001 survived ten years of internal and 
external discussion. I have already speculated about the possible motives of the European 
Commission. What is missing is an attempt to understand the role and function of the academics 
involved in the project. We have to recall that the acquis group was composed of traditional nation 
state private lawyers. There was obviously no preparedness on the side of the European Commission 
to take professors of EU law, or of energy, internet or telecommunication law on board. The merging 
of the free standing Study Group and the Acquis Group brought a new dynamic into the drafting 
process. The Study Group continued the work started by Ole Lando which eventually led to the 
adoption of the Principles of European Contract Law. They both distilled out of a comparative analysis 
of different private legal orders a set of principles that could and should find common support not only 
in the academic environment but also in courts. The Study Group gave the codification project a new 
direction, one which the European Commission obviously had not in mind, and it extended the 
mandate beyond European Contract Law to the development of a fully-fledged European Civil Code. 
Services were included into the project but not the services where the EU had most actively changed 
the legal rules. Summa summarum---the merger of the two groups had even strengthened the nation 
state understanding of a future European private law. The overall group of academics was rather 
homogeneous, all trained in their respective nation state private legal orders. The internal homogeneity 
finds its counterpart in the external pressure from those of the private law community which were not 
involved in the drafting process. The Study Group and the Acquis Group had to demonstrate the 
feasibility of a European Civil Code shaped along the line of nation state private legal orders and 
respecting the droit commun.40 Inside and outside pressure favour a monistic view on private law, one 
where a European Civil Code is discussed as a means to replace national and nation state private legal 
orders, at least in the long run.  
The Innovative Character of European Regulatory Private Law  
Thinking and discussing in categories of the nation state means to turn a blind eye on  the development 
of private law outside nation state formed categories. Elsewhere I have tried to show the breadth and 
depth of European private law making, if one is ready to change the perspective, from traditional 
forms of private law to the new forms that do not fit into our nation state trained legal minds. There is 
a price to pay for the long deep sleep of private lawyers in Europe. They entered the European field 
rather late and, due to their lack of understanding of the European legal order as a ‘genuine’ legal 
order – to use the language of the ECJ in van Gend & Loos41 – they transposed nation state thinking 
and nation state concepts to the European level, as if they could start from scratch, largely disregarding 
the tremendous changes that the whole legal system, including private law, has undergone in the last 
twenty to thirty years through the European integration process. I will not reiterate the whole story, but 
I will pinpoint to the major steps in the development, in order to make my argument that European 
private law must be understood as economic law and that only such a shift in perspective allows the 
discovery of the singularity of European private law.  
Not being a state, the European Union was never concerned with the underpinnings of establishing 
private law as a national legal order, based on private autonomy or freedom of contract. The overall 
                                                     
40 See Eidenmüller, Faust, Grigoleit, Jansen, Wagner, Zimmermann, The Common Frame of Reference for European Private 
Law: Policy Choices and Codification Problems,: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 28 (2008), S. 659. 
41 Judgment of 05/02/1963, C ase26/62 Van Gend en Loos / Administratie der Belastingen ECR 1963,p.3. 
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project of the European integration process was first the common market, later the Internal Market and 
only gradually the building of a legal order that reached beyond mere economic transactions, the 
shaping of a social order, a citizen order or even a constitution. Private law – aside from family law  – 
may be by and large associated with economic transactions with a social outlook as enshrined in 
consumer law and anti-discrimination law. However, the kind of justice provided through private law 
differs from patterns of national social justice. In European private law, the Internal Market rhetoric 
sets the tone. Here the European Union appears as a regulator, be it through the ECJ which is 
challenging national economic rules that hinder free trade of products, services, capital or persons or 
be it through the EU legislator which is adopting horizontal or vertical market related rules on private 
transactions, often by way of new modes of governance.42 The regulatory private law, in its negative 
variant through the impact of the four freedoms on the private law and in its positive variant through 
the bulk of EU rules that have been adopted in the aftermath of the Single European Act outside 
Consumer and Anti-discrimination Law, deserve outmost attention. This is the European regulatory 
private law, in which the modern variant of the European Union as a market state comes clear. This 
private law is different from national private legal orders based on private autonomy and free will. 
This private law takes its form, procedure and content from being instrumentalised for building and 
shaping markets,43 yielding its own pattern of justice. It covers the setting of the regulatory frame 
through the EU institutions, the EU driven building of new market surveillance authorities, the fine-
tuning of the rules through intermediary forms of co-operation between EU and Member States 
institutions – be they called comitology, Lamfalussy, open method of co-ordination, – the 
development of new substantive legal mechanisms that reach beyond traditional private law rules and, 
last but not least, the enforcement of the self-standing rules through the sectorial regulatory agencies 
and through new forms of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms.44 
There is an obvious argument against the distinction between nation states being equated with contract 
and tort law, with freedom of contract and private autonomy and European private law being 
regulatory in nature and meant to design markets.  Regulation in private law is a matter that has been 
discussed already for more than one hundred years. Otto v. Gierke belongs to those who defended the 
need for a distinction between private law and private law regulation, although, at that time, with a 
clear highly political message. His analysis of the development in the late 19th century German law is 
as relevant today as it was hundred years ago.45 
‚Man erhält nun zwei von ganz verschiedenem Geist beherrschte Systeme: ein System des 
gemeinsamen Civilrechts, in welchem das ‚reine’ Privatrecht beschlossen liegt, und eine Fülle von 
Sonderrechten, in denen ein vom öffentlich Recht her getrübtes und mit öffentlichem Recht 
vermischtes Privatrecht waltet. H i e r lebendiges, volksthümliches, sozial gefärbtes Recht voll 
innerer Bewerbung – d  o  r  t eine abstrakte Schablone, romanistisch, individualistisch, 
verknöchert in todter Dogmatik.“ 
(One receives two systems, which are dominated by a totally different philosophy: a system of a 
common civil law, which enshrines the pure private law, and a bulk of special rules, which is 
governed by a cloudy mixture of public and private law. Here a vivid, popular, socially coloured 
law, full of inner dynamic; there an abstract model, romanistic, individualistic, ossified in dead 
legal doctrine)  
                                                     
42 Cafaggi/Muir Watt, F. Cafaggi/H. Muir Watt (eds.), Making European Private Law, 2008; same authors The Regulatory 
Functions of European Private Law, 2010. 
43 In the German understanding private law as economic law, Privatrecht als Wirtschaftsrecht, see for Europe Ch. Schmidt, 
Die Instrumentalisierung des Europäischen Privatrechts durch die Europäische Union, 2010. 
44 I have given a much clear picture of both the substance and the enforcement in the report I wrote for the German 
Juristentag 2012 to be held in Munich, Brauchen Konsumenten und Unternehmen eine neue Architektur des 
Verbraucherrechts? To be published 2012. An English translation is under the title of ‘A new architecture for consumer 
law’ is under preparation. 
45 Otto v. Gierke, Die Soziale Aufgabe des Privatrechts, 1889, at 13 [translation of H.-W.M.].  
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In comparison to the beginning of the 21st century, there are, however, major differences in terms of 
substance and in terms of institutions which justify to maintain the equations---nation states = the 
traditional concept of private law (contract and tort law (common law and/or codifications)) and the 
European Market State = the modern concept of private law (European regulatory private law). So my 
argument is that the late 19th century and the early 21st century may each be associated to a particular 
stage of development, in terms of nation state vs. market state and in terms of traditional vs. modern 
private law.   
The regulatory law at that time was mainly labour and social law which was kept outside the BGB. 
The German BGB provided only for a basic set of rules on the contract for services, the so-called 
Dienstverträge,  aside all the social concerns of labour lawyers who were fighting for a better 
protection of the legal position of dependent workers. This is what v. Gierke was referring too. 
Today’s regulatory private law cuts across all sectors of the economy and accross policies. It lies at the 
heart in particular of service contracts on financial services, on telecommunications, on energy 
(electricity, gas), on (the increasingly privatised) health care services, more and more on educational 
services, last but not least on transport. Services amount for 70% of the gross income in the EU. The 
driving force behind all these rules that aim mainly at opening up markets, at establishing competition, 
at liberalising former public services, at promoting privatisation in former areas of public services, is 
undoubtedly the EU, more precisely the European Commission. Private law issues tie in only 
inbetween other more ‘important aspects’ of the appropriate market design. This private law is 
regulatory law, but regulatory should not be equated with rules that restrict private autonomy and 
freedom of contract. Its instrumental character saves it against easy classification. Regulatory private 
law contains both elements, establishing market freedoms, therefore increasing private autonomy, 
whilst at the same time providing for rules that set boundaries to the newly created competitive market 
autonomy. The White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market46 provided the European 
Commission with the necessary legal mandate and legitimation to initiate legislative measures which 
aimed mainly at establishing markets, which inter alia, however, contain a whole series of private law 
rules, being understood as economic law.  
The regulator, about one hundred years ago, was the nation state which used regulation to shape 
national markets for national economies. Implicit in this assumption is the understanding that 
‘legislative’ or, more broadly, ‘regulatory’ meant to shape markets is not an invention of the market 
state. Regulatory private law existed already in the late 19th century. This is particularly true for the 
then emerging new industries, such as the chemical industry and, in today’s terminology, the 
telecommunication industry. At that time, however, the firms were national, they were deeply 
anchored in the nation state, economically and culturally.47 They were operating on the national 
markets, which was the case both of the old industries and of the  the new. The establishment of 
European Economic Community in 1957 has changed the economic, the political and the social 
environment. The regulator which is setting the agenda in todays’ time has become the EU. All that 
the European Commission as the major driver needs is a competence in the Treaty and the majority in 
the European Parliament and in the Council. There are only a few examples where the European 
Commission suffered from a severe setback, such as in the legislative history of the Service Directive 
2006/123/EC. In most cases the European Commission managed to get the necessary support at all 
institutional levels to implement its policies to complete the Internal Market, even in the sensitive area 
of health care. It then remains for the Member States to implement and to enforce what has been 
decided at the EU level. The here relevant pieces of secondary Community law focus on the shaping 
of a genuine European market. They address economic actors, business and consumers, who are ready 
to invest into a market that offers more opportunities and better choices on both sides. The legislative 
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47 C. Torp, Von Junkern und Schlotbaronen. Zur Interpretation des deutschen Protektionismus vor 1914, in: Saeculum 60. 
2010, S. 143. 
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means and regulatory tools, not to speak of the particular content of the rules, inherently bear a cross-
border dimension. This might explain why the EU has to ‘invent’ new devices that fit to overall policy 
objective. In short, the EU regulator differs from the national regulator 100 years ago.   
There is no clear-cut moment, which allows for making the point when exactly the transformation 
from shifting away from the national to the building of a European market started. In Europe, the 
Single European Act may be identified with the break-even point for the visibly instrumental use of 
private law to market building purposes. Transformation is a process. The new European private legal 
order still bears elements of the old one and is indeed built on the old one. A deeper look into the 
service sector which lies at the heart of the European regulatory private law would easily reveal the 
differences. It suffices to underline the differences between the telecommunication and the energy 
markets. So there are transitional periods, where the two orders are hard to separate even analytically. 
In Europe, the differences are not only linked to the history of the EU, but also to those of the Member 
States.48  
The Multiplicity of Private Law Regimes in the EU  
For the analysis of the interaction between nation state private legal orders and the EU market state 
private order I will use four normative models which are meant to capture the set of variants available 
in the relationship between European private law and national private law. They reflect my 
understanding of European private law,49 the formal, the informal and the mixed authority of the law. 
The four categories share a common theoretical background. I incorporate in my analysis legal 
theories on the transformation of private law into economic law50 with theories analysing private law 
beyond the state.51 In order to fully grasp the change in paradigm, I draw on institutional economics as 
an analytic framework. The concept of ‘institutions’52 that I use in order to get to grips with the 
‘substance’ of European regulatory private law – understood as the rules regulating the structure of 
human interaction, composed of formal (legal) and informal (social) constraints and their enforcement 
– complies with the institutional design of legal orders, notwithstanding their origin, be it European or 
national. In this light, legal theories help to understand and to explain the transformation process on a 
more abstract theoretical level. The insights of institutional economics allow for an analysis of how 
exactly the transformation process of the two legal orders occurs or, in the language of institutional 
economics, how the ‘institutional change’ reaching beyond national political economies manifests 
itself. I have identified four parameters which tentatively allow me to describe and analyse the 
interaction between national private law regimes and European private law regimes: conflict and 
resistance, intrusion and substitution, hybridisation and convergence. Without any attempt at 
explaining the deeper reasons behind each category, I will use them in a rather pragmatic way so as to 
demonstrate how nation state private law and market state European law interact.  
                                                     
48 S. Steinmö, The Evolution of the Modern States, CUP 2010. 
49 The following is no more than a snapshot of the theoretical background that guides my analysis. This is not the right place 
to explain the deeper reasons that in my view explain the theories. For the purpose of this paper, I will simply ‘use’ and 
‘apply’ what I have developed elsewhere. 
50 L. Raiser, Die Zukunft des Privatrechts, 1971. 
51 R. Michaels/N. Jansen, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, (54) American 
Journal of Comparative Law 2006, p. 843. 
52 “Institutions: The rules of the game: the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction.  They are made up 
of formal constraints (such as rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (such as norms of behaviour, conventions, 
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Conflict and Resistance  
Conflict and resistance53 is suggested as one of the possible reactions of the Member States. The 
perspective is that the Member States do not give way to the intruding European regulatory private 
law. Instead, they provoke a clash between the European regulatory private law and the traditional 
national law and set limits to where the intruding law ends and where the national laws begin.  
In defending the national private legal order, more precisely national civil codes, Member States 
defend nation states patterns and habits. The political and academic reactions in the Member States on 
the feasibility of a European Civil Code provide ample evidence for such an understanding. Even the 
academic world is divided between the ‘believers’ and the ‘opponents’. With the adoption of the draft 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL) the codification project has reached the 
political agenda in the Council of Ministers, in the European Parliament, but also in nation states. The 
national parliaments of seven Member States have raised objection against the draft Regulation mainly 
for lack of competence.54 Whilst this does not suffice to stop the initiative, it provides evidence for the 
strong resistance in a considerable number of Member States against any attempt of the EU to 
intervene into the core of the national private legal orders, i.e. into sales law.  
The objections from the Member States, can be broken down into three different legal categories: 
competence, subsidiarity and proportionality.55 Member States argue that the EU has no competence 
and that Art. 114 TFEU is not the appropriate basis for the introduction of a Common European Sales 
Law. So far the EU has only used Art. 114 TFEU for the adoption of consumer law directives and for 
the adoption of sector related rules in various service markets. Art. 81 TFEU provides for a special 
legal basis for matters of international private law. With CESL it is the first time that the European 
Commission is using Art. 114 TFEU to intervene into the core of the nation state private laws, that is, 
the law of obligations and sales law. An analysis requires to engage into the case-law of the ECJ, the 
rules of the Treaty and to define the reach of Art. 114 TFEU. The essence of the debate turns around 
the question whether different nation state private law rules detrimentally affect trans-border trade. 
The European Commission is relying on self-produced impact assessments whose expressiveness and 
added value is challenged in national governments, for good reasons. Let us assume that the EU has no 
competence. What does this mean for the interaction between the two legal orders, the nation state and 
the EU private legal order? It means separation and it implies that the two should remain side-by-side. 
Does the competence argument help to understand the ongoing transformation of private being 
understood as economic law? The answer is a clear no.  
The subsidiarity argument, the second one very strongly promoted by the national parliaments is much 
more political, in that it claims the Member States level to be better suited to handle trans-border 
consumer sales in combination with an Europeanised international private law mechanism.56  
Its legal value still needs to be determined. The ECJ had no opportunity to give shape to the 
subsidiarity principle. As a political argument, it suggests that nation state private legal orders, built on 
autonomy and freedom of contract are the appropriate means to handle all sorts of conflicts which 
result from the rise of regulatory private law at the European level. This avoids considering that 
                                                     
53 See for a deeper understanding B. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Pluralism, Past to Present, Local to Global, (30) 
Sydney Law Review, 375; D. Caruso The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European Legal 
Integration, ELJ (3) 1997, 3; L. Niglia, The non-Europeanisation of Private Law ERPL 4 (2001) 575. 
54 The seven complaints are on file with the author, not all are publicly available, but see for the UK Published in Council 
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stenographischen Protokollen des Bundesrates. 
55 This is not the right place to discuss whether CESL can be based on Art. 114 TFEU or not. My point is different.  
56 See for the origin of the subsidiarity principle the message of Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, London Catholic Truth 
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regulatory private law largely operates outside the national courts, that is, that regulatory agencies play 
an key role and that the vast majority of conflicts are solved within or through the agencies and the 
newly established dispute settlement mechanisms.  
The proportionality argument, quite to the contrary allows for looking deeper into the reasons that 
might justify or not (!) the adoption of an optional instrument for transborder sales.57 The test, as set 
out in Gebhard58 requires that the adoption of CESL must be justified by imperative requirements of 
the general interest, must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective it is designed for and 
must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective. It is only at this level, that is,  
after having discussed the competence and the subsidiarity argument, that it is possible  to bring into 
the debate  less formalistic reasons , that is to say, in the language I use, the interaction between the 
nation state and the market state private legal order. The general interest test allows for discussing the 
changing patterns of the state, from nation to market state and the needs and possible justifications for 
the development of a new private legal order. Taking the test seriously, it would reveal straight away 
that CESL is NOT in the general interest as it does not tackle the most basic question of what kind of 
European private law is needed for an EU market state. It is neither suitable nor necessary for the very 
same reasons. A viable alternative might well be a soft-law instrument that reduces the set of rules to 
what is really needed and links it to an appropriate ODR procedure.59  
Intrusion and Substitution  
Intrusion and substitution60 is suggested to be the perspective of the current EU law-making and law 
enforcement strategies, enshrined in the idea of a self-sufficient order composed of three major 
elements: (1) the horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (2) the general principles enshrined in the 
horizontal and vertical sectoral rules; (3) the general principles of civil law. In my paper on the ‘visible 
hand of European private law’ I tried to give shape to the horizontal and the vertical sectorial rules; in 
‘competitive contract law’ I tried to show that it is possible to derive a set of ‘principles’ out of the 
regulatory private law, however incremental that might still be; in ‘universal services: a nucleus for a 
social European private law’ I argued that  the EU has introduced, or is going to introduce, a new 
lawyer of principles  into the shaping of horizontal contract law rules.61 When I wrote these papers the 
ECJ had not yet introduced the ‘general principles of civil law’,62 - the third element – which may 
close possible gaps resulting from the horizontal and vertical legal rules. This new approach of the 
ECJ has provoked strong reactions in the legal discourse, as it is easy to imagine. In the context of my 
analysis, I am concerned with the role that ‘the general principles of civil law’ might play in the 
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58 ECJ Case C-55/94 (1995) ECR I-4165. 
59 See for a first attempt for such a design with regard to b2c relationship: Optional Soft Law Instrument on EU Contract Law 
for Businesses and Consumers, Study for BEUC, prepared by G. Howells/H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, 2011; 
http://www.beuc.eu/BEUCNoFrame/Docs/1/ODIJBMNBCEILOJPPMPNDENNBPDWY9D7G219DW3571KM/BEUC/
docs/DLS/2011-09955-01-E.pdf. 
60 The link to system theory is obvious, though not sufficient, see G. Teubner, Self-subversive Justice: Contingency or 
Transcendence Formula of Law, 72 MLR 2009, 1. 
61 For a different vision, R. Michaels, Of Islands and the Ocean: The Two Rationalities of European Private Law, R. 
Brownword/H.-W. Micklitz/L. Niglia/St. Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law, Hart Publishing, 
2011, 139. 
62 ECJ 10.4.2008 Case C-412/06 – Hamilton, at 42; AG Trstenjak, Case C-489/07 Messner, at 91 and 108, ECJ at 29; 15.10. 
2009 Case C-101/08 – Audiolux ECR 2009 I-nyr; J. Basedow, Mangold, Audiolux und die allgemeinen Grundsätze des 
europäischen Privatrechts, Festschrift für K. Hopt 2010, 27; St. Weatherill, The 'principles of civil law' as a basis for 
interpreting the legislative acquis, ERCL 2010, 74; A. Hartkamp, 'The General Principles of EU Law and Private Law', 
RabelsZ 2011, 241. 
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shaping of a self-standing European private legal order. Here I will not discuss the (dubious) informal 
authority of both the DCFR and the OI, which are already used today by Advocate Generals as a 
source to give shape to the general principles of civil law.63  
‘Regulatory private law’ is the blueprint for understanding the transformation process that private law 
has been and is undergoing in the last 25 years. The EU is by-passing the nation states and developing 
its own design for a market based private legal order, an enabling legal order. The standard model for 
private law as a self-sufficient order is the sectorial rules on telecommunication, energy, financial 
services and transport. Self-sufficiency means the whole process of law-making up to law enforcement 
follows sector specific patterns. The Member States have given way to substitution and intrusion by 
adopting three generations of secondary community law (1st, 2nd and 3rd) rules which aim at 
establishing a European market for telecommunication, for energy and for transport, thereby 
promoting a distinction between the average and the vulnerable consumer. The EU rules, when 
implemented into national law, are usually kept distinct from the codified national private legal orders. 
They are enshrined in national acts, which do not alter the structure of the EU regulatory approach, 
that is, the going together of market access rules and private law rules.  
In order to understand the concept of self-sufficiency, it is crucial to take the full spectrum of EU law 
making and EU law enforcement into account. The making of the EU unites the formal and the 
informal authority of the law. Formal, in that the EU is the legislator which sets the frame for the 
institutional design – in particular the building of regulatory agencies – and in that the EU is laying 
down the procedure which public and private actors have to observe in the rule making. These are the 
new modes of governance, here in the form of co-regulation. The substantive rules, which are yielded 
in this process, are often on the borderline between ‘mere’ technical standards and ‘binding’ legal 
rules. They produce a genuine model of access justice. They cover public and private rights, such as 
access, price transparency, price adequacy and price control, quality and information, continuity, 
change of the service provider, advice and responsibilities of intermediaries and new remedies. They 
reach beyond the traditional understanding of private law and more narrowly beyond contract law 
rules, which were underdeveloped already in all 19th century codifications. The implementation 
process yields ‘strange’ scenarios of mixed powers, such as administrative enforcement of private law 
or administrative enforcement of collective actions or administrative complaint management and 
settling of conflicts. The national courts are largely kept outside the conflict management. They 
intervene only in situations of severe conflicts, when the regulatory approach, jointly promoted by the 
EU legislator, the national legislator, the competent administrative authorities and business 
organisations and actors meets strong and organised resistance of those who have not been involved in 
the making and the implementation of the rules. An illustrative case, though of regional importance 
only, is the ‘fight’ of consumers organised by the consumer advice centre, in the city of Hamburg 
against dramatic increases of gas prices. After a quite heavy and burdensome litigation, the civil courts 
seem ready to smash the EU promoted objective of competitive prices meant to replace regulated 
prices.64  
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Hybridisation65 is suggested to be an overall normative model of a composite legal order, within 
which the European and the national legal orders both play their role  in some sort of  merged 
European-national private legal order. Hybridisation means that the legal character of the respective 
rule is neither European nor national. It bears elements of both legal orders and is therefore supposed 
to be hybrid. I admit that the concept of hybridisation is under-theorised and that it has become a 
fashionable concept to circumscribe phenomena which we do not understand.66  
In a historical perspective, hybridisation is an old form of the co-existence of different legal orders. 
The colonial experience provides ample evidence for hybrid legal orders, from inter-penetration to the 
side-by-side co-existence of the old local law and the imported colonial law. In a EU perspective, 
hybridisation characterises the relationship between national private legal laws and European private 
law and/or national private legal orders and higher ranking constitutional rights, fundamental freedoms 
and fundamental rights. In view of the envisaged analysis one might understand hybridisation as a 
means to leave space for nation state private legal orders and self-standing market state private legal 
order(s). A prominent field of analysis where hybridisation has raised concern is consumer law. The 
EU directives and regulations do not provide for a complete order, not even with regard to particular 
problems that should be solved via EU law. Whenever courts engage in interpreting harmonised 
private law, they must combine European and national legal requirements. National private lawyers 
often complain about the sketchy European private law rules that shatter national private law 
doctrines. A more promising view would be to speak of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter). Nation 
state private law patterns have to be reconstructed in a market state European perspective. 
The second form of hybridisation covers what has been termed constitutionalisation of private law. 
The development started already decades ago in the Member States, when national courts referred to 
constitutional rights to intervene into classical private law cases, mainly in order to enhance the 
importance of social rights in private law matters.67 A similar development can be observed in the 
interplay of national/European private law and primary EU law. It started with the impact of primary 
Community law on national private law, the forgotten dimension in the acquis project of the European 
Commission. Nowadays the attention should be drawn to the ECJ and the ECtHR which have begun in 
an ever stronger form to use human rights and, since 2000, fundamental rights as a means to enhance 
the position of the individual be it against his or her state, be it horizontally in private law relations.68  
I would like to use remedies as the most prominent example of hybridisation, where the different 
levels of the private law are coming together, national law and European private law, national 
constitutional law and EU fundamental rights. The European legal order is designed in a way so as to 
leave it to the Member States to designate the appropriate institutions and to define the appropriate 
remedies, which should secure the uniform application of EU law. The procedural autonomy of the 
Member States, so amply underpinned by the ECJ, is, however, bound to two major restrictions---for 
national measures to implement EU law must be equivalent to those meant for the implementation of 
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national law and they must be effective. In light of Art. 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights, a new 
principle of ‘adequate’ legal protection might be available.69 The ECJ has deduced from primary 
Community law three remedies: injunctive relief, state liability, compensation for antitrust injuries. 
But even here the European remedies have to be complemented by the respective national legal rules 
as U. Bernitz and N. Reich have amply demonstrated.70 In secondary Community law, the European 
legislator is rather reluctant to introduce remedies. The standard formula found in secondary 
community law requires that Member States make sure that national remedies, meant to implement 
EU law, are effective, proportionate and deterrent. It is by no means clear to what extent fundamental 
rights and human rights can promote the development of appropriate European remedies that build on 
national law or that reach beyond national law. So far, the ECJ is not ready to accept that remedies 
must not only be equivalent and effective but ‘adequate’.71 Only such an opening of legal doctrine 
would pave the way for a new wave of hybridisation of remedies. I happily confirm that I sympathize 
with such a development, which would enhance hybridisation. Finally, even if secondary Community 
law provides for remedies, such as in the directive of consumer sales, the concrete shaping is the result 
of a going together of EU law and national law. The Putz/Weber judgment72 and its implementation by 
the German Supreme Court is just another example of the hybrid character of remedies in EU law, 
here at the level of secondary Community law read together with national private law.   
Convergence  
Convergence73 means a process of mutual approximation of the two different legal orders, of nation 
state based legal orders and market based legal order(s). They are not merged as in the case of 
hybridisation, for they still exist side by side, but they are drawing nearer to each other. Convergence 
is not bound to mandatory standards and default rules. It instead enshrines in particular the new modes 
of governance, co-regulation and self-regulation, which are enhanced by limited and limiting state 
powers. 
The market state opens up space for private regulation, i.e. for private actors and private regulation.74 
The theoretical debate on convergence is very advanced; however, it focuses maybe too much on 
statutory law making or, more precisely, on EU law making via directives and regulations. The 
inherent assumption in all EU law making is that harmonisation of private law rules via top down 
binding directives and regulations increase convergence. The counter-position is most prominently 
documented in the Jus Commune Series edited by W.v. Gerven. Here the idea is that the courts are the 
key players in paving the way for convergence via a mutual learning process. I start from the premise 
that convergence is easier to manage and to realise in areas where private actors dominate. Private 
regulation is older than the state nation (lex mercatoria). It brings a wealth of research to the fore 
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mainly dealing with the international legal environment. Of particular interest with regard to private 
regulation of services is the research of L. Bernstein75 on the diamond and cotton industry, revealing a 
particular form of a closed shop rule-making and enforcement via private actors. Conceptually 
speaking, private regulation as a form of convergence requires the analysis of not only nation state but 
also state nation patterns and their combination with the emerging European market state.76  
The dominating pattern in the area of services is co-regulation. This is true with regard to 
telecommunication, energy, transport and financial services, where the EU legislator sets a regulatory 
frame that needs to be completed via rules that have to be developed in close co-operation with the 
business sector concerned. Due to their right regulatory frame, these rules fit much more into what I 
have termed intrusion and substitution. Convergence, however, can be observed in an area of 
European law making which has not yet raised much attention in the academic environment, where the 
regulatory frame is rather loose and leaves much space for private actors – standardisation of services 
via national and European standard bodies. The Service Directive is meant to provide a common legal 
ground for those services that are not subject to sector related rules, such as telecommunication, 
energy, financial services, health care and transport. It bears a strong horizontal dimension, providing 
a kind of competence net for all those services for which no specific European rules and requirements 
exist. Art. 26 paves the way for private rule making within the framework of standardisation. The EU 
has successfully used this technique in the 1985 ‘New Approach on Technical Standards and 
Regulations’,77 combining mandatory framework regulation with voluntary rule making in standard 
bodies. A largely unnoticed development, the European Commission, the national and European 
standard bodies and the respective business sectors have engaged in the development of ‘technical 
standards for services’ which design rights and obligations for a whole series of services bearing a 
cross border dimension. Currently, we know little about the practical effects of these standards, let 
alone their legal quality and the possibilities of judicial review. However, it is suggested that 
standardisation of services is a most prominent field of convergence via private regulation.  
The Current State of Affairs and some Tentative Conclusions 
The current state of affairs, the intermingling of nation state private legal orders and the emerging EU 
market state, could be summed up with the chart below. The chart demonstrates that we are observing 
an ongoing process of change with different patterns and different variations of the state that stand side 
by side, and with a multiplicity of legal regimes that exist. This underpins the hypothesis that, without 
taking into account the new European regulatory private law, the discussion on and over European 
private law remains incomplete. I am using the four parameters of analysis which are meant to cover 
the major forms of inter-action between the nation state private legal orders and the EU market state 
private legal order. The chart allows for understanding that different forms of statecraft can be 
observed at the same time, depending on the parameter of analysis. In such a light, it is possible to 
assign to each parameter and each form of statecraft a particular area of private law here being 
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Much research still has to be done. What is needed is a hard look at the full picture of private law, one 
which is not guided by nation states ideologies but which is prepared to study the developments which 
occur at the boundaries of traditional private law, contract and tort law, but which affect more and 
more the core of private law. The tentative outcome of the analysis is European private law pluralism 
in action. The transformation of the state, from nation state to market state yields new forms of legal 
regimes cutting across the distinction between formal and informal authority. The role and function of 




W(H)ITHER PRIVATE LAW IN THE FACE OF THE REGULATORY DELUGE 
Yane Svetiev* 
Introduction 
A question that is central to the underlying concerns of the project is how to conceptualise the 
relationship between European law and national private law? And a key aspect of that question is the 
impact on national private law and institutions of the growing corpus of EU regulation of important 
services sectors of the economy.  In that context, we might ask are national regulatory or 
administrative authorities, now increasingly networked in EU regulatory networks, an interface 
between the European and the local, or are they co-opted as arms of European regulatory law? 
In this paper, I begin with the observation that the sidelining of traditional private law, together with 
adjudication and courts as its principal institutions, was a longer-term process, resulting from 
transformations of society and its knowledge base and the inability of the traditional institutions to 
cope with those transformations.  In the post-industrial society of networks, some prominent 
commentators have foreseen a role for the re-emergence of private law as the institution that mediates 
or translates various fragmented social rationalities.  Yet I argue that private law has not risen to this 
task of orchestrating various stakeholders because, even if such a task of translation is possible, private 
law institutions are not well-adapted to perform it with traditional tools.  By reference to examples 
from the regulated sectors, I argue that conceptions of European law as hierarchical “intrusions” into 
national space may be oversimplified.  At the EU level we witness attempts to overcome the 
limitations of standard interventions through proceduralised mechanisms for joint learning: both 
between administrators at different levels and between administrators and private actors (both 
regulated entities and other social stakeholders).  The advantage of EU level interventions is that they 
are not as steeped in tradition and habitual patterns as national private or public law institutions, so 
they are more open to experimentation with heterodox approaches.  The disadvantage is that EU 
interventions can self-consciously define their mandate as narrow or their objectives as limited.  In 
such cases, those whose perspectives are excluded by the narrow mandate may, in the absence of other 
ways of redefining that mandate, seek redress through the national courts.  The local and generalist 
nature of national courts can be their advantage in providing a venue that amplifies the voice of small 
scale communities and their apparently small scale problems. 
The discussion of the Europeanisation of private law has in recent times usually focused on the project 
of drafting a European Code.1 This tendency is understandable, since in most EU member states, the 
national codes have been seen traditionally as the principal source of national private law.  As Micklitz 
has argued, this was the private law counterpart of the “constitutionalisation” of the EU project and 
shoring up the Union’s “state-like” status.  Yet a “codification” perspective has a certain “back to the 
future” quality even in the more traditional state context.  Even more so for the EU, given that EU has 
already heavily intervened in various non-traditional aspects of private law, such as consumer 
protection, as part of the process of market-making and re-regulation.  Thus, the process of intrusion 
and substitution of local rules can be said to have commenced quite early, beginning with seminal EU 
cases, such as Cassis de Dijon. 
More recently attention is increasingly focused on the various (EU) regulatory regimes in sectors such 
as food safety, financial services, energy or transport increasingly affecting the conduct of private 
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actors and restructuring private relationships. A mixture of competence limitations, subsidiary 
concerns and the inexistence of “traditional” institutions produces institutional innovation at the EU 
level, which incorporates member state actors. Does this mean that a self-standing European 
functional law now governs many if not most key economic activities with little or no reference to 
national private law and courts? Once eager agents of European integration, by taking up with 
enthusiasm the power afforded by the preliminary reference procedure, have European courts dealt 
themselves out of the adjudication game?  Are there good reasons for such a process of distancing and 
autonomisation to take place? 
One common view from private lawyers in the member states might be that this distancing of 
European law and marginalisation of traditional institutions is driven by the high-jacking of the 
functionalist logic of integration by European institutions, such as principally the Commission and the 
Parliament aided and abetted by the ECJ.  But the trend away from private law adjudication of 
disputes had begun much earlier and independently of EU integration, as a combined result of 
transformations in the economy and society as well as the increasingly more encompassing definition 
of the public interest pursued by the state.   While EU integration, and the creation and re-regulation of 
the common market have exacerbated that process, it bears emphasizing that the EU, even if this were 
at all feasible, does not have the capacity or resources to act as a formal hierarchy.2 Instead, EU 
institutions must engage with (in the sense of “collaborate with” as opposed to “give orders to”) 
private actors, national administrations and even courts, to achieve their policy goals.   
The aim of the paper is both to identify the different dimensions and the reasons for which the 
European legal order may be becoming “self-sufficient”, situating these developments in on-going 
debates about European law and governance and exploring the possible residual role that might be 
played by national private law and courts in that context.  Specifically, I am sceptical that private law 
can re-emerge as a mechanism for review and discipline over private self-regulatory systems and of 
translating and orchestrating various social rationalities.  Yet there may be spaces and functions to 
which the local and general nature of national private law courts can provide them with an advantage 
so as to be synergistic with European regulatory private law (ERPL) in the EU multi-level order. 
Background – Private Law in the Nation State and Beyond 
National private law is usually seen to comprise contract and tort law as its main pillars, and in most 
Member States of the EU following the civilian tradition, these bodies of law have traditionally been 
complied in the form of comprehensive codification of general rules.3 Schematising broadly, the 
principal features of private law rules were that they were general in scope and facilitative in function.  
Private (civil and common) law is general in scope because it does not typically differentiate between 
different fields or sectors of activity.  Instead, the rules are meant to apply generally (or 
“horizontally”) across all different kinds of activities and sectors.  Moreover, private law can be 
regarded as facilitative in the sense that it is meant to support the autonomy of private actors.  Thus, 
private law rules ordinarily did not mandate substantive outcomes, but instead aim to facilitate private 
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ordering, such as for example in economic and commercial affairs.  Thus, we might say that contract 
law provides the background default rules for cooperation, while tort law supplies the default rules for 
bearing the risk from interaction between private parties. 
Ladeur points out that the rules of private (as well as public law) were based on what he calls “social 
knowledge”, which together with “conventions and professional practices” was “enshrined in the 
public order at large or in social and technical experience”.4  Thus, from the institutional point of 
view, these rules could be applied by generalist judges (and even juries), who could easily access this 
generalised knowledge, rather than having to rely on some form of specialised or functional 
knowledge.  Lone judges could resolve private law disputes through adjudicative means and without 
the aid of specialised knowledge or decisional machinery, both because of their substance, but also 
because of their “unicentric” nature.5 Fuller described as unicentric those disputes which were 
individualised, localised and self-contained.  By contrast Fuller termed as “polycentric” those disputes 
that have broad and disparate ramifications and ripple effects, on actors other than the parties to the 
dispute, which might be difficult to anticipate and resolve by ordinary private law remedies, such as 
simple injunctions or damages to make good the harmed party. 
Based on the facilitative conception of private law, principles such as individual “autonomy” of 
private individuals or their “freedom” or of the “equality” implied by the horizontal application of the 
rules to all different actors in society are sometimes said to be “foundational tenets” of private law, 
buttressed by philosophical and moral considerations, separate and apart and quite irrespective of any 
functions those principles might serve.6 Yet, one ought not to forget Dewey’s observation that such 
apparently foundational principles become salient at specific junctures as a rallying cry for those 
pursuing particular (functional) objectives (such as the redistribution of power or economic 
opportunity from some prior equilibrium).7 Thus, Wiaecker has argued that the vitality of codes 
depends “on the social and economic value-judgments which inform them”.  While they might appear 
abstract, the codes were “a result of an alliance between bourgeois society and nation-state”.8   
Whatever their source, the foundational tenets of private law such as autonomy, the facilitative rather 
than mandatory nature, and the general horizontal applicability of rules have come under various 
pressures over the course of the 20th century.  A number of such related pressures have been identified 
in the literature. 
One such pressure was the rise of the first regulatory and even more significantly the welfare state, 
which had explicit redistributive objectives coupled with a recognition that the general and faclitative 
nature of private law nonetheless systematically favoured certain groups, such as for instance the 
“repeat-players” in the legal system vis-à-vis one shot players9 or even the adjudicative institutions.  
The redistributive objectives were pursued through various instruments, one of which was a regulatory 
contract law with numerous mandatory provisions protecting various “weaker” parties and thereby 
restricting the freedom to contract.10 This process obviously introduces greater differentiation or 
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9 Galanter, Why The “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, Law and Society Review 
(1974) 9(1), p. 95. 
10 The extent to which this regulatory turn in contract law actually had protective or redistributive effects may be subject to 
considerable doubt, given the sporadic and unpredictable ways in which individuals could access the courts, the ability of 
courts to balance individual considerations (of the case at hand) with unpredictable follow-on effects (on other similar 
cases, such as with mass produced goods or widely available services) as well as the relative cost and length of court 
proceedings. 
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fragmentation within private law, by selecting specific classes of actors (consumers, workers, tenants 
etc.) to whom special rules and protections apply. 
Even more profound differentiation results from the implementation of specialised regulatory regimes 
pursuing specific substantive outcomes, as a response to problems that might be different in different 
industries.  Such regulatory regimes were often targeted to specific sectors of the economy. This is 
because the force of the ordoliberals’ preferred disciplining mechanism that undergirds the view of the 
economy and economic law as autonomous, namely competition, is considerably weakened.  As Adolf 
Berle, the bard of the modern theory of the corporate form, will recognise writing in 1954 “the 
supporters of capitalism have to recognize that the economic check of competition through the market 
has weakened and in some cases disappeared. Yet if that check is re-moved, the modern corporation 
becomes something very close to a center of absolute economic and hence of political power”.11 Thus, 
for example the public service utilities in most European nations were treated as natural monopolies 
subject to ownership and/or strict regulation by the state.   
It was not just the increasing state involvement that diminished the role of private law, but also the 
capacity of courts, as the principal adjudicative institutions, to handle the problems thrown up as legal 
disputes. Ladeur describes a transition from a society of individuals to a “society of organisations”, 
whereby individual relationships to the state and the law are mediated via organisations that dominated 
in production settings, though not only those.12 The organisations are the “repeat-players” who enjoy 
an informational advantage both vis-à-vis their customers and the courts and can systematically use 
that advantage.  In such a setting, the use by the adjudicative institutions of “experience as the 
common societal knowledge basis was no longer sufficient”.  In other words, Ladeur identifies a 
fragmentation between the “continuity of the self-reproduction of general experience distributed over 
the whole of society, and … the advanced knowledge which is generated by the big organisations both 
in the economic and the broader sense (including political parties, unions etc.)”.13 
To be able to regulate comprehensively in an organization-dominated landscape, the state itself must 
pool expertise in bureaucratic structures mimicking the large organisations, to intervene through 
planning, organised decisions and rules that apply prospectively. Through such interventions, to take 
the public utilities as an example, the administration could seek to regulate price charged to final 
customers. Such an approach could be used so as to achieve – or balance - both technical efficiency 
and distributional public policy objectives though such an approach requires the ability to access 
information from deep within the regulated organisations and to remain attentive to the possibility of 
capture and the risk of stifling dynamic change.  While this expansion of the role of the state makes 
public law more important as a control mechanism in society, in effect (as Ladeur recognises) the 
emergence of an expertise-based administration led to an overall effective “reduction of judicial 
control” over substantive decision-making.  This is largely for institutional reasons:  courts and judges 
do not have institutional capabilities to access the knowledge generated either by organised firms or 
organised bureaucracies to engage in substantive oversight or comprehensive planning.14 Given the 
intermediation of relationships through large organisations in all different spheres, disputes tend to 
become polycentric according to Fuller’s taxonomy. Both private law and judicial institutions are thus 
under pressure in such an environment.  Moreover, the emergence of sectoral regulatory agencies and 
regimes leads to a further fragmentation of the once cohesive source of law (whether common law or 
code) and a distancing of the traditional legal institutions (courts) from the substantive regulation of 
conduct. 
                                                     
11 Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Grace & Co. 1954). 
12 Ladeur, Emergence and Evolution. 
13 Ladeur, Emergence and Evolution. 
14 The administrative law discourse in this era focuses on the ideas of deference and controls on procedure, neither of which 
guarantees either the accountability or the efficacy of regulatory decision-making, conceptually or in actual practice. 
Yane Svetiev 
 30 
The important point to note from our perspective is that these processes largely precede the onset of 
European integration and the resulting considerable expansion of European regulatory law. This, 
perhaps unremarkable observation serves as an antidote to two common tendencies, or fallacies, in 
scholarship on the interaction between supranational and national law as identified by Ladeur. One is 
the assumption that globalisation somehow “invades” a “stable domestic administrative or private 
legal system from outside”. This, in turn, leads to a second tendency to both over ascribe responsibility 
to the supranational processes and to romanticise the efficacy and legitimacy of the national legal 
order and institutions. 
European Integration: Going Beyond the State 
It is in this landscape of a growing relative importance of the administration vis-à-vis private law and 
judicial institutions more generally, that European integration begins to take shape “through law” 
thereby influencing national legal orders.  It bears emphasis that since EU level law-making is of 
limited competences, this imposes an additional constraint on the process and the resulting forms of 
the law.  Formally the EU does not have competence over private law, and codes are sometimes 
sentimentally seen as a mark of nationhood and a reflection of domestic social norms and customs or 
culture (despite a considerable degree of similarity of principles across national codes and the fact that 
many jurisdictions used transnational (“imperial”) templates as a basis for codification).  Moreover, in 
virtually every sphere of legal intervention, the EU faced an enforcement challenge given the 
limitations of administrative enforcement institutions at EU level, the inexistence of EU primary 
courts and the relative unfamiliarity of EU law to individuals and legal practitioners in the member 
states. 
Given those limitations, the most commonly used basis for European legislation in the regulatory 
sphere was the integration or creation of the common market through the removal of restrictions on 
cross-border trade.  Given the deregulatory tendencies at the national level produced by early cases 
such as Dassonville and Cassis, this produced an oft-cited need to reregulate at the EU level.  As might 
be expected the EU regulatory efforts initially mimicked the national formats of regulation that they 
were supplanting, such as through the introduction of horizontal regimes for consumer protection, 
including regulatory contract law15 type provisions, such as cooling off periods, rights of cancelation 
and so on. 
The domain of the public service utilities does not appear to be one where one would have expected to 
see much activity by the EU, particularly given the perception of their localised monopoly nature and 
the fact that these were heavily nationally regulated and expected to perform a variety of social 
functions.  However, a number of authors have pointed out, the “output” legitimacy that the EU 
derives from pushing through successful projects that ultimately benefit the citizens of the Member 
States.16  The aim of using the market-making powers to break open national monopolies to 
competition, allow new entry and lower prices for consumers can be viewed through that lens.  
However, the combination of limited competences and the use of the market integration powers can 
produce a tendency to focus on a narrow mandate in designing and implementing the EU regulatory 
intervention.  In particular, the focus would be on the opening up of domestic markets to competition 
or liberalisation of entry either at all levels of supply or through vertical disintegration.  This does not 
mean that the interventions would be light or limited, given that in many of these markets competitive 
structures essentially have to be created.  Nonetheless, the objectives pursued within a legal regime 
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can provide another dimension of autonomy; a narrow mandate regime may tend towards self-
sufficiency so as to achieve that mandate more effectively. 
Yet, the mere fact of privatising or liberalising and opening up these markets does not guarantee that 
the ultimate outcomes will be beneficial to either consumers or other social groups and policy goals 
without regulatory intervention.  There may well be intermediate periods during which regulatory 
intervention to protect consumers or to enable them to learn and to take advantage of more competitive 
structures (to make adequate price comparisons, to switch carriers) would be necessary.  Moreover, in 
the medium to long term there may also be unintended consequences or unpredictable shocks that 
impede the achievement of the objectives of the reforms or that may even require substantial re-
regulation. 
In a number of contributions, Teubner has argued that there is an opening within the increasingly 
globalised environment for private law to re-emerge as an institution (in the broad sense) that plays a 
key role in the achievement of social order, including specifically in the newly privatised sectors.  
This, in his view, would “transform private law itself into the constitutional law of diverse private 
governance regimes which will amount to its far-reaching fragmentation and hybridization”.17 
More specifically, Teubner has suggested that the combination of social or functional “differentiation” 
and processes of globalisation lead to the emergence of autonomous regimes of norm-production that 
are trans-national and quite separate from the state and ordinary politics:   
“The economy, not just the economy but other social sectors such as science, technology, the mass 
media, medicine, education or transport are, on their specific path to globalization, developing a 
massive requirement for norms that is met not by governmental and intergovernmental institutions 
but by themselves in direct action upon the law.  Increasingly, global private regimes are 
producing substantive law without the state, without national legislation or international 
treaties.”18  
Moreover, to be effective, according to Teubner, these private regimes build an institutional support 
frame, including “quasi-private bodies” for dispute resolution, often without prior infrastructure 
supplied by states:  “autonomous global law is increasingly basing itself on its own resources”.19  He 
views these regimes as relatively effective at self-organisation, despite the fact that they are largely 
spontaneous, thereby turning many of the hierarchical aspects of traditional law on their head. 
There are two important underlying ideas that lead to Teubner’s observations cited above.  One is the 
recognition that the emergence of networked architectures, in production, economic and in social 
relationships enables channels of communication that connect normative communities, whereby these 
are no longer mediated through the state or state institutions20 or other formal hierarchies.  Ladeur 
notes that the emergence of the “society of networks” is a “reaction to a further rise in complexity of 
the knowledge base of society”, given “the importance of information as the principal resource of 
production” and the fact that technological knowledge “is no longer concentrated in stable expert 
communities, but is distributed in overlapping project-oriented ‘epistemic communities’ which 
combine general and specific knowledge production in hybrid forms of communication”.  
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A second and related recognition is that this transformation in the “knowledge base of society” 
enhances the capacity of private actors, economic and social, to self-organise in order to solve 
common problems and thereby create normative communities.  Moreover they can and they do do so 
across state borders so that such communities can be sources of global normativity even in the absence 
of a world state or relevant international organizations or treaties.  Since these are private “regimes” 
unmediated by the state, this form of self-organisation could provide the basis for a renaissance of an 
autonomy-based (and autonomy-protecting) private law,21 thus far sidelined by the growing 
intervention by the state through hierarchical action and expertise-based agencies. 
Teubner envisages that private law will need to “undergo massive transformation”22 in the process of 
recapturing its role as a tool for facilitating self-organisation in the new society of networks.  First, the 
law must recognise the interrelatedness of relationships in networked regimes, rather than treating 
them as a multiplicity of bilateral arrangements.23 Secondly, he suggests that private law should 
facilitate the self-constitution of these regimes with the appropriate mixture of a “spontaneous” and an 
“organized” sector,24 but also “develop criteria for their legal review”.25  Finally, and perhaps more 
controversially, in performing this role, law must maintain the autonomy of the various “spheres” to 
pursue their own “rationality”,26 while at the same time maintaining the law’s own autonomy.  While 
this does not mean law should completely ignore, or not seek to incorporate, the knowledge generated 
in such systems, nonetheless it must do so on its own terms and within the pursuit of its own 
rationality.27 
Private Law and European Institutions 
While not stated explicitly in the works cited, traditional (though reformed) private law could be the 
legal order that plays this facilitative function. Teubner’s views have triggered a rich research 
programme in private regulatory regimes, examining the tools through which private entities self-
organise in regimes that regulate their interactions and the mechanisms through which they enforce 
such arrangements.28  
There are two variables that are either missing from or require further elaboration in the foregoing 
discussion.  One is the question of guarding the public interest, since the private regulatory regimes 
can easily be subverted to the interests of some or all of the participants.  Another aspect that requires 
further exploration is the role of supranational institutions, both administrative and legal, such as the 
EU, both vis-à-vis the private regimes and vis-à-vis the private law that constitutes and regulates them. 
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Specifically, Teubner does not appear to envisage any explicit role for the institutions of the EU or 
European law in the process of facilitating the self-organisation of these trans-border networks of 
actors.  Presumably, based on the idea that the regimes are capable of more or less spontaneous self-
organisation, at best any role of the EU institutions is unnecessary.  At worst it could be harmful since 
it might reintroduce (supranational) hierarchy, which might ensnare the spontaneous processes, 
rigidify them and instrumentalise them to its own purposes (or its own “rationality”). 
Yet considering the appropriate role of EU institutions, it is worth observing that the logic of linking 
the capabilities of actors in network architectures is recently manifested in the trend towards the 
creation of European networks of regulatory bodies across a number of important regulated economic 
sectors.29 Perhaps an early example of this practice can be found in the European Competition 
Network (ECN), which was formalised as a network in 2004, though reflected practices that had 
developed previously.  The ECN was set up as part of the Modernization process for competition 
enforcement, which decentralised enforcement responsibility for EU law to the authorities of the 
Member States.  As Ottow has pointed out, this model or approach has been extended in other sectors, 
including financial services, insurance, communications, energy, consumer protection and others.  The 
common design appears to be to link the member state authorities, as well as the Commission, in a 
common discursive and/or enforcement network, rather than to completely centralise supervision and 
enforcement through a classical hierarchical European agency.30   
There may well be legal competence as well as political constraints in going down the path of forming 
a European agency in various sectors. Whatever the reason for the choice, this approach towards 
building regulatory architectures has resulted in a range of hybrid or “mixed administration” forms 
whereby responsibilities are “shared to differing degrees between the European Commission, new 
European regulators and national regulatory authorities”.31  The European regulatory networks follow 
the logic of the networked linking of capabilities of actors across borders. In other words, one could 
argue that a regime is created which links the entities that seek to promote and protect the public 
interest in the broadest sense. 
Importantly, the national agencies that form the networks operate both in the domestic and the 
European plane, sometimes (as in the case of the ECN) they are charged with enforcing both EU and 
national law.  Two crucial factors in understanding the potential functioning and the outcomes of these 
networked regulatory regimes in the EU are their “constitution” and their relationship with other 
stakeholders in the sectors that they regulate, including the regulated entities, customers in general and 
those with specific characteristics (vulnerable, disabled etc.), labour, groups affected by environmental 
pollution or organised to pursue environmental goals.  
Regulatory Network Constitutions: Formal and Informal 
By the constitution of the networks I mean the constituting document of the network, the way in which 
it defines the mandate of the specific network (and the policy or public interest they are meant to 
pursue) and the relationships between the network members, as well as the relationship with the 
European Commission and other EU or national institutions.  In considering those “constitutive” 
issues, attention needs to be paid of course not only at the constitutive document, but also the informal 
dynamics and practices that emerge and perhaps become stabilised within the agency networks.  
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Within the Network 
To begin with the relationship between the EU Commission and national agencies. Formally, none of 
the sectoral networks appear to follow a typical hierarchical model in which either the network or the 
Commission has the power to determine or to reverse the action of a national agency.  Instead, they are 
discursive fora that aim to stimulate cooperation between agencies in their efforts to implement the 
law. 
Even within network that have a degree of centralisation in the hands of the Commission, this 
discursive principle appears to be important.  For instance, in the ECN, the Commission can relieve 
national authorities of the responsibility for a particular case and take up the case itself (Art 11(6)).  
However, such a decision could require justification before the Advisory Committee on 
Anticompetitive Practices and Dominant Positions (Art 14(7)).  Case allocation is an important 
determinant of the network dynamics in an enforcement network such as the ECN as well as in setting 
policy direction.  On the issue of allocation, within the determination is based on a flexible standard of 
the authority best placed to decide a case, which despite its flexibility has not lead to considerable 
disputes and turf battles. 
Within the ECN members “are subject to an obligation to offer persuasive justifications for their 
actions and positions” to other network members; “further deliberation, not hierarchical action 
provides the only dispute resolution mechanism”.32 However, given the privileged role of the 
Commission both historically and within the ECN, the informal internal dynamics may paint a 
different story. 
In the ECN Regulation, a requirement is imposed on national actors (agencies or courts) not take 
decisions contrary to or conflicting with a decision of the Commission (Art 16).  Again to the extent 
this is meant to prevent the imposition of conflicting injunctions on undertakings in specific 
circumstances, it makes sense.  Beyond that, however, it simply invites the ordinary tool of 
distinguishing: in other words, offering a persuasive justification for the course pursued which also 
offers an explanation of any apparent departures from prior practice.33 
Apart from the formal rules of interaction within the regulatory networks, another key consideration 
are the informal dynamics in the actual operation of the networks both when deciding cases and 
formulating policy or filling out the details of legislation in general terms.  We might call this the 
“informal” constitution: are the networks and their members delegates of the Commission aiming to 
propagate a monolithic view?  Or are they being used to stimulate and encourage divergent 
approaches, so as to promote collective learning from pursuing different reasonable courses. 
The informal dynamics are important because of the dominant position of the Commission in some 
regulatory settings due to its past functions or due to its relative capacity, but also due to predilections 
for mimicry and copying, the public tendency for maintaining surface level consensus.34 Such 
dynamics cannot always be captured by looking at the formal rules of engagement of networked 
regulators (for instance, if employment with the Commission is perceived as prestigious, national 
officials may be of the view that their prospects of joining the Commission staff would be promoted 
by manifesting agreement). 
On the one hand, pursuing a monolithic vision enhances the likelihood of achieving it, but increases 
greatly the resulting damage if the original vision was wrong or incomplete.  On the other hand, as 
Steinmo has argued, variation in the characteristics of actors and their settings in the various member 
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states would likely lead them to choose from different menus of policy responses.35 However, to the 
extent that there are general pressures for conformity, such an outcome may require a demonstrated 
commitment to allowing diversity by the actors present.  Moreover, such an approach may be 
inconsistent with having a narrow mandate regime: there may be one best way to pursue a single 
objective, if it is being pursued without regard to the constraints imposed by other policy goals or by 
interaction with neighbouring regimes and systems.36   
Relationship with EU Courts 
In two important respects, the decision-making within the regulated sectors, both of a regulatory (rule-
making) nature and where it impacts and restructures a horizontal relationship between private parties, 
has been significantly isolated from court review even at the EU level.   
First, as already alluded to, the constitutive arrangements for the various regulatory networks 
ordinarily do not appear to envisage disputes between network members being referred to judicial 
review by the EU courts.  To the contrary, these networks to some extent embody the principle of peer 
review, even if it is sometimes imperfectly implemented.  
Secondly, even where regulatory decision-making impacts or seriously restructures private party 
relationships, the tendency away from court review can be observed through a preference for non-
adversary resolution of disputes.  One notable aspect of enforcement practice by the Commission in 
the exercise of its powers under the new Competition Regulation has been its use of commitment 
decisions under Art. 9.37 This provision allows the parties following the Commission’s expression of 
concerns with respect to the competitive impact of conduct, in an administrative conversation with the 
Commission, to restructure their own economic relationship so as to address or attenuate those 
concerns.  In a 2006 case, one undertaking (DeBeers) provided a commitment to the Commission to 
cease purchases from another undertaking (ALROSA) pursuant to a 2001 contract and a preceding 
purchasing relationship dating from 1959.38 ALROSA, who was faced with essentially a breach of the 
2001 contract, a termination of a long term purchasing relationship and the need to build an alternative 
effective distribution system sought judicial review of the commitment decisions from the EU courts.  
Emphasising the “voluntary” nature of this type of resolution, whereby the party proposed the 
commitment to the Commission, the ECJ has opted for minimal judicial review of this increasingly 
common type of resolution mode.  The Court in refusing to take up the invitation to exercise judicial 
review in such a case, declines to take on an important private law function to essentially decide 
whether it was appropriate for DeBeers to breach its purchase contract to address the Commission’s 
concerns, subject to a three year “transitional period … necessary to build an efficient distribution 
system” by ALROSA. 
One of the areas in which the Commission has used this flexible power to affect private relationships 
and reshape markets is in the utilities sectors.  Specifically, the Commission has used the Art. 9 
procedure on a number of occasions to intervene in the energy sector. In one case, the Commission 
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through a negotiated Art. 9 procedure, obtained commitments from E.ON, a key player in the 
electricity generation and wholesale market in Germany, to divest itself of about one fifth of its 
generation capacity.39  This approach has left the Commission open to the charge that it is pursuing 
wider policy objectives, such as liberalization of the energy market, through the latitude allowed in the 
competition mechanisms, particularly in light of the “German government’s opposition towards the 3 
energy liberalization package” and in particular of “ownership unbundling”.40  A similar procedure has 
been used by the Commission with respect to the unbundling of RWE’s gas distribution network.41  
No doubt, the ECJ would have been aware of the Commission’s extensive use of the Art. 9 procedure 
to essentially restructure essential utility markets at the time of its decision in Al Rosa, yet it did not 
claim a power of review for the EU courts of such decisions, even in a complaint by concerned third 
parties (rather than the party offering the commitments itself). 
Defining the Mandate  
The question of how the mandate of EU regulatory networks and actors is defined is quite important 
issue when considering the relationship between European regulation and national private law and 
institutions.  EU regulation has often been justified formally and based substantively on the criterion 
of creating the internal market.  Even competition law enforcement from its very outset was largely 
subservient to the internal market dimension and has continued to be so for much of its history in the 
EU.  Thus, not only did EU regulatory regimes favour competition, but in fact they favoured one 
specific type of competition, that is cross-border competition. This, in turn, means focusing on 
liberalisation (i.e. removal of government restrictions on entry to an industry) or unbundling so as to 
introduce additional scope and entry points for foreign operators.   
A narrowing of the mandate can of course be one way in which an EU regulatory regime can become 
autonomous or “self-sufficient” in the sense that it is charged with pursuing a focused limited 
objective: removing barriers to cross-border competition, while other objectives are pursued through 
other EU interventions (e.g. consumer protection) or national private law. At the same time, however, 
this may reduce the scope for learning from diversity42 and from the productive, even conflict-
generating interaction of different policy instruments and objectives.43 Even more importantly, 
narrowing the mandate to focus regulatory activity on intermediate policy goals can sometimes 
obscure the relationship between regulatory interventions and the ultimate outcomes that are of 
interest presumably both to policy-makers, to economic actors and to citizens. 
The case of the competition network discussed earlier is important in this context, both because it is a 
policy in which competence at the EU level is undisputed and in which the Commission has 
traditionally played a dominant role.  Moreover, it is a policy area that cuts across all of the other 
sectoral regimes:  as part of the ECN there are working groups around the various sectors, such as 
energy, telecommunications, financial services, transport, food, pharmaceuticals etc. and there is an 
emergent view that sectoral regulation should be undertaken on the basis of “antitrust principles”.  In 
at least one of the member states, the Netherlands, there is an on-going move to combine all of the 
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sectoral regulators of the networked utilities (telecommunications, energy, transport) together with the 
competition authority into a single agency.  This horizontal focus on competition may undermine the 
self-sufficiency of the different vertical regimes from each other.  At the same time, however, it may 
underscore the view of the autonomy of the mandate (or objectives) being pursued through EU 
intervention. 
Focusing on the energy sectoral regulation regime, the objectives of the creation of the internal energy 
market are said to be “to deliver real choice for all consumers of the European Union, be they citizens 
or businesses, new business opportunities and more cross-border trade, so as to achieve efficiency 
gains competitive prices, and higher standards of service, and to contribute to security of supply and 
sustainability”.44  Thus, from the perspective of consumers, Lavrijssen, Bordei and Kooij distinguish 
three principal interests “affordable energy prices achieved by effective competition; sustainable 
development of energy production, transport, and consumption and security of supply”.45 The Agency 
for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is a “connection between the Commission and the 
NRAs” and aims to promote “cooperation between national regulatory authorities, within a formalized 
context”.46  Yet ACER’s tasks and powers “have the potential of promoting and/ or affecting the level 
of investments in cross-border energy infrastructure, the promotion of cross-border trade and the 
competition on the wholesale markets”.47  In other words, they are more imminently connected to the 
intermediate goal of the completion of an integrated market, and their effect on the promotion and 
protection of the identified interests of final consumers is more “indirect”.48 Wholesale competition 
may or may not lead to affordable final prices, depending on both cost changes and the competitive 
structures in retail markets.  Investments in cross-border infrastructure may improve reliability of 
supply while increasing reliance on current fuel sources (e.g. gas), while investments in renewable 
generation sources may promote sustainability, environmental goals and reliability of supply.   
Relationships with other Stakeholders in the Regulatory Process: An Entry Point for 
Private Law? 
Apart from the constitution and the relationships within the networked regulatory regimes and other 
governmental or EU actors, the process of elaborating and enforcing EU rules also involves receiving 
and appropriating input from various stakeholders in the regulatory setting, each potentially bearing a 
different perspective on the regulatory problem.  Thus, in describing the role of ACER, Lavrijssen et 
al note that in the process of regulation, supervision, creation of industry codes ACER must work 
closely with “the new European transmission bodies; the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE) and the European Network Transmission System Operators for 
Gas (ENTSOG)”, which are the cooperation platforms at EU level for transmission system operators49 
as well as consulting “other relevant stakeholders”.  But of course, the multiplicity of rationalities of 
various social groups or movements can also be manifested in different ways, such as Lindahl’s 
example of the “occupation of the Brent Spar oil storage and tanker loading buoy by Green Peace 
activists, and the associated consumer boycott of Shell service stations”.50 
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Therefore, the second key issue to consider is how to integrate these various perspectives in 
formulating and protecting the public interest in general? 
In elaborating the law’s role in structuring the “relationship of the subsystems to each other”,51 
Teubner has argued for private law to become “responsive to a plurality of diverse ‘private’ 
autonomies in civil society”.52 The “social spheres of autonomy” are spontaneous and self-regulated 
collectives, which interact with each other and precisely such mutual interaction constrains each 
regime’s pursuit of its own rationality.   
“[T]he main attention of global law would then have to be directed towards underpinning the 
duality of social autonomy in the subsystems, i.e. a mutual control dynamic of spontaneous sector 
and organized sector…”53  
In some way, this appears to be an attempt to mimic the ordoliberal disciplining mechanism of arms-
length competition in a world where arms-length relationships are no longer possible either because of 
the size of the organizations involved or because of the need to cooperate. By maintaining their 
autonomy both from the economy and from institutionalised politics, the separate social spheres can 
exercise a private constraint on economic actors in the newly privatised public services: 
“Here, in the resistance of social practices to their new economic regime is the source of all kinds 
of new quasi-political conflicts which now take place within the ‘private’ spheres. A good 
indicator for this change is the growing intensity of political fights between regulatory agencies, 
consumer groups, regulated companies and their shareholders which we are experiencing 
today…”54 
Teubner views such conflicts being reflected, at least in part, in private litigation and he foresees an 
active role of private law in the resolution of these emergent conflicts in the newly privatized settings.  
But to be able to perform this task successfully, in his view, both private law doctrines and procedures 
may need to change: 
“For the future of private law it is crucial that not just its doctrinal-conceptual structures are 
prepared for such conflicts. Also different litigation procedures, among other rules of standing for 
groups, collective representation, multilateralization of the adversary two-party process, and 
elements of public interest litigation, would need to be introduced to make private law responsive 
to the new conflictuality caused by privatization itself.”55  
However, in managing or mediating such conflict, according to Teubner, private law too must 
maintain its autonomy both at a conceptual (doctrinal?) and procedural level, to be able to play this 
mediating role.56  In particular, as a consequence of social fragmentation a “multitude of social sectors 
require a multitude of perspectives of self-description” and the resulting “multiplicity of social 
perspectives” needs to be “simultaneously reflected” or “translated” into the law.57 This idea of 
“translation” into private law he has described elsewhere as “an autonomous legal reconstruction of 
normative social orientations” and a “legal mode of dealing with the collision between different social 
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rationalities”.58 Lobel, drawing upon Teubner’s ideas, has spoken of the emergent role of law as one of 
“orchestration”.59 
Private Law – Orchestrator or Concertmaster?  
In considering the role of private law in the process of European integration, it is worth noting that 
national private law and national courts do not appear to have emerged as principal actors in the 
process of either ensuring discipline or coordinating various functionally differentiated autonomous 
regimes. 
In addition, as part of the re-regulation of essential service provision in the EU, there may even be 
tendencies to reduce further the reliance on national private law courts even for purposes of dispute 
resolution in regulated sectors.  For instance, there is a push to implement alternative dispute 
resolution schemes, whereby all kinds of consumer related disputes would be channeled through to 
non-court fora, including online platforms for dispute resolution.  At national level, the independent 
sectoral regulators provide information on out-of-court dispute resolution procedures and sometimes 
provide the (sector-specific) dispute resolution services themselves.60 While there may well be a 
preference by parties not to channel their disputes via courts, it is also appears that EU intervention 
facilitates, and even encourages non-court venues for dispute resolution.61 
If this does indeed signal a wider trend away from the use of national courts as dispute-resolution 
institutions, it also makes it less likely that private law will be the institution through which we will 
mediate the conflicts that ultimately define the public interest. Which in turn leads us to the question 
why me might observe a trend away from relying on the courts.   
EU as a Vertically Integrated Regime 
One possible answer might be that the interposition of the EU as a supranational hierarchy 
encouraging such a trend is denying this new role of private law.  In other words, the EU is following 
the logic of vertical integration in the implementation of regulatory law, even where it wishes to rely 
on the potentially powerful horizontal direct effect between private parties as an enforcement tool.62 If 
both law-making and law enforcement proceeds through integrated (i.e., EU) institutions, it is more 
likely to be seamless and less likely to be impeded by the local peculiarities or interests. 
The EU (and in particular the Commission) might find it easier to refashion national administrative 
agencies into “European” ones through close engagement in various European networks.  If the 
national agencies “internalize” the EU mandate and perspective, they can become delegates of the 
Commission even in cases where the Commission does not engage in heavy oversight.63 National 
courts, by contrast, are a more challenging site for intervention for EU institutions, such as the 
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Commission.  The sites for interaction with national court judiciary are more limited. This is to a large 
extent because of the principle of independence (autonomy) of the judicial institutions, which forms 
part of the constitutional ideology of all the Member States of the EU.  As a result, EU intervention in 
the national courts must always proceed more cautiously. Despite the heterogeneity in the 
organization, make-up and even general quality of judicial institutions across the different MS, the EU 
formally treats the 27 legal orders as equal or at least equivalent.  There may be softer approaches 
through programmes for “judicial education”, particularly in the more specialized areas of competition 
or sectoral regulation, but again the formal independence of judicial institutions may make it difficult 
to compare outcomes or to assess the efficacy of such education programmes. 
If intervention in national judicial institutions is difficult and if the establishment of a comprehensive 
system of European courts impossible (for political reasons), the European legal order may be more 
effective if it becomes self-sufficient even at the level of enforcement and dispute resolution.  Private 
parties can be given EU rights vis-à-vis other private actors and those rights can be enforced through 
European dispute resolution platforms. 
But this “vertical integration” perspective, namely that European regulatory objectives are likely to be 
impeded, both by less than seamless communication and by hold-up, if channeled through national 
private law courts, may in fact be overstated for a number of reasons. 
First, national courts were key protagonists in the emergence of EU law as we know it today.  Most 
key cases establishing the foundational principles of EU law resulted from preliminary references 
from national courts.  National courts fairly enthusiastically took up the invitation extended to them 
through the preliminary reference procedure.64  This provision was a mere “invitation” to national 
judicatures, precisely because there is no judicial review or other procedure that can force national 
courts to make a reference and there are many escape routes through which to avoid such a 
reference.65  Even after the apparently extensive expansion of the scope of EU law in sometimes quite 
strong and unexpected ECJ rulings, MS courts have continued to make preliminary references to the 
EU courts. 
Secondly, in a number of fields, the Commission has sought to include actions in private law courts as 
an aspect of enforcement of EU regulatory law in a number of areas, including consumer protection 
law and competition law.  The Commission’s push for the expansion of rights of action in antitrust 
cases in private litigation before national courts was a reason for one of the recent major political 
conflicts between itself and the MS governments.66 
Yet in other fields, the regulatory purpose that is being pursued by the EU intervention may well be 
frustrated if channeled through formalised court proceedings, because they aim to produce quick local 
(i.e. on the spot) problem solving.  One example might be the rights granted to airline passengers vis-
à-vis airlines in cases of delays and cancelation.67 The aim of such a regulatory regime would be to 
offer speedy arrangements for alternate travel and for the intervening period, not to stimulate 
litigation.  Such a regulatory purpose might be relevant in a variety of consumer protection contexts. 
 
Finally, in recent times we have seen innovative ways through which the Commission has sought to 
establish a more deliberative, or collaborative, relationship with national courts in areas where there is 
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significant EU law intervention.  Thus, Article 15(1) of the Modernization Regulation for competition 
enforcement (1/2003) provides that “courts of the Member States may ask the Commission to transmit 
to them information … or its opinion on questions concerning the application of the Community 
competition rules.”  In addition, under Article 15 (3) the Commission can act on its own initiative, 
“[w]here the coherent application of [Art 81 or 82] so requires,” to “submit written observations to 
courts of Member States” and also to make oral submissions with the permission of the local court.  
There is some evidence68 that national courts have understood this as a relationship not of 
subservience to the Commission, but as one of dialogue.69 
The Limits of Law’s Capacity for Translation 
To the extent that national private law and institutions are not reemerging as key players in the new 
environment, this may not have anything to do with their being sidelined by EU regulatory law.  
Instead, in the world of functional and social differentiation as well as epistemic fragmentation, the 
traditional private (or public for that matter) law institutions may be limited by their own capacity to 
play the adaptive role of “orchestration”.  Precisely the “autonomy” and the “rationality” of law and 
legal institutions may stand in the way of traditional private law playing such a role.  The need for 
closure, the logic of procedural formality (as opposed to proceduralisation of problem-solving), the 
translation and subdivision of problems presented into questions that can be answered in a binary way 
(e.g. yes/no), the limited set of judicial remedies; all of these might impede the law’s capacity to 
mediate social conflict and translate different social rationalities and public purposes. 
The story of courts incorporating the knowledge generated by other systems of knowledge is not 
necessarily a happy one.  In the context of the adoption by US courts of economic analysis in antitrust 
cases, Lopatka and Page have argued that courts rely only to a limited extent on expert assistance in 
order to acquire the economic knowledge necessary to resolve antitrust disputes presented to them.70  
Instead, under the logic of preserving the law’s autonomy or rationality, courts are said to develop 
“economic authority” through an unstructured method of “pragmatically examining the scholarly 
literature in the context of existing case law and adopting the most persuasive and plausible accounts” 
available at the time of decision.71 Lopatka and Page explain that this process of selection is 
influenced by “intuitions”, “social visions”, and “ideologies”72 of the judiciary, as well as legal 
process considerations about the institutional capacity of courts to process highly fact specific expert 
testimony.73 The expert knowledge that courts have to incorporate is itself partial and likely to change 
over time. Yet following its own rationality (such as for example, the notion of the balance of proof 
for a proposition) the law ordinarily will seek a level of certainty and coherence that eludes knowledge 
communities, particularly in cases where the environment is unstable and rapidly changing.   
As a result, the translated “economic authority” considered by Lopatka and Page, is recoded in legal-
procedural categories of a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficiency or a summary judgment 
granted based on an assessment that the available evidence shows no substantial or material dispute.  
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Such an approach forecloses “further inquiry to both develop new learning and to incorporate it into 
decision-making”.74 
While one might object that the foregoing discussion is based on evidence from the US, arguably it is 
quite salient in the present context for a number of reasons.  First, in the US tradition there has been a 
much greater openness towards the reliance on courts for the resolution of social problems (including 
in private disputes, such as the antitrust disputes on which the above observations are based).  
Moreover, there has also been a relatively high level of trust in the integrity and capacity of courts at 
least at the US federal level.  Secondly, US law and judicial doctrine is said to be relatively open to the 
incorporation of “extra-legal” knowledge and nowhere has this been the case more so than with 
respect to economic knowledge in antitrust cases over the past few decades. Thirdly, the above 
example is based on an attempt to incorporate only a single rationality into judicial decision-making, 
namely upholding only the value of competition, and this understood very narrowly as allocative 
efficiency (or short run effects on consumer prices).  In fact, in the context of antitrust cases, US 
courts have emphatically disclaimed any possibility that in the context of antitrust cases, judges could 
pursue other social or policy objectives, apart from competition, precisely because these different 
dimensions of the public interest may appear ex ante incommensurate and due to legitimacy concerns 
about the judiciary performing such substantive balancing.  We might suspect that any attempt at 
translation into law of multiple (and incomplete) social rationalities would be all the more challenging. 
This might give us reason to doubt the capacity of private law and its traditional dispute resolution 
institutions to both guarantee the autonomy of various regimes in the pursuit of their rationality or 
mandate, while at the same time “orchestrating” them into a way that balances their various 
contributions to the common or public interest. 
Conclusions and Ways Forward: Recapturing Private Law 
While Teubner’s reemphasis on autonomy is an important shift and represents part of a growing 
literature that entertains considerable doubt in traditional legal and administrative tools of law-making 
and law enforcement, advocating instead for alternative mechanisms that can provide a way of 
(re)accessing the deeply local knowledge of parties interdependent and interlinked in networked 
architectures, so that it can be used as an input into social and economic innovations.  Private 
governance regimes are certainly one way of accessing such knowledge and structuring collaboration 
among interdependent parties.  However, in light of the foregoing discussion about the limits of law, 
the question still remains:  how to ensure that private networked regimes are not subverted entirely to 
the (short run) private interests of (some or all) their participants and what role, if any, for law and 
legal institutions? 
One response might be that even if national private law does not rise to the occasion, European courts 
might step in to play this role.  Yet European judicial institutions are subject to similar constraints as 
national judiciaries and even other ones. Thus, European courts are even more distant from private 
actors and have to decide across many different contexts to be able to effectively elicit knowledge and 
translate or recode it into law that then has to also be applied across many different settings. The ECJ’s 
refusal to claim a more searching mandate of review for the negotiated resolution of competition 
complaints by the Commission may be treated as one manifestation of self-doubt of the European 
courts in their capacity to perform such a function.   
Nonetheless, the ECJ’s decisions in cases such as Viking/Laval point to a more modest role that 
European courts could play in seeking to include various dimensions of the public interest,75 neither 
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by complete re-judicialisation nor by an attempt to mediate or translate different social rationalities 
into law.  The decision recognizes that the EU has “not only an economic, but also a social purpose”76 
and as such serves to emancipate social actors by giving them a seat at the table vis-à-vis economic 
operators who have benefited from European negative integration. As Azoulai has recognized, the 
“practical problem” relates to the “technical methods” for realizing it.77 But the ECJ does not anoint 
itself as the actor that mediates between these different purposes across different context, turning the 
tables onto the private parties: they cannot act to take drastic self-help or national legal remedies 
without taking into account the interests of the other parties involved.78 But this, in itself, may be 
insufficient – just as judicial institutions have a limited capacity of translation, they also have a limited 
capacity to engage in broad oversight and monitoring.  Moreover, EU court interventions are sporadic. 
Both of these limitations lead to the problem of how to ensure that the possibilities created by the 
emancipation of different aspects of the public interests are being taken up and effectuated by private 
actors? 
 
A second response might be that the involvement of the administration would be sufficient to fulfill 
the function of guarding the broader interests of the public; after all we saw earlier from the discussion 
of the ACER example that the administration often needs to collaborate with private actor networks to 
be able to perform its regulatory functions.79 In addition in the EU, administrations are increasingly 
networked, they can rely on each other’s capabilities and they can also engage in learning from each 
other. They also increasingly exercise a review function over each other’s activities. 
One concern might be that there may be tendencies to re-establish the logic of hierarchy in the 
networked administration regimes. Rigid hierarchies are both an inadequate response to the 
environment and are easier to capture. They may in fact be impossible as a response,80 but this does 
not exclude the possibility that mimicking the logic of hierarchy may be present in administrative 
networks. 
There is some reason to believe that this is not likely to be the case. As Lavrijssen et al point out, 
while the Commission can treat the network codes developed by ACER as recommendations only, in 
practice the Commission is likely to adopt them given that their preparation requires “extended 
technical knowledge” unavailable to the Commission, based on deep consultation which the 
Commission would be unable to replicate.81 Yet these are not designed (in the sense of fully specified) 
regulatory systems and they cannot be, which often implies reliance on ad hock provisional 
arrangements.  By good fortune, this may result in an effective solution, but this is not necessarily 
going to be the case always.82   
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A further concern from over-reliance upon the administration is that of capture.  While a networked 
multi-level administration would be more difficult to capture, this is not impossible.  But a subtler, and 
somewhat analogous problem has already been alluded to earlier. This is the problem of the narrow 
definition of the mandate of administrative networked regimes,83 or more specifically the interest or 
interests they seek to promote, including a focus on intermediate goals rather than the ultimate 
objectives of policy.  Sometimes this can be the unintended consequence of excessive fragmentation, 
whereby certain policies are assigned to different regulatory instruments.   
Such an approach can have the effect of restricting the interests that fall within the purview of the 
regulation and the regulatory regime:84  by defining the boundaries of intervention, they exclude a 
particular group or perspective from the decision-making processes. 
In such circumstances, both the generalist jurisdiction, the breadth of the rules and principles, as well 
as the proximity of national private law institutions can serve a useful counterpoint function for 
national actors.  They provide a place to which those unrepresented in the administrative “mandate” 
can turn in order to seek to redefine “in whose name” and for whose interests the regime acts.85 The 
story of the consumers turning to the local courts in Hamburg to seek relief from the ultimate effects 
of the gas liberalization at EU level may provide an example of such a use of the national institutions, 
in a situation where they can neither impose their will upon, nor be ignored by EU actors. 
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THE LAW OF THE MARKET SOCIETY: 
A POLANYIAN ACCOUNT OF ITS CONFLICTS AND DYNAMICS 
Sabine Frerichs*1 
Introduction: Taking Polanyi to the Law 
The aim of this contribution is to elucidate the law of the market society, its inherent conflicts and 
dynamics, and in doing so, to put the conflicts-law approach (developed by Christian Joerges and his 
team) in a Polanyian perspective. What follows from this basic commitment, or commission, to the 
work of Karl Polanyi – namely, “The Great Transformation” (1957 [1944]) – is the two-fold need to 
adjust his approach to the “postnational constellation” (Habermas 2001) and to enrich it, at the same 
time, with legal categories. In other words, we have to turn from “nineteenth century civilization” and 
its ultimate “collapse” in World War II to the market society of the (early) twenty-first century and its 
inherent conflict patterns. Moreover, while Polanyi did not elaborate much on the legal dimension of 
the political-economic developments dubbed “The Great Transformation”, the elective affinity 
between his work and the conflicts-law approach, which is suggested by Joerges and Falke (2011), 
requires carving out the law of the market society - both now and then. In light of these somewhat 
overstretched ambitions, two disclaimers seem in place: Being a sociologist and not a historian, my 
account of historical developments of the law of the market society is ‘second-hand’ and very 
selective. Furthermore, as I am no lawyer (or legal theorist) either but approach the law from a 
sociological point of view, I will take the tension “Between Facts and Norms” (Habermas 1996) as 
given, and make no effort to resolve it. Nevertheless, I hope that the following experiment will open 
some avenues for discussion across the disciplines. 
The cross-disciplinary challenge already begins within the sociology of law, which is a sub-discipline 
both of sociology and jurisprudence. As such, it is split in its identity and divided in its loyalties. But 
this is not what Polanyi’s work is about. His main concern is not in the intricacies of law and society 
but in the “interior” relationship of economy and society (Krippner and Alvarez 2007). While he can 
thus be considered a classic of economic sociology, references to his name are – despite a rising 
interest - still a curiosity in legal sociology. Nonetheless, there is no blame in taking Polanyi back to 
the law since this is where he once started from: as a doctor of law (Múcsi 1990). However, it is less 
his biographical background than his ‘holistic’ approach, which also qualifies Polanyi as a pioneer of 
the “economic sociology of law” – if not actually, so at least potentially (Swedberg 2003; Frerichs 
2009). Polanyi’s work forms part of the classical, historical tradition in sociology, which aims at the 
‘whole’ of society (Frerichs 2012, forthcoming). Accordingly, modern Western societies are collective 
entities - or complex institutional constellations - which developed in a certain space and time and can 
be compared with other, traditional or non-Western, societies. They encompass and ‘integrate’ not 
only a vast number of individuals but also a variety of differentiated social spheres. Ideally speaking, a 
‘holistic’ account of modern society is thus historically and globally comparative, puts individuals in 
their social context, and highlights the interdependencies of different social spheres. The latter aspect 
is emphasized in the economic sociology of law, whose subject-matter is, namely, law and economy in 
society. 
In the following, we will, first, have a closer look at Polanyi’s writings, and notably focus on what he 
describes as the institutional and ideological preconditions of “nineteenth century civilization”, which 
is the prototype of the modern “market society”. Drawing on Polanyi’s historical treatise “The Great 
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Transformation” as well as a shorter, conceptual piece entitled “The Economy as Instituted Process” 
(2001 [1957]), I will offer two different readings or reconstructions of the law of the market society, 
which is hidden in Polanyi’s account. However, what is ‘hidden’ is not so much the law as such than 
law as a sociological category. In the analytical framework offered by Polanyi this is notably law as an 
institution (among others) which “institutes” the economy, and law as a “commodity” (among others) 
which is subject to market forces. These two different readings lay the ground for mapping the conflict 
which is inherent to the law of the market society inasmuch as the law is also constitutive of the 
market society. 
Moving from law’s conflict to conflicts-law – and, notably, conflicting ideals of market law - we will, 
then, engage in a discourse on the modern history of market law from “nineteenth century civilization” 
to contemporary society, that is, the market society of the (early) twenty-first century. Combining 
different voices from different fields of law - which nevertheless seem to share a somewhat ‘holistic’ 
approach to the law and its history – a historical narrative will emerge, which offers a legal (or socio-
legal) supplement to, and update of, Polanyi’s approach. In line with the cited literature, I will 
schematically distinguish between three stages, or generations, of modern market law: its universalist 
origins in the nineteenth century, its national closings in the twentieth century, and its transnational 
openings in the twenty-first century. 
Framed in Polanyian terms, these developments exemplify law’s great transformation. Inasmuch as 
law’s inherent tensions are thereby perpetuated, the continuous transformation of the law contributes 
to the “re-formation” of the market society (Streeck 2009). While this is already an outlook on the 
conclusion, the introduction should end on a more promising note: The story to be told in the 
remainder of this article will - perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively - link three Karls (Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny, Karl Marx, Karoly Polanyi) and two Kennedies (Duncan and David). Whatever their 
respective credits and authorities, all blame remains of course with the weakest link in the chain, 
which is the present author. 
1. The Law of the Market Society: Two Readings 
In the present section, we will go back to the work of Karl Polanyi, whose writings have already 
inspired a volume on the “potential” of – a reconceived – conflicts-law in “transnational markets” 
(Joerges and Falke 2011). My aim is still to find the law in the market society that Polanyi describes in 
his book and that continues to exist, in more or less contained forms, until today (Frerichs 2011b). 
Since this means discovering something that was not in the focus of Polanyi’s enquiries, the present 
section goes beyond exegetical work, properly speaking. In extrapolating Polanyi’s approach to the 
law, it is thus a constructive exercise. It constructs - or reconstructs - the law of the market society, 
which is implied but not explicated in “The Great Transformation”. In other words, I will add the law 
(or the legal dimension) where it seems to be missing: notably, as a ‘fifth’ institution, and as a ‘fourth’ 
commodity. However, in doing so, I will stay within Polanyi’s conceptual framework. While the two 
readings offered below are thus creative, they stop short from rewriting what has become, with good 
reason, a sociological classic. 
Before turning to the role of institutions and commodities in Polanyi’s approach, and extending them 
to the law, it seems useful to briefly summarize the three (ideal-typical) stages of “The Great 
Transformation”, which can also be depicted in legal terms (Frerichs 2011b, 82). In a nutshell, the first 
stage is characterized by “social embeddedness”, the core principle of pre-modern economies. In this 
stage, market exchange is still embedded in “custom and law, magic and religion” – and the gain 
motive thereby kept in check (Polanyi 1957 [1944], 55). The second stage is marked by a gradual but 
radical “disembedding” of the market, that is, its liberalization and prioritization in modern market 
economies. Normatively speaking, market exchange is then no longer restricted by “human laws” 
(ibid., 125) – or by a natural law of divine origin – but left to “the laws of Nature” (ibid., 114). These 
quasi-natural laws, which are rationalized and popularized by liberal economics, notably include the 
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new norm of profit-seeking behaviour in markets of whatever kind. In the third stage, social 
countermovements work towards the “reembedding” of the market in a framework of social 
regulation, which can either resort to traditional (conservative) or modern (progressive) means. In 
political terms, Polanyi promotes a liberal form of socialism, which directly challenges the 
presumptions and pretensions of economic liberalism. The naturalist and axiomatic language of the 
latter would thus be replaced with an agenda which includes law as a malleable social institution. Thus 
understood, Polanyi was a legal realist. 
1.1 Law as Institution 
The first step will be to re-read the overture of Polanyi’s “The Great Transformation”, which describes 
the historical and institutional background of the market society and notably its insertion into “The 
International System” (ibid., part one). Accordingly, “[n]ineteenth century civilization rested on four 
institutions”, namely the “balance-of-power system”, the “gold standard”, the “self-regulating 
market”, and the “liberal state” (ibid., 3). Without much commentary, Polanyi notes that “[c]lassified 
in one way, two of these institutions were economic, two political” and that “[c]lassified in another 
way, two of them were national, two international” (ibid.). Analytically, he thereby draws a line 
between economic and political, national and international institutions. Empirically, his focus is, 
however, on how these institutions were actually intertwined in nineteenth century civilization. 
Already at this stage, we note that the law is not singled out as an institution, even though some form 
of law, both of national and international scope, seems to be implied by the interplay of gold standard 
and balance-of-power system, self-regulating market and liberal state. This is supported by Polanyi’s 
notion of the “organization” of the world, which he conceives not in terms of “centrally directed 
bodies acting through functionaries of their own” but in terms of the “universally accepted principles” 
and the “factual elements” on which the international order rests (ibid., 18). Law can thus be 
understood as the missing link between the above mentioned institutions, or as the hidden constitution 
of the overall system. 
In the following, Polanyi lays special emphasis on the two economic institutions. On the one hand, 
“the self-regulating market” is presented as “the fount and matrix of the system” (ibid., 3). In this 
regard, nineteenth century civilization can be considered the prototype of a modern market society, in 
which market exchange plays a key role as principle of social organization. On the other hand, Polanyi 
also notes that the gold standard “proved crucial” for the functioning of the international political 
economy of that time. With hindsight, its collapse can even be considered “the proximate cause of the 
catastrophe” of World War II (ibid.). At the same time, the gold standard (a monetary system based on 
the currencies’ convertibility into gold which guaranteed a fixed exchange rate between the 
participating countries) is qualified as “an attempt to extend the domestic market system to the 
international field” (ibid.). The two political institutions, namely the balance-of-power system and the 
liberal state, are understood as closely related to, if not dependent on, their economic counterparts. 
“[T]he balance-of-power system was a superstructure erected upon and, partly, worked through the 
gold standard; the liberal state was itself a creation of the self-regulating market.” (ibid.) While 
Polanyi is thus well aware of the interdependencies between the different institutions, he privileges 
nonetheless the self-regulating market (both on the national level and – via the gold standard – on the 
international scale). In conclusion, “[t]he key to the institutional system of the nineteenth century lay 
in the laws governing market economy” (ibid.). Again, we can assume that the quasi-natural laws of 
the market also found expression in man-made law. 
In the remainder of this section, I want to dwell on the role of the gold standard, which can not only be 
understood as an economic (or even political) institution but also as a legal institution – namely of 
international economic law. Furthermore, it highlights the role that (convertible) money plays in the 
international political-economic regime, which will be of relevance in the next section. As Polanyi 
argues, “the hundred years’ peace” enduring by and large from 1815 to 1914 (ibid., ch. 1) cannot be 
attributed to the balance-of-power system alone (that is, the ‘Concert of Europe’ established in 1815 
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after the defeat of Napoleon). Instead, the relative political stability of that time can also be explained 
through “the emergence of an acute peace interest” of a more economic nature (ibid., 7). This peace 
interest was notably embodied by international finance, whose “powerful social instrumentality” was 
itself premised on the gold standard (ibid., 9). Polanyi pictures international finance as “an institution 
sui generis, peculiar to the last third of the nineteenth and the first third of the twentieth century, 
[which] functioned as the main link between the political and the economic organization of the world” 
(ibid., 10; original emphasis). 
Through the gold standard, and the disciplining influence of international finance, “[t]rade had [thus] 
become linked with peace” (ibid., 15). In other words, the political (or peace) organization of the 
world became anchored in its economic organization and, hence, contingent on a reliable system of 
foreign trade and currency exchange. At the same time, the international monetary system was no 
longer a “purely economic institution” but had itself developed a “political function” (ibid., 20). The 
effects of this regime of the gold standard and international finance are depicted in terms which seem 
as topical today as they were in the late nineteenth century: “By the fourth quarter of the nineteenth 
century, world commodity prices were the central reality in the lives of millions of Continental 
peasants; the repercussions of the London money market were daily noted by businessmen all over the 
world; and governments discussed plans for the future in light of the situation on the world capital 
markets.” (ibid., 18) In short, the power and wealth of the nations ultimately became “functions of 
currency and credit” (ibid.). When the gold standard collapsed, the whole system thus became 
obsolete. In Polanyi’s words, “[t]he snapping of the golden thread was the signal for a world 
revolution” (ibid., 27). 
1.2 Law as Commodity 
The second step will be to recapitulate Polanyi’s argument in the main part of the book with a view on 
the liaison of the self-regulating market and the liberal state, which was somewhat neglected in the 
introductory part. Bearing in mind that the liberal state was characterized above as a ‘creation’ of the 
self-regulating market (ibid., 3), Polanyi’s enquiries into “The Rise and Fall of Market Economy” 
(ibid., part two) should also yield insights into the fate and fortune of its political counterpart. The 
liberal state is typically seen as wedded to the ‘rule of law’, which is one entry-point for the law in 
Polanyi’s argumentation. Alexander Ebner summarizes in this respect: “the rise of the market as a set 
of hegemonic institutions which shape the modern exchange economy coincides with the rule of law, 
which implies a reduction of social relations to the regulation of property and contract” (2011, 22; 
reference omitted). Another option is to study the interface between the self-regulating market and the 
liberal state in terms of Polanyi’s “fictitious commodities”, notably labour, land, and money, which 
can also be conceived as legal fictions. Both avenues will be explored in the following. In order to do 
so, we can start from the chapter entitled “The Self-Regulating Market and the Fictitious 
Commodities” (ibid., ch. 6), which introduces the market economy as “an economic system controlled, 
regulated, and directed by markets alone” (ibid., 68). Accordingly, “order in the production and 
distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating mechanism” only (ibid.). At first, market 
exchange thus appears to be a self-contained economic institution which is detached from all politics. 
In fact, the market economy rests on assumptions of political non-interference into the formation of 
markets and notably the price mechanism (ibid., 69). In positive terms, “only such policies and 
measures are in order which help to ensure the self-regulation of the market by creating conditions 
which make the market the only organizing power in the economic sphere” (ibid.). 
This paradox is also expressed in the policy of “laissez-faire”, which was “enforced by the state” 
(ibid., 139; original emphasis). Accordingly, the nineteenth century was not only characterized by “an 
outburst of legislation repealing restrictive regulations” but also by “an enormous increase in the 
administrative functions of the state” (ibid.). Polanyi highlights in this respect that “the introduction of 
free markets, far from doing away with the need for control, regulation, and intervention, enormously 
increased their range” (ibid., 140). In the end, this means that the liberal state is ‘liberal’ only in its 
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aims but not necessarily in its means - which can, according to Polanyi, reach from law to war. “The 
economic liberal can, therefore, without any inconsistency call upon the state to use the force of law; 
he can even appeal to the violent forces of civil war to set up the preconditions of a self-regulating 
market.” (ibid., 149) Following this argument, the ‘rule of law’ is less to be understood as a formal 
prerequisite of the market economy than as a powerful instrument for its implementation. The 
transformation of certain aspects of (economic) life into commodities appears to play a central role in 
this respect. Moreover, within the process of commodification the law can both act as a ‘commodifier’ 
and become itself a commodity. In order to make this point, we will first have a look at the (other) 
fictitious commodities. 
At the outset of his study, Polanyi distinguished somewhat inconclusively between economic and 
political institutions. Later on, he points to the novelty of this arrangement: “A self-regulating market 
demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic and political 
sphere.” (ibid., 71) To the same effect, he claims elsewhere in the book that “[e]conomic society had 
emerged as distinct from the political state” (ibid., 115). But this only concerns the institutional form 
of the market society. In terms of its substance – “the human beings [...] of which every society 
consists and the natural surroundings in which it exists” (ibid., 71) – the market society was anything 
but self-sufficient in Polanyi’s view. This is where the fictitious commodities come into play, which 
are ‘fictitious’ in that they are traded on the market but have not been produced for the market in the 
first place. As to the production factors of land and labour, Polanyi argues that “labor is only another 
name for a human activity which goes with life itself” and “land is only another name for nature, 
which is not produced by man” (ibid., 72). In other words, commodification turns the natural 
productivity of man and nature into land and labour. In contrast, the ‘substance’ of money seems 
harder to define. 
On the one hand, Polanyi distinguishes between money as mere purchasing power and money as a 
marketable commodity. According to this, “actual money” is “merely a token of purchasing power 
which [...] comes into being through the mechanism of banking or state finance” (ibid.; cf. ibid., 196-
197). On the other hand, he relates money to “capitalistic production” (ibid., 132). This seems at least 
to be suggested by the chapter on “Man, Nature, and Productive Organization” (ibid., ch. 11), which 
thus replicates the well-known distinction between real capital and money capital. Both definitions 
seem to be backed by the idea or fact that the international gold standard – a “self-regulating 
mechanism of supplying credit” – furthers the commodity form of money (that is, its exchange 
function), whereas national central banking is premised on its “manipulation”, that is, the management 
of currency exchange and money supply (hence, its payment and investment function) (ibid., 195). 
What we end up with can, again, be framed in terms of international economic law, which strikes a 
balance – however skewed - between economic self-regulation, backed by the gold standard, and 
political regulation in the context of central banking. In the final analysis, nineteenth century 
civilization was thus characterized by a law which allowed for “the organization of world commodity 
markets, world capital markets, and world currency markets under the aegis of the gold standard” 
(ibid., 76). 
Going beyond international economic law, we can claim in more general terms that the process of 
commodification works on the grounds of economic fictions which are translated into legal fictions. In 
other words, the law responds to the ideas of economic liberalism and helps to implement and enforce 
them. In this regard, it acts as a commodifier. Furthermore, we can conceive of the law itself as a 
fictitious commodity in analogy to money - and notwithstanding other ‘fourth’ commodities such as 
knowledge (Jessop 2007), culture (Macneill 2009), or even market competition (Block 2012). This 
intuition is based on similarities between law and money as social forms, or media of communication, 
which also ‘mediate’ between political regulation and economic self-regulation, and which are as such 
closely linked to the market society. This will be further elaborated in the next section. 
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1.3 Mapping Law’s Conflict 
The third step is to systematize the claims made above and to illustrate how the law, by instituting the 
economy, may itself become commodified. This time, our point of departure is Polanyi’s essay on 
“The Economy as Instituted Process” (2001 [1957]). Under this title, he advances a ‘substantivist’ 
approach to the economy which acknowledges “the transcending importance of [its] institutional 
aspect” (ibid., 35). Whereas liberal economics (and notably, neoclassical economics) adheres to a 
‘formalist’ understanding of frictionless markets, Polanyi thus conceives of the economy in terms of 
its ‘institutional embeddedness’ (ibid., 36). In this perspective, law would only be one of the 
institutions which provide the economic process with “[u]nity and stability, structure and function, 
history and policy” (ibid.). But, again, the legal institutedness of economic life is not specifically 
mentioned. Instead, money – the third fictitious commodity in “The Great Transformation” – is 
explicitly introduced as an institution in the substantivist meaning of the term (ibid., 32). As such, it 
can also be defined independent of markets, and of the modern market economy in particular (ibid., 
45). Polanyi distinguishes in this respect between different functions, or uses, of money, including the 
“payment use”, the “standard, or accounting use”, and the “exchange use” (ibid.). As to the latter, he 
claims that “[i]n the absence of markets the exchange use of money is no more than a subordinate 
culture trait” (ibid., 46). However, in a market economy which works according to the price-
mechanism this specific function becomes predominant. 
Money is a means of exchange which has – in the commodified state – itself a price. As a ‘quantifiable 
unit for indirect exchange’ which consists in “mere verbalizations or written symbols” (ibid.), money 
can be considered the fictitious commodity par excellence. Law does not have a price but it is certainly 
a means of exchange. This unlikely comparison between law and money can be made on the grounds 
of sociological systems theory - from Parsons to Luhmann and Habermas (Frerichs 2011c, 243-
262) - which specifies, besides money, also other media of exchange, which are ‘symbolically 
generalized’ and ‘functionally specific’ at the same time. These media condense an otherwise very 
complex sequence of communications in the form of abstract symbols which often work as binary 
codes. Importantly, the notion of ‘exchange’ is here not reduced to market exchange but also 
encompasses other forms or contexts of communication. Nevertheless, in the market society, law 
becomes indeed closely linked to market exchange and can even itself become subject to market 
decisions. This is at least the lesson of “The Law Market” (O’Hara and Ribstein 2009), in which 
different jurisdictions compete for customers (not: citizens), who diligently compare the respective 
costs and benefits. A certain legal rule or regime can then be marketed and shopped for – within a 
federation or even world-wide. In this context, the idea of law as a fictitious commodity seems not so 
far-fetched anymore. Under certain conditions, political and legal regulation thus become part of an 
international economic regime which imitates the logic of a self-regulating market. 
In a nutshell, my argument is the following: While it would make sense to start with the role of the law 
in the decommodification of land, labour, and money, it seems to make even more sense to me to start 
with its role in the commodification process. If the fictitious commodities are basically legal artefacts 
which create the ‘reality’ of the market society, law is a commodifier and potential decommodifier at 
the same time. This idea is not entirely original but derived from Marxian lines of thinking, which 
have also inspired Polanyi’s work. In linking one Karl to the other, we can thus claim that the 
relationship between the “economic structure of society” and its “legal and political superstructure” 
(Marx 1845) resurfaces, in Polanyi’s approach, in the ways the fictitious commodities ‘institute’ the 
self-regulating market. Alain Supiot speaks of the “dogmatic foundations” of the market in this respect 
– notably its foundation in legal dogmas (2007, 94). At the same time, he also notes a tendency 
towards “‘law shopping’” on the “‘market for legislative products’”, which makes law a matter of 
choice and subject to competition (2010, 156). The relationship between law and economics is thus 
twofold: The market is shaped by legal institutions, but the law is also shaped by economic thinking. 
Not surprisingly then, lawyers and economists do share certain concepts – such as ‘person’ (subject), 
‘property’ (object)’, ‘contract’ (exchange) - which are all fundamental to the functioning of the market 
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society. Somewhat paradoxically Polanyi’s notion of the instituted economy thus includes not only the 
embedded but also the disembedded market, which is instituted with the help of the commodity 
fiction. The substance (man, nature) and symbols (law, money) of economic life - its material values 
as well as its means of exchange – are then reduced to mere numbers in cost-benefit calculations. 
Hence, we are left with two conflicting roles of the law: as commodifier and decommodifier, as 
institution and commodity. Arguably, these conflicting laws can also be found in conflicts of law, or 
conflicting laws of conflicts-law. 
1.4 Example: Contested Persons 
To illustrate what I mean by the nexus between legal and economic fictions, and how it can work 
either towards commodification or decommodification, let us consider different concepts of 
personhood as they appear at the interface of law and economics. The background for the following is 
Ngaire Naffine’s distinction between ‘legalist’ and ‘realist’ concepts of the legal person (2009). From 
a legalist point of view, the legal person is an entirely fictitious concept: “The ‘person’ is the formal 
subject of rights and duties: a legal idea or construct, not to be mistaken for a real natural being.” 
(ibid., 1) Accordingly, the law may define anybody or anything as a subject of rights and duties, at 
least “as long as it is compatible with the purpose of any particular law” (ibid., 21). In contrast, realist 
understandings draw on substantive conditions of legal personhood which are imported from outside 
the law: from philosophy, religion, science – or, as we may add: economics (or even sociology). In 
practice, both lawyers and economists oscillate between formalist-legalist and substantivist-realist 
notions of personhood, as the following two examples show. Under this condition, ‘the purpose of the 
law’ becomes pivotal for what kind of fiction is actually chosen. 
The first example concerns the fictitious legal person par excellence: the firm - and notably the stock 
company. Philipp Klages (2010) demonstrates how the legal understanding and social function of the 
latter developed in Germany and the US throughout the twentieth century. Most importantly, he finds 
an “oscillation” (ibid., 193) between contractualist and institutionalist views of the firm. These 
resonate with both Naffine’s distinction between legalism and realism and Polanyi’s dialectic of 
(liberal) movement and (social) countermovement. Accordingly, the firm is either conceived as a 
creation of contracts only, or it is defined as a collective entity with manifold institutional effects in 
society. Whereas the contractualist view emphasizes the interests of individual shareholders, the 
institutionalist view equally considers the interests of all stakeholder (with a view on ‘financialisation’ 
cf. Zumbansen 2011, 187-190). In this context, an understanding of firms as contracts has 
commodifying effects, while an understanding of firms as social institutions works towards 
decommodification. Company law can thus play both roles. Moreover, private investors may compare 
and choose between different corporate law regimes according to their respective costs and benefits 
(e.g., within the US or the EU). Similarly, public regulators may reform company law to boost 
economic growth and international competitiveness, and to reduce market failures and social 
externalities – all these motivations surface in Klages’ study (2010). In the final analysis, both views 
of the firm draw on economic rationalities. While the commodity character of company law seems 
more obvious on the microeconomic than on the macroeconomic level, “the regulation of business 
conduct and corporations” is as such strongly affected by “globally interdependent activity spheres 
(marketisation), fundamentally changing national political economies (privatisation), and a dramatic 
expansion of issue-driven, functionalist regulatory regimes (scientisation)” (ibid., 205). Thus 
understood, company law is more exposed to market forces today than in the heyday of the national 
welfare state. Its instrumentalization for economic goals seems therefore more probable than before. 
The second example concerns ‘real humans’, as they have recently been advocated for in behavioural 
economics, from which they made their way into consumer law. The starting point is simply that 
“[r]eal people [...] are not homo economicus” (Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 7). In other words, they are 
not rational utility maximizers which always act in their own best interest. Instead, they are prone to 
cognitive biases, social influences, and human failure, which make their decisions far from optimal 
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(and sometimes outright disastrous). What we can observe in the present debate is thus a trade-off 
between rationalist and behaviouralist views of the consumer, between the fiction of homo 
economicus and ‘real’ market behaviour. Yet commodifying and decommodifying functions are less 
clear than in the previous example. To be sure, homo economicus is a fairly disembedded concept of 
the (legal) person to begin with. Being more ‘realistic’ about his limitations may thus point to a more 
contextualized understanding of economic action. However, behavioural economists rather draw on 
our (‘hard-wired’) universal human nature than on our (malleable) cultural identities. In other words, 
they tend to reify our selves. Interestingly, this reification seems to be linked to commodification. As a 
case in point, “libertarian paternalism” (ibid., 5-6) does not really subtract from economic liberalism 
but rather adds to it. In other words, the ‘visible hand of the state’ is less used to curb or contain 
market forces than to complement or compensate for individual failure. By ‘nudging’ consumers into 
more rational decisions, they are thus not shielded from but rather adjusted to the markets, which have 
become inescapable in many matters of life. Hence, the ‘purpose of the law’ is not simply consumer 
protection - or even decommodification - but to increase market participation at lowest possible 
individual and collective costs. (Frerichs 2011a) In this sense, the market utility of certain models of 
the consumer only exemplifies the commodity character of consumer law. And it demonstrates it 
much better than the occasional ‘law shopping’ by sufficiently sophisticated consumers. 
In the law of the market society, legal persons are thus ultimately meant to fulfil economic functions. 
In other words, legal personhood is attributed and qualified in ways which serve the ideal of the “one 
big self-regulating market” (Polanyi 1957 [1944], 67). The conceptual adjustment of legal persons to 
the market sphere can not only be interpreted as the commodification of man (as worker and 
consumer) and of ‘productive organization’ (as firms and stock companies) but also as the 
commodification of law itself, which institutionalizes and enforces these very fictions. In its 
commodifying function, law thus appears to be ‘cognitively embedded’ in economics (Frerichs 2011b, 
69-71). It becomes a means which serves the ends of the market, of creating competition, increasing 
efficiency, and furthering growth. In this general equation, law becomes a ‘production factor’ just like 
labour, land, and money/capital. We can thus speak of law as a commodity first of all in the 
macroeconomic sense. However, whenever regulatory competition allows a ‘law market’ to arise, its 
commodity character also materializes in the microeconomic sense, and law becomes a variable factor 
in individual production (or consumption) functions. 
2. The Modern History of Market Law: A Discourse 
The previous section provided us with a conceptual framework to recount the history of the law of the 
market society from its emergence in the nineteenth century until today. It goes without saying that the 
story to be told in the present section will be highly simplified and selective. Instead of accuracy, I am 
aiming for a schematic account, which will notably be framed in Polanyian terms. This is not an 
unprecedented project. In the following, I will build on various contributions which address related 
questions of how the law evolved in the last two centuries, what conflicting rationalities it adopted, 
and how this is reflected in the narratives of today’s lawyers and legal scientists. Importantly, the law 
of the market society includes all types of law that constitute or regulate the (allegedly) self-regulating 
market. This definition cuts across different legal fields and disciplines, namely public and private 
law, national and international law (including transnational and supranational law). It thus seems 
legitimate to draw on authors with different backgrounds and ambitions, which address, in one way or 
another, the historical and institutional dynamic of ‘market-constitutive’ and ‘market-regulative’ forms 
of law. Mirroring Polanyi’s interest in the ‘organization’ of the international political economy, it 
seems most suitable to summarize these different fields and forms of law under the label of 
international economic law. According to David Kennedy (1999, 38), this “is defined not by the 
subjects it governs, but by its regulatory terrain – the law, of whatever origin, which governs 
international economic transactions”. As such, it transgresses common lines of demarcation within 
legal scholarship: “It mixes national and international law, and is rooted in private law – both national 
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regimes of contract or property and international regimes of private law unification and conflict of 
laws.” (ibid.) 
This rather broad definition of the law of the market society is still lacking a Polanyian element which 
would be indicative of its inner conflict. The tension between commodifying and decommodifying 
functions, which was suggested above, can actually be translated into a ‘dialectical’ principle of 
development which Polanyi specifies as “double movement”. What he has in mind are “two 
organizing principles in society”, which compete with each other, both synchronically and 
diachronically (1957 [1944], 132). One is characterized as the “principle of economic liberalism, 
aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market”; the other as the “principle of social 
protection[,] aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization” (ibid.). 
One is marked as “utopian” (ibid., 142) and a “peril to society” (ibid., 150), the other as “realistic” 
(ibid., 142) in that it defends the “interests of society as a whole” (ibid., 162). Our narrative of the 
development of international economic law – from its ‘universalist’ origins in the nineteenth century 
to its national ‘closings’ in the twentieth century, and to its transnational ‘openings’ in the twenty-first 
century – is thus meant to exhibit a certain dynamic of “movement” and “countermovement” (ibid., 
130). 
2.1 Nineteenth Century Origins 
Our reconstruction of the history of market law begins with the nineteenth century, that is, the time-
frame which Polanyi set for his study. David Kennedy (1996, 391) - albeit critical of the stories 
lawyers tell each other about this century (and about how they have made a leap ahead since 
then) - characterizes its dynamic in the following terms: “If the century has a direction, it is 
simultaneously from Europe outwards and from politics to commerce. The move to commerce brings 
a move from public to private order, and foreshadows a move from the imperial capitals of Paris, 
London and Berlin to the financial centers of London and New York.” If this is the liberal movement 
in Polanyi’s terms, the countermovement is announced in the following: “Nostalgia for a peaceful 
Central European order, before the explosions of nationalism.” (ibid.) The international political 
economy thus sways from a pronounced liberalism to sweeping forms of nationalism. Whereas the 
beginning of the ‘long’ nineteenth century is given with the year 1789, the conventional legal narrative 
focuses on its last few decades only - “from roughly 1870 (the Franco-German war of 1871 will do) 
until 1914” (ibid.). In other words: “For international law, as for much of the rest of twentieth century 
legal thought, it is really only the last five minutes of the nineteenth century that counts.” (ibid.) What 
is referred to here is namely the “triumph” of positivism over naturalism (ibid., 398), or the “classic 
synthesis of the late nineteenth century” (ibid., 397). 
Similarly, Duncan Kennedy begins his narrative of the “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal 
Thought” (2006) with an account of “the rise of Classical Legal Thought between 1850 and 1914” 
(ibid., 19), which he sees connected to “the liberal attack on mercantilist or ‘early modern’ economic 
and social policy making” (ibid., 20). The response is given as the rise of “socially oriented legal 
thought between 1900 and 1968” (ibid., 19), which is thus already considered characteristic of the 
twentieth century. Whereas Kennedy’s overall focus is on the latter, socially oriented law, he classifies 
the former, classical conception, not least in terms of “the creation of a first global system of 
international economic law, based on free trade, the gold standard, and private international law (often 
applied by arbitrators) to settle disputes” (ibid., 29). Moreover, he explicitly points to the “process of 
social transformation” brought about by this political-economic regime, and notably refers to the work 
of Karl Polanyi in this respect (ibid.). However, another name seems much more important in 
reconstructions of nineteenth century legal thinking: Friedrich Carl von Savigny. Kennedy attributes 
“his seminal importance” to the paradoxical “combination [...] of a universalizing legal formalist will 
theory with the idea that particular regimes of state law reflect diverse [...] societal normative orders” 




Moreover, he cannot only be considered the founding father of German historical jurisprudence but 
also of private international law, or the modern conflict-of-laws methodology. This is emphasized by 
Florian Rödl, whose short history of the “Law of Conflict of Laws” (2011, 31) – and its inherent 
dialectic – inspired much of this chapter. Rödl distinguishes between “Universal Free-trade Law” in 
the nineteenth century (ibid., 32) and “(National) Private International Law” in the twentieth century 
(ibid., 34), dividing the latter into two distinctive periods of “Nationally-organised Capitalism” (ibid., 
35) and “‘Embedded Liberalism’” (ibid., 38). To account for the ‘long’ nineteenth century in the time-
frame mentioned above, we can thus speak of a development from universal free-trade law (in the 
international political economy) to national private international law (under the regime of nationally-
organized capitalism). As Rödl points out, von Savigny was not yet preoccupied with national interests 
but propagated a systematic (rationally deduced) form of conflicts-law instead, which would serve the 
interests of all nations in a world of free trade. Von Savigny’s methodology, which dates back to the 
year 1849, thus supported the agenda of economic liberalism. Or, in Rödl’s words, “[h]is push for a 
universalistic form of law of conflict of laws was an adaptation to the prevailing theoretical 
conceptions and hegemonic practical endeavours towards the desired international integration of 
national economies” (ibid., 33). This early universalism notwithstanding, his references to the “spirit 
of the people” also paved the way for more nationalist interpretations (ibid., 34-36). In the end, 
“national-particular and international-universal creeds” within the discipline could thus draw on the 
same legacy. (For a more comprehensive account see Rödl 2008.) 
The “domestication of private international law” is also the focus of Horatia Muir Watt’s history of the 
field (2011, 20). The ‘domestication’ of the law of conflicts of law precisely consists in framing its 
contents in national, private, technical terms and thereby separating it from the international, public, 
political sphere. For Muir Watt, this means leaving the transnational market, or the “informal 
economic empire” (ibid., 35), largely unattended – as it would then remain outside of both public and 
private international law. One of her historical reference-points is “the middle of the nineteenth 
century”, when von Savigny developed his ‘universalist’ methodology, which is also labelled as 
“multilateralism” or “monism”. Muir Watt points out that the legal universe, within which this 
conflict-of-laws methodology could be applied in a more or less technical manner, was the “Romanist 
legal community” only and not the wider world society (ibid., 41). With regard to the global 
dimension, she therefore points to another, “minoritarian methodology” which existed side-by-side 
with Savigny’s ‘Roman’ multilateralism and could in contrast to the latter also deal with “‘true 
conflicts’”, that is, culturally or politically particularly sensitive issues (ibid.). This alternative 
methodology, which allows “opening the legal order to other normativities on their own terms”, is 
labelled “unilateralism” or “pluralism” (ibid.). The paradox is that it is more universalist (going 
beyond Roman law nations) and particularist (emphasizing domestic legal perspectives), at the same 
time. However, this “pluralist counter-narrative, left over from the era, before the nation-state” (ibid., 
34 [sic]) also reminds of a more political and potentially cosmopolitan function of conflicts-law. To 
“reappropriate” this function (ibid., 53) is what Muir Watt understands as a “re-embedding” 
countermovement, both now and then (ibid., 47). 
Another, even older reference point of hers is the ius gentium, which preceded the separation of public 
and private international law and is notably introduced as “as an overarching system of legality and 
morality, integrating relations both as between princes, and as between merchants” (ibid., 11-12) This 
brings us back to the two Kennedies. Duncan Kennedy (2006, 30) links nineteenth century legal 
thinking both to von Savigny’s idea of a universalist Roman legacy and to the universalist ideal of ius 
gentium: “[Classical Legal Thought] affirmed that every country with a Western legal heritage shared 
the Roman legacy along with Savigny’s Germans, [...] and that every nation that participated in the 
global order of commerce and finance participated in the ius gentium.” (ibid., 30) David Kennedy 
(1996) explains how princes and merchants ended up in different, yet analogically structured legal 
orders. Accordingly, “[i]nternational legal positivism is simply the working out of the private law 
metaphor of contract for a public legal order” (ibid., 398). The positivist understanding of sovereignty, 
whose development is attributed to nineteenth century legal scholarship, thus mirrored private law 
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relations: “By the end of the century, sovereignty described a relation to territory parallel to the 
contemporaneous understanding of the relationship between individuals and their property, and the 
analogy became ever more explicit.” (ibid., 408) In other words, public international law owes its 
methodological individualism to private law. At the same time, private international law owes its 
‘domestication’ to the methodological nationalism of its public counterpart, which came to be 
dominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. How this affects private law more 
generally will be discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Twentieth Century Closings 
Nineteenth century civilization was thus characterized by classical legal thinking which reflected - in 
its universalism, formalism, and positivism - the ideological and institutional requirements of classical 
economic liberalism. However, towards the end of the ‘long’ nineteenth century, the international 
political economy increasingly moved from liberalism to nationalism. This conflict inherent to the 
normative and factual ‘organization’ of the world is also handed over to the twentieth century. In other 
words, while Polanyi explicitly speaks of “the rise and fall of market economy”, the market economy 
has not come to end in the two world wars, but is reinvented as a more ‘social’ type of market 
economy in the postwar decades. Wolfgang Streeck’s above-mentioned study of “Institutional Change 
in the German Political Economy” (2009) – which is the model case, in this respect – can accordingly 
be read as a Polanyian account of the rise and fall of the social market economy. The story of the 
twentieth century is thus the continuation of the market society with different legal means but similar 
political-economic tensions. 
For the new law of the market society - which can be understood as ‘neo-liberal’ in the widest sense of 
the term – we can draw on Duncan Kennedy’s characterization of the second ‘globalization’ of law 
and legal thought. Accordingly, legal thinking “[b]etween 1900 and 1968” is preoccupied with “The 
Social”, that is, with reinventing the law “as a purposive activity, as a regulatory mechanism that could 
and should facilitate the evolution of social life in accordance with ever greater perceived social 
interdependence at every level, from the family to the world of nations” (1996, 22). Instead of laissez-
faire, there is thus a clear perspective of social engineering. And while Kennedy does not identify the 
‘social’ critics of classical legal thinking with any “particular political ideology” (ibid.), he sees a 
commonality between the legal realist (my label) and the Marxist critique in “that they interpreted the 
actual regime of the [legal formalist] will theory as an epiphenomenon in relation to a ‘base,’ [which 
is] in the case of the Marxists, the capitalist economy and in the case of the social, ‘society’ conceived 
as an organism” (ibid., 38). However, other than radical Marxists, “the social people” did not want to 
replace capitalism with socialism, in Kennedy’s account, but “to save liberalism from itself” (ibid.). 
Strictly speaking, he thus equates the new mainstream of legal thinking with the social reform 
movement, “leaving out only Marxist collectivism at one extreme and pure Manchesterism at the 
other” (ibid., 39). In contrast to the “‘conflict ideology’” of Marxism, and to the competitive 
rationality of laissez-faire liberalism, “the social” is notably characterized as a “‘harmony ideology,’ 
preaching a function for each organized interest, and the existence of a ‘public interest’ in the 
coordination of their interdependent activities in order to maximize social welfare” (ibid., 42). 
To highlight the discontinuities between nineteenth and twentieth-century legal thinking, but also to 
remind of the continuities in the law of the market society, we will dwell on Kennedy’s picture of the 
new legal consensus a little longer. The end of the ‘long’ nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century – notably, in the two world wars and the world economic crisis - is marked by the “rejection of 
the nineteenth-century ‘gold standard/free trade/private international law’ regime” and its replacement 
with a “‘national strategy’ based on bilateral agreements and then on the formation of blocs, first those 
of the empires and then those based on ideology in the confrontation of liberalism with fascism and 
communism” (ibid., 56). However, this is not the end of capitalism: after the Second World War, a 
new regime of a “nationally and internationally regulated market economy” was created between the 
“capitalist core countries” of the Western hemisphere and, with the “globalization of the Bretton 
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Woods system”, also exported elsewhere (ibid., 57). Whereas the Bretton Woods institutions form 
thus the international backbone of the “highly regulated mixed capitalist economy”, which is 
characterized by “pursuing a strategy of social peace through economic development” (ibid.), its 
national form is given by the economic and social regulation of the welfare state. In contrast to the 
classical liberal ideal, “[s]ocial legislation meant expanding the regulatory functions of the state, 
carving out and redefining as public law vast areas that had fallen safely within the domain of right, 
will, and fault” (ibid., 43). The market economy was thus discontinued in its (legal) form only but not 
in its (economic) content. While the idea of the self-regulating market was not abandoned, ‘market-
constitutive’ forms of law came to be more balanced with ‘market-regulative’ forms, such as “labor 
legislation, the regulation of urban areas through landlord/tenant, sanitary and zoning regimes, the 
regulation of financial markets, and the development of new institutions of international law” (ibid., 
38-39). 
Reflecting these developments, Florian Rödl characterizes the “Law of Conflict of Laws in the 20th 
Century” (2011, 34) as moving from “Nationally-organised Capitalism” (ibid., 35) to “‘Embedded 
Liberalism’” (ibid., 38). This is the era of “national private international law”, that is, a nationally 
premised form of conflicts-law: “Throughout the Twentieth century, nothing changed in the authority 
of the nation state over private international law.” (ibid.) While the national prerogative, or bias, of 
conflicts-law was thus upheld, the changes in the international economic order, and the emergence of 
the modern welfare state, entail new problems in reconciling the given methodology with the new 
social goals of the law. What results is a “conceptual crisis” of private international law, which is not 
yet prepared to take into account the “substantive social regulatory concerns” of the reformed national 
private laws (ibid., 39). Both the ‘national’ and the ‘social’ challenge to the universalist methodology 
of private international law, as once envisioned by von Savigny, are expressed in tensions between 
“general conflict-of laws norms” (ibid., 37) on the one hand, and “prohibitive norms” (ibid.), or 
“norms of intervention which are only in favour of one’s own law”, on the other (ibid., 39). However, 
there is a tendency in conflicts-law scholarship to counter the social challenge, if not in universalist, so 
at least in more systematic terms: by conceptually reintegrating “special conflict-of-laws norms [such 
as] for consumer, labour and insurance contracts” into the system of general conflict-of-laws norms 
(ibid.). 
Similarly, Horatia Muir Watt (2011, 24) characterizes the development of private international law 
“during the second half of the 20th century” as a “turn from the dogmatic to the functional, from the 
private to the regulatory”. Furthermore, she highlights and compares the ‘federalist’ context of the 
United States and the ‘quasi-federalist’ context of the European Union, which both shaped the 
conflict-of-laws methodology in ways that allowed giving “greater attention to the needs of the 
community of Sister or Member States, but closed off the global horizon” (ibid., 24-25). While the 
conflicts-law thus becomes more functional, regulatory, and pragmatic in the “more cosmopolitan 
second half of the twentieth century” (ibid., 42), it is still oriented towards a group of like-minded 
(culturally and politically similar) states, and not to the world polity. Muir Watt’s vision and project of 
“a re-embedding of the global” through a more pluralist definition of conflicts-law is thus left to the 
twenty-first century (ibid., 48). 
Also in international law more generally, twentieth century legal thinking is, according to David 
Kennedy (1996), generally equated with pragmatism. The respective narrative indicates the ‘progress’ 
which legal thought has made since the ‘classic synthesis’, and notably since the internationalist 
liberal movement gave way to nationalist countermovements: “If we choose pragmatism over 
formalism, we will have chosen the international over the national, the modem over the classical, order 
over chaos, exactly as we have moved from the nineteenth to the twentieth century.” (ibid., 419-420) 
This can also be understood as a (relative) move from ‘rule’ to ‘policy’. With an eye on the United 
States, Kennedy (1999, 27) claims in this respect that compared to their public international law 
colleagues “[t]he inheritors of the private international law tradition – conflicts of law, international 
business transactions, comparative law, and international economic law – are all policy embracers”. 
The Law of the Market Society 
 57 
To complement this picture, and to follow up on the idea that ‘the private is political’, we will finally 
turn to national private law in the European context. 
Christian Joerges summarizes the history of private law in Germany with a view on the relationship of 
“The Science of Private Law and the Nation State” (2000 [1994]). Accordingly, the twentieth century 
is marked by three different periods, or generations, of private law scholarship. The first is the “Private 
Law of the Volksnation” (ibid., 8), which reflects the instrumentalization of private law in the name of 
the (racially defined) ‘national community’ by National Socialism. The second is the “Private Law of 
the Staatsbürgernation” (ibid., 23), which refers to more enlightened ideas of a ‘nation of citizens’, 
which is conceived as an open civil society and based on a strong, liberal and democratic constitution. 
The third is the Europeanized private law, or a private law “Beyond The Nation State” (ibid., 37), 
which already marks the transition from the twentieth to the twenty-first century. All in all, Joerges’ 
account thus addresses “three aspects of nation-statehood” and the respective challenges they pose to 
(the science of) private law in and beyond Germany (ibid., 7). One problem of twentieth century 
scholarship was thus to come to grips with the nationalist heritage of the discipline. At the same time, 
it could not simply return to the – discredited – legal formalism and economic liberalism of the 
previous century but also had to cope with its new, regulatory role in the social welfare state (not yet 
mentioning the latter’s downscaling towards the end of the century). These characteristic tensions are 
illustrated by the fact that “the programmatic idea of the social market economy [...] seemed open to a 
variety of contents” (ibid., 8). To wit, the idea could equally be embraced by a new movement and a 
new countermovement whose “Models of ‘Materialised’ Private Law” (ibid., 15) are  far from 
identical. On the one hand, the ordoliberal theory of private law considered “a State-guaranteed 
competitive constitution” which would bring about a well-functioning ‘private-law society’ “an 
attractive model for the reconstruction of the economic and legal system” (ibid., 16). On the other 
hand, the emergence of the national welfare state motivated “an alternative social model of private 
law” which starts from a “theoretical, sociologically oriented reconstruction of the social functions of 
private law itself” (ibid., 28). 
2.3 Twenty-First Century Openings 
As to the situation in the late twentieth and the early twenty-first century, Duncan Kennedy (2006, 63) 
speaks of an “unsynthesized coexistence of transformed elements of [Classical Legal Thought] with 
transformed elements of the social”. In a language which is itself remindful of the ‘double movement’, 
he illustrates this as follows: “There is a substratum of positively enacted classical contract law 
everywhere, and a superstructure of positively enacted social labor law.” (ibid.) While this example 
specifically refers to the different layers of universalist and instrumentalist (private) law, Kennedy 
contrasts and connects market law and social regulation also in more general terms: “There are 
multiple administrative agencies dealing with a host of socially problematic areas, everywhere; and 
everywhere there is the law of the free market (itself more or less internally ‘socialized’) governing 
beneath and between and among the regulatory regimes” (ibid.). To be sure, this lack of an 
integrative - or hegemonic - consensus could still be framed in terms of pragmatism, which David 
Kennedy (1996) found to be characteristic of twentieth century legal thinking. In order to explore what 
seems to be ‘new’ about the twenty-first century, I will begin with Florian Rödl’s account of recent 
developments in private international law, which suggest less that the private is political than that the 
political increasingly tends to be privatized. 
In his succinct review of conflicts-law history, Rödl’s (2011) section on the “Law of Conflict of Laws 
for the Twenty-first Century” thus points to the “Privatisation of the Function of Law” (ibid., 40). 
Accordingly, the new challenge after the nationalisation and ‘materialization’ of private (international) 
law is its transformation “into a framework law in which private actors should be able to choose as 
freely as possible which national legal norms should, in each case, apply to the private legal relations 
that concern them” (ibid., 41). This implies not only the de-politicization of the nation state – or, to 
speak with Muir Watt (2011, 24), of the federalist (US) or quasi-federalist system (EU) in question – 
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but, more specifically, its subjection to private economic choices, which may then undermine the 
political choices of a collective. What was a ‘nation of citizens’ - as Joerges’ (2000 [1994], 23) 
depicted German constitutional democracy in the second half of the twentieth century - thus dissolves 
into a world of “buyers and sellers” (Kennedy 1996, 45) which handle law as a commodity. This 
privatization of the political by means of regulatory competition is, as Rödl (2011, 31) points out, 
“diametrically opposed to our venture here”. The reconstruction of conflicts-law in terms of its 
decommodification and re-politicization can thus be understood as the latest countermovement to an 
ongoing trend in private international law. Both the privatization of conflicts-law on the one hand, and 
its re-politization on the other. take place in the “postnational constellation”, that is, a markedly trans- 
and supranational context (Habermas 2001). 
As to the supranational dimension of twenty-first century market law and its social complements, we 
can more specifically resort to developments in the realm of European law, starting with the 
Europeanization of private law. In a terminology which appears to be compatible with the present 
chapter, Ralf Michaels distinguishes between “The Two Rationalities of European Private Law” 
(2011). One is the formal, “juridical” rationality (ibid., 142) exemplified by classical legal thought and 
the ius commune. The other is the functional, “instrumentalist” rationality (ibid.) which is 
characteristic of ‘materialized’ private law, including its competing ‘ordoliberal’ and ‘social’ 
interpretations. The respective regulatory context does not have to be given by the nation state only 
but can also be defined by the European Union. Michaels’ version of a “European Private Law 
History” (ibid., 149) gives an intriguing account of the dynamics of these conflicting – and “perhaps 
even [mutually] constitutive” – rationalities (ibid., 143). Accordingly, the juridical rationality, which 
was originally perceived as universalist, was ‘nationalized’ in the course, or aftermath, of national 
codification projects (ibid., 151-153). In this respect, a Europeanization of private law would mean to 
uncover the shared (or imagined) heritage of the transnational ius commune and to streamline its 
domestic variations (ibid., 157). In contrast, the instrumentalist rationality, which was once perceived 
as a national prerogative, has now found its equivalent in the European Union (ibid., 154-155). In this 
case, the Europeanization of private law amounts to a transfer of regulatory powers from the national 
to the supranational level. In both cases, the ‘denationalization’ of substantive private law can be 
perceived as ‘de-politicization’ – here including the identity politics of the member states (ibid., 155). 
If these are the ongoing projects and practices of European Private Law, it comes as no surprise that 
the respective countermovement works towards a re-politicization of private law, either on a national 
or supranational level. 
Arguably, the ius commune is thus for European private law, what the ius gentium is for public 
international law: a universalist idea based on the generalizability of formal rules; moreover, a 
reference-point in the past, which is at times still taken as a model for the future. This raises the 
question if one can ‘bracket’ the nation state in a way which allows presenting the nationalisation of 
private law, and the domestication of private international law, as historical exceptions. However, the 
nation state is and was intricately linked with (legal expressions of) ‘the social’, notably in the form of 
the national welfare state. A historical demise of the nation state would thus also endanger the social 
embeddedness of private law achieved within its borders. In Christian Joerges’ early account of “The 
Europeanisation of Private Law” (2000 [1994], 44), this problem is condensed as follows: “[t]he 
integration process forces renewed grappling with the universalizability of private-law principles and 
rules, with the meaningfulness of legislative activities - but also with the erosion of the nation State 
and its political institutions” (ibid., 45). 
Going beyond the confines of European private law, Polanyian patterns have explicitly been claimed 
for the development of European market integration and concomitant social regulation by means of 
law. While it seems not difficult to find a ‘liberalizing’ movement in the market-building project as 
such (as it is exemplified by the four freedoms with their far-reaching legal effects), there are clear 
differences in what is considered, or counted, as a legal countermovement which would provide for 
the reembedding of the market in social relations or rationalities. Alternative suggestions include 
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global soft law, European case-law, and postnational conflicts-law. A fourth example will be 
considered more elaborately in the subsequent section: European regulatory private law as applied to 
regulated network markets. 
In their piece on “Polanyi in Brussels”, James Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow (2009) suggest that 
something “analogous to [...] the movement/countermovement dialectic that Polanyi perceived” (ibid. 
615) is also at work in the European Union: “The EU uses its regulatory tools not only with the aim of 
market-making, but to engage in both market-making and market modification” (ibid., 599). The main 
example they draw upon is the extension and consolidation of cross-national social rights of EU 
citizens in the case-law of the European Court of Justice - hence, market integration/regulation 
through judge-made law. In Caporaso and Tarrow’s view, the double movement involves a 
‘disembedding’ of social rights and relations from the national context and their ‘reembedding’ in the 
supranational context: “one kind of solidarity (among nationals and their political institutions) was 
weakened and another was strengthened (between EU institutions and foreign workers)” (ibid., 609). 
Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer (2010) object in their critical reply that this gives a “much too 
optimistic” picture of the ‘realities’ of integration through law (ibid., 22). In their view, liberalizing 
measures with market-enhancing or market-enforcing effects clearly outweigh market-correcting or 
market-shaping social policies in the EU, and the overall setting seems thus more “Hayekian” than 
“Polanyian” in spirit (ibid., 7-11). At the end of the day, the selective upgrading of social rights on the 
European level could thus come along with a general downgrading of social policies on the national 
level, or what Höpner and Schäfer refer to as “welfare state retrenchment” (ibid., 24). 
Furthermore, whereas Caporaso and Tarrow concede that “the ECJ is indeed cut off from popular 
politics”, they also hold that “its jurisprudence is thickest in those areas in which social-economic 
demands are strongest and where interest groups, nongovernmental organizations [...], and social 
movements are most active” (2009, 613; reference omitted). In contrast, Höpner and Schäfer are 
doubtful if judicial activism makes a proper example for a Polanyian countermovement, not least since 
the political conflict arising from economic liberalization would then be considered in legal terms 
only, in this case as trading off individual economic and social rights (2010, 25). 
Another Polanyian interpretation of legal integration, or rather legal innovation, in the European 
context, locates the countermovement not in ‘hard law’, that is, in the trias of legislation, adjudication, 
and enforcement, but in ‘soft law’, or so-called new modes of governance. Marc Amstutz (2011) 
namely interprets “European efforts [...] to establish a viable [Corporate Social Responsibility] model” 
(ibid., 377) as an instance of “world law”, which is considered “the [spontaneous] medium from which 
the Polanyian counter-movement to globalisation arises” (ibid., 365). In his view, the 
countermovement is “no longer a matter of political communication, but one of legal communication” 
(ibid., 363; original emphasis). Following a Luhmannian rather than a Habermasian line of argument, 
law is thus considered part of the functionally differentiated world of systems, while being 
disconnected from anything like a lifeworld (as a background condition for social movements). 
Reflecting the systems-theoretical emphasis on the cognitive or adaptive orientation of both world 
society and world law, Amstutz emphasizes that, “in establishing the European Alliance for 
[Corporate Social Responsibility], the [European] Commission created a legal institution that produces 
cognitive resources” (ibid., 384; original emphasis). These learning opportunities were capable to 
inform, irritate, and influence corporations (notably via the effects of “market, reputation, public 
opinion”; ibid., 392), without however imposing formal legal restrictions or sanctions on them. In the 
end, Amstutz claims that “world law is civil society law” and, as such, “not the product of any (state or 
other) organisational will, but the fruit of blind evolution, what von Hayek terms a spontaneous order” 
(ibid., 391; emphasis omitted). 
Christian Joerges agrees with Amstutz’ account and also with Caporaso and Tarrow’s approach only 
inasmuch as law is understood as a (possible) site, or means, of a Polanyian countermovement, which 
seeks to reembed European market-building in social policies, purposes, and responsibilities. 
However, as an instance of the ‘discourse theory of law’, Joerges’ three-dimensional conflicts-law is 
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committed to the principle of a democratic rule of law and complementary deliberative arrangements 
within and beyond nation states. Conflicts-law is thus understood as a legal countermovement which 
nevertheless brings politics – and even the state – back in. “Indeed, the state has to remain present as a 
forum and organization form of democratic processes and a democratically legitimate law.” (Joerges 
2012, 73; my translation) Accordingly, political and legal communication remain closely linked, and 
also backed up with the legitimating potential of the (rationalized) lifeworld. At the same time, Joerges 
indicates that it would be misleading to interpret Polanyi’s ‘spontaneous’ countermovement - as 
Amstutz did - in a Hayekian sense of ‘blind evolution’ only. The key difference between the two 
accounts can thus be found in the envisioned form of the law. For Amstutz, the source of reembedding 
is a “self-validating global law” (2011, 367). For Joerges, this is a new type of conflicts-law which is 
adjusted to the ‘postnational constellation’, but which requires nevertheless the ‘organization form’ of 
the state: in order to ‘constitutionalise’ governance arrangements, such as the corporate social 
responsibility practices studied by Amstutz, but also to rectify the “de-coupling of [European] 
economic and [national] social constitutions” (2009, 538), which the recent case law of the European 
Court of Justice only laid bare. 
2.4 Example: Regulated Markets 
The outlined development of the law of the market society culminates – at least pars pro toto - in 
“European regulatory private law”, which thus seems suitable to summarize the present argument. Let 
us briefly resume: If a universalist private law with a “juridical” rationality was characteristic of 
formal legal thought in the nineteenth century, the hallmark of the twentieth century was socially 
oriented legal thought as expressed, not least, in the “instrumentalist” rationality of ‘materialized’ 
private law. Whereas the former was constitutive of the liberal movement, the latter can be understood 
as a result of a ‘reembedding’ countermovement, which laid the foundations for the social market 
economy in liaison with the national welfare state. At the same time, one can already distinguish 
between a regulatory (efficiency-based) and a redistributive (equality-based) orientation of ‘social 
law’ in the most general sense – movement and countermovement within the regime of “embedded 
liberalism”. If the early twenty-first century is now characterized by a heightened role of European 
“regulatory” private law, this means that a specific type of regulation has been generalized on the 
European level: namely market regulation (including the law of ‘regulated markets’ as one of its key 
examples). Within the realm of private law, this shift of emphasis is expressed in what Micklitz calls a 
“transformation of European private law from autonomy to functionalism in competition and 
regulation” (2009, 6; emphasis omitted). 
Micklitz clarifies that European regulatory private law, thus understood, “may contain both elements, 
establishing market freedoms, therefore increasing private autonomy, while at the same time providing 
for rules that set boundaries to the newly created market autonomy” (Micklitz and Patterson 2012, 22). 
In this regard, he also distinguishes between its “negative variant”, which stems from the effects of the 
four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons), and its “positive variant”, 
which includes “the bulk of EU rules that have been adopted in the aftermath of the Single European 
Act outside Consumer and Anti-discrimination Law” (ibid., 21). However, his point is not so much a 
tension between negative and positive variants of European regulatory private law, but the latter’s 
distinctiveness and apparent ‘self-sufficiency’. “This private law is different from national private 
legal orders which based on private autonomy and free will, it is a private law which takes its form, its 
procedure and its content from being instrumentalised for building and shaping markets.” (ibid., 21; 
emphasis omitted) 
A Polanyian perspective on European regulatory private law would have to question and contextualize 
this very assumption of self-sufficiency. This analytical step will be illustrated, in the following, with 
regard to one special objective of European market regulation: the creation of regulated network 
markets and their integration into “a single market for network services (such as electricity, gas, 
waters, telecoms, transport and retail banking)” (Gual 2008, 161). Due to the externalities of these 
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network industries, and the resulting oligopolistic or even monopolistic market structures, they were 
typically organized by the government sector in the twentieth century. A precondition of the new 
regulatory arrangement is thus the commodification of the respective government activities: their 
redefinition and reorganization as marketable ‘network services’. 
Hence, there are two points to be considered: the commodification of network services by means of 
(private) law, and the self-sufficiency of the new branch of regulatory (private) law. As to the 
commodification of ‘services of general interest’, which then become subject to (transnational) market 
competition, we can draw on Krajewski’s (2011) and Batura’s (2011) respective studies of the 
liberalization of health services and telecommunications services, which are both framed in Polanyian 
terms. Krajewski (2011, 237) points out, that “the commodification of an activity requires a 
fundamental change in the ideas underlying that activity, its legal and institutional framework, and the 
actual modalities of its production and consumption”. While the first step implies a redefinition of 
formerly governmental activities in commercial terms, the second step involves a change in the law 
governing these ‘services’, and notably a shift from mandatory to voluntary contractual relationships. 
“The final and third stage of the commodification process is reached with the actual establishment of 
markets as systems of voluntary exchanges of products [or services].” (ibid., 238) Batura emphasizes 
in turn that “[t]ransnational telecommunications services markets were a legal construction in which a 
(competitive) market was created from scratch by using a holistic concept of what such a market had 
to look like” (2011, 258-259). Accordingly, the liberalization of telecommunications services was less 
about European market integration, that is, about removing national barriers between already existing 
service markets. Instead, it was an unprecedented “market-building project which started at 
international level”, with Japan, the UK, and the US being “named as its initiators” (ibid., 258). 
So far, liberalization and commodification seem to follow familiar patterns. At the same time, the 
“regulated” network markets appear to be at odds with the “self-regulating” markets that Polanyi had 
in mind. Nevertheless, they do rely on the commodity fiction, which can only be upheld with massive 
regulatory intervention (Gual 2008, 166). In this respect, they only replicate the paradox of self-
regulation already pointed out by Polanyi. His historical account is thus still topical and also 
applicable to network markets: Just as the introduction of free markets by so-called laissez-faire 
polices entailed “an enormous increase in the administrative functions of the state” (1957 [1944], 139-
140), the essence of European regulatory (private) law is the active management of (network) markets, 
which cannot be left alone. Instead, there is a permanent “need for control, regulation, and 
intervention” (ibid., 140). It seems the emphasis has only shifted from ‘self-regulating markets’ two 
centuries ago, to ‘self-sufficiently regulated markets’ today. 
If the law of the market society of the twenty-first century is thus exemplified by European regulatory 
(private) law, which appears to be increasingly self-sufficient - what does that mean from a Polanyian 
point of view? I will offer two alternative interpretations. The first and normatively preferable 
interpretation would be that the countermovement is already expressed in the social objectives of the 
law in question. In fact, European regulatory private law was introduced above as combining both 
market-making and market-shaping functions. If social purposes and responsibilities thus form part of 
the law of regulated markets (e.g., by granting vulnerable consumers access to commercial network 
services), this may appear as formally or substantially (relatively) self-sufficient. Both Krajewski 
(2011, 241-242) and Batura (2011, 261) point in this regard to aspects of decommodification in the 
regulation of services of general interest in the EU, with the question remaining how this social-policy 
content made its way into the law (supranational anticipation or national resistance?). 
The second, more critical interpretation builds on the above argument of law as a commodifier or even 
commodity, not least in the sense of the “commodification” of “private-law relationships” on the 
European level (Joerges 2012, 68). My point is here that decommodification is in the context of 
regulated markets not an end in itself but also a means to uphold the commodity fiction and, thereby, 
to bolster the respective market activities. As Krajewski (2011, 238) rightfully emphasizes, the third 
and decisive step in the commodification process is that consumers and suppliers of network services 
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“are not only able to choose, but also exercise this choice to a considerable extent, and create 
opportunities for competition on markets”. In other words, only when there is enough activity or 
exchange on the markets (however fictitious or regulated they are), the market forces can properly 
work and bring about the desired efficiency. Inasmuch as regulatory (private) law assumes this 
activating function, it acts a production factor in bringing about a competitive network economy. Its 
‘self-sufficiency’ is derived from this overarching goal, and thus has nothing to do with what Polanyi 
understood as the ‘substance’ of economic life. To find the ‘externalities’ of European regulatory 
private law, we would thus have to look elsewhere – just as for the fictitious commodities of land, 
labour, and money. However, one of the first aspects to be considered is its distinctiveness, 
disconnectedness, and disembeddedness from other forms or branches of law, and notably its strictly 
economic (rather than social, political, or even juridical) outlook. 
Conclusion: Law’s Great Transformation 
At the beginning of “The Great Transformation”, which spans several centuries of economic history, 
Polanyi (1957 [1944], 4) emphasizes: “Ours is not a historical work; what we are searching for is not a 
convincing sequence of outstanding events, but an explanation of their trend in terms of human 
institutions.” In the present contribution, we tried to do something similar: to give an account of the 
law of the market society, which is ‘historical’ only in the way we trace its institutional development 
in constituting and regulating the market. Just like Polanyi’s study, this exercise cuts across “the field 
of several disciplines” (ibid.) and falls prey to the respective limitations. To conclude, I would like to 
recapitulate the main steps of the above argument and reflect them on a more general level. 
First we suggested two different readings of “The Great Transformation”, which shed light on the law 
of the market society. One way was to conceive the law as the ‘fifth’ institution next to the economic 
and political, national and international institutions which Polanyi found characteristic of nineteenth 
century civilization (namely, balance-of-power system, gold standard, self-regulating market, and 
liberal state). In more substantive terms, the law of the market society was equated with the normative 
and factual ‘organization’ of the international political economy of that time, and thus specified as 
international economic law. The other way to find the law was to take a closer look at how the self-
regulating market was eventually institutionalized. Considering that the so-called ‘fictitious 
commodities’ are not only economic but also legal fictions, the law seems indeed to play a crucial role 
in this respect – both as a commodifier and a decommodifier. Moreover, law can itself be pictured as 
the ‘fourth’ fictitious commodity next to labour, land, and money. Similarly to money, it mediates 
between economic and political functions and oscillates between embedded and commodified forms. 
This basic tension was marked as a conflict inherent to the law of the market society. For illustration, 
we referred to divergent concepts of the legal person, which can - despite their differences - all be 
made functional to the ‘needs’ of the market. 
We then argued that this basic conflict also explains the dynamics of the law of the market society, 
that is, it changing forms and functions over time. Against this background, the modern history of 
market law was reconstructed in terms of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ – of (liberal) movement and 
(social) countermovement. Building on different yet compatible narratives of law’s development, we 
separately addressed the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. The nineteenth century 
exhibits the tension between universal legal forms, which are supportive of the agenda of liberalism, 
and national specifications (or exceptions), which rather serve protective means. Moreover, public 
international law came to mimic private law relations, and private international law was adjusted to the 
national/territorial differentiation of public law. In the twentieth century, the domestication of private 
international law is complemented by the ‘materialization’ of substantive private law. Within the new 
paradigm of ‘the social’, law’s basic conflict takes the (exemplary) form of ordoliberal private law 
versus social private law, which may also be conceived as a continuation of the conflict between a 
more ‘juridical’ rationality and a more ‘instrumentalist’ rationality under new premises. The twenty-
first century is characterized by new efforts in the privatization of the law, this time working towards a 
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private choice of law in a transnational context, which fuels the commodification of law. The 
cosmopolitan counter-project combines instead the denationalization of the form of the law with a re-
politicization of its substance. With regard to the European level, the liberalization and integration of 
markets can easily be framed as an act of ‘disembedding’ them from their social and national context, 
first and foremost by legal means. However, as to the ‘reembedding’ countermovement, and notably 
the legal form it takes, the Polanyian accounts in the literature differ. Equally discussed were global 
soft law (with regard to corporate social responsibility) and European case-law (with regard to free 
movement rights), which are both in contrast with the project(ion) of a postnational conflicts-law. 
Adding to this, I put the ‘self-sufficient’ European regulatory private law in a Polanyian perspective, 
using the example of regulated network markets. 
What all this demonstrates is that Wolfgang Streeck was very insightful in choosing for his (implicit) 
follow-up study to Polanyi’s “The Great Transformation” the ambivalent title “Re-forming 
Capitalism” (2009; cf. Frerichs 2010). In a nutshell, his argument is that the ‘social reform’ of the 
market economy – which brought about the model case of the ‘social market economy’ in Germany – 
could not prevent the reformation of capitalism at its core. In other words, however ‘instituted’ or 
regulated the social market economy was at the beginning or at its heyday, it remained a market 
economy after all. In this institutional context, social obligations (or what Streeck calls ‘Durkheimian 
institutions’) tend to be replaced by individual choices (or what is referred to as ‘Williamsonian 
institutions’). Accordingly, it is the “slowly grinding force” (ibid., 146) of private interest which also 
gnaws on the law of the market society. The ‘legal embeddedness of the market’ may thus end up as 
‘economic embeddedness of the law’. Or as Streeck argues: “Polanyian institutions that are market-
breaking rather than market-making probably need to be Durkheimian in character: public rather than 
private, obligatory rather than expedient, and political instead of economic.” (ibid., p. 252; original 
emphasis). The result of the ‘free’ interplay of the law and the market often appears to result in the 
opposite. Law becomes private, voluntary, and economic. In that respect, countermovements – smaller 
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Section II: FOUR SCENARIOS 
1) Hybridisation 
ON LEGAL HYBRIDS 
Kaarlo Tuori*1 
 
In my paper, I invoke legal hybrids at three levels: at the level of individual legal phenomena and 
concepts; at the level of fields of law; and at the level of legal orders or systems. In addition, I refer to 
what have been called hybrid legal spaces. My central argument is that there are no legal hybrids as 
such but only as seen through a particular conceptual and systematizing framework. What we today 
call legal hybrids are legal phenomena which cannot be caught by the traditional systematization and 
conceptual ordering of nation-state law or the complementary black-box model of the relations among 
national legal orders and international law. EU law as the most developed epitome of transnational law 
– law beyond the dichotomy of national and international law – is a veritable gold mine of legal 
hybrids, among these the branch of law called European regulatory private law. Legal hybrids are – or 
at least should be – merely temporary creatures, awaiting their extinction through novel ways of legal 
conceptualising and mapping of our legal universe. But legal hybrids can also be instrumental in 
evoking the need of redefining the very point of legal conceptualisation and systematizing: in showing 
the necessity of abandoning the objective of total coherence in favour of mere local coherence; in 
illuminating the inevitable perspectivism in law; in accentuating the heuristic function of legal 
concepts; and in prompting us to perceive the mutual relations among legal concepts in terms of 
clusters and networks. 
1. 
Our legal universe used to be so nicely organised, every legal phenomenon finding its ”natural” 
conceptual department; the legal universe was ordered in a quasi-Linnean way into kingdoms, classes, 
orders, genera and species. In Continental Europe, the law’s systematization, which was brought into 
perfection by German Begriffsjurisprudenz in the 19th century, had its origins in (the reception of) 
Roman Law. The basic division between public and private law derived from Justinian’s Institutionen. 
Classification of the law’s objects into persons (personae), things (res) and actions (actiones) went 
back to Gaius (130-180), and the further division of things into material (res corporales) and 
immaterial (res incorporales) was also found in Roman sources. These divisions were reiterated in the 
five books of the German 19th-century private-law Begriffsjurisprudenz – Pandect law 
(Pandektenrecht): the general part, the law of obligations, property law (Sachenrecht), family law, and 
the law of inheritance.  Within public law, the 19th century brought about the differentiation of state 
law into constitutional and administrative law. This basic systematisation was conceived from a 
nation-state perspective; despite the legal-cultural transnationalism derived from common Roman-law 
roots, especially in private law, systematization stemming from the efforts of 19th-century legal 
scholarship focused on the national legal order.  
                                                     
*1Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Helsinki. 
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The basic systematization of law was complemented by two branches which crossed state-boundaries: 
public and private international law. But these fields of law did not dispense with the nation-state 
perspective, either. Both private and public international law regulate relationships between nation 
states or their legal orders. International private law comprises the rules of choice determining what 
norms are applied to an issue bearing on more than one nation-state municipal legal order. Private 
international law itself is part of the municipal legal order of the respective nation state. And when 
nation states opt for either the monistic or dualistic model in the relationship between municipal law 
and public international law, they also define the latter’s place in the law’s system. What is important 
is that according to the traditional view, public international law did not interfere in the domestic legal 
order. This fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state; there were no rival legal orders within the 
space of the nation-state, claiming for authority.  
The traditional mapping of our legal universe gave expression to a state-sovereigntist view of modern 
law. On the global scale, this view leads to what William Twining (2000) has fittingly termed the 
black-box model. This model is premised on the (co-)existence of territorially differentiated nation-
state legal orders, each of them claiming exclusive jurisdiction within their respective territorially 
defined social spaces, and international law, confined to regulating external relations between 
sovereign states. In internal legal relations, the sovereign nation states, are supposed to treat each other 
according to the principle of exclusivity, that is, as black boxes. In this conception, both national legal 
orders and international law are treated as self-contained and self-sufficient normative wholes.  
The following figure summarizes the systematization of (municipal) law which Lars Björne, a Finnish 
legal historian, still considered valid three decades ago (Björne 1979, 15). When complemented by the 
black-box model of national legal orders and international law, it provides us with a gapless charting 
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Legal systematization within the boxes of national legal orders did not stop at the division of the law 
into distinct branches. Under the systematic ideal of 19th-century German legal scholarship, each 
branch of law was to be ordered through its specific general doctrines (allgemeine Lehren). Actually, 
it was the general doctrines with their general legal concepts – such as contract in the law of 
obligations or competence and administrative act in administrative law – which rendered legal fields 
their identity and further systematized the legal ”raw material”. In the division of labour between the 
three main actors of modern law – the legislator, the judges and the legal scholars – it was the legal 
scholars who produced the law’s systematization and, hence, played an active role in the development 
of law. A strict classifying conceptual hierarchy or pyramid, often attributed to Georg Friedrich 
Puchta, is probably an invention of the critics of Begriffsjurisprudenz – as is the very term 
Begriffsjurisprudenz, too - but there is no doubt of the systematizing and conceptualizing urge so 
typical of the 19th century and early 20th-century continental legal scholarship. In the USA, it had its 
parallel development in the conceptualism of what has been called the Classical Legal Thought, the 
main object of ridicule of American legal realists (as Begriffsjurisprudenz was the object of derision 
for German Intressenjurisprudenz and Scandinavian legal realism).  
2. 
Today, the traditional order of our legal universe is threatened by strange creatures, legal hybrids. In 
biology, hybrids are defined as offsprings resulting from cross-breeding. Biological hybrids break out 
of the nested hierarchy of the Linnean taxonomy. Correspondingly, legal hybrids defy the conceptual 
compartmentalization of the traditional systematisation. To put it in the shape of a definition: legal 
hybrids are legal phenomena which our inherited conceptual framework is unable to capture and to 
imprison in a determinate conceptual box. 
Contemporary legal literature abounds with examples of legal hybrids. Legal concepts are organised in 
line with the law’s division into distinct branches; each branch of law possesses its specific concepts, 
which are vital for its very identity. But because of the different temporality of the law and the society 
it regulates, it may well be that problems awaiting legal translation do not respect but cut across the 
boundaries separating branches of law. In recent decades, public administration has in all Western 
countries been subject to extensive privatisation. Administrative tasks have been assigned to private-
law organisations, and the administrative management of society has taken recourse to private-law 
means, such as contracts. Traditional general doctrines of administrative law, premised on hierarchical 
power relations between the parties, are no longer able to catch all legally relevant problems in public 
administration’s external or internal relationships. New concepts opening channels between public and 
private law are needed. “Administrative contract” is a representative example of such a conceptual 
renewal; but, seen through the lenses of traditional legal systematization, it is a typical legal hybrid, an 
offspring of cross-breeding of private- and public-law concepts.  
Privatisation of administration manifests the typical late modern expansion of market mechanisms. 
This development has extended the relevance of competition-law considerations: competition law 
traverses almost the whole legal order, including domains traditionally reserved for administrative law. 
This, too, can be deemed hybridization, incursion of foreign elements into the citadel of public law, 
shaking its traditional hierarchical model. But, in effect, even competition law as such, as viewed from 
the perspective of the law’s traditional systematization, is a legal hybrid: it brings together elements 
from both sides of the principal division of public and private law.  
3. 
Thus, legal hybrids exist not only at the level of individual legal phenomena and tentative concepts 
trying to come into grips with these – such as administrative contracts – but even entire branches of 
law can be examined as resulting from hybridization. Present-day debates on the law’s divisions have 
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moved far from the traditional systematization. Interest in the law’s differentiation into specific 
branches has not vanished or even diminished. On the contrary, we are witnessing a revival of 
classification debates. The focus, however, has shifted, so that 19th-century discussants would have a 
hard time in orienting themselves in present debates on such putative departments of law as social law, 
medical and bio-law, sports law, information law, or communications law. Characteristic of recent 
interventions is that they are no longer concerned with the law’s overall systematisation. When labour 
law, some decades ago, waged its battle for independence, it was, at least on the Continent, still 
considered important to ponder its place with regard to the basic distinction between private and 
public law. Present discussants do not seem to be troubled by the location in the law’s comprehensive 
system of the new fields (and disciplines) they are advocating. Instead of total coherence of the law, 
their aim is more modest: to bring about local coherence into a particular body of law.  
It may even be argued that the local coherence sought in contemporary debates stands in contradiction 
with the aspiration for total coherence. As already was the case with labour law or with environmental 
law, the putative new branches of law typically combine normative material which, within the 
traditional divisions, would fall into several compartments.  
In our table, labour law and environmental law are treated as sub-fields of economic law or special 
private law, as it was also called. If the power relations between private and public law had turned out 
differently, new bodies of law could have found a convenient place on the public law side, too: in the 
category called special administrative law. In German-influenced legal systematization, economic law 
and special administrative law are late comers which were introduced to address the consequences of 
welfare-state regulation, in particular the increasing intrusion of public-law elements into the domain 
of private law. But at the same time they shook the premises of the system; economic law or special 
administrative law could not display such unifying general doctrines which, according to the basic 
idea of the traditional systematisation, conferred on relatively independent fields of law their identity.  
Yet economic law and special administrative law as new residual categories also made continuity 
possible. As I have argued, the traditional divisions were meant to classify the legal order of the 
sovereign nation state, although they in part relied on the legal tradition predating the rise of nation 
states. The welfare state has been a political project of the nation state, and the regulations that were 
included in economic law and special administrative law were still attached to the monocentric 
perspective of the nation-state legislator. Present pretenders to the status of an independent field of law 
throw a more profound challenge to the traditional system. They are no longer tied to the nation-state 
legislator but attest to the polycentrism of legal sources and the pluralism of legal orders, perhaps even 
legal systems. They also blur the sharp boundary between legal and other social norms which, in Max 
Weber’s (1978, 657) view, was indispensable for the law’s formal rationality. Environmental law, 
medical and bio-law, information law, or sports law introduce breaches into the system based on the 
fundamental distinction between private and public law and gather together norms which, in 
traditional divisions, are dispersed across several fields. But this is not all. Besides norms issued by the 
domestic legislator, they include EU norms, as well as other norms of international or transnational 
origin. Finally, soft law material, such as recommendations or codes of good practice adopted by 
international and national organisations, also plays an important role in the self-conception of would-
be new branches of law. Thus, not only can the new fields of law not be unequivocally inserted into 
the traditional system; they also renounce its nation-state premises and even question the very 
separateness of law from other social norms. Here we could perhaps speak of multiple hybridization! 
4. 
Our brief discussion of new branches of law points to a third level of legal hybridization, 
complementing the levels of, first, individual legal phenomena and concepts, and, second, branches of 
law. The third level is that of legal orders and legal systems. The black-box model of national legal 
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orders and international law has proven to be incapable of mapping the present global legal landscape. 
This is largely due to the rise of transnational law, the true El Dorado of legal hybrids. 
In effect, the very idea of transnational law is an epitome of legal hybridization. Transnational law is 
law beyond the dichotomy of nation-state law and international law which has emerged as a reaction 
to the spatial and temporal shortcomings of the black-box model in front of the cultural and social 
changes often enough examined under the notion of globalisation or – to use a less pretentious 
expression – de-nationalisation. The distinctive features of transnational law can be attached to either 
norm-formation or norm-application. Transnational norm giving assumes other forms than bi- or 
multilateral treaties between nation states. In norm-application, in turn, the establishment of dispute-
solving or sanctioning bodies beyond the control of nation states suggests the emergence of 
transnational law.  
EU law is the most conspicuous but not the only epitome of transnational law; other examples include 
European human-rights law and WTO-law. These examples display a similar pattern: they all have 
their background in international law but have subsequently severed their international-law moorings 
and, by the same token, largely escaped from the control of nation states. But, they still bear traces of 
their origin, as can be seen from, for instance, the debate of the dual nature of the foundational treaties 
of the EU. From the internal perspective of the EU they are treated as giving expression to 
constitutional law, with legal effects analogous to those of nation-state constitutions. But they have 
also retained their character of international treaties, as have Member States their position of Herren 
der Verträge.  The abortive Constitutional Treaty further accentuated the dual nature of the founding 
treaties and even spelled it out in its very title: an international treaty which contained the constitution 
of the EU! This is typical legal hybridity beyond the grip of the black-box model with its underlying 
the state-sovereigntist premises.  
The hybrid nature of our examples of transnational law relates them to recent debates among 
international lawyers. In fact, from an international law perspective the above-mentioned examples 
can be examined as instances of fragmentation which, in the view of some observers, worryingly 
threatens its cogency. Particular court-like bodies that do not defer to the precedents of the 
International Court of Justice shake its position as a guarantor of international law’s unity. The 
qualified approach of some special courts, including the European Court of Human Rights, to the 
Vienna Convention on International Treaty Law, has also been seen as a danger to the coherence of 
international law.  
But whether we conceive of the on-going process as fragmentation of international law or as the dawn 
of transnational law, the growing plethora of legal sources, legal orders, and even legal systems does 
not mesh with the dichotomy of municipal and international law. The municipal legal order has lost its 
monopoly on determining legal relations involving private individuals. Even in states whose 
constitution defines the status of international law according to the dualistic model, transnational 
norms have an immediate effect, regardless of a transformative act of the national legislator. This is 
the case in Finland, for instance. Art. 95 of the Constitution lays down that international treaties and 
other international-law obligations are to be incorporated into the domestic legal order through an Act 
of Parliament or a presidential decree. Nonetheless, this constitutional provision cannot prevent the 
direct effect of, for instance, EU regulations, preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice, or 
precedents of the European Court of Human Rights; here, no prior decision of the national legislature 
is needed. 
The deficiency of the black-box model is even more conspicuous with regard to transnational 
regulation that altogether lacks a background in international treaty law and that has – if we are to lend 
credence to Niklas Luhmann’s disciples in autopoietic systems theory – emerged as a result of 
autonomous operation of de-nationalised social sub-systems. Examples are provided by the lex 
mercatoria of international trade, the lex sportiva of international sports, and the lex digitalis of the 
Internet. In each of these transnational legal systems, the applicable norms have been subsumed by 
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neither municipal legal orders nor international law, while disputes are settled and sanctions imposed 
by designated transnational bodies. 
5. 
The rise of transnational law entails that municipal law has lost its monopoly of jurisdiction within the 
territorial confines of the nation-state. We have arrived at a situation where we have rival legal orders 
or even legal systems competing for authority in the same territorial and social space; this has led 
some observers to talk of hybrid legal spaces. This is the backdrop to the at least potential 
fundamental conflicts of authority between transnational courts, such as the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, and domestic courts, such as constitutional courts of EU Member States.  
Conflicts between legal systems are not excluded under the black-box model of self-contained 
territorially differentiated legal systems, either. But under the dominance of this model, the default 
assumption is that at issue are mere boundary disputes, few in number and manageable by private 
international law and the choice-of-law doctrine.  Boundary disputes of this character can, of course, 
also crop up in the relations between transnational law and nation-state law. But here a much more 
momentous conflict, extending to the very foundations of legal authority, remains at least a latent 
possibility. 
In the black-box model, legal systems and the reach of their respective claims of authority are 
differentiated along territorial criteria; within its territory, the claim of authority of the nation-state 
legal system is universal and exclusive. It is universal in the sense of covering all substantive fields of 
regulation; and it is exclusive in the sense of not acknowledging any rival legal authority. In contrast to 
legal systems adhering to state-sovereigntist premises, transnational law does not follow territorial but 
functional or substantive criteria of differentiation. This is true even of EU law, in spite of its 
notorious expansionist tendencies. As a rule, transnational law’s claim of authority is not exclusive or 
exhaustive, either. There are, though, exceptions to this rule, as is proved by Treaty provisions on the 
EU’s exclusive legislative competence. Transnational law contends nation-state law’s claim to both 
exclusivity and universality, and clashes arising from contradictory principles of attribution of legal 
authority seem inevitable: transnational law’s functionally or substantively limited claim of authority 
disputes nation-state law’s universal and exclusive claim.  A particularly acute crisis in the relations of 
transnational and nation-state law may erupt if the former claims authority in issues which the latter 
has reserved for the competence of constitutional law. 
EU law provides us with illuminating examples of such at least potential fundamental conflicts 
between transnational and nation-state law. National constitutional courts, the German one as arguably 
the most prominent among them, have contested EU law’s – and, at the institutional level, the ECJ’s – 
claim of authority in three interrelated issues: the Kompetenz-Kompetenz; the monitoring of 
fundamental rights; and (other) fundamental constitutional principles. But the possibility of 
fundamental conflicts of authority is not a specificity of EU law’s relation to the Member States’ legal 
system. Thus, the reservations expressed by the German Constitutional Court with regard to the 
rulings of the ECtHR, for instance, imply a similar contest of authority 
6. 
EU law as the most developed instance of transnational law deserves a closer examination. EU law is a 
veritable gold mine for a researcher digging for examples of legal hybrids at the three levels of 
individual legal phenomena and concepts, branches of law and legal orders or systems. Not only is EU 
law as a whole a legal hybrid breaking out of the black-box model, but it also ignores the traditional 
division into relatively independent branches of law which has provided the general framework for 
systematizing municipal, nation-state law. EU legislation cannot be compressed into the compartments 
of the traditional systematization. What has been christened European regulatory private law is clearly 
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an instance of legal hybridization as well, not only because of its obvious transnational character but 
also because the very expression “regulatory private law” intimates cross-breeding of elements which 
in the traditional systematization are located on opposite sides of the watershed separating private and 
public law. 
Our inherited legal concepts, which our national legal cultures have taught us to employ when tackling 
with legal issues and which constitute an integral element of our legal Vorverständnis, are organized 
according to the traditional divisions of law – we have private-law concepts, criminal-law concepts, 
administrative-law concepts and so forth. Their applicability to legal phenomena with an EU law 
background cannot be taken for granted. Rather, it is to be expected that EU law increasingly 
generates legal phenomena that cannot be caught in the conceptual net elaborated in the context of 
nation-state law. In legal proceedings before national courts, this gives rise to what Thomas 
Wilhelmsson (1997) has memorably called the Jack-in-the-box effect of EU law. Some of the most 
recent examples of legal hybrids stem from the rather improvised responses to the sovereign debt 
crisis. Here I shall be content to invoke only one of them: the Framework Agreement on the European 
Financial Stability Facility which combined aspects of private law, public international law and EU 
law.  
Even when we presume that a normative whole corresponding to a particular branch of the traditional 
systematization can be distilled from EU law, the pertinence of concepts tailored to nation-state 
context may still be contested. The adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the drafting of 
the Constitutional Treaty intensified the discussion of the EU and its law in constitutional terms. As 
many clear-sighted participants have noted, the discussion is dogged by conceptual difficulties and 
paradoxes. The constitutional concepts available to us have received their present established 
meanings in the context of modern nation states, although they may originally date from the pre-
modern period. “State”, “sovereignty”, “constitution”, “democracy” and “demos”, “separation of 
powers”, “civil society” and “public sphere”, as well as “citizenship”, all suggest the nation state as 
the governing structure. But the EU cannot be equated with a modern nation state, although our 
unexamined and even obstinate patterns of thinking often lead us in a quasi-automatic way to describe 
and assess it with conceptual and normative tools tailored to this particular type of polity.  Among 
scholars, no agreement exists on a positive characterisation of the EU. What, by contrast, is generally 
accepted is its negative portrayal as a non-state: the EU is not a federation that shares its sovereignty 
with its Member States, nor is it a confederation of sovereign states.  
7. 
What conclusions should we draw from the present disorder generated by legal hybrids? We still need 
conceptualization and systematization in order to bring about order and coherence in our legal 
universe. However, the traditional comprehensive systematization of the national legal order and the 
complementary black-box model have proved to be incapable of achieving this objective. There are no 
legal hybrids as such but only as seen from the perspective of a particular conceptual and 
systematizing framework. What we today call legal hybridity is a sign of our conceptual confusion: 
new conceptual and systematizing grids are needed, but our legal mind-set is still in many respects 
attached to the state-sovereigntism of the black-box model and the distinctions of the traditional 
systematization.  
Nonetheless, the conceptual and systematizing frameworks coined in the nation-state context are often 
enough the only available starting-point for examining what we - temporarily - call legal hybrids. 
Thus, to revert to the example of the constitutional analysis of the EU, we cannot simply abandon 
concepts attached to modern nation states; rather, the task is to assign them a meaning suited to 
examining the transnational polity of the EU and its transnational legal order. They must be detached 
from their “nation-state logic”, so that they can capture the interaction between the transnational and 
the national, so typical of the EU and its law (and a major source of hybridity). 
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However, not only are new conceptual and systematic frameworks needed but the very point of legal 
conceptualization and systematization must be redefined. Coherence of normative legal material is 
still, for both scholarly and practical reasons, a pertinent objective. But a total coherence presupposing 
a gapless conceptual compartmentalization of all legal phenomena is a chimera and as such can no 
longer constitute a viable regulative ideal for legal scholarship. Instead of comprehensive, total 
coherence, we have to be content with such local coherence which has been the central promise of 
recent proposals for new fields of law, such as bio or medical law, information or communication law, 
or – why not? – European regulatory private law. 
These new proposals help us to perceive the inevitable perspectivism in law. The same healthy and 
sobering effect is to be expected from what has been called spatial legal hybridity: the existence of 
rival legal orders or systems within the same social and territorial space. Along with the objective of 
total coherence, we have to abandon the idea of one and only “correct” way of conceptualising and 
systematizing law. The new branches of law or legal transnationalization do not necessarily render the 
traditional systematization completely obsolete. It may still be instrumental for specific purposes, but 
it has certainly lost its exclusive validity, as has the domestic legal order within the nation-state. 
Alternative, mutually non-exclusive ways of conceptualising and systematizing legal phenomena and 
of defining and tackling legal problems exist. This might be called legal pluralism, but it is legal 
pluralism which rejects neither the normativity of law nor the normative objective of coherence. 
Finally, we have to reconsider the role of legal concepts in legal scholarship and practice. Now as 
before, concepts constitute an integral and indispensable element of our legal Vorverständnis. But we 
should accentuate their heuristic function. Concepts are necessary for identifying, defining and 
organising legal issues. But their mutual relations should be seen in terms of clusters and networks 
rather than as amounting to conceptual pyramids or trees. Emphasis on the heuristic function also 
makes clear that concepts as such cannot be expected to provide a basis for normative conclusions or 
derivation of new legal rules. But perhaps such legal constructivism, along with the ideal of a 
conceptual pyramid, only exists in the travesty of Begriffsjurisprudenz, concocted by “late” Ihering 
and his the intellectual heirs, and in the complementary caricatures of conceptualism drawn by the 
American and Scandinavian realist soul mates of German Interessenjurisprudenz (Tuori 2011, 105 
ff.).  
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CONVERGENCE: WHAT, WHY, AND WHY NOT? 
Roger Brownsword* 1 
Introduction 
Imagine that it is proposed that there should be a degree of ‘convergence’ (partial, total, specific, 
general) between two legal orders, A (LOA) and B (LOB). When such a proposal comes ‘out of 
nowhere’, without any explanatory context, there are many questions to be asked about it. However, 
even a proposal for convergence between LOA and LOB that has a more explicit context invites a 
number of questions. What precisely do we mean by ‘convergence’? Why do we think this is a good 
idea? Are there reasons for resisting convergence? How is convergence to be effectuated, and so on? 
In this short paper, I will focus on what we mean by ‘convergence’ and then, and for the most part, on 
the reasons we have for thinking that convergence might be a good or a bad idea. Here, I will 
introduce a distinction between Type 1 convergence (broadly speaking convergence for its own sake) 
and Type 2 convergence, where the underlying reasons point, first, to the credentials of a particular 
rule and then to convergence. I think that this is potentially an important distinction; but, as with 
everything else in this paper, I could be wrong. In case my analysis seems to make too much of a 
presumption in favour of convergence (whatever it might be), I close with a few remarks about the 
value of self-governance and private ordering. 
What Do We Mean by ‘Convergence’? 
The idea of ‘convergence’ is open to a variety of interpretations. For example, we might judge that 
there is ‘convergence’ between LOA and LOB if: 
(i) the same formal rule exists in both LOA and LOB (e.g., in both LOA and LOB, the law is that 
cars should be driven on the right hand side of the road and that the maximum speed on any 
highway is 120kmph; or that in the general law of contract there is a ‘reception’ rule for the 
time at which an acceptance takes effect) 
(ii) as in (i) but also that, in both LOA and LOB, the formally convergent rules are enforced in 
practice 
(iii) regardless of formal convergence or divergence, in both LOA and LOB, materially similar 
questions of law are decided in ways that generate convergent outcomes (e.g., in both LOA and 
LOB, issues concerning fair dealing produce convergent outcomes even though LOA relies on 
a doctrine of good faith and LOB relies on particular applications of reasonableness) 
For the purposes of this paper, let me take the first of these interpretations (purely formal 
convergence) as the operative one. Although this interpretation allows for divergence in practice, it 
suffices to concentrate the mind on why anyone should propose that the rules in LOA and LOB should 
be brought into alignment or why we should think that it is a good thing (even only a prima facie, 
other things being equal, good thing) that the rules in LOA and LOB are formally identical.  
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However, before we get to the question of ‘Why convergence?’, I want to highlight a critical 
distinction (between convergence for the sake of convergence and convergence for the sake of some 
independent reason); and I want to note that, even at the level of formal convergence, there seem to be 
different degrees  of convergence. 
A Critical Distinction 
Suppose that LOA and LOB share a border and that there is a great deal of road traffic across this 
border. Whereas, in LOA, the rule is that cars drive on the left, in LOB the rule is that they drive on 
the right. It is proposed that, in both LOA and LOB, the rule should be the same. The case for 
convergence, however, might be put in two rather different ways as follows. 
One proposal for convergence might state that it does not matter whether the rule provides for driving 
on the left or the right; the important thing is that, either side of the border, the rule should be the 
same. What matters is convergence—that is, convergence for the sake of convergence. 
A second proposal, however, might agree that the two rules cause some inconvenience to drivers but 
maintain that the best reason for convergence is that there is evidence that driving on the right is 
actually safer than driving on the left. In other words, the question is not so much whether there should 
be the same rule in LOA and LOB (a question of convergence pure and simple), it is whether the rule 
in LOA or the rule in LOB should be adopted as the better rule relative to what we know about the 
conditions for road safety. 
So, there is a potentially critical distinction between (i) a proposal for convergence that is driven 
purely by the consideration that it is better to have the same rule in LOA and LOB than it is to have 
different rules and (ii) a proposal that has independent reasons for supporting a particular rule and then 
arguing for adoption of that rule in both LOA and LOB (which would lead to formal convergence). 
Let me call the former ‘Type 1 convergence’ and the latter ‘Type 2 convergence’. 
I can see that this distinction is too simple. For example, we might sub-divide Type 1 convergence into 
cases where, quite literally, any rule will do (so long as it is the same rule in LOA and LOB) and cases 
where there are a number of candidate rules, any one of which will do. In these various Type 1 cases, 
there are different degrees of indifference as to the particular rule that is used. Nevertheless, they share 
the essential Type 1 characteristic, namely that their primary concern is that there should be 
convergence, that the rule should be the same, not that the rule should be a good one, or the best. 
Degrees of Convergence 
Let us suppose that formal convergence in its ideal-typical expression requires that, in both LOA and 
LOB, on a particular legal question, a particular rule applies. In both LOA and LOB, this rule is the 
only rule that applies; it is mandatory; and it is maximal. For example, in both LOA and LOB, the rule 
that governs the recovery of consequential losses following a breach of contract is that the claimant 
may recover damages in relation to the losses that flow directly and naturally from the breach. There is 
no way round this rule; and there is no way that the formal rules may permit any different level of 
recovery.  
Nevertheless, formal convergence might be a bit less strict, a bit less rigid. Within a scheme for 
convergence, there might be a degree of optionality. I am not sure how to characterise these limited 
openings for divergence, but we might perhaps speak about hard, medium, and soft convergence.  
Thus: 
• Hard (ideal-typical) convergence means that the rule is mandatory and maximal. 
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• Medium convergence means that the rule is mandatory but minimal (so some optionality is 
available) 
• Soft convergence means that the rule is either optional (as with the development risks defence in 
European product liability law; or the moral exclusions against patentability in Article 27(2) 
TRIPS in patent law) or a default. 
To return to the example of the rule for the recovery of consequential losses following a breach of 
contract, we have the following: 
• The claimant may recover, always and only, in respect of the losses that flow directly and 
naturally from the breach (hard convergence: maximal) 
• The claimant may always recover in respect of the losses that flow directly and naturally from 
the breach, however it is for each legal order (LOA and LOB)  to decide whether to provide also 
for the recovery of some indirect losses (medium convergence: minimal harmonisation) 
• Unless contrary provision is made in LOA or LOB, the claimant may recover, always and only, 
in respect of the losses that flow directly and naturally from the breach (soft convergence: 
default rule). 
No doubt, more could be made of the different degrees of convergence but I do not think that it is an 
absolutely fundamental matter—or, at any rate, I do not think that it is as critical as the Type 1/Type 2 
distinction. 
Why Convergence? 
What reasons might be given for a proposed convergence between some or all rules in LOA and LOB? 
Here are four classes of reasons that might be offered: (i) political; (ii) economic/efficiency/trade; (iii) 
health, safety, and environment; and (iv) moral. 
The Political Case 
Where the context for a discussion about convergence is one of political union between LOA and 
LOB, there might be competing ideas about how the union is best expressed.  
The symbolic significance of sharing the same rules (at any rate, the same rules for the public ordering 
of the union) will be an important consideration. However, there might still be questions about (i) 
which rules should be adopted (it is not entirely a matter of convergence for the sake of convergence) 
and (ii) how much room is to be left for local (and divergent) ordering within the union. (Compare the 
debate between ‘Hamiltonian federalists’ who argue for convergence as a close binding together 
[coupled with central control] and ‘Jeffersonians’ who argue for a looser networked society). 
We should also note the possible application of cosmopolitan ideals. According to Kwame Anthony 
Appiah (in his book, Cosmopolitanism): 
[T]here are two strands that intertwine in the notion of cosmopolitanism. One is the idea that we 
have obligations to others, obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties 
of kith and kind, or even the more formal ties of a shared citizenship. The other is that we take 
seriously the value not just of human life but of particular human lives, which means taking an 
interest in the practices and beliefs that lend them significance. People are different, the 
cosmopolitan knows, and there is much to learn from our differences. Because there are so many 
human possibilities worth exploring, we neither expect nor desire that every person or every 
society should converge on a single mode of life. Whatever our obligations are to others (or theirs 
to us) they often have the right to go their own way….[T]here will be times when these two 
ideals—universal concern and respect for legitimate difference—clash.  
Roger Brownsword 
 80 
The italics in the above quotation from Appiah are mine. They suggest that, for cosmopolitans, a hard 
look should be taken at proposals for convergence if the effect of convergence will be to reduce the 
permitted and available (different but legitimate) modes of life.  
The Economic/Efficiency/Trade Case 
Where the context is not one of political union between LOA and LOB, how do we decide whether 
convergence is rational?  
One argument is that the particular (divergent) rules in LOA and LOB have no underpinning rationale 
other than that there was a need for a rule (like the rule of the road) and that these divergent rules are 
‘inefficient’, in the sense that they impose some unnecessary costs on traders and their customers (or 
they impair the realisation of some economic benefits). To achieve convergence, there will be some 
costs; but, let us suppose, the case for convergence factors in these costs.  
I am not sure how many cases for convergence can be made out on the premise that what is most 
needed is that the rule in LOA and LOB should be formally convergent rather than that what matters is 
having the ‘best’ or the ‘right’ rule in LOA and LOB.  But, we can be sure that the debates about 
convergence will become more contested once one side judges that its rule is better than others (and 
not just because its rule has a certain pedigree or a long history).    
There is also a further complication. Even if it is agreed that a particular rule should be adopted for the 
sake of economic efficiency, it might be opposed on quite different grounds—for example, for reasons 
relating to matters of human health and safety, or protection of the environment, or for reasons that are 
of a moral nature. Here, the objection is not to convergence as such; the objection is to economically-
driven convergence that presents unacceptable HSE risks or that offends moral principles. 
While HSE and moral reasons can operate as objections, they might also be cited as reasons in favour 
of convergence. However, where this is the case, the argument for convergence will be of a Type 2 
kind.  
The HSE Case 
Consider, again, the rules in LOA and LOB that regulate road traffic. Let us suppose that, in LOA, the 
demand is for very high levels of road safety (the maximum speed is 90kmph) and the background 
culture is very ‘green’ (which is reflected in strict laws regulating car emissions and fuel 
consumption). In LOB, things are completely different. Now, when it is proposed that there should be 
convergence between these sets of laws in LOA and LOB, there will be a strong resistance in LOA to 
any relaxation in its safety and environmental standards. For LOA to meet LOB half-way, just is not 
an option. 
Suppose, though, that the economic arguments for convergence are strong. Suppose that, with 
convergence (on LOB’s terms), LOA would increase its trade with LOB so that it would be 
significantly ‘better off’.  If citizens in LOA put HSE considerations on a different (higher) plane to 
economic considerations, the strength of the economic arguments will not make any difference. 
However, if citizens in LOA regard economic cost/benefits as commensurable with HSE 
costs/benefits, their willingness to relax their HSE standards for the sake of economically beneficial 
convergence will depend on how the overall cost/benefit calculation looks.   
If, for the sake of the economic benefits, LOA is prepared to give some ground in relation to its pre-
convergence HSE standards, the adoption of LOB’s standards might not be the only way forward. For 
example, LOA and LOB might agree upon a scheme of mutual recognition (which produces some 
version of convergence although I am not sure quite how it fits in with my earlier typology). 
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The Moral Case 
A Type 2 case for convergence might be made out on moral grounds. For example, it might be argued 
that, in both LOA and LOB, there should be a convergent set of rules that prohibit discrimination on 
grounds of race, sex, political or religious views, and so on.  
If such a scheme of convergence is agreed, at any rate where it is agreed at a relatively high level of 
generality, there might be scope for a degree of local diversity and divergence (legally protected under 
margins of difference and margins of appreciation, and the like; as well as by some notions of 
‘regulatory cosmopolitanism’). This scenario is one of what I call ‘closed pluralism’ (the baseline 
values are agreed but they may be articulated in somewhat different ways—for example, even though 
LOA and LOB have convergent anti-discrimination or equal opportunity laws, they may take different 
views about the legality of reverse/positive discrimination). 
Moral reasons may, of course, feature as reasons against convergence. In a moral community, unless 
its morality is utilitarian, economic benefits will be ‘trumped’ by arguments that draw on moral rights 
or duties. Here, even though convergence might be economically beneficial, it is unacceptable if it 
involves the violation of human rights or the compromising of human dignity. 
In conditions of what I call ‘open pluralism’, where LOA subscribes to one kind of morality and LOB 
to another, there will be little interest in morally driven convergence and plenty of reasons to oppose 
convergence that offends moral principles. Of course, there might be occasions where moral 
convergence arises in a spontaneous and happenstance way (‘incompletely theorised agreements’ as 
Cass Sunstein might put it)—for example, it might be the case that in both LOA and LOB the 
divergent moralities lead to the prohibition of human reproductive cloning. Market and morals might 
seem to inhabit different worlds; but, if we understand morals as being about ‘doing the right thing’, 
there is no reason to exempt the marketplace from such reasoning. 
Consider the central question in regulating the consumer marketplace: what do we judge to be a fair 
balance of rights and responsibilities as between suppliers and purchasers? Why should LOA and LOB 
have the same rules for consumer transactions? Why convergence? This is not convergence for 
convergence’s sake; it is not the case that we think that any convergent rule will do. If the case is that 
convergence (with some level of consumer protection) will serve the interests of efficiency, this might 
not be enough to convince a moral community that subscribes to ideas of fairness that are not based on 
utilitarian considerations. If the community puts moral reasons on a higher plane than efficiency 
reasons, convergence should be resisted unless these moral reasons are satisfied. Possibly, this might 
mean that only soft convergence will be acceptable. 
A Different Thought: How Important is Private Ordering (Self-Governance)? 
In some of my more recent writing on contracts and on the use of technologies as regulatory 
instruments, I have underlined the importance of self-governance and of preserving zones in which 
there is a real practical opportunity for private ordering.  I did not write any of this in opposition to 
convergence. Nevertheless, it does imply some tension with convergence, or at least with convergence 
for its own sake. If there is to be convergence, those who value self-governance will think that the 
softer the convergence the better. 
To connect contracts to technological instruments of regulation, as contracts migrate to on-line 
environments, the infrastructure (which might seem to be just ‘technical’) needs to be interoperable---
for the sake of efficiency, there does need to be degree of convergence. However, as Johnson and Post 
argue, this is a place for private ordering, for networked divergence.  
Consider, too, the vexed question of the regulation of business networks (Teubner): self-governance is 
surely important to recognise and preserve. Each network can order its internal relationships in its own 
way. External relations raise different questions. Similarly, I would want to allow commercial 
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contractors to be permitted to provide for their own sectoral regimes of governance and to be able to 
rely on what they take to be the agreed sectoral groundrules. 
Conclusion and Caveat 
The conclusion is: convergence is complex!  
No doubt, as with many things, convergence has its time and its place. We do well to ask whether 
early 21st century Europe is such a time and place. What exactly are the drivers (is there a danger of 
mindless Type 1 convergence)? Why, if at all, and where, should we resist convergence? 
My sense (and it is no more than a very general sense) is that, where the trajectory is towards greater 
standardisation and convergence, much of it ostensibly for the sake of efficiency, we need to resist 
when our valuations of HSE risks are overridden or when our moral values are at stake.  
We should also think about how convergence sits with both cosmopolitan ideals (which favour Type 2 
convergence of universal values as well as non-convergence where there is a threat to legitimate local 
difference) and with the opportunity to act as self-governing individuals and communities. 





SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF EUROPEAN (REGULATORY) PRIVATE LAW: 
A DISCUSSION PAPER 
Jan M. Smits* 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this exploratory paper is to discuss the idea of a ‘self-sufficient European private law.’ As 
is rightly set out in the writings of Hans Micklitz,1 and in the project in the context of which this 
workshop takes place, there is a clear need to address the question of how the large body of European 
rules with relevance for private actors relates to the traditional national private laws. This paper aims 
to provoke discussion about the idea of a self-sufficient European private law itself. To this end, a 
provisional answer is offered to the question whether ‘a self-sufficient European private law’ is indeed 
a viable concept. 
Section 2 sets out the relevant background, largely providing my own understanding of the problems 
at stake in the present project. This will make readily clear that there is a need to better define some of 
the concepts used in the discussion, including the ambiguous term ‘(European) private law’ itself. 
Once we have more clarity on this, we are able to explore three types of interaction between the 
European and the national private law order (section 3). In my view it is only possible to make 
progress on whether self-sufficiency is a viable concept if we identify the function of self-sufficiency 
and subsequently distinguish between different ways in which it can be achieved at the national and 
the European level (section 4). 
2. Framing the Question and Making Assumptions Explicit 
My starting point is formed by the claims underlying the present project.2 I paraphrase these claims as 
follows. While traditional national private legal orders are largely guided by autonomy and freedom of 
contract, continuing European influence has transformed private law into a field that is increasingly 
characterised by ‘functionalism in competition and regulation.’ The result is a growing tension 
between the nation state private laws (still different from one country to another, but united in their 
aim to provide a particular type of ‘justice’: see below) and the ‘market state’ European private law. 
This tension is mainly due to the fundamentally contradictory aims of national and European private 
law: while national private laws would aim to realise some national view of justice, European private 
law reflects a more instrumental view. This could be qualified as a development from social justice to 
‘access justice’: the European Union grants ‘access justice to those who are excluded from the market 
or to those who face difficulties in making use of the market freedoms. European private law rules 
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have to make sure that the weaker parties have and maintain access to the market – and to the 
European society in so far as this exists.’3 
It seems useful to distinguish two aspects of this important and insightful account. First, it describes 
the emergence of a large set of rules and policies at the European level and indicates that these rules 
have remained largely separate from traditional private law, prompting a tension that is apparent in a 
variety of ways.4 In fields such as telecom, energy, finance, insurance, transport, health, food, 
intellectual property, public procurement, non-discrimination and consumer law, a large number of 
rules with relevance for private actors has emerged. This account fits in with previous work on the rise 
of the European ‘regulatory state’ in general: since the 1985 Commission White Paper on the 
completion of the internal market, European policymakers have focused on guaranteeing access of 
actors to the market in order to further develop it.5 
Second, the account is normative by claiming that it is wrong to keep this large regulatory framework 
on access justice separate from the traditional national private laws: a fundamental re-orientation of 
structures and methods of European private law is needed in order to keep our ideas of private law in 
sync with a 21st century society. I could not agree more,6 but it is important to point at two 
assumptions underlying this claim that can provide the necessary perspective. 
The first implicit assumption is a view on what is actually ‘private law.’ If one looks at the way in 
which this field is usually understood (e.g. taught and written about), it is clear that also at the national 
level, many rules with relevance for private parties are not seen as part of ‘classic’ private law and are 
not related to the ‘core’ areas of contracts, torts and property. In the fields just mentioned, there are 
often specific national law rules as well (to a greater or lesser extent curtailed by European law), but 
they mostly are separately studied. I believe this is wrong, but this does imply the need to better define 
what the field of ‘private law’ is exactly about and how it should be studied. This is even more urgent 
in view of the unclear concept of ‘European private law’ itself: there is no common understanding of 
what this field exactly includes. In the above I formulated it as providing rules with relevance for 
private actors, but this is if course a rather vague formulation that is in need of further refinement. And 
all this is not just a matter of definition: the question of what is the ‘true’ (European) private law sets 
the agenda for how many different rules and policies are to be part of the same system (see below). 
The second assumption is that traditional national private law is not primarily about access to the 
market (or in any event in a different way than European private law). However, also at the national 
level the main aim of private law is arguably to provide all citizens with the possibility to enter into 
transactions and to enjoy property on a national market and in a national society. The expression of the 
Civil Code being the true constitution of a country7 is in this respect telling.8 Seen from this 
perspective, it could be argued that the rise of access justice in the European Union is ‘only’ the next 
logical next step in a development towards Europeanisation of the market. If this is true, there is only a 
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Brownsword, Hans Micklitz, Leone Niglia & Stephen Weatherill (eds.), The Foundations of European Private Law, 
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gradual difference between European and national access justice: while at the national level all kinds 
of mechanisms have developed over time to enable parties to operate on the national market, such 
mechanisms are now put into place to also allow access to the European market. If this alternative 
reading of the present situation makes sense, it is of course still urgent to redefine the relationship 
between the national and the European level (and between the different conceptions of justice 
operating at these levels), but the challenge may not be to aim for a complete re-orientation of present-
day private law. This calls for a clear definition of what is access justice.9 
With these two caveats in mind, it is possible to frame the main question. It can be defined as how the 
European and the national level private legal order should interact. Three types of interaction are to be 
considered. 
3. Three Types of Interaction between the European and the National Private Law 
Order 
The question of interaction between different legal orders is of course not new, but it has received new 
impetus in the last decade as a result of the accelerating pace of European integration. The question is 
also certainly not restricted to the field of private law, to the contrary: most of the debate on pluralism 
and multilevel law making takes place in the field of constitutional law.10 In the context of the present 
workshop, I distinguish between three ways in which one can deal with the interaction between the 
national and the European private legal order. 
The first possibility is not to consider European regulatory private law as private law, or even as law, 
at all. This is not as strange as it may seem. If ‘the purpose of private law is to be private law’, as 
Weinrib has famously claimed,11 there is no need to integrate any regulatory aims in this field. To 
some extent, this is even the present situation, caused by the compartmentation of sub-disciplines 
(including different scholars publishing in different journals and being active in different academic 
circles). It also fits in with the claim that the European Union is moving from integration through law 
to integration without law. This perspective is one of denial and for me there is no question that it is 
therefore the wrong perspective. It is exactly this view that leads to ‘surprises’ caused by the tension 
between national and European conceptions of justice, as apparent in for example the cases of Viking 
and Laval12 and Kücükdeveci.13 
The second possible way to deal with the interaction between national and European private legal 
orders is to consider European regulatory private law as law, but to look at it through the national lens. 
This assumes that the national private law is still the starting point of any meaningful analysis and that 
the European norms are to be studied as influencing national law. The emergence of rules emanating 
from the European legislature and courts is then considered as a phenomenon that stands next to the 
‘normal’ production of norms at the national level. This view prevails in present-day academia.14 It 
must however be discarded for being too one-sided: it does not take European private law seriously by 
not looking at it as a separate field of study. Even if the outcome of such study would be that European 
                                                     
9 For Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 2001, social justice seems to be about assuring the ‘protection of equal 
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11 Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, Harvard UP 1995. 
12 C-438/05; C-341/05. 
13 C-555/07. 
14 See e.g. Gebauer & Wiedmann (eds.), Zivilrecht unter europäischem Einfluss, 2nd ed., Stuttgart (Boorberg) 2010 and 
Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Keus (eds.), De invloed van het Europese recht op het Nederlandse privaatrecht, Deventer (Kluwer), 
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private law cannot be seen as a separate field in its own right, the second perspective does not even 
allow an attempt to consider it in this way. 
The third possibility is to look at European private law as an autonomous field. This view of European 
private law as a ‘self-sufficient’ system implies that the substantive body of European private law 
norms can be looked at from the ‘European’ perspective. This is, however, not enough. If a truly 
autonomous European private law does exist (or can be developed), one also needs to establish how 
this body of law relates to the national private laws, either through hierarchy, coordination or 
competition. In the following section, an attempt is made to show what such a self-sufficient European 
private law could look like and how it could relate to national laws. 
4. A ‘Self-sufficient’ European Private Law 
4.1 What is a ‘Self-Sufficient’ Legal Order? 
It makes sense to ask first what we must understand by a ‘self-sufficient’ order of private law and why 
we would need it. Self-sufficiency in general refers to a state of not requiring any support or 
interaction for survival, thus reflecting collective or personal autonomy. I see this concept as a gradual 
one: one side of the spectrum is formed by autarky, meaning that a system or a person is completely 
independent and does not need to interact with any other system or person to survive. On the other 
side of the spectrum, self-sufficiency also exists if a system or a person enjoys at least some autonomy 
in the broader scheme of things. While complete autonomy of a person (meaning: without any 
interaction with the outside world) seems very difficult in today’s world, complete independence of a 
societal system (such as law) seems even impossible: legal systems will always interact in some way. 
The main reason why we are in need of a sufficiently autonomous law is that it creates a ‘stable 
practice’: it allows people to rely on a set of norms that is publicly recognised as binding on the 
collectivity.15 Elements of this self-sufficiency at the national level consist in my view of common 
values inherent in the products of national legislatures and courts, a common legal system and a 
common discussion by way of a shared frame of reference of all legal actors (legislatures, courts, 
practitioners and academics). This shapes the legal process from the making of law to its enforcement. 
4.2 What Shall We Do With European Private Law? Searching for European Self-Sufficiency by 
Mimicking National Law 
Is it possible to find a self-sufficient European private law that consists of the same elements just 
described for the national level? This is partly suggested in the present project, in which the hypothesis 
is that a self-sufficient private law could consist of three different layers: ‘(1) the sectorial substance of 
ERPL, (2) general principles – provisionally termed competitive contract law – and (3) common 
principles of civil law.’ 
If we ask what these elements would look like at the European level, some problems may emerge. 
Systematisation of the sectorial substance of regulatory private law is of course possible, but if all the 
areas mentioned in section 2 have to be part of this system, its informative value may not be very 
high.16 An additional problem is that regulatory law tends to change rather quickly. When it comes to 
an area such as European consumer law, the development of a system is of course easier to achieve. I 
                                                     
15 Cf. the summary of a forthcoming book by Mariano Croce, Self-sufficiency of Law: A Critical-Institutional Theory of 
Social Order, (Springer) 2012. 
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understand the second element (‘competitive contract law’) to be about the conditions under which 
choice by private actors is possible within the European private law system, which is indeed important 
(see also below). The third element (common principles of civil law) would in my view require a 
different perspective than the one apparent in the present case law of the Court of Justice, that only 
seems to repeat the principles already accepted at the national level or laid down in the DCFR.17 
However, to say that a contract has binding force is not very informative. The real challenge is to 
develop principles on basis of the existing acquis, that might actually speak in favour of a strong 
mitigation of the binding force of consumer contracts. 
The general elements needed for self-sufficiency at the level of the member-states may also be 
difficult to achieve at the European level. Naturally, in a Union of 27 member-states there is much 
more debate about the common values than within one country, necessarily leading to a type of 
minimum justice. More importantly, a common discussion on basis of a shared frame of reference used 
by all legal actors is still largely missing. I believe this element to be the most important one of a self-
sufficient system because it allows discussion among all relevant actors. In the last twenty years, we 
have made huge progress towards in particular a European legal science, but we must accept that the 
other legal actors are not yet sufficiently part of this debate. This makes it difficult to adopt a similar 
conception of self-sufficiency at the European level as at the national level. 
4.3 Self-Sufficiency at the European Level: Ensuring Stable Practices through Private Actors 
Must we then find the self-sufficiency of the European private law order in something else than we are 
used to at the national level? I believe this is indeed the case. My point is that the degree of self-
sufficiency of a legal system that is required to make it function is also influenced by Europeanisation. 
We should not transplant our idea of what is a self-sufficient legal system at the national level to the 
European one. In each national private law system, there is some idea of the role that private actors 
should play within the system18 and of how the legal system should therefore be designed. But the 
different European conception of ‘access justice’ does not only influence the law substantively, it also 
affects the search for what makes European private law a system. In my view (and despite the 
differences among them) national private laws have in common that primarily the State institutions 
provide the ‘stable practice’ that allows people to rely on a set of norms (see above, section 4.1). This 
is impossible at the European level for the simple reason that the EU is (for various reasons, among 
them the already mentioned lack of a common European discussion, a lack of competences and a lack 
of a highest European civil court deciding upon the facts of the case) not able to provide coherence 
and legal certainty through law. This means that European private law simply has to give much greater 
importance to the role of private actors in setting and ensuring their rights: what the European Union 
cannot provide in the same way as national institutions must be remedied by giving private actors a 
more important role. This explains not only the conception of the consumer as a ‘reasonably well 
informed and reasonably observant and circumspect’19 actor, but also the emphasis put on 
empowerment of consumers, on ADR and on optional legal regimes such as the proposed CESL.20 
What this means for the self-sufficiency of European private law is obvious. While national 
jurisdictions can be self-sufficient through emphasising their own values, principles and coherent 
system (providing parties with legal certainty and justice), the European Union has to put the 
responsibility for ensuring these goods in the hands of private actors. They need to undertake action 
                                                     
17 Cf. Masdar (47/07); Hamilton (412/06); Société thermale d’Eugénie‐ les‐ Bains (277/05). 
18 See Hans-W. Micklitz, Introduction, in: id. (ed.), The Many Concepts of Social Justice in European Private Law, 
Cheltenham (Elgar) 2011, 3-57, at 37: while English law reflects a liberal and commercial view of justice, French law 
adopts the idea of a political and ‘just’ society and German law ‘an authoritarian paternalistic-ideological’ view. 
19 See e.g. CoJ EU, C-220/98, [2000] ECR I-117 (Estée Lauder). 
20 Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635 final, claiming (p. 11) it offers ‘a self-
standing, uniform set of rules’ on contract law. 
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themselves in order to get what they want. This also makes the need to develop common values less 
urgent: minimum level protection is sufficient. Put differently: self-sufficient actors can replace a self-
sufficient legal system. 
Also when it comes to the aspect of interaction between the European and national legal orders, an 
essential (if not the essential) element consists of a theory on the choices that private actors should be 
allowed to make. This is consistent with the view that if we take pluralism of (national and European) 
sources seriously, this is incompatible with the idea of one coherent system. Hans Kelsen wrote that a 
system cannot serve two masters at the same time.21 
5. A Provisional Answer 
It was announced in the introduction of this discussion paper that I would provide a provisional answer 
to the question whether a self-sufficient European private law is a viable concept. It was shown that 
the answer depends on a number of variables. Apart from the exact definition of what is (European) 
private law and what is access justice, it has become clear that it is vital from which perspective one 
looks at the interaction between the European and the national private law order. If one adopts the 
perspective of a self-sufficient European private law, it is important to ask why one would need such 
self-sufficiency. The answer is found in the ‘stable practice’ it provides: it allows people to rely on a 
set of norms that is publicly recognised as binding on the collectivity. While national jurisdictions can 
be self-sufficient through emphasising their own values, principles and a coherent system through the 
State institutions, the European Union has to put the responsibility for ensuring these goods to a 
greater extent in the hands of private actors.  
                                                     
21 Hans Kelsen, Reine Rechtslehre, reprint 2000) 330: ‘Niemand kann zweien Herren dienen.’ 
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INTRUSION OF PUBLIC LAW INTO CONTRACT LAW:  
THE CASE OF NETWORK SECTORS 
Annetje Ottow*1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Main Claims of Prof. Micklitz 
In his EUI Working paper (2008/14), ‘The visible hand of European regulatory Private law’ Prof 
Micklitz makes the following observations: 
(i) his major argument is sectors such as energy and telecom have established their own separate 
legal order distinct from general administrative or civil law; 
(ii) European governance has yielded new processes of law-making, new regulatory instruments 
and new enforcement mechanisms, and is going to change the substance of the (private) law 
itself; 
(iii) law enforcement is moving away from courts to public bodies that seek soft solutions (new 
enforcement mechanisms); 
(iv) new network law develops: this new law sets aside the contractual (private) law dimension and 
focuses instead on the public law side i.e. regulatory devices meant to open up markets and to 
establish a competitive structure, as well as on the availability of an appropriate decentralized 
enforcement structure;  
(v) the focus is no longer on traditional contract (private) law, but contract law is not more than a 
device to serve the overall purpose of liberalization of markets, the so called “regulatory role of 
contract law”. 
The question is whether these observations are factually and theoretically correct. In this paper some 
examples will be given from the energy and telecoms areas, inspired by the Dutch practice. The focus 
will be on regulatory instruments, the influence of  public law in private law and some enforcement 
issues. This paper mainly deals with the influence of sector regulation  on commercial contracts 
related to infrastructure access (so called whole sale contracts), but some attention is also given to the 
influence on consumer contract law. 
1.2 Main Objectives of Infrastructure Regulation 
For network industries, such as telecom and energy, over the last 10-15 years regulation has been 
developed on the basis of European Directives, implemented in the national regulatory regimes. In 
these generations of directives basically two main objectives have been laid down: 
(i) the liberalization of these markets: introducing, obtaining and maintaining competition; 
(ii) protecting the consumer/end users of services: guaranteeing basic services (universal services), 
setting minimum standards for those services and consumer protection against unfair 
contractual conditions. 
                                                     




To obtain these objectives, broad regulatory powers have been given to national, independent 
authorities (“NRA’s”). They have received many regulatory instruments to impose obligations on 
undertakings, intervening in the contractual relationships with commercial users of infrastructure 
(networks) and contracts with end users for (telecom and energy) services. The main objective is to 
ensure that no abuse of power takes place by the owner of the networks (which is considered as an 
essential facility). For that purpose the (European) legislator has chosen for a public regulatory 
framework. 
2. Influence of Regulatory Public Law on Commercial Infrastructure Contracts 
2.1 Powers to Impose Terms and Conditions 
Around these objectives the directives provide many rules for access to infrastructure and connecting 
different networks (interconnection), the so called whole sale provisions: competitors can have under 
certain conditions access to the infrastructure (telecom, electricity, gas or rail infrastructure). Powers 
are given to the NRA’s to impose access and set terms and conditions for this access. Mainly, these 
powers can divided in two categories: 
(i) the NRA takes in its own right a decision in which it imposes tariffs or other terms and 
conditions for certain types of access services; 
(ii) it can resolve a dispute between undertakings and solve the matter as a “mediator”/”arbitrator”. 
In all these cases the NRA imposes certain terms and conditions applicable to the whole sale contract. 
On the basis of public law (regulation) the NRA regulates certain parts of the contractual relationship 
between the owner of the infrastructure and the user of the network. These conditions are in many 
cases related to pricing issues: the access has to be calculated on the basis of cost orientation 
principles. But also other terms and conditions (such as very detailed regulation on service level 
agreements, time frames, access to facilities, technical requirements, etc…) form part of the regulatory 
whole sale rules. 
Looking at the regulation for these network sectors, with an origin in European public law, sectors 
such as energy and telecom have established their own separate legal order distinct from general 
administrative or civil law. Those regimes have a complex set of rules, which deviate more and more 
from general rules and are difficult to incorporate fully in the national general systems of public and 
private law. 2  This has also led to the choice for public enforcement by NRA’s and specialized 
(economic) courts, which review the decision of NRA’s in complex economic cases. 
2.2 Relationship between Public and Private Law 
This regulatory work requires complex cost calculation models and specific (sector) expertise. This 
forms an important consideration for choice of the public law enforcement in these cases:  this 
expertise is developed by independent public authorities, the NRA’s (and within the framework of the 
European networks of these NRA’s) in order to harmonize these terms and conditions within the EU 
and create a level playing field. This implies, the exclusionary powers to set these rules and conditions 
on the basis of this regulatory framework, excluding contractual law. But is this always accepted 
according to the applicable national law? This forms an important question. What is the relationship 
                                                     
2 A.T. Ottow, Supervising telecommunications, The influence of European and Dutch administrative procedural law, 
(‘Telecommunicatietoezicht. De invloed van het Europese en Nederlandse bestuursprocesrecht’) (thesis), The Hague: 
Sdu Uitgevers, 2006 and S.A.C.M. Lavrijssen & A.T. Ottow, The legality of independent regulatory authorities, in: L. 
Besselink, F. Pennings & S. Prechal (ed.), The eclips of the legality principle in the European Union, Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011, p. 73-96. 
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between public and contract law? Or to phrase it in a Micklitz way: is contract law not more than a 
device to serve the overall purpose of liberalization of markets? Is there only the so called regulatory 
role of contract law? As the public rules must be incorporated in a contractual relationship, both – 
public and civil – regimes are relevant. A strict borderline cannot always be drawn. In practice, the 
(Dutch) courts do not always answer this question in the same way. Some courts state clearly that 
public law must prevail, others find this less clear. 
For example electricity case: CBB (highest Dutch administrative court in economic cases) February 1, 
2012, case AWB 09/1105 and 09/1112, Liander vs.NMa.  
In this case the administrative court explicitly states that the establishment of the network tariff the 
infrastructure provider can charge is exclusively regulated by public rules on the basis of the 
applicable electricity act (the Wet tarievencode elektriciteit. The cost based principle must me 
interpreted on the basis of the objectives of this act, mainly to avoid abuse of the natural monopoly 
of the owner of the network. See also CBb 25 June 2009 (LJN BJ2637). 
TV cable case: Civil court of appeal Amsterdam, UPC vs. Council of Hilversum, October 19, 2010, 
LJN BO1-50. 
One of the questions in this case is whether the Council of Hilversum has the legal authority to fix 
prices in a contract with the local TV cable operator (UPC), where at the same time the NRA 
(OPTA) has the (assumed)3 power to set these tariffs (when certain conditions are met). One of the 
for this paper relevant question is whether the Council of Hilversum can forbid the TV cable 
operator to increase its tariffs, referring to the applicable contract, when at the same time these 
tariffs are being regulated on the basis of the ex ante rules of the Communications Directives, 
where the NRA is given the explicit power to set those tariffs. This question is now referred to the 
European Court of Justice in a preliminary procedure. 
KPN case: decision of OPTA in 2006, where an infringement of tariff regulation was established on 
the basis of the Dutch telecommunications Act 
OPTA established that KPN had given illegal tariff reductions to customers, to the detriment of 
competitors. Special in this case was that OPTA did not only impose a administrative penalty on 
KPN, but in addition it obliges KPN to pay a substantial amount to its competitors a compensation 
for the damages they suffered. As a result of this decision, these undertakings did not have to 
initiate civil procedures for damages against KPN, but was the dispute solved within the context of 
the administrative sanction procedure. 
In my opinion, there are good reasons to give the NRA the exclusionary power to set those 
infrastructure tariffs on the basis of the applicable regulatory framework and exclude contractual 
freedom in this respect. The regulatory frameworks provide for a complex set of rules which require 
an economic analysis of the markets concerned and the position of parties on these markets. Moreover, 
special procedural rules are put in place (consultation of market parties and the intervention by the 
European Commission4) to ensure harmonized and balanced decisions by NRA’s. The application of 
contract law would circumvent these procedural safeguards, as set by the European legislator. In fact, 
this whole framework can be considered as a separate legal order distinct from general administrative 
or civil law (claim Micklitz). 
                                                     
3 Complication in this case is that this power of OPTA is disputed. I leave this element of the dispute aside. 





2.3 Dispute resolution 
Looking back one can observe that in the first year of liberalization many of the whole sale rules 
where established in the context of disputes: the regulatory framework of the first generation directives 
was not yet as developed and through conflicts the regulatory rules were built on a case by case basis. 
In later years, the frameworks became more sophisticated, as a result of which the NRA’s imposed 
obligations mostly on the basis of standard decisions and models. This explains why (especially in the 
telecom sector) dispute resolution was – in the first years of liberalization - a popular (new) regulatory 
instrument to regulate whole sale contracts, in later years these disputes were seldom used. However, 
from a legal academic perspective and for the purpose of this paper, it were mainly these disputes 
which caused the most interesting and complex questions, as this instrument involved a mixture of 
public and private law elements, which led to new legal questions. 
The problems pointed out in this paper actually converged in OPTA’s power to resolve disputes. The 
character of this power of the independent regulatory authority does not correlate well with the 
traditional regulatory supervision of an administrative body. Dispute resolution is characterised by its 
contradictory nature, the dispute being between two private parties. This configuration does not relate 
to a traditional dispute between a private individual/undertaking and the government, in which the 
individual needs to be protected from overly authoritative action taken by the government. This 
procedure does not correlate to the administrative model taken into account in the Dutch General Act 
on Administrative Law. In the Dutch Telecommunications Act and in the actual practice of OPTA, 
however, an attempt has been made to fit this legal concept into the general system of administrative 
(procedural) law, thus paying too little attention to the contradictory character of dispute resolution 
and the resulting specific role of the regulatory authority. This led to many complex legal questions. 
In a dispute, the NRA (in this case for The Netherlands) OPTA does not function in its role as an 
administrative body in the traditional way, rather as a sort of arbiter or arbitrator. OPTA’s conflict 
management role received too little recognition from both legislation and OPTA itself, with the result 
that too much emphasis is placed on clamping down on the powers of the regulatory authority and not 
on its instrumental and guiding role as an arbitrator. As a result, the administrative and adjudicative 
tasks of the administrative body have converged, which does not do justice to the specific 
characteristics of this procedure and the position of the parties involved in the dispute.5 
In previous papers6 I have analysed these complications in details. In the current paper I will select 
two topics to illustrate the previous observations. 
Case 1 
A major concern was the evaluation of interconnection disputes. The Dutch telecommunications 
Act mentioned that the “reasonable” tariffs could be asked. The main question was how to establish 
reasonable tariffs. Was this a public law concept or was it possible to take into account the 
contractual relationship between the parties? OPTA was of the opinion that this was a public 
standard, which required implementation on the basis of the regulatory framework of the EU 
Directives. However, the administrative court of Rotterdam was of the opinion that the powers of 
OPTA on the basis of the Telecommunications Act was limited by the contractual relationship and 
the applicable rules on the basis of contract law.7 
                                                     
5 Ottow 2006.  
6 A.T. Ottow, ‘Effective Access and Procedure in telecommunications Disputes in Europe. National Report Netherlands.’, In: 
M. Andenas & S. Zleptnig, ‘Telecommunications Dispute resolution: procedure and effectiveness’, London: British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2004 and A.T. Ottow, ‘Dispute resolution under the new European 
framework’ in: E.J. Dommering & N.A.N.M. van Eijk, ‘The Round Table Expert Group on Telecommunications Law. 
Conference Papers’, Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam, 2005.   
7 Administrative court of Rotterdam, January 31, 2003, Mediaforum 2003-4, Jur. Nr. 21., p. 139-141. 




In interconnection disputes, relating to tariffs, problems can exist in relation to the refund of money 
already paid to the other party (mostly the incumbent) once the correct tariffs has been established 
by the NRA. The European directives do not regulate this issue. One of the main problems is the 
fact that this is mainly a contractual issue, while the decision of the NRA is mostly seen as a 
decision of administrative law. The NRA lacks in many cases the power to force the party 
concerned to pay the amount due. In The Netherlands this problem has been a major obstacle for 
newcomers on the market. Due to the legal system they are forced to litigate before OPTA and the 
administrative appeal courts and only after a final judgment is given, they can start civil litigation 
before the civil courts to collect their money.8  
OPTA’s position as arbiter has also repercussions in the established appeal procedure. Because of the 
civil law character of disputes, I have questioned whether the option of legal protection against rulings 
of OPTA through administrative law is an obvious one.9 The appeal procedure should take place 
between the two parties involved in a dispute, OPTA being involved only as an expert. In the 
traditional, administrative law appeal procedure, the appeal of a party affected by the dispute decision 
is made against the administrative body. However, the dispute is in reality a conflict between two 
private companies, the administrative body being involved only as a third party. The applicable appeal 
procedure should be geared to this, which requires a modification of the current applicable rules for 
administrative appeals. In the French legal system, appeal against dispute resolution rulings of the 
French telecommunications regulator ARCEP is open at one actual instance only – at the especially 
designated civil appeals court (Cour d’Appèl de Paris, première chambre). For such an appeal, the 
procedural rules of civil law are applicable. The appeal procedure takes place between the two parties 
involved in the dispute, with the regulatory authority functioning only as an expert. The civil court is 
able to examine the dispute resolution ruling to full extent, taking into account the civil law aspects of 
the dispute.  
Also in other dispute cases this mixture of civil and public la w elements lead to problems. Dispute 
resolution is (in The Netherlands) also used for dispute relating to installment, replacement, transfer 
and removal of infrastructure (cables). In case of a dispute between the land owner and the cable 
operator, this dispute can be brought before the NRA, OPTA. OPTA has the power to calculate the 
damages the cable operator has to pay to the owner of the land. This is not an exclusive power of 
OPTA, as the land owner can also chose to bring the dispute before the civil court. As a result of this 
option, parallel procedures are taken place, where the case is not only decided by the civil courts, but 
also by OPTA. The Dutch Supreme Court has accepted this situation by deciding that the civil courts 
have the legal competence to decide in these cases.10 For this reason OPTA has decided recently to 
refer litigating parties to the civil courts and stop dispute resolution in these matters. 
 
3. Influence of Regulation on Consumer Contracts 
A separate part of the sector regulation concerns the rules relating to consumers and consumer 
contracts. The sector regulation contains special rules to ensure that services are delivered with a 
specific (minimum) quality and that the service contracts do not contain unfair clauses. In most cases, 
these rules contain mandatory rules and must be considered as a lex specialis to general contract law.  
These rules are related to for example transparency (providing (tariff)information), duration of the 
contract, termination of contracts, invoices, number portability, service of call centers etc… 
                                                     
8 Administrative Court of Rotterdam in first instance, 29 November 2001, BabyXL vs. KPN Telecom. 
9 Ottow 2006, p. 136-180. 




But the rules can go even further. In the Dutch Electricity Act for example, a specific provision is 
made that the NRA (in this case the Dutch Competition Authority) formulates a model consumer 
contract for certain services, the energy companies must offer to consumers. Specific terms and 
conditions, including the type of services and tariffs, are established by the NRA for this model 
contract. This consumer protection law is not based on European law, but was included on the special 
request of the Dutch parliament and is a novum in sector specific regulation. In this case the NRA had 
to develop a model contract, using public regulation and general contract law, resulting in a “public 
law model contract”. This model was developed by the NRA in consultation with consumer 
organizations and energy companies. Energy companies are now obliged– on the basis of a decision of 
the NRA – to offer this model contract to consumers. Other type of contracts can still be used, but it is 
a signal to consumers that this model contract is “safe”. It is expected that energy companies will 
adapt other contract according to this model. This mandatory model is limiting the contractual 
freedom of energy companies in an extensive way, setting general contract law aside.  
Enforcement of the contractual regulatory provisions takes place by the NRAs on the basis of 
administrative law instruments (such as administrative sanctions), which causes a strange mix of 
public law enforcement for contractual issues.11 In addition (at least in The Netherlands) a separate 
dispute resolution procedure for consumers has been introduced. This is a low threshold and low cost 
procedure, where a special committee (“de Geschillencommissie”)12 solves disputes between 
consumers and operators. De Geschillencommissie is a non-profit private organization, not falling 
within the judiciary. According to the sector regulation operators must offer this dispute resolution 
procedure in their contracts. In many disputes in these sectors consumers make use of this procedure. 
Public enforcement by the NRA on the basis of the sector regulation only takes place in important 
cases with a public interest aspect.  
For network sectors a new trend can be envisaged. The interest of the consumer and its protection 
becomes more and more important and the sector regulation is shifting from pure market regulation 
towards more consumer oriented regulation. Consumer protection will play a key role in the further 
development of sector specific regulation (but probably also in general competition law) as the public 
has become more skeptical towards full liberalization of markets (and competition) and draws 
attention to the (perceived) adverse effects for consumers. 
 
4. Some Preliminary Conclusions 
Whether all the above mentioned claims of Prof. Micklitz can be substantiated by the law and practice 
in the different Member States will need further study (e.g. on the aspect of enforcement13). This paper 
is a first tour d’ horizon written mainly on the basis of experience in The Netherlands. However, some 
preliminary observations can be made: 
• The two systems are interrelated, but exist in parallel, using each other’s legal norms, 
• Public regulation dictates which terms and conditions must be incorporated in contracts; 
                                                     
11 See e.g. CBb September 30, 2009, SD&P vs. OPTA, LJN: BJ9068, where the administrative court had to decide whether 
OPTA had the power to amend a certain contractual provision. In that case the CBb decided that OPTA was lacking the 
legal mandate to do so. 
12 The Geschillencommissie is used in many sectors as a dispute resolution committee. See for an evaluation of the 
functioning of this committee: A. Klapwijk & M. ter Voort, Evaluatie De geschillencommissie 2009, WODC, 2009, deel 
278. 
13 Currently at the Europa Institute, Utrecht University, a Phd study takes place on ‘The alternative enforcement of 
competition law’. See also: A.T. Ottow, Mastering the market? Exploring new forms of market supervision (‘De markt 
meester? De zoektocht naar nieuwe vormen van toezicht’),  inaugural lecture 18 September 2008, The Hague: Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers, 2009.  
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• Public regulation is incorporating contract law as a regulatory tool (the regulatory function of 
contract law); 
• Consumer protection rules in sector specific regulation override general contract law (lex 
specialis); 
• Public enforcement takes over civil litigation for contractual issues. 
It is clear that trough sector specific regulation for network industries borders between public and 
private law are blurred. Within the context of public regulation provisions and decisions of regulators 
interfere directly with the contractual relationship of parties. Professor Micklitz has rightly pointed to 
this development, a development which has been a silent process for many years. A new legal order 
has been created for the liberalisation of markets. New mechanisms have been developed, such as 
dispute resolution by NRA’s and the instrument of model contracts in public regulation. This leads to 
new legal questions. In my opinion, the discussion should not focus on the question which system 
should prevail (public or private law), but how a legal system can be built which serves the needs of 
markets and consumers. General public and private law can no longer be studied and analysed in an 
isolated manner. A new common legal system is created14, which is a fact of life legal scholars will 
have to live with! 
                                                     




4) Conflict and Resistance 
BEHIND JUDICIAL RESISTANCE TO EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 
Guido Comparato* 
Introduction 
According to its usual understanding in law, the expression conflict of laws refers to a situation in 
which the provisions of two or more legal orders may be applicable to a given concrete case. Such a 
contrast between legal orders is traditionally solved by specific rules, termed indeed ‘conflict of law 
rules’, which provide for the criteria to follow in order to solve the coordination problems naturally 
arising in a context of factual legal pluralism. While private international law rules have been partially 
harmonised in the European Union, in that particular context nonetheless, a particular case of conflict 
still concerns the relation between national and supranational rules. The settlement of that contrast has 
kept and is still keeping busy highest national courts and the Court of Justice for the European Union 
for several years already, resulting in a conflict which has assumed such dimensions to be 
emphatically defined in political science as an institutional ‘cold war’.1 Provisionally, this has been 
settled in the sense that, as specified by the European Court, community law should prevail over 
national rules unless, as specified by various national constitutional courts,2 the former one infringes 
fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the latter. In that solution, the tension which opposes 
European and national actors is self-evident and reveals the existence of further political and value 
considerations underlying conflict of law rules. 
Despite of the existence of such more or less clear statutory or judge-made criteria to solve conflict of 
laws, in a more general sense conflicts can indeed arise also at a deeper level. The application of a 
transnational or supranational rule in a domestic legal order can be problematic for several reasons, 
since legal rules may be characterised by particular economic, social or institutional backgrounds 
which could be impossible to transpose into another context. Not just a conflict of laws might arise but 
rather a conflict of values or rationalities of different legal orders. This problem is well-known and 
largely discussed in comparative law and more recently in the debate as to the possibility or 
impossibility of legal transplants in Europe. In the European context jurists are indeed confronted with 
a high number of such transplants every day so that resistance to the application of the foreign or 
supranational rule may be the likely result of these different values or rationalities. 
The likelihood of such a conflict has also often been considered as a sufficient reason why processes 
of legal harmonisation or even unification at a supra-national level are doomed to failure and there is 
little alternative to national law: while black-letter law can be unified and standardised at the 
supranational level, this does not happen with the judiciary rule. While these divergences and therefore 
the difficulty of harmonisation increases with the number of legal actors involved and possibly 
geographic dimensions, these dynamics are present also at the national level and can involve one 
jurisdiction only. It is then important to make clear that conflicts of values, which the current academic 
fascination for European Union law has led to discuss mainly in a trans-national scenario, can very 
easily also arise even within the same legal order, when new rules establish themselves over previous 
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1 K. Goldmann, Transforming the European Nation-State. Dynamics of Internationalization (London: Sage, 2001) at 89. 
2 In particular German Constitutional Court, Solange II [1986] BVerfGE 73, 339. 
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ones elaborated under different political and social circumstances. Such an internal value conflict 
appears clearly also only considering black-letter rules, especially when new rules are elaborated 
through a democratic process by a political majority which is expression of a different social and 
economic ideology than the one of the parliamentary majority which drafted the previous rules. When 
this conflict concerns rules whose political and ideological connotation is manifest also to public 
opinion, such as may often be the case with labour law rules, resistance can even assume a social 
dimension.3 Something analogous, although clearly less apparent, happens in the courts also in cases 
of less politically divisive legal rules. 
That having been said, the main difference between the internal conflicts of this kind and those 
opposing national and European rules rather lies in the institutional framework and in the existence of 
different mechanisms to ensure uniformity within a jurisdiction. In order to ensure predictability and 
uniformity of the legal system and possibly reduce the resistance of lower courts, national legal orders 
in particular have developed and still rely on a system which can be termed nomophilachia, consisting 
in conferring only one specific judicial body the authority to provide for the only and exact 
interpretation of law. This mechanism, that may occasionally be reinforced by the explicit recognition 
of a stare decisis principle but that can also operate just thanks to the informal authority of the highest 
courts’ decisions, does not however rule out the possibility of a value conflict between the rule as 
drafted by the legislator and as interpreted by the highest court. 
While these dynamics are common to all legal orders despite of the myth-principle of the internal 
coherence of legal systems,4 the likelihood of this kind of conflict when we consider not only the 
national but also the supranational European legal system arises considerably. This is due to two 
institutional reasons: on the one hand, the matter of competences determines that the rules elaborated 
at the European level are likely to be inspired by economic considerations which can be at odds with 
those of some national order. Given the ‘omnipotence’ of national legislators, national rules may 
indeed be aimed at the achievement of further objectives than just economic ones. This contrast may 
concern not only an opposition of European and national legislations, but even more importantly of 
European and national case-law.5 On the other hand, the described function of nomophilachia 
established at the national level is less strongly developed at the European level, leaving freeway for 
divergences and national judicial resistance. 
Let us then consider the cases in which these two aspects are combined, that is to say in which the 
nomophiliachia function of the European court is compromised as a possible consequence of a conflict 
of values between national and European private law. To this aim the next part delves into the 
institutional dynamics of the interaction between national and European courts and the following part 
will look into the private law dimension, putting emphasis on the employment of the acte clair 
doctrine in matters concerning the regulation of financial services. 
The Dialogue between European and National Courts 
If one considers the many and frequent infringements proceedings against member states for delayed 
or inexact implementation of European law, the resistance offered by national judiciaries may appear 
as less noteworthy than that given by national parliaments. National judges, quite to the contrary, 
‘have often used the leverage of EC law to denounce or even make up for the shortcomings of their 
own national systems. By complying with Brussels rule even beyond the mandates of their own States’ 
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legislators, courts have experienced a veritable institutional empowerment’.6 In this sense, national 
judges have often behaved like real European Union judges. Several other times, nonetheless, it is 
exactly the national judiciary that has offered more resistance to European law. Resistance at this level 
can take different forms – often not easily detectable – such as rejection and avoidance;7 but more 
subtly and frequently judges could be led, intentionally or just unwittingly, to an interpretation of 
community law in light of the principles of their particular national system, something which 
jeopardises the uniformity of supranational law and has already been described in the literature on 
transnational private law as homeward bias.8 To this purpose, the apparent neutrality of formalism has 
often become a suitable means of resistance.9 
Several doctrines have been elaborated at the European level in order to cope with this situation. In 
particular, the Court of Justice of the European Union has made clear that since Community law binds 
not only legislators but also judges, these latter are required to interpret domestic law in conformity 
with the provisions of the treaties and also ‘in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive(s)’, even when these have not been implemented yet.10 But while the principle that national 
law has to be interpreted in light of Community law has been imposed by the Court of Justice, the 
procedures to enforce this interpretative rule remain less clearly delineated. The institutional 
mechanism that has been foreseen in the treaties to reduce resistance and which is quite innovative for 
an international organisation, allows or even obliges national judges to refer to the European Court for 
a preliminary ruling when they are in doubt about the exact meaning of a European disposition, 
demanding national courts of final appeal to do so. Owing to this mechanism, the European Court can 
exercise a (limited) function of nomophilachia which is typical of national highest courts and should 
prevent divergent interpretations within the European legal system. That mechanism is therefore 
necessary to ensure the effective unity of a legal system, both at the national and at the European level. 
Nevertheless, while the European Union has proven to have efficient instruments – first and foremost 
the infringement proceeding – to combat and limit national legislative resistance, the same does not 
hold true with regard to judicial resistance. The introduction at the European level of a mechanism that 
has proved to be successful at the national level seems to be still insufficient to ensure judicial 
uniformity. This is due to several reasons. In the first place, it is not even clear what the legal 
consequences would be in cases where national judges fail to request the intervention of the European 
Court when they are expected to,11 since although it would be theoretically possible to see an 
infringement of articles 258 and 259 TFEU, such proceedings would lead to delicate constitutional 
issues of independency of the judiciary12 and, politically, would compromise the cooperation between 
European and domestic courts in an era in which the European Court seems to be particularly 
interested in a constitutional dialogue with the member states rather than in imposing politically 
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11 K. Langenbucher, ‘Europarechtliche Methodenlehre’, in K. Langenucher (ed), Europarechtliche Bezüge des Privatrechts 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008) 10. 
12 In Commission vs Italy, the ECJ has nonetheless stated that even the conduct of constitutionally independent institutions 
may result in an infringement of EU law, see B. Hofstötter, Non-Compliance of National Courts. Remedies in European 
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contentious decisions upon them.13 For these reasons, in the end, infringement proceedings are very 
unlikely to be brought against a member state for the decision of a national court not to refer to the 
CJEU.14 In this scenario, the risk arises again that European law is interpreted from the perspective of 
the national order so that a ‘parallel-version’ of European law can jeopardise legal unity once again.15 
Nevertheless, this often appears as the main concern for European institutions and scholars, this is not 
only a problem of ensuring legal unity, but more substantively of effectiveness of the legal rule: if 
supranational rules are interpreted in a way which conforms with national law, deliberately or as the 
result of the mentioned homeward bias tendency, the innovative character of the former is denied, and 
the policy aims of that intervention are likely to go disappointed. In the second place, consequently, 
national judges may be reluctant to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, especially 
when their national training suggests to them that the legal issue at stake is already clear and does not 
need for an intervention by the European Court. Particular ideological considerations may nonetheless 
also lie behind this choice to refer. 
The value dimension of the lack of dialogue between national and supranational courts may be 
concisely touched upon by means of a look at the constitutional dimension. As a general trend, it 
appears that constitutional courts are particularly reluctant to refer to the European Court. This path 
has been followed in particular by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and for a long time by the 
Italian Corte Costituzionale,16 the two institutions that most developed limits to the supremacy of 
European law. In particular in the case of the Italian Constitutional Court, the ‘rebelliousness’17 to 
refer to the European court was formally justified on the basis of the argument that the Constitutional 
Court is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’ in the sense in which the European treaties speak of,18 so that also 
in this case, a ‘strict formalism’ has been the way chosen to maintain the separation of European and 
domestic law. The Italian court changed approach for the first time in 2008,19 with a judgment which 
was hailed as the beginning of a new dialogue between the Italian and the European Court.20 This 
general trend of resistance among national constitutional courts can be understood if one considers the 
subtle distrust that is based on institutional reasons in the first place. As a result of the peculiar 
function they perform, constitutional courts can hardly accept a higher authority which could 
occasionally imply the powerlessness of the courts when faced with unconstitutional European 
provisions, that is, in other terms, the priority of the four economic freedoms over established internal 
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345-364; E. Happacher, ‘Der italienische Verfassungsgerichtshof und das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren gemäß Art. 234 
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constitutional principles.21 The way in which the potential unconstitutionality of a European provision 
has to be dealt with by a domestic constitutional court represents a highly intricate legal and even 
political question, which already led to the afore-mentioned ‘cold war’ between the European and the 
domestic highest courts. Particular political and historical contingencies may reinforce those 
tendencies and distrust. Let us consider another country whose Tribunal Constitucional has shown 
strong reluctance to refer to the CJEU: in the case of Portugal, the adhesion to the European 
Communities raised several problems of compatibility with the democratic principles, since the 
Constitution of 1976 – which laid the fundamentals of an economic system potentially in conflict with 
the European market idea22 – did not expressly contain clauses of attribution of competences to the 
European Communities. If such absence were understandable in constitutions drafted before the 
creation of the European Communities, exemplified by the Italian and German basic laws, the silence 
on this aspect of the Portuguese Constitution was more telling. While authors could ‘save’ the 
democratic legitimacy of adhesion to the EC on the basis of an extensive interpretation of the clause of 
adaption to general international law – similar to what had been done in Italy – the problem of the 
prevalence of the decisions of the European Court of Justice on the domestic courts remained more 
difficult to solve23 and can have reasonably led to some resistance at least in the lower courts, taking 
into account that, unlike in other European countries, there was no constitutional court that could 
authoritatively shed light on the complicated issue until constitutional reform took place in 1982. A 
new reform of the constitutional text in 2004 – adopted in (confident) view of the entry into force of 
the European Constitution – was eventually necessary to affirm the principle of supremacy of EU law 
as well as the limitation represented by the theory that Italians call controlimiti.24 
How to Escape EU Law 
As it is known, according to the treaties national judges may halt proceedings and refer to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling when they have a doubt as to the correct 
interpretation of European law, while in the case of judges against whose decision there is no legal 
remedy, there is no space left for discretion and that option converts into an obligation. The CJEU 
itself has nonetheless clarified that there are important exceptions to the strictness of that rule, 
elaborating two doctrines usually referred to with the French expressions (given the fact that they have 
been elaborated mainly in France to demarcate the competences of civil and administrative tribunals) 
acte éclairé and acte clair. Pursuant to the acte éclairé doctrine, national tribunals are relieved from 
the obligation to refer when the European Court has already delivered its interpretation on a materially 
identical question. By means of this doctrine, elaborated already in the case Da Costa25 of 1963, a 
feeble system of authority of precedents was introduced in European law so that, in this sense, the acte 
éclairé doctrine was instrumental to the establishment of a nomophiliachia system for European law. 
In contrast to this, the second and more controversial exception was later developed in the CILFIT 
case26 of 1982 and refers to the situation in which the meaning of a rule is so obvious that a reference 
to the CJEU would be superfluous. This idea was not new, as this had already been proposed in the 
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opinion of the Advocate General in the Da Costa case and later accepted by certain national courts.27 
As later framed by the CJEU, the acte clair doctrine requires national judges to be convinced that the 
matter is equally obvious to the courts of the other Member State and to the Court of Justice, also 
including a comparison between the different language versions of EU law and in any case provided 
that the interpretation has to be in light of the objectives of Community law. The doctrine, in other 
terms, appears as the Community revival of the old principle in claris non fit interpretatio. Exactly 
like that Latin expression, the acte clair doctrine has controversial and problematic aspects. Indeed, 
the institution which has to establish whether an act is sufficiently clear, comparing different linguistic 
versions too, is the national judge, while as already said the legal consequences under EU law for a 
refusal of referring a question remain unclear. Under these circumstances, national courts have 
developed quite different approaches, ranging from those which are more inclined to refer to those 
who are more ‘relaxed’ in assessing whether a matter is sufficiently clear. In general, national courts 
of last instance seem to adopt a more relaxed interpretation of the strict conditions established in 
CILFT.28 The autonomy and potential unaccountability that it offers to the national courts, makes the 
acte clair a possibly ideal instrument of resistance to European law. 
At the same time, the employment of the acte clair doctrine or even a low number of reference to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union cannot be considered to be per se a mark of resistance to 
European law. While in past years a high number of references was considered to be a ‘good’ sign, as 
it would show that national courts are aware of European law and are open to accept that domestic 
rules should be interpreted coherently with supranational rules, in later years a growing number of 
scholars have highlighted that this may not necessarily be the case. In this sense, it has been suggested 
that the need to refer to the CJEU was essential during the first phase of existence of the European 
Communities, in which that supranational legal order was still particularly weak, the knowledge of it 
was not widespread among national judges and there was therefore still a concrete risk of 
ineffectiveness of European rules, while it would be almost physiological for a sound legal order that 
the number of references diminish at some point.29 In this perspective, the insistence of the ‘CJEU on 
accepting references undermines the role of national courts as a network of EU courts’ and appears as 
a form of ‘supremacist supervision’ inspired by certain distrust in the capabilities and willingness of 
national judges to apply European rules.30 Indeed, the reference mechanism is mainly intended to 
ensure the uniformity of Community law in different jurisdictions by avoiding that national courts 
offer different interpretations of supranational black-letter rules; nonetheless, in the recent years legal 
literature seems to have assumed a more favourable post-modern approach towards legal 
diversification, admitting that uniformity of Community law is not necessarily the most important 
value to be pursued, often on the basis of the idea that legal diversification may be the expression of a 
value and cultural diversification which is worth being maintained.31 By the same token and despite of 
the low attitude of certain tribunals, the lack of references to the European Court may be not indicative 
of the real Euro-friendly or Euro-sceptic tendency of national judges.32 While these observations can 
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certainly be shared, the idea of a harmonious and well working judicial dialogue between European 
and national courts seems, at present, not necessarily correct. An empirical study (by means of 
questionnaires and interviews) on the attitude of national judges in Germany and the Netherlands 
towards European law highlighted for instances that the conditions under which a preliminary ruling 
has to be requested are not entirely clear to numerous judges, in particular when and how such a 
reference must be requested is unclear to most of them,33 and slightly less than half knew what they 
were supposed to do with an answer from the European Court.34 This was linked more to the lack of 
adequate training obtained during law school years35 on European law rather than a Eurosceptic 
political attitude.36 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the CILFIT doctrine has been employed 
already several times by national courts in order to challenge the supremacy of EU law; a 
commentator has pointed out in the case of Denmark that the acte clair argumentation may be used to 
‘shield politically important Danish statutes from a potentially destructive Union-judicial scrutiny’.37 
For these reasons, while the decision to refer to the interpretative authority of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union cannot be directly considered to be determined by some kind of resistant political 
attitude, it is necessary to verify the practical significance of that resistance, as this may be 
determined, especially in the case of the highest courts, by an opposition to certain principles and 
values. The question of referring to the European Court is therefore not just a procedural matter, but it 
is a substantive one. All this considered, instead of focusing on the general legal mechanism of 
reference as it is outlined in the treaties, it is necessary to look into concrete legal cases to observe the 
value dimension behind this particularly nuanced form of resistance. 
Cases-studies from the United Kingdom 
Among the national courts that have explicitly resorted to the acte clair doctrine, a particular case is 
the English Supreme Court, formerly the House of Lords. While its general attitude towards the 
preliminary reference procedure has changed through the years apparently moving from an initial 
particularly reluctant orientation to a gradually more open position,38 recently it has shown a 
conservative approach to the interpretation of European legal concepts in the English system and, in 
addition, a lack of willingness to refer to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.  
Such a tendency may be provisionally interpreted in different ways. In the first sense, it could be 
considered as an expression of some kind of ‘Euro-sceptic’ attitude which is said to be widespread in 
England and would consequently be mirrored in the way in which European law is considered by 
English jurists and in which manner the Supreme Court interacts with the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Indeed, the European Court has been the focus of fierce and occasionally 
nationalistically oriented criticisms in non-legal literature, where it has been pointed out that this 
institution goes too far in its interpretation of European law creating de facto new law without any 
democratic legitimacy and imposing it on national institutions.39 At the same time, the impact of 
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European law and its consequences for national sovereignty had been famously denounced in the 
English system by distinguished judges in the past.40 Nevertheless, such simplistic political 
interpretation may easily mislead and the link between judicial behaviour and attitude towards 
European integration of the country as a whole, although not necessarily irrelevant, remains 
questionable and likely less significant than other factors.41 The House of Lords is indeed also one of 
the institutions that, in its judgments concerning European law has shown a particular deep 
understanding of European law, often analysing in detail the characteristics of that legal system or 
referring to the travaux préparatoires of EU law. For these reason, it is necessary to look behind the 
particular instance of resistance to highlight the interests at stake in each case. 
Looking for the implication of resistance strategies for the development of European private law, a 
few important and famous decisions of that court can be mentioned here, while specific focus will lie 
on only one of these, which has the clearest consequences. These cases are not even ‘clear’ in the 
sense that they unequivocally lead to an easy conclusion as to resistance to European law and the 
relation between national and supranational law, since that relation is anything but obvious. The cases 
are rather evidence of the complex dynamics between national and European law and of contrasting 
tendencies, values and regulatory strategies in legal orders. Not by coincidence, the cases have already 
resulted in an extensive debate in the literature – not exclusively from the United Kingdom – inasmuch 
as they deal with core areas of banking and contract law and also have a particularly strong economic 
and social impact. What characterises these cases is not only the lack of willingness to refer to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, but also their particular economic relevance, as they mostly 
deal with the financial sector. It may be suggested that the two evident features of those cases are 
interconnected, that is, that the lack of willingness to refer to the Court of Justice has been an 
instrument for the Court to maintain an exclusive authority to judge on economically and politically 
important matters. 
Limiting ourselves to contract law, this tendency may emerge already from the First National Bank 
case of 2001, a famous case with pivotal implications for English and European contract law. On 25 
October 2001 the House of Lords42 had to find whether a term included in the standard loan contracts 
of the First National Bank fell within the scope of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 
1999 (UTCCR)43 which implemented the Unfair Terms Directive and, if so, whether that term had to 
be deemed unfair. The disputed term established more specifically that ‘If the repayment instalment is 
not paid in full by that date, [the Bank] will be entitled to demand payment of the balance on the 
Customer’s account and interest then outstanding together with all reasonable legal and other costs 
charges and expenses claimed or incurred by [the Bank] in trying to obtain the repayment of the 
unpaid instalment of such balance and interest. Interest on the amount which becomes payable shall be 
charged […] at the rate in paragraph D overleaf (subject to variation) until repayment after as well as 
before any judgment (such obligation to be independent of and not to merge with the judgement)’. The 
Director General of Fair Trading, in representation of the interests of consumers, alleged that the term 
was unfair and that the First Bank should therefore discontinue making use of it in its standard 
contracts. This view was supported by the Court of Appeal which, in quite consumer-friendly terms, 
considered that ‘The bank, with its strong bargaining position as against the relatively weak position of 
the consumer, has not adequately considered the consumer’s interests in this respect. In our view the 
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relevant term in that respect does create unfair surprise and so does not satisfy the test of good faith’. 
The decision of the House of Lords went in the opposite direction.  
The pronouncement of the court was grounded on a particular interpretation of the notion of good 
faith. The case indeed gave the highest UK Court the opportunity to address the controversial issue of 
good faith, a concept of allegedly civil law tradition that had been previously openly rejected by 
common law courts, later introduced in English legislation under the duty to implement the Unfair 
Term directive which stated that a terms that, ‘contrary to the requirement of good faith, […] causes a 
significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment 
of the consumer’ is unfair and therefore does not bind the consumer. It is with regard to the 
introduction of good faith in common law that the famous expression ‘legal irritants’ was developed.44 
Despite the often alleged extraneousness of the concept to British law,45 in interpreting that provision 
the House of Lords rejected the view that good faith is something foreign to the English legal tradition 
as long as one gives a particular interpretation of it: ‘the requirement of good faith in this context is 
one of fair and open dealing. Openness requires that the terms should be expressed fully, clearly and 
legibly, containing no concealed pitfalls or traps’. The House of Lords concludes affirming that, given 
this particular reading, good faith ‘is not an artificial or technical concept; nor, since Lord Mansfield 
was its champion, is it a concept wholly unfamiliar to British lawyers. It looks to good standards of 
commercial morality and practice’. In the national legal system, the requirement of good faith has 
therefore ended up being interpreted in a restrictive way by the House of Lords,46 which made it 
basically coincide with legal concepts coherent with the English legal tradition and coloured it with a 
clearly commercial connotation – as a good standard of commercial morality. This reading could be 
considered as expression of a certain homeward trend. Despite the nebulousness of that concept – 
quite inherent to such a general and vague notion such as ‘good faith’ and that led legal literature to 
draw a considerable number of doctrines from that notion on the continent – and its relative novelty in 
the English context, the Court stated that the interpretation given was somehow obvious, which 
allowed it to resort to the doctrine of the acte clair in order to avoid a reference for preliminary ruling 
to the Court of Justice. Their Lordships recognised that ‘if the meaning of the test were doubtful, or 
vulnerable to the possibility of differing interpretations in differing member states, it might be 
desirable or necessary to seek a ruling from the European Court of Justice on its interpretation. But the 
language used in expressing the test, so far as applicable in this case, is in my opinion clear and not 
reasonably capable of differing interpretations’.47 As it has been noted by the finest private law 
literature, this choice is already ‘surely surprising given the disagreement between the members of the 
House of Lords, and the implied disagreement with the lower courts’.48 Indeed, literature on the acte 
clair doctrine has discussed the situation in which there is a disagreement between national courts as 
to the interpretation of a provision as particularly problematic, concluding that such a disagreement 
does not automatically imply that there is a lack of clarity on the issue and therefore the Court of last 
instance is obliged to refer the question to the European Court, since it would be possible to affirm that 
the internal disagreement was determined by the incapacity of a court of assessing the correct 
                                                     
44 G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies’ (1998) 61 
Modern Law Review 11. 
45 The literature on good faith in English and European private law is vast, generally the novelty of the concept as introduced 
by the Unfair Terms directive has been emphasised, while comparative and historical analysis have rather insisted that 
the concept is not foreign at all to the English legal system. Amongst many see, G. Alpa, ‘A Glance at Unfair Terms in 
Italy and England’, in G. Alpa, Markets and Comparative Law (London: British Institute of International anc 
Comparative Law, 2010) 150 ff; H. Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 Oxford Legal Studies 
229; G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergencies’ 
(1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11; R. Zimmermann… ; M.W. Hesselink … 
46 House of Lords, Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001]. 
47 House of Lords, Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank plc [2001] at 17 (Lord Bingham). 
48 H. Collins, ‘The ‘Common Frame of Reference’ for EC Contract Law: A Common Lawyer’s Perspective’, in M. Meli and 
M.R. Maugeri (ed), L’armonizzazione del diritto privato europeo. Il piano d’azione 2003 (Milano: Giuffrè, 2004) 116. 
Guido Comparato 
 106 
interpretation of something which remains nonetheless objectively obvious. The price to be paid in 
this case is of course the necessity to very little diplomatically affirm that the lower judge was totally 
wrong about the interpretation of such a clear legal rule. 
Nevertheless, the CILFIT criteria elaborated by the Court of Justice – more interested in the issue of 
uniformity of EU law among different jurisdiction rather than of etiquette between internal judges – 
require the interpretation to be obvious rather than to internal judges, to all judges in different member 
states. Not even this was the case, since, as recognised by the House of Lords, ‘the member states have 
no common concept of fairness or good faith, and the directive does not purport to state the law of any 
single member state’.49 The mentioned ‘relaxed’ approach followed by the highest national courts in 
understanding the CILFIT criteria is thus manifest in this decision. The result of this interpretation was 
that the House of Lords could autonomously conclude that the contract term at stake was not covered 
by the exception concerning ‘the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the good or 
services sold or supplied’ which would have excluded the fairness assessment, but that in concrete the 
term in itself could not be deemed unfair so that the Bank could continue including it in its standard 
contracts. 
In Particular: The Bank Charges Case and Its Aftermaths 
Standard terms of Banks in England were again the focus of an important judgment of the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom in 2009, which has also had a strong media coverage given the relevance 
of the issue at stake for the economic interests of a high number of consumers involved, whose 
expectations were bitterly disappointed by the decision of the Court. The case revolved around the 
fairness of the unauthorised overdraft fees that banks use to charge on customers after performing a 
payment request for which there is no sufficient coverage in the customer’s account. 
This particular set of terms had come under the lens of the Office of Fair Trading which started, in 
accordance with seven important banks and one building society, a test case to verify whether these 
could be assessed for fairness under the provisions of the UTCCR. The OFT had indeed found out in 
specific studies that, despite some positive features and high level of beneficial competition, the 
personal account market in the United Kingdom was mostly non-transparent and therefore ‘not 
working well’ for the consumer. In particular, consumers would have only a limited capacity to 
control the services for which they pay and more seriously ‘low levels of transparency on fees that 
make up a substantial proportion of the effective payment that consumers make for current account 
services’ and ‘complexity in the way that these fees, particularly insufficient funds charges, are 
implemented that makes it hard for consumers to predict when they will be incurred’.50 This 
circumstance gives rise to a problematic situation not only for individual consumers but even for the 
well-functioning of the market since, lacking basic information, consumers cannot act rationally on the 
market jeopardising the competitiveness of the system. Ensuring transparency of standard terms is 
therefore also an instrument to foster competition. What can appear to be mainly a problem of 
efficiency of the market has nonetheless also a quite important social dimension as well, as just in 
2006 twenty three per cent of accounts incurred at least one insufficient funds charge, while the 
incurrence into a charge once was associated with a high probability of incurring in a new charge 
later.51 Overdraft charges are at least statistically strongly linked to phenomena of financial and social 
exclusion, a concern that had long been addressed in the United Kingdom52 and increasingly more at 
the European level, and which called for policies intended to include a higher number of people in the 
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financial market under better economic conditions. On the other hand, this lack of transparency 
seemed beneficial for the providers of financial services, since insufficient funds charges provides for 
2.6bn of banks’ revenue on personal current accounts, which means – together with net credit interest 
income – 85 per cent of the total revenue on personal current accounts.53 While overdraft consumers 
are charged with these prices, banks rather adopt a ‘free-if-in-credit’ policy for accounts not going into 
overdraft. In oversimplified terms, this basically means that the ‘poor’ paradoxically finances the bank 
account of the ‘rich’ – although the free-if-in-credit policy is also financed through low interest rates 
on deposits. As Lord Mance put it, this is a sort of ‘reverse Robin Hood exercise’.54 In this context, in 
which lack of transparency appears to be detrimental to consumer and competition but beneficial for 
the financial services providers, it is unlikely that the problem can be solved without some form of 
outside regulatory intervention. The study identified the need to promote transparency, possibly 
according the principles of ‘better regulation’, rather than strong regulatory interventions: 
transparency, accountability, proportionality, consistency and targeted intervention’: some forms of 
‘light touch regulatory intervention’ seems necessary in that sector.55 
While the studies of the OFT showed how important and wide the economic and social implications of 
the issue were, the question of law discussed by the Supreme Court was narrower, as it only concerned 
the legitimacy of the OFT to assess the fairness of unauthorised overdraft fees. More specifically, the 
jurisdiction of the OFT depended on whether those charges had to be considered penalties – so that the 
standard terms allowing these practices could be deemed unfair in case they determine a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer – or whether, as 
sustained by the Banks, overdraft fees are rather a component of the remuneration for the bank 
services and that, therefore, they pertain to the core economic bargain that cannot be subjected to the 
fairness assessment. Since permission to appeal on that particular ground was denied by the Court of 
Appeal, the question as to whether the terms were drafted in plain and intelligible language was not 
considered by the Supreme Court, so that it was common ground that the relevant terms at stake were 
in plain and intelligible language indeed. Correctly implementing the European directive of 1993, Reg 
6(2) of the UTCCR indeed states that ‘In so far as it is in plain intelligible language, the assessment of 
fairness of a term shall not relate (a) to the definition of the main subject matter of the contract, or (b) 
to the adequacy of the price or remuneration, as against the goods or services supplied in exchange’. 
Overturning the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court found that the overdraft charges 
were to be considered to form part of the price or remuneration for the ‘package of services’ offered 
by the banks and therefore covered by the exclusion from the fairness assessment.56 In the metaphor of 
Lord Walker, ‘If for instance a consumer orders a variety of goods from a mail-order catalogue – say 
clothing, blinds, kitchen utensils and toys – there is no possible basis on which the court can decide 
that some items are more essential to the contract than others’.57 The way in which the Court formed 
such a decision has nonetheless been matter of criticisms that in this place can be addressed in 
particular from the European private law perspective. 
Core of the decision of the court was not the fairness of the charges, but rather the question whether 
these can be considered a price or remuneration. This appears to be a complicated problem, as to 
which unequivocal answers are difficult and different solutions are imaginable, as these terms may be 
considered ‘unreasonable charges for consumer default’, embracing clauses ‘imposing liabilities for 
breach that exceed the real losses’ or ‘in response to consumer actions that are not technically 
breaches, imposing (via primary obligations) charges and costs that are not reasonably expected in the 
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circumstances’.58 Again the Office of Fair Trading had traditionally considered this kind of clauses as 
unfair.59 And indeed the question whether these form part of the price or remuneration had been 
solved differently by different judges and jurisdictions.60 The point was already discussed in the afore-
mentioned First National Bank case. On that occasion, the Supreme Court – at that time the House of 
Lords – opted for a narrow understanding of the notion of remuneration so that it could exclude that 
the terms at stake were part of the economic core bargain and subject them to the test of fairness, 
which, in the concrete case resulted in the fairness of the terms. A similar interpretation had been 
sustained in the Bank Charges case by the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court overturned this latter 
decision, adopting an approach which already appears as partially innovative compared to the one 
taken in the First National Bank case. This solution has been criticised in the literature, in particular by 
Whittaker, for being inconsistent also with the different approach followed by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union in a contextual judgment, Caja de Madrid,61 concerning the legitimacy of the lack 
of transposition in Spanish law of the exclusion of core economic terms from the fairness assessment.  
Considering the different ways in which ‘price or remuneration’ can be construed and therefore the 
possibility of divergent interpretations of such a pivotal provision of the directive, a reference to the 
CJEU for solving the interpretative question as to whether those clauses had to be considered to fall 
within the scope of the exclusion could have led to a different conclusion. The Supreme Court 
nonetheless avoided referring the question to the CJEU, again ignoring the disagreement with the 
lower courts, which, usually, should be indicative of a lack of clarity of a matter. Curiously, in this 
case the disagreement was not limited to a difference between the Supreme and the lowest courts – 
which can already put higher Courts in quite an uncomfortable situation inasmuch as they have to 
consider that lower judges are unable to understand correctly something which is obvious62 – but it 
even was an internal disagreement. Actually, the disagreement did not involve the interpretation of the 
regulation at stake, as to which there was unanimity among the justices, but rather concerned whether 
that provision was an acte clair or not. From this perspective, the decision not to refer is quite 
surprising, considering that Lord Phillips stated: ‘I do not find the resolution of the narrow issue 
before the court to be acte clair. I agree, however, that it would not be appropriate to refer the issue to 
the European Court’.63 Evidently, that decision not to refer was based on considerations other than the 
clarity of the rule: one of this appears to be the alleged ‘non relevance’ of the question,64 the other 
concerns the intention to avoid delays in the activities of the Court. 
Having decided that the issue did not have to be addressed by the European Court, the Supreme Court 
resorted to a mainly empirical economic argument to assess whether the relevant terms had to be 
considered to form part of the price or remuneration for the banks’ services. Unanimously, their 
Lordships held that the charges for unauthorised overdrafts ‘are a monetary consideration for the 
package of banking services’ which constitute ‘an important part of the bank’s charging structure, 
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amounting to over 30% of their revenue stream from all personal current account customers’.65 
Moreover, if banks ‘did not receive relevant charges they would not be able profitably to provide 
current account services to their customers in credit without making a charge to augment the value of 
the use of their funds’.66 In this light, Lord Walker clarifies: ‘I do not see how [the Court of Appeal] 
could have come to the conclusion that charges amounting to over 30 per cent of the revenue stream 
were “not part of the core or essential bargain’’.67 The Court therefore employed an economic 
consideration, implying that intruding on the autonomy of determining a core issue may lead to higher 
costs for other parties involved, because of the free-if-in-credit mechanism adopted by the Banks. 
From this perspective, intruding on the autonomy of the parties may alter this economic mechanism, 
producing externalities and imposing costs on other subjects. The Supreme Court was also well aware 
of the link between overdraft fees and financing of the particular banking system followed in the 
United Kingdom, which mostly adopts a free-if-in-credit approach different from the one followed for 
instance in France.68 As Whittaker has critically pointed out, ‘rather than an objective approach to the 
determination of the price’, the arguments employed by the Supreme Court ‘adopt the viewpoint of the 
supplier of the goods or services’,69 failing to see that ‘the customer makes no firm commitment to pay 
[the relevant charges] at all on concluding the contract’.70  
It was on the contrary exactly from the standpoint of the consumer that the issue had been looked at by 
the Court of Appeal, which referred to the ‘typical’ (i.e. average) consumer to understand whether the 
terms were part of the essential bargain between the parties.71 Even more interestingly in particular in 
a jus commune perspective is that exactly the same perspective of the ‘average customer’ is adopted in 
other jurisdictions such as Germany as a criterion to distinguish primary from secondary obligations 
and consequently decide whether a contract term may be tested by courts.72 The reason for this 
solution is that the typical consumer has in mind mostly the primary obligations while he pays less 
attention to the secondary ones, regardless of the fact that these are drafted in a plain and intelligible 
language. Indeed, already the study of the OFT had highlighted that ‘The bulk of consumers pay little 
or no attention to the key elements of either insufficient funds charges or the interest they earn on 
credit balances. Only five per cent of consumers surveyed considered overdraft fees – arranged and 
unarranged – important when choosing a [personal current account]’,73 and many were not even aware 
of the existence of certain fees.74 This interpretation was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court: 
identifying the price or remuneration ‘is a matter of objective interpretation by the court’.75  
Nonetheless, while the conclusions of the Supreme Court have been criticised from different 
perspectives, there is one specific point as to which their Lordships were incontrovertibly right: ‘this 
decision is not the end of the matter’.76 Outside the courtroom, government-supported banks Northern 
Rock, HBOS and RBS were soon asked to review their overdraft charges terms in order to make them 
fairer to consumers, but even before the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered, the Office of 
                                                     
65 Bank Charges [2009] UKSC 6, at 47 (Lord Walker). 
66 Bank Charges [2009] UKSC 6, at 88 (Lord Phillips).  
67 Bank Charges [2009] UKSC 6, at 47 (Lord Walker). 
68 Bank Charges [2009] UKSC 6, at 1 (Lord Walker). 
69 S. Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’ (2011) 74 The Modern Law Review 106-122, 116. 
70 S. Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’, 117. 
71 S. Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’, 112. 
72 H. Kötz, ‘Shranken der Inhaltskontrolle bei den Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen der Banken. Entscheidung der 
britischen Supreme Court vom 25. November 2009’ (2012) 343. 
73 OFT, Personal current accounts in the UK, 4. 
74 OFT, Personal current accounts in the UK, 5. 
75 Bank Charges [2009] UKSC 6, at 113 (Lord Mance). 
76 Bank Charges [2009] UKSC 6, at 62 (Lord Walker).  
Guido Comparato 
 110 
Fair Trading had already started negotiations with the industry to introduce changes in standard 
contracts and in October 2009 announced that banks had agreed to make costs related to personal 
current account more transparent. Since the decision of the Supreme Court, particular attention has 
then been paid to unarranged overdrafts. The OFT and the industry agreed to introduce changes to the 
contract terms in particular in matters relating to ‘the development of minimum standards to cover 
how consumers are offered the ability to opt out of unarranged overdraft facilities’. 77  At the same 
time, ‘On clarity and predictability, the OFT expects some PCA providers to introduce new products 
that provide consumers with greater clarity and predictability around unarranged overdraft charges, 
including in some cases a shift away from charges based on transactions towards other forms of 
charging.’78 In the expectations of the OFT, these changes will produce benefits not only for a 
competitive market but also for consumers, who will be likely to pay less charges and have less 
difficulties in opting out of unarranged overdraft facilities. These results can be achieved through ‘co-
regulation’ rather than strong legislative intervention: ‘Given the significant developments underway, 
the OFT considers that a market-based approach with banks competing to find the best way of 
addressing the needs of their customers is likely to be preferable to a regulatory ‘one size fits all’ 
approach. As a result, the OFT is not recommending legislative change at the present time’.79 One year 
later, the minimum standards for personal current account providers covering how they offer 
customers the ability to opt out of unarranged overdraft facilities as well as best practices on how to 
deal with customers in difficult economic situations who incurred unarranged overdraft charges were 
finalised and introduced in the new Lending Code of 2011.80 At the same time the OTF could confirm 
its prevision on a decrease in the average cost of unpaid item charge.81 
In this sense, while the judiciary maintained a conservative position which resulted in a defence of 
parties’ autonomy, regulation (in a broad sense) is intervening nonetheless through different national 
channel, more specifically authorities such as the Office of Fair Trading. 
Conclusion 
Can the fact that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom chooses not to refer to the ECJ / CJEU in 
such important and unclear legal issues be interpreted as a resistant and likely Eurosceptic attitude of 
that Court? Actually, it is impossible to speak of resistance in the sense of a simple avoidance of the 
application of European (secondary) legislation such as the one that could occasionally emerge at the 
judiciary level in particular in the first years of activity of the European Communities. The cases 
considered directly concerned the application of national legislation with regard to the implementation 
of European law, which moreover had been correctly transposed in the British legal system by the 
legislator (this could even be considered as a problematic element, given the lack of coordination with 
the UCTA regulation dating back to 1974). The justices of the Supreme Court are certainly well aware 
of the reference procedure and even addressed this issue explicitly in their decisions, discussing, as in 
the Bank Charges case, whether a reference to the European Court was necessitated. What is more, in 
order to legitimate their interpretation the justices of the Court resorted to the travaux préparatoires of 
European directives, considering not only the history of the drafting of black-letter rules but also 
inquiring the purposes of those interventions and even engaged in a comparison with other language 
versions (that, however, in the Bank Charges case ‘cast little light on the interpretation of the English 
text’82). These are complicated and time-consuming activities that surely not many national judges are 
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inclined or even able to perform and in light of which the stereotypical association English-
Eurosceptic, translated in the legal field, appears as an unsophisticated simplification. What emerges 
from the cases is rather that, as demonstrated in the literature on Community law as a general trend of 
a high number of national courts, the English supreme judges too applied a particularly ‘relaxed’ 
understanding of the conditions under which a question has to be referred – continuously ignoring the 
disagreement with the lower judges and even internal to the Court – together with a certain homeward 
biased interpretation of supranational legal categories which could have deprived European private 
law of some of its regulatory strength.  
Considering for instance the First National Bank case, the interpretation given of the standard of good 
faith appears as a conservative one which on the one hand challenged the trite assumption of this 
notion being irreconcilable with the English legal tradition but which on the other hand may have 
impaired some of the innovativeness of the concept, since ‘[b]y defining good faith as a requirement 
for the trader to take into account the interests of the consumer, the Directive poses a challenge to 
purely self-interested rationality which so often provides the values which guide the common law of 
contract’.83 Within the space of autonomy so obtained, the Court gave mainly conservative 
interpretations in light of the English common law shielding parties’ autonomy, and notably that of the 
banking sector. 
As the Bank Charges case shows, the ‘price’ appears to be the aspect of market transactions as to 
which contract law mostly remains anchored to a traditional autonomy perspective,84 and in which 
regulatory interventions encounter more trouble intruding. This holds true also at the European level, 
since also the Unfair Terms directive left the control on the economic bargain of the contract 
untouched as a compromise between consumer protection and freedom of contract. The reason for that 
choice, as expressed in the comments to the Acquis principles is two-folded: on the one hand a judicial 
control on the adequacy of price would presuppose the existence of criteria to determine a iustum 
pretium, on the other hand and more fundamentally, that control would be ‘incompatible with the 
needs of a market economy’.85 In this context, it can be misleading to establish a simple link between 
consumer protection and European law on the one hand and freedom of contract and national law on 
the other hand, all the more considering that some member states have extended judiciary control also 
to price and remuneration (this was the situation that led to the Caja de Madrid case in front of the 
CJEU) and that the first legislative attempts to regulate standard terms originated in national context, 
and specifically in the English one. The situation is undoubtedly more nuanced. Nonetheless, when it 
came to the interpretation of economically complicated border-line cases, the interpretations offered 
by the UK Supreme Court favoured an approach meant to shield parties autonomy. The Supreme 
Court moreover showed not to take in particular consideration reasoning based on the behaviour of a 
typical consumer – a category which is now gaining momentum in European private law discourse – 
who is often not be fully aware of certain contract terms, rather favouring a classical view of the 
consumer as a rational economic actor, perfectly able to identify the core terms of a contract. This can 
be seen as coherent with the circumstance that the common law has shown a ‘traditional resistance to 
test the fairness of contracts’ from which the combined formal-substantive fairness test of the unfair 
terms directive marks a departure.86 The regulatory technique of the European directive therefore 
infringes on the traditional approach of English law, including the provisions of the UCTA which, 
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intended as part of a broader welfarist project with a specific political colour,87 was mostly limited to 
exemption clauses. 
The judiciary result of the case appears nonetheless to be mostly due to the choices taken by the 
English legislator, which the Supreme Court has just interpreted in a strict way. It indeed appears as a 
new instance of formalism as a means of resistance as described in the literature. The English 
legislator could have adopted a broader approach meant to provide higher consumer protection, such 
as the Spanish and several other legislators did and as it emerged to be legitimated according to the 
Caja de Madrid decision. This option was nonetheless not taken by the English legislator. That this 
was a deliberate economic-political choice is clearly highlighted, analysing the political background of 
the English legislation, by Lord Walker: Ministers and Parliament ‘decided, in an era of so-called 
“light-touch” regulation, to transpose the Directive as it stood rather than to confer the higher degree 
of consumer protection afforded by the national laws of some other member states.’88 The ideological 
dimension inherent to the matter was even clearer in the observation of Lady Hale: ‘As a very general 
proposition, consumer law in this country aims to give the consumer an informed choice rather than to 
protect the consumer from making an unwise choice. […] Fortunately, however, that is for Parliament 
and not for this Court’.89 
At the same time, behind the denial of reference to the European Court lies a further consideration: 
parties before the judge are certainly more interested in their case solved as soon as possible rather 
than in the uniformity of interpretations throughout Europe and be therefore quite hostile vis-à-vis the 
preliminary reference mechanisms. There is even some empirical evidence that, at least before the 
lower courts, just presenting the mere hypothesis of referring to the CJEU has a stimulus function for 
the litigants, who are more persuaded to rapidly find a conciliation.90 In this sense, the avoidance of 
the reference has also been determined by the intention of the Supreme Court to avoid delays in the 
definition of the case. The point was explicitly admitted by Lord Walker in the Bank Charges case: 
‘Neither side showed any enthusiasm for a reference, because of the further delay that would be 
occasioned in a very large number of claims at present stayed. The Court is entitled to take the likely 
delay into account, although not as an overriding consideration, in deciding whether to make a 
reference’.91 In the end, the Court decided not to make that reference considering that ‘[t]here is a 
strong public interest in resolving the matter without further delay’.92 Such necessity may be adverted 
more strongly by the UK Supreme Court, which, as a court of last resort, is already used to receive 
very few cases per year compared with analogous institutions in other European countries, before 
which a higher number of cases – often with consequent higher delays in the judiciary activity – are 
heard. The need for considering the economic costs and the possible delays determined by a reference 
were even explicitly mentioned by Lord Denning as further criteria to be considered before asking a 
preliminary ruling.93 Those considerations – that were nonetheless mainly developed by the judge of a 
lower court, who as such has a larger margin of appreciation to determine whether a reference should 
be made – were later dismissed by the English courts as these took a less reluctant approach to EU law 
and recognised that it not up to the national judge determining issues of Community law94 but seem to 
have now re-appeared in the considered more recent case-law of the Supreme Court. It is however 
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doubtful that this approach is compatible with the raison d’être of the preliminary reference 
procedure, which is to ensure effectiveness and uniform interpretation of European law. While 
discretion is left to lower judge, who may also be free to consider also the preferences of the parties as 
pointed out by Lord Denning, such autonomy does not seem to exist for the courts of last instance: 
referring to the CJEU in case of interpretative doubt is a duty for national judge and not a further 
method of appeal to the benefit of the parties of the procedure. This reveals an underlying contrast 
between the rationalities underlying the two judiciary systems, one more focused on the celerity of 
problem-solving and the other about the uniformity and effectiveness of law. In this light, it is likely 
that in particular situations, this difference may lead to some kind of resistant behaviour. 
In particular, while the necessity for trials to be solved rapidly may be felt as particularly important by 
any national court (as to this aspect, Lord Denning referred to analogous considerations by a German 
court),95 this is of pivotal importance for the interests of business contract parties, and, consequently 
particularly important also for a well-functioning judicial system which aims to maintain a 
competitive, and actually the leading, position in Europe as the jurisdiction of choice for businesses 
transactions.96 Both in the literature and in the perception of economic actors, there is quite a strong 
opinion that the English common law system has a strong ‘business-friendly’ connotation, so that, 
with the necessary modifications, English law still appears as the law ‘designated for a nation of 
shopkeepers’ comparative lawyers spoke of some years ago.97 Rather than to some kind of specific 
trait of the Englishmen, this is mostly due to economic specialisation and the particular institutional 
conformation of the court system of the country, which makes access to the Supreme Court accessible 
basically only to businesses and for particularly economically important issues.98 While the considered 
decisions of the Supreme Court contribute to continue seeing the English system under that particular 
viewpoint, the view that the whole English legal system remains basically the realm of freedom of 
contract would therefore be deceptive. Quite to the contrary, in particular the aftermath of the decision 
by the Supreme Court in the Bank Charges case has shown that the market is being regulated not by 
traditional legislative instruments, but through co-regulation practices promoted by administrative 
authorities. 
                                                     
95 Bulmer v. Bollinger [1974] EWCA Civ 14, at 9(2)1 (Lord Denning). 
96 This exigency is felt as being so important that Section 2 (3) (e) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) 
requires the Financial Services Authority to have regard to ‘the international character of financial services and markets 
and the desirability of maintaining the competitive position of the United Kingdom’. 
97 O. Kahn-Freund, C. Lévy and B. Rudden, A Source-book on French Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979) 318. 
98 H Kötz, ‘The Jurisdiction of Choice: England and Wales or Germany?’ (2010) 6 European Review of Private Law 1243-




CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE – THE NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW RESPONSE 
Horatia Muir Watt*1 
I have been asked to assemble some introductory ideas to start the discussion on the “conflict and 
resistance” generated in national private law systems by the rise of European (regulatory) private law. 
At the outset, it must be said that this question covers a great deal of ground, much of which is already 
far too well-trodden to be of much interest here. Perhaps the most promising angle would therefore be 
to focus debate on the various shifts which seem to be taking place currently within the various sites of 
national resistance to European private law.  
I. 
It may be useful to consider, first, the political economy of national resistance. Clearly, there are both 
ostensible and hidden reasons behind the resistance in Member states’ legal systems. Complex and 
often invisible alliances may link different stakeholders in counterintuitive ways. For instance, 
according to the national sovereignty/European unity divide, hostility towards European Union private 
regulatory law may go hand in hand with rejection of European human rights law and the pursuit of 
cultural diversity. On the other hand, it may, on the contrary, federate ideological opposition along the 
neoliberal/redistributive divide, where champions of national tradition and pursuers of social justice 
through human rights may find themselves allied against the claims of the market-based ideology 
which is generally perceived to be promoted by the European Union and its Court.  
Thus, political resistance may exist either because European law is supranational, and thus a threat 
either to sovereignty or local culture, or because it is regulatory, heralding a contested model of private 
law. It may vary therefore, according to whether the system is linked to a strong or weak economy, in 
which the regulatory turn in the law is perceived to play (for better or worse) a significant causal role. 
Conflicts may again be more or less likely according to whether European private law is seen as a 
salutary factor of progressive change from an oppressive political regime, or on the contrary as 
destructive of national tradition or indeed as a downgrading of domestic standards. Embracing 
European private law may be perceived as empowering by smaller state actors and threatening by the 
more influential. And of course, each national Member state comprises highly heterogeneous groups, 
which may seize on European private law as a means of contestation of an established order, or on the 
contrary resist its impact on vested power structures such as the local notariat or the bar.   
Less obviously, analogous factors may be at play within the academic world which participates in the 
articulation of the very idea of a European private law. In academic circles, being seen as a player on 
the European law scene may be a way of asserting influence within the domestic or wider international 
context. Since standardization projects bring the windfall of European Union funding, there is an 
obvious academic race to “join in” the various unification programs. As the trajectory of the European 
civil code project over the past ten years shows, such participation has often involved changing an 
intellectual stance according to the policy choices of the powers that be. The rest of the academic 
community looks on bemused at the conflicts which surface from under the draft common frame of 
reference, or the creation of the European law Institute. However, the band-wagon syndrome is so 
obvious that in many circles, pursuing prestige through European funding also means running the risk 
of being outcast to the “foreign and exotic” department, and gives an unfortunate academic name to 
exercises in European private law teaching and research.   
                                                     
1* Professor of Private Law at SciencesPo. 
Horatia Muir Watt 
 116 
Economic lobbies may stand to gain, or not, from legal standardization. This factor is of course at the 
heart of the familiar debate over the Commission’s private law unification projects. Powerful interest 
groups may be wary of losing the economic benefit of national legal idiosyncracies which 
accommodate forum shopping or compartmentalize markets. But they may on the contrary profit 
considerably not only from the economies of scale which the disappearance of conflicts of laws is 
supposed to bring, but also from the rise of economic freedoms at the expense of national regimes of 
social justice. On the other hand of course, less powerful or at least less organized consumer groups 
may either fight for higher protection through European private law or reject it in turn either as 
eroding more generous domestic standards, or as serving as a Trojan horse for an information-based 
model of contract law, with insufficient regard to substantive consumer welfare.  
II. 
This analysis might then make it easier to identify the processes and focuses of resistance. What sorts 
of arguments are opposed to European regulatory private law and what are the types of conflicts upon 
which they crystalize? The sites of resistance have traditionally been found in culture, politics, 
methodology/epistemology and economics. But as the complex political economy of resistance 
suggests, arguments drawn from these areas are all highly intertwined, but at the same time may 
combine or conflict in unexpected ways.  
Thus, among cultural concerns, language has been a focal point for resistance. Since legal unity can 
hardly come with linguistic diversity (the argument goes), much opposition has been expressed in 
terms of defense of national languages, big and small. English having gained ground meanwhile in the 
outside commercial world, resistance tends now to be essentially academic, leading the weaker among 
the non-native English-speakers to engage in a losing battle over the linguistic justice of law review 
publications. The price to be paid within the European Union for linguistic diversity is a highly costly 
translation of all official documents - of which private regulatory law is but a (albeit substantial) part - 
in all the recognized languages. The dominance of English in practice does however seem to be linked 
to the appearance of a new regulatory language within the law, in which the very term  “regulatory” or 
“regulation” is the subject of some confusion.   
But of course, the cultural debate was framed from an early stage in terms of methodological and 
epistemological opposition between civilian and common law traditions, codes and non-code, the 
latter being staged as a minoritarian stance within a largely civilian Europe - curiously mirroring the 
reverse picture outside, where linguistic and cultural majorities have largely tended to coincide. This is 
of course a standard debate in comparative law and there is no need here to recall its terms.  It suffices 
here to point out that this debate does not seem to capture the contemporary regulatory technology of 
European law, whose hand, both visible and invisible, obviously comes in many forms other than 
codes or case-law. Open method of coordination, internal market clause, mutual recognition, minimal 
or maximal harmonization through directives, soft law, self-regulation, proportionality analysis, use of 
indicators … all engage novel methods of law-making which, beyond methodological issues, rather 
provide food for political thought.  
In turn however, the civilian tradition has largely come to stand for an ideological model of social 
justice and redistribution, as opposed to a perceived common law-driven, English-speaking, neo-
liberal model of private contract law supported by the economic freedoms, and perhaps paradoxically 
(given its lack of popularity in such circles), by an activist Court, more versed in competition law than 
in concerns of collective equality. But the terms of the economic debate, like the alliances it inspires, 
are again more complex than meets the eye, since the case for diversity in national legal systems is 
made both by partisans of regulatory competition whose stance tends to be neo-liberal, and by those 
concerned with the status of cultural minorities, who are usually, if not necessarily, located at the other 
end of the political spectrum. Moreover, within the camp for European private law and even among 
the supporters of its current regulatory turn, models may very along a spectrum ranging from the 
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“competitive” within Hans Micklitz’ reading, to the centralized or distributional, passing through the 
informational, all of which also have various anthropological foundations, or connect to diverse claims 
in social theory.   
III. 
Within all these sites of resistance, various interesting shifts are becoming visible. It seems to me that 
these shifts reflect contemporary global governance debates, or new trends in critical de-
compartmentalized legal analysis, which were kept at bay for a surprisingly long time during the 
formation years of the internal market. European private law has now therefore to come to terms with 
the situation of Europe itself within a wider world, and with the rise of other European or 
supranational legal sources, whether conflicting or confluent, which can impact considerably upon the 
field of private law. Attention can then be drawn to the fragile equilibrium on which it is built.  Crises 
– whether the sovereign debt crisis or climate change - may also be working beneficially to enlarge its 
horizon in some respects. 
Thus, among the methodological issues in adjudication, the deduction/induction debate linked to the 
common law/civil law divide seems to be more or less exhausted (which does not mean it is solved), 
and has to a large extent been superseded by conflicting views on the emergence of proportionality in 
private law reasoning. Here, however, while national-traditionalists may oppose the impact of public 
law methods in private law, those in favor of the horizontal effect of human rights in private litigation 
may prefer the flexible appearance of judicial balancing, perceived as more open to the equities of 
each case. Yet proportionality can also be preferred by those who hold the view that the pursuit of 
economic freedoms should prevail over the national interest in maintaining dissuasive levels of social 
protection. Moreover, the rising influence of distributional analysis in private law leads to awareness 
that wider concerns in the field of labor law, family law or immigration can provide the invisible 
background for the functioning of private law rules, so that much that goes into the balancing weighs 
in unseen. 
Remarkably, too, the various public and private actors with stakes in these various debates are 
changing swiftly. Horizontal effect oblige, clashes between the two European Courts over private law 
issues are appearing increasingly, in virtual or real form. Thus although the recent Ullens case before 
the European Court of Human Rights concerns the field of criminal law, the procedural conflict it 
revealed between national res judicata and primacy of European Union law, could of course easily 
arise in the field of private law. Similarly, the equally recent Sneersone conflict, in which the 
procedural expediency pursued by Regulation Brussels II bis clashed with fundamental rights before 
the same Court, could well play out in a field other than family law, such as in contract cases 
involving jurisdictional immunities. The Germany v. Italy case before the CIJ illustrates the type of 
conflict which might arise in the context of tort litigation.  
There may well be also a shift taking place in the focus of public and academic awareness and concern 
from the protection of the European consumer to the third world farmer. The law of the internal 
market grew up with little concern for third states either as players, or as the location of private 
economic actors, or indeed as the geographical origin of diverse categories of economic or ecological 
migrants and refugees from war and violence. European regulatory private law is concerned by these 
limitations to the extent that it operates functionally and geographically to ensure the smooth working 
of the European consumer market at the end of the agricultural and industrial production chain, which 
typically originates in developing countries. At least one benefit of the current world crises, financial 
and ecological, may be to create public awareness of poverty, famine, and destruction of natural 
resources beyond the frontiers of Europe but in the service of its consumers. Similar consciousness–
raising could usefully draw attention to the highly significant global governance implications of 
European laws of contract, tort, property and the conflict of laws, and their articulation with WTO law 
and fundamental rights. 
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Finally, although private law is not the most obvious point of impact of the sovereign debt crisis, there 
are in fact many points on which weaknesses in the private law regime for debt and default may have 
contributed to worsen its consequences. But beyond these aspects of the substantive law of complex 
obligations or contractual structures, the much decried role of rating agencies may not only lead to 
improving  modes of public accountability and private liability, but to giving specific attention to the 
use and abuse of private benchmarking as a market substitute for public law-making. Academic 
awareness of private trans- or post-national rule-making is already developing fast in Europe in 
various fora. But in a similar vein, the epistemology and the politics of the use of indicators by public 
lawmakers, including the European legislator, needs to be addressed. The shift in focus suggested here 
concerns the means through which is constructed the knowledge on which policy and legislation are 
built and monitored. 
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Section III: APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
1) Remedies 
RESHAPING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL REGULATION: 
UNITAS IN DIVERSITATE – THE CONSTRUCTION OF A HYBRID RELATIONSHIP 
Betül Kas* 
Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between the European and the national level when 
it comes to shaping remedies within the area of European social regulation as for instance consumer 
law, anti-discrimination law, unfair commercial practices and aspects of the regulated markets. The 
European enforcement structure is based on the concept of ‘executive federalism’, meaning that the 
substantive rules adopted by the European level are applied and enforced by the national courts and 
the national public authorities.1 Under the principle of procedural autonomy, national procedures and 
remedies are then applicable before the national enforcers for the enforcement of European rights. 
However, the principle of procedural autonomy seems to have lost its relevance as the European 
Union is exerting more and more influence on the national enforcement structures by borrowing its 
competence in enforcement matters from the respective subject-related substantive area at stake.2 The 
growing European influence on the national enforcement structures, whether resulting from subject-
related secondary Union law, the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union or the role of 
the European Commission in a network of national authorities, raises the need for a new 
conceptualization of the interplay between the European and the national level in enforcement matters.  
The hypothesized conceptualization of the relationship between the European and the national level is 
that of “hybridization”, meaning that the national level is required to shape its remedies according to a 
European minimum standard. Hybridity means that the legal character of the respective remedy is 
neither European nor national but bears elements of both legal orders. Hybridization processes are 
hypothetically able to achieve unitas in diversitate in the sense that the different national legal systems 
are not homogenised but each national legal order determines individually how it shapes its remedies 
in compliance with the European standard. In order to determine the processes that give shape to 
remedies in the area of European social regulation and to examine whether the concept of 
“hybridization” has an explanatory ability to define current trends, the research will be carried out by 
way of case-studies.3  
                                                     
* PhD Researcher, EUI. 
1 H.W. Micklitz, "The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States - A Plea for a Judge-made European Law 
on Remedies," in The ECJ and the Autonomy of the Member States, ed. B. de Witte and H.W. Micklitz (Cambridge, 
Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2011), 367. 
2 E. Storskrubb, "Civil Justice - A Newcomer and an Unstoppable Wave?," in The Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig and G. 
de Burca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
3 It has to be pointed out that in the selection of cases, there is currently a bias for the judiciary (i.e. the case-law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union) which is due to the (at the current state of research) opaque operations of the networks 
of national administrative authorities and particularly the extent of influence the European Commission is exerting over 
the national authorities via those networks and the degree of autonomy left to the national authorities. Moreover, gaining 
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The paper will start by providing a sketch of the European enforcement structure and thereby set the 
scene for the rest of the paper by distinguishing three forms of enforcement: “judicial”, 
“administrative” and “extra-judicial” enforcement. The paper will illustrate the patterns of the 
hybridisation processes by example of three case studies, namely the Putz/Weber4, Janecek5 and 
Alassini6 case, each linked to the three forms of enforcement. Following, the paper will develop a 
constitutional perspective and draw on integration theories to conceptualize the relationship between 
the national and the European level in shaping hybrid remedies. Particularly, it will be claimed that 
current legal integration theories as based on hierarchical thinking or perceiving the European and the 
national level on equal footing fail to grasp the complex interplay between both levels.   
Part I: Setting the Scene - The European Enforcement Structure 
This part intends to give a broad overview of the institutional and remedial dimension of the 
enforcement of European law in general and in the area of social regulation in particular. The focus 
will be on the extent of influence exerted by the European level on the national enforcement 
structures.  Looking at the central enforcement instruments under the Treaty, it becomes clear that the 
European level has no structure at its disposal to ensure the effective enforcement of European social 
regulation independently from the national level but depends in that regard on the national courts and 
national administrative authorities. While constitutional barriers exist to the development of a 
European enforcement policy, resting on the principle of subsidiarity7 and even more on the principle 
of procedural autonomy8, those did not hinder the European level to heavily intervene into the national 
enforcement structures. It will be shown that the increasing European influence on the institutional 
organisation of the national enforcement structures as well as on national remedies and procedures 
sheds doubt on the continued relevance of the principle of procedural autonomy and raises the need for 
a new conceptualisation of the interplay between the European and the national level in enforcement 
matters.  
The Institutional Perspective of the European Enforcement Structure 
The Limitations of the Central Enforcement Instruments under the Treaty 
In principle, European law can be enforced by administrative or judicial mechanisms as well as 
centrally or decentrally. While central administrative enforcement takes place via the infringement 
(Contd.)                                                                  
access to case-studies regarding the enforcement actions taken by the national authorities is more difficult than obtaining 
access to court decisions. 
4 Joined Cases C-65/09, Gebr. Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and C-87/09, Ingrid Putz v Medianess Electronics GmbH 
[2011] ECR 00000. 
5 C-237/07, Janecek v. Freistaat Bayern [2008] ECR I-6221. 
6 C-317-320/08, Rosalba Alassini et al. v. Telecom Italia [2010] ECR I-02213. 
7 The principle of subsidiarity was introduced into EU legislation by Article 5 (3) TEU, providing: “Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at 
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at 
Union level.” 
8 The classic statement of the procedural autonomy of the Member States can be found in the Rewe and Comet case: “[…] in 
the absence of Community rules on this subject, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the 
courts having jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the 
protection of the rights which citizens have from the direct effect of Community law, it being understood that such 
conditions cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature […] the position would 
be different only if the conditions and time-limits made it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the national 
courts are obliged to protect.” Case C-33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer 
für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, para. 5; Case C- 45/76, Comet [1976] ECR 2043, para. 13. 
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procedure before the European Commission set out in Articles 258 TFEU9, central judicial 
enforcement can be initiated before the Court of Justice of the European Union via the annulment 
procedure provided for in Article 263 TFEU. Although the centralised enforcement of European law 
was the primary method of enforcement foreseen by the Treaty of Rome, the protection offered by 
both instruments is limited. The annulment procedure allows challenging only the legality of European 
acts but not the conduct of the Member States or private parties. Moreover, the restrictive standing 
requirements of “direct and individual concern” pose many obstacles for private parties. Also the 
standing conditions for NGOs under the annulment procedure are a subject of controversy.  The 
changes under the Treaty of Lisbon loosened the standing requirements in only very limited 
circumstances: Under the new regime, private parties need to show only “direct concern” when a 
regulatory act which does not entail implementing measures is at stake.10 Even though it has to be 
noted that there is a tendency of the Commission to use the infringement procedure to ensure the 
enforcement of European law, in principle, the infringement procedure aims to ensure the proper 
implementation of European law and not its application.11 Furthermore, the Commission’s limited 
resources and its large discretion in setting its priorities need to be stressed.12 Also the powers of the 
European Ombudsman as established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 are limited: His role is 
restricted to investigate complaints of private parties about maladministration in the institutions and 
bodies of the European Union and he attempts to find an amicable resolution of the dispute between 
the parties.13  As the centralised enforcement instruments are subject to many restrictions and 
limitations, a decentralisation of the judicial and administrative enforcement structures took place, 
leading to a situation in which the responsibility to enforce European law is currently shared among 
various actors. 
Decentralised Judicial Enforcement: National Courts with a European Mission 
The Court of Justice has over time construed a system of decentralised judicial enforcement based on 
the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. In van Gend and Loos the Court of Justice created the 
principle of direct effect, according to which European law provisions are capable of conferring rights 
on individuals which the national courts are bound to recognise and enforce, provided the respective 
European provision is sufficiently clear, precise and unconditional.14 In Costa v Enel the Court of 
Justice established the principle of supremacy pointing out that the European provisions take 
precedence over all conflicting national law, whatever its rank in the national hierarchy of sources.15 
                                                     
9 For reasons of completeness, the Article 259 TFEU procedure has to be mentioned, which allows a Member State to initiate 
the infringement procedure against another Member State. However, this mechanism is considered to be a “dead letter” in 
legal scholarship. For political reasons, it is well known that Member States are very reluctant to use this procedure. 
See:S. Weatherill, "Addressing Problems of Imbalanced Implementation in EC Law: Remedies in an Institutional 
Perspective," in The Future of European Remedies, ed. T. Novitz et al. (Oxford and Protland, Oregon: Hart Publisher, 
2000). 
10 M. Eliantonio and B. Kas, "Private Parties and the Annulment Procedure: Can the Gap in the European System of Judicial 
Protection Be Closed?," Journal of Politics and Law 3, no. 2 (2010). 
11 Micklitz has shown that in some policy areas where the Commission has formally no enforcement power, the Commission 
is using the infringement procedure not only to make sure that European law is properly implemented but that the 
respective European rules have been properly applied, meaning enforced. An example for this is the area of European 
environmental law. For further details see: H.W. Micklitz, "Administrative Enforcement of Private Law," in The 
Foundations of European Private Law, ed. R. Brownsword et al. (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
12 M. Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice : Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation (Oxford; 
Portland, Or. : Hart Publishing, 2004). 1-2; M. Eliantonio, Europeanisation of Administrative Justice  (Groningen: 
Europa Law Publishing, 2009). 3-11. 
13 See: Article 288 TFEU. 
14 Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratis der 
Belastingen [1963] ECR 1. 
15 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
Betül Kas 
 122 
The implications of the principal of supremacy were clarified in the Simmenthal judgement, in which 
the Court of Justice held that “every national court, must in a case within its jurisdiction, apply 
Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers upon individuals and must 
accordingly set aside any provisions of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or 
subsequent to the Community rule.”16 Moreover, in Marleasing, the Court of Justice made clear that 
national courts are obliged to interpret national law, as far as possible, in the light of European law.17 
Article 4 (3) TEU, the principle of loyal cooperation, was regarded by the Court of Justice as the 
principal legal basis for the duties of national courts under European law. Consequently, the Court of 
Justice imposed on national courts a European mission and thereby turned them into “European” 
courts.18  
In the decentralised judicial structure, the preliminary ruling procedure as provided for in Article 267 
TFEU constitutes a unique method of co-operation between the national courts and the Court of 
Justice. It allows the national courts to seek assistance from the Court of Justice with regard to the 
interpretation and application of European law. The preliminary ruling procedure aims to ensure that 
European law is applied uniformly. In order for the preliminary ruling procedure to function, the 
national court and the Court of Justice need to mutually communicate. As pointed out by Micklitz, this 
could be difficult for the following reason: The national court needs an interpretation by the Court of 
Justice of a European provision in order to solve a specific national dispute. On the other hand, the 
Court of Justice is aware that it will give a judgement, which is valid for the whole European Union.19 
Decentralised Administrative Enforcement: Setting up of National Public Authorities 
Looking at secondary Union law in the area of social regulation, the choice between judicial and 
administrative enforcement has been primarily left to the Member States in accordance with the 
principle of procedural autonomy.20 However, a trend is emerging, which requires the Member States 
to set up national authorities responsible for the implementation and enforcement of European law. 
These initiatives are rather patchy as they depend on the substantive area at stake. This development 
can be observed for instance in the areas of the regulated markets, particularly in the context of the 
liberalization and privatization of former state monopolies, as for instance in the areas of financial 
services, electricity, gas, telecommunication, postal services and transport.  Even though the Member 
States have autonomy of organization and procedure, European influence is intensifying. While these 
public authorities focus their activities currently on ensuring the workability of the respective market, 
secondary Union law is pressuring the Member States to include the protection of customers into their 
main activities.21 A further example can be found in the area of consumer protection as the Consumer 
                                                     
16 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629, para. 21. 
17 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA  [1991] 1 ECR 4135, para. 8. 
18 S. Prechal, "National Courts in EU Judicial Structures," Yearbook of European Law 25(2006). 
19 H.W. Micklitz, The Politics of Judicial Co-operation in the EU - Sunday Trading, Equal Treatment and Good Faith  
(Cambridge University Press, 2005). 41. 
20 F. Cafaggi, "The Great Transformation. Administrative and Judicial Enforcement in Consumer Protection: A Remedial 
Perspective. ," Loyola Consumer Law Review 21(2009): 502. For instance, in the area of consumer protection, Article 2 
of Directive 98/27/EC of 19 May 1998 on injunctions for the protection of consumers' interests left the choice between 
judicial enforcement, administrative enforcement or both to the Member States. A further example can be provided by 
Article 7 of Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, requiring Member States that judicial and/or administrative procedures are 
available for the enforcement of the obligations under the directive. 
21 Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments; Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity; Directive 2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas; Directive 2009/136/EC of 25 November 2009 on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services. See also: Micklitz, "Administrative 
Enforcement of Private Law." 
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Protection Cooperation Regulation 2006/2004 requires the Member States to establish national 
authorities, which are responsible for the enforcement of consumer law in trans-border litigation and 
are entitled to issue actions for injunctions.22  
 
The question arises as to what extent the European level can exert influence on the enforcement 
actions to be taken by the national authorities. A design seems to appear, which links the national 
authorities, as well as the Commission, in an enforcement network. Networks of national regulators 
may enhance cooperation with regard to enforcement through for example information sharing and 
coordination of national procedures. The national authorities often fulfil a double role: They are part of 
both the national administration and the European administration, meaning that they co-operate with 
the agencies of other Member States as well as the European Commission. Consequently, the crucial 
factors in understanding the functioning of these networks are the relationships between the national 
authorities, as well as the relationship with the European Commission. The extent of influence the 
European Commission is exerting over the national authorities via those networks and the degree of 
autonomy left to the national agencies needs to be determined. In considering this, attention has to be 
paid not only to the formal but also the informal dynamics and practices outside the legislative 
framework. It seems that no hierarchical structure is created but that the networks aim to stimulate a 
co-operative relationship.23 Consequently, hybrid forms are emerging whereby responsibilities are 
shared to differing degrees between the European Commission, European agencies and the national 
authorities.24 
Extra-judicial Enforcement: Promoting ADR Mechanisms 
The European Union is showing a growing interest in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms. ADR is promoted by the Commission as a less costly and less time-consuming 
alternative to court proceedings, which is able to improve access to justice for consumers. A 2009 
study of the European Commission as well as a more recent study conducted by the CMS Research 
Programme for Civil Justice headed by Professor Hodges revealed that Consumer ADR is widespread 
among the Member States.25 The national ADR models provide for different architectures and many 
variations as to their extent of independence and transparency can be found. On the European level, 
there are two non-binding Recommendations 98/257/EC and 2001/310/EC, which set out minimum 
requirements for ADR bodies, and two networks, the European Consumer Centre Network (ECC-Net)   
and the Financial Services Complaint Network (Fin-Net), which help consumers to access the 
appropriate ADR body in case of cross-border disputes.  
 
Also secondary Union law in the regulated markets emphasizes the importance of ADR mechanisms. 
In the telecom sector26, energy sector27, Consumer Credit Directive28 and Payment Services 
                                                     
22 Article 3 Regulation 2006/2004/EC of 27 October 2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws.  
23 M. Groenleer, "Regulatory Governance in the European Union: The Role of Committees, Agencies and Networks," in 
Handbook on the Politics of Regulation, ed. D. Levi-Faur (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA, USA: 
Edward Elgar, 2011), 548. 
24 Y. Svetiev, "W(h)ither Private Law in the Face of the Regulatory Deluge," in this working paper. 
25 C. Hodges et al., Consumer ADR in Europe  (Nomos, 2012). 390-91.This study claims that the 2009 study of the European 
Commission, showing that there exist more than 750 consumer ADR schemes in Europe, to be based on a miscalculation 
and that one can find around 100 ADR schemes in Europe. (For the Commission study, see: Civic Consulting Study, 
“Study on the Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the European Union” commissioned by DG Sanco (2009), 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_study.pdf (last visited: 12.05.2012).   
26 Directive 2009/136/EC of 25 November 2009 on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications 
networks and services. 
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Directive29 Member States are required to set up adequate and effective ADR bodies for consumer 
disputes. Next to the requirements to adopt ADR systems, we find measures encouraging Member 
States to provide for ADR bodies like in the Directives for Postal Services30 and Markets in Financial 
Instruments31. The sector-related Directives do not prescribe any detailed requirements as to the 
organization of the ADR bodies or the procedure followed by them. The Member States can decide 
whether they attribute the competence for dispute resolution to the national regulatory authorities or to 
another public or private entity.  
 
Most recently, on the 29th of November 2011, the European Commission presented a proposal for a 
Directive on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes requiring that Member States ensure 
that all disputes between a consumer and a trader arising from the sale of goods or the provision of 
services can be submitted to an ADR body. Of major concern in the discussions of legal scholars and 
practitioners are the quality requirements provided for in the Commission proposal, which aim to 
ensure that the consumer is adequately protected during the ADR proceedings. Concerns are raised to 
not impose a too high burden on companies by adopting too strict quality requirements. Particularly 
the principle of legality, requiring that the consumer is not deprived of the protection afforded by 
mandatory legal provisions, is a subject of controversy as it was not included into the Commission 
proposal.32  
The deeper implications of the promotion of ADR mechanisms for the legal protection of European 
rights need to be considered. As put by Edwards, “we must determine whether ADR will result in an 
abandonment of our constitutional system in which ‘the rule of law’ is created and principally 
enforced by legitimate branches of government.”33 It needs to be determined whether and under which 
conditions ADR constitutes an adequate mechanism to provide for the legal protection of European 
rights.  
The Remedial Perspective of the European Enforcement Structure 
The institutional decentralisation of the enforcement structure raises the question about which 
remedies and procedures are applicable before the national enforcers of European law. The principle 
of procedural autonomy provides that in the absence of European rules on this matter, the national 
legal systems lay down the detailed procedural rules for the enforcement of European law.34 The 
doctrine of procedural autonomy also extends to remedies. According to the national remedial 
autonomy, in the absence of European rules on this subject, European law does not intend to create 
new remedies other than those already laid down by national law.35  
(Contd.)                                                                  
27 Directive 2009/72/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity; Directive 
2009/73/EC of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 
28 Directive 2008/48/EC of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers. 
29 Directive 2007/64/EC of 13 November 2007 on payment services in the internal market. 
30 Directive 2008/6/EC of 20 February 2008 with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community 
postal services. 
31 Directive 2004/39/EC of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments. 
32 Possible reasons for not including the principle of legality in the Commission proposal can be found in Svetiev, "W(h)ither 
Private Law in the Face of the Regulatory Deluge." 
33 H.T. Edwards, "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?," Harvard Law Review 99(1986): 671. 
34 Case 33/76,  Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, 
para. 5. 
35 C-158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord and Rewe-Markt Steffen [1981] ECR 1805, para. 44; C-432/05, Unibet [2007] 
ECR 2271, para. 40. It hast to be pointed out that the term “remedial autonomy” is not used by the Court of Justice but it 
is also referring to “procedural autonomy” in the context of remedies. See: V. Trstenjak and E. Beysen, "European 
Consumer Protection Law: Curia semper dabit remedium?," Common Market Law Review 48(2011). 
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However, national procedures and remedies may not be able to fulfill the policy objectives of the 
European legislation at stake and may not fit to the particularities of the European legal order. As 
national procedural and remedial rules may hinder the effective and uniform application of European 
law, a growing influence is exerted by secondary Union law as in the areas of consumer protection and 
anti-discrimination law.36 Also in the areas of the regulated markets, minimum requirements can be 
found requiring that Member States make sure that national remedies are effective, proportionate and 
deterrent.37  However, the European legislative influence on national remedies remains either patchy, 
depending on the substantive area at stake or rather vague, leaving a wide discretion to the Member 
States.  
Despite the subject-related influence via secondary Union law, the Court of Justice has a major role in 
influencing national remedies for the enforcement of European law. The Court of Justice intervened 
into the remedial and procedural dimensions of the national enforcement systems already in 1976 by 
imposing two cumulative requirements on the national systems, namely the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness. According to the principle of equivalence, the same conditions need to apply to 
claims based on European law brought before the national courts than in respect of similar actions 
based on purely national law. The principle of effectiveness requires that national remedies and 
procedural rules must not render the exercise of European rights virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult in practice.38 However, even though those principles are constantly reoccurring in the case-
law of the Court of Justice, their definite meaning and relationship to each other remains unclear. 
Moreover, both principles are considered to be minimum standards as they set an outer limit to the 
national autonomy and take a negative role by excluding excessive restrictions or discrimination 
against claims based on European law.39   
Legal scholars are pleading for the development of a positive theory of legal protection.40 As argued 
by W. Van Gerven, adequate and not minimum legal protection is needed.41  The principle of effective 
judicial protection is recognised as a general principle of European law, influencing all stages of the 
judicial enforcement process.42 Indeed, Article 19 (1) TEU provides that “Member States shall provide 
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.” As the 
Court of Justice is increasingly emphasizing the fundamental right to legal protection as guaranteed by 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, it might be argued that a new 
understanding of the principle of effective legal protection as requiring not only effective but adequate 
remedies is evolving.43 However, the definite meaning of what constitutes an adequate remedy (i.e. 
what is adequate enough?) and whether it has to be understood as a substantive or procedural concept 
remains unclear. 
Indeed, in the case-law of the Court of Justice, a series of cases can be found in which the Court of 
Justice has intervened into the national legal systems more strongly than might be expected regarding 
                                                     
36 N. Reich, "Effective Private Law Remedies in Discrimination Cases," in Non-Discrimiantion in European Private Law, 
ed. Schulze (Mohr-Siebeck 2011); N. Reich, "Individueller und kollektiver Rechtsschutz im EU-Verbraucherrecht," 
Schriftenreihe der Juristischen Studiengesellschaft Hannover ( Nomos) 51(2012). 
37 A. Ottow and K. de Weers, "Towards a European Enforcement Toolkit? ," Working Paper of The Europe Institute Utrecht 
(01/2011). 
38 Case 33/76,  Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland [1976] ECR 1989. 
39 M. Bobek, "Why there is no Principle of "Procedural Autonomy" of the Member States," in The European Court of Justice 
and the Autonomy of the Member States, ed. H.W. Micklitz and B. de Witte (Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 
2012); Reich, "Effective Private Law Remedies in Discrimination Cases." 
40 Reich, "Effective Private Law Remedies in Discrimination Cases."; Micklitz, "The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and 
the Member States - A Plea for a Judge-made European Law on Remedies," 395. 
41 W. van Gerven, "Of rights, remedies and procedures," Common Market Law Review 37(2000): 529. 
42 Case C-125/01, Peter Pflücke v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit [2003] ECR I-9375. See also: Eliantonio, Europeanisation of 
Administrative Justice: 10-11. 
43 Reich, "Individueller und kollektiver Rechtsschutz im EU-Verbraucherrecht." 
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a strict application of the principle of procedural autonomy. The Court does not seem to be reluctant to 
require the creation of new remedies or the shaping of existing national remedies if it considers it 
necessary in order to ensure the legal protection of rights derived from European law. However, 
despite some spectacular landmark decisions as for instance Francovich44 and Factortame45 in which 
the Court of Justice introduced the remedies of state liability and interim relief respectively, the 
influence of the Court of Justice will be “gradual and contain ups and downs, with activist and 
receptive phases.”46 
Linking “Judicial”, “Administrative” and “Extra-judicial” Enforcement 
Examining the effectiveness of an enforcement structure in the area of social regulation necessitates 
not only looking at the three forms of enforcement independently from each other, but requires 
determining also the interrelationships between the different mechanisms. This is particularly relevant 
in case of disputes having a collective dimension. Social conflicts often involve diffuse interests, 
meaning that the individual losses of the victims are small while the aggregate gains for the tortfeasor 
are high. The costs for the individual person might be too high to have an incentive to initiate court 
proceedings. Those problems can be addressed by collective judicial enforcement, administrative 
enforcement or a combination of both.  While the Member States become more and more active in 
establishing collective judicial enforcement mechanisms, it has been shown that in particular sector-
related areas, the European Union is pushing the Member States to set up national public authorities. 
Consequently, in the areas in which we observe the establishment of national public authorities, the 
interface with collective judicial enforcement needs to be rebalanced.47 In addition, extra-judicial 
enforcement enters the picture and questions arise as to whether collective conflicts are suitable to be 
dealt with by alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. 
Moreover, the relationship between individual and collective enforcement needs to be clarified. 
Collective enforcement via the courts or administration is often not conceptually linked to individual 
litigation. Under the res judicata doctrine, the collective and the individual procedure have to be kept 
separate. However, ensuring effective legal protection might require to link collective and individual 
proceedings: It needs to be clarified whether a collective action before a court can bind another court 
in individual proceedings and whether an action of a public authority may bind a national court.48  
Consequently, individual judicial enforcement has to be aligned with administrative and collective 
judicial enforcement.  
Finally, it has to be stressed that the interrelationships between the different forms of enforcement are 
rendered even more complex in case of cross-border disputes, raising the need for the establishment of 
horizontal co-ordination and co-operation techniques amongst the different enforcers in the Member 
States. 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that the European enforcement structure is based on the concept of ‘executive 
federalism’, meaning that the rules adopted by the European level are applied and enforced by the 
                                                     
44  Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich [1991] ECR I-5357. 
45  Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] ECR I-2433. 
46 Micklitz, "The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States - A Plea for a Judge-made European Law on 
Remedies." 
47 H.W. Micklitz, "The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law," EUI Working Paper Law (2008/14): 36; F. 
Cafaggi and H.W. Micklitz, New Frontiers of Consumer Protection. The Interplay between Private and Public 
Enforcement  (Antwerp, Oxford, Portland: Intersentia, 2009). 
48 H.W. Micklitz, "Reforming European Unfair Terms Legislation in Consumer Contracts," European Review of Contract 
Law 6, no. 4 (2010): 350-59. 
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Member States, whether in form of the national courts or the national public authorities.49 As a 
consequence, under the principle of procedural autonomy, national procedures and remedies are 
applicable for the enforcement of European rights. The principle of procedural autonomy can be seen 
as a source of policy diversity, allowing the Member States to follow their own national conceptions 
about the organisation and functioning of the administration of justice, according to their local legal 
culture and varied societal goals.50 However, in light of the European influence on the mode of 
enforcement chosen as well as on particular remedies and procedures, it becomes clear that the 
principle of procedural autonomy is fading away and that it is unable to capture the relationship 
between the European and the national level in enforcement matters. While the influence exerted by 
secondary Union law depends on the substantive area at stake and is therefore subject to subject-
related fragmentation, the role of the Court of Justice seems to be that of filling the gaps left by 
secondary Union law.51  The aim of this research is to determine whether it is possible to discern 
European minimum standards or common principles on enforcement matters by way of a horizontal 
analysis of the dispersed rules contained in secondary Union law as well as the case-law of the Court 
of Justice and to finally provide a new conceptualization of the interplay between the European and 
the national level. 
Part II: Three Examples of the Interplay between the European and the National Level 
in Shaping Remedies 
The Putz-Weber52, Janecek53 and Alassini54 cases are used as case-studies to determine the interplay 
between the national and the European level when it comes to shaping remedies for the enforcement of 
European law. The three cases chosen are of a different nature and concern different fields of the area 
of social regulation. In the Putz/Weber case, the Court of Justice strengthened the remedies available 
to the consumer-buyer against the seller under the Consumer Sales Directive. Consequently, the case 
dealt with individual judicial remedies available in the horizontal relation between private parties. In 
the Janecek case, the Court of Justice guaranteed the existence of an administrative remedy, which 
makes it possible for private parties to take enforcement actions to ensure compliance of the Member 
States with European environmental law. Contrary to Putz/Weber, the Janecek case involved the 
vertical relation between private parties and the state and is furthermore illustrative for the difficulties 
that arise if diffuse interests are at stake. The reasoning adopted in this case could be transferred to 
other legal areas, as financial services.55 Regarding extra-judicial enforcement, in the Alassini case, the 
Court of Justice clarified which requirements have to be met in order for out-of-court settlement 
procedures in consumer disputes to comply with the principle of effective legal protection. 
                                                     
49 Micklitz, "The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States - A Plea for a Judge-made European Law on 
Remedies," 367. 
50 M. Dougan, "The Vicissitudes of Life at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures for Enforcing Union Law before the 
National Courts," in The Evolution of EU Law, ed. P. Craig and G. de Burca (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
51 Micklitz, "The ECJ between the Individual Citizen and the Member States - A Plea for a Judge-made European Law on 
Remedies," 367. 
52 Joined Cases C-65/09, Gebr. Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and C-87/09, Ingrid Putz v Medianess Electronics GmbH 
[2011] ECR 00000. 
53 C-237/07, Janecek v. Freistaat Bayern [2008] ECR I-6221.  
54 C-317-320/08, Rosalba Alassini et al. v. Telecom Italia [2010] ECR I-02213. 




The Putz/Weber Case – Strengthening Individual Remedies under European Consumer Law 
The joined cases C-65/09 Gebr. Weber56 and C-87/09 Putz57 dealt with the interpretation of Article 3 
of the Directive 1999/44/EC of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and 
associated guarantees. Article 3 of the Consumer Sales Directive establishes a liability system in case 
the seller had delivered non-conforming goods to the buyer. According to Article 3 (3), the consumer 
is entitled to repair or replacement of the defective goods free of charge, unless this is impossible or 
disproportionate. Article 3 (5) allows the consumer to require a price reduction or to rescined the 
contract if the consumer is not entitled either to repair or to replacement. 
 
Both cases deal with the same situation: After a consumer bought goods from a seller and properly 
installed them, it turned out that the goods have been in non-conformity with the contract. The German 
courts were required to determine the exact scope of the seller’s obligation to cure the defect and 
particularly, whether the seller has to bear the costs of removing the defective goods and installing 
replacement goods. In German private law, this issue has been one of the most controversial and 
extensively discussed topics. In a previous decision in 2008, the German Federal Civil Court held that 
the seller is not obliged to bear the costs of installing replacement goods, if installation was not part of 
the contractual obligations.58 While the Federal Civil Court had a clear view that the seller does not 
need to bear the installation costs, a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union was made in the Weber case as to whether the seller is obliged to bear the costs for 
removing the non-conforming goods.59 However, the first instance court in the Putz case openly 
questioned the reasoning of the Federal Civil Court and expressed its doubts that an interpretation of 
Directive 1999/44/EC in the light of European law would not require the seller to bear the costs for the 
installation of the new goods. Consequently, it decided to submit the question whether the seller has to 
bear also the costs for installation to the Court of Justice via the preliminary ruling procedure.60 
The Ruling of the Court of Justice 
Contrary to the opinion of Advocate-General Mazak, the Court of Justice came to the conclusion that 
the seller has to bear the costs for the removal of the defective goods and for the installation of the new 
goods. By relying on the Quelle61 judgment, the Court of Justice firstly refers to the purpose of the 
“free of charge” aspect of the obligation of the seller to bring the goods into conformity with the 
contract: “The 'free of charge' requirement […] is intended to protect consumers from the risk of 
financial burdens which might dissuade them from asserting their rights in the absence of such 
protection.”62 The Court of Justice held that if the consumer cannot require the seller to pay for the 
removal of the already installed goods and for installing replacement goods, that replacement would 
                                                     
56 Mr Wittmer bought polished floor tiles from Weber which he had laid in his house. Subsequently, Mr Wittmer noticed 
shading on the surface of the tiles. An expert concluded that the marks could not be removed, so that the only remedy 
possible was complete replacement of the tiles. 
57 Ms Putz concluded a contract for the sale of a dishwasher with Medianess Electronics which delivered the machine to the 
door of her house. After Ms Putz had the dishwasher installed, a defect, which was not attributable to the installation, 
became apparent. Since removal of the defect was impossible, Ms Putz requested delivery of a dishwasher free from 
defects as well as the removal of the defective machine and installation of the new one. 
58 BGH, decision of 15 July 2008, NJW, 2837 (Parkettstäbe-Entscheidung). 
59 BGH, decision of 14 January 2009, BeckRS 2009, 05318. 
60 Amtsgericht Schorndorf, decision of 25. February 2009, BeckRS 2009, 88603. A. Johnston and H. Unberath, "Case 
comment on Joined Cases C-65/09 Weber & C-87/09 Putz," Common Market Law Review 49(2012): 795-97; J. 
Glöckner, "Von Greeman v. Yuba zu Gebr. Weber und Putz - der EuGH geht den nächsten Schritt auf dem Wege der 
Ökonomisierung des Europäischen Verbraucherprivatrechts," Europäisches Wirtschafts - und Steuerrecht 9(2011): 361. 
61 Case C-404/06, Quelle [2008] ECR I-2685. 
62 Joined Cases C-65/09 Gebr. Weber GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer and C-87/09 Ingrid Putz v Medianess Electronics GmbH 
[2011] ECR 00000, para. 46. 
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impose an additional financial burden on the consumer.63 Consequently, if the consumer needs to bear 
those costs, the replacement would not have been “free of charge”.64 Moreover, the consumer would 
not have been subject to this burden if the seller had correctly performed his contractual obligations. 
Consequently, the seller must bear the consequences of the non-conforming performance.65  
The Court of Justice further points out that the seller’s financial interests are protected by the two year 
time-limitation for the buyer to bring a claim against the seller in Article 5 (1) of the Consumer Sales 
Directive, by the seller’s right to refuse replacement if it is a disproportionate remedy in that it 
imposes unreasonable costs as well as by the seller’s right of redress against persons in the same 
contractual chain.66 According to the Court of Justice, it is of no relevance whether the seller was 
originally obliged to install the goods delivered under the contract, since the obligations of the seller 
arising from Article 3 of the Consumer Sales Directive are considered to be independent of the 
contractual obligations and may in some cases exceed those provided by the contract.67  
The Court of Justice dealt then with the question if the seller could refuse the remedy of replacement 
because the costs of removing the defective goods and installing replacement goods are 
disproportionate with regard to the value of the conforming goods. According to Article 3 (3) of the 
Consumer Sales Directive, the consumer has a right to repair or replacement of the non-conforming 
goods. The seller may refuse a remedy if it is disproportionate, meaning that the remedy demands 
costs from the seller that are unreasonable in comparison with the alternative remedy. The question 
arises whether the seller may refuse replacement on the ground that it will require unreasonable costs 
from him even though the remedy of repair is unavailable because of impossibility. The Court of 
Justice pointed out that the seller may refuse one of these remedies only if it is disproportionate in 
relation to the other remedy, which means that the right to refuse is limited to cases of relative lack of 
proportionality.68 Consequently, it is ensured that there is always one of the remedies, either repair or 
replacement, available to the buyer. The Court of Justice finds support for its view in recital 11 of the 
Consumer Sales Directive, stating that “in order to determine whether the costs are unreasonable, the 
costs of one remedy should be significantly higher than the costs of the other remedy.”69 The result is 
that “if only one of the two remedies is possible, the seller may therefore not refuse the only remedy 
which allows the goods to be brought into conformity with the contract."70 Consequently, on the basis 
of Article 3 (3) of the Consumer Sales Directive, Member States are prohibited to adopt legislation, 
which allows the seller to refuse the only possible remedy because of an absolute lack of 
proportionality.71 
However, the Court of Justice allows the national courts to limit the consumer’s right to 
reimbursement of the costs for removing the defective goods and installing the new goods to a certain 
amount.72 The Court of Justice gives further guidelines to the national court by requiring that the 
national court should bear in mind “first, the value the goods would have if there were no lack of 
conformity and the significance of the lack of conformity, and secondly, the Directive’s purpose of 
ensuring a high level of protection for consumers.”73 The reduction may not render the consumer’s 
                                                     
63 Ibid., para. 47. 
64 Ibid., paras. 48-49. 
65 Ibid., para 56. 
66 Ibid., para 58. 
67 Ibid., para 59. 
68 Ibid., para 68 
69 Ibid., para 69. 
70 Ibid., para 71. 
71 Ibid., para 73. 
72 Ibid., para 74. 
73 Ibid., para 76. 
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right to reimbursement effectively devoid of any substance. In case the national court decides for a 
reduction of the reimbursement, the consumer has to be able to choose instead for an appropriate price 
reduction or termination of the contract as provided by Article 3 (5) of the Consumer Sales 
Directive.74 The new limitation to the amount of reimbursement was established by the Court of 
Justice without legal basis and was justified on policy reasons, namely to ensure a fair balance of 
interests. 
The Interplay of the European and National Level 
In the Putz/Weber judgment, the Court of Justice interfered strongly with German private law in order 
to ensure the effet utile of the Consumer Sales Directive.75 Under German law, the buyer has only 
limited possibilities to be compensated for the loss of expenses caused by the installation of the non-
conforming goods provided that the fault requirement could be met. The Court of Justice turned the 
fault-based claim for compensation under German law into a claim encompassing the costs for de-
installation and new installation irrespective of the fault of the seller. The Court of Justice did not base 
its argumentation on the traditions of the Member States but instead interpreted the Consumer Sales 
Directive autonomously by focusing on the wording (“free of charge”), systematics and function 
(“high level of protection for consumers”) of the Consumer Sales Directive and embraces thereby a 
teleological interpretation.76 The implementation of the scope of the consumer’s right to 
reimbursement of the cost of removal and installation was implemented by the German Federal Civil 
Court in its follow-up decision within the existing framework of the Civil Code without major 
problems. § 439 German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) provides that the buyer may require 
the repair of the defect or the delivery of the goods free from defects. The Federal Civil Court 
stretched the wording “delivery of goods free from defect” to include the de-installation and new 
installation.77 
The more difficult part concerned the refusal of the Court of Justice to grant the seller the defence of 
absolute disproportionality. § 439 (3) German Civil Code clearly provides that the seller may refuse 
repair and replacement if the cost of remedying the defect as such is disproportionate to the value of 
performance to the buyer. As it is the case under the CISG and English law, German law allows for 
the defence of absolute disproportionality.78 Moreover, as the Court of Justice did not provide any 
legal basis for limiting the amount of reimbursement, it was even more difficult for the German courts 
to accommodate the judgment in the existing statutory framework. Since it was not possible for the 
German Federal Civil Court to interpret § 439 (3) in conformity with the Directive, it restricted the 
applicability of this provision for consumer sale contracts. The German Federal Civil Court held that 
in case of consumer sales contracts, the seller’s defense of absolute disproportionality is restricted to 
the seller’s right to refer the buyer to an appropriate amount regarding the reimbursement of the costs 
for de-installation of the defective goods and the new installation of the replacement goods. Moreover, 
it has to be noted that the German Federal Civil Court requested the adjustment of the relevant 
provisions by the German legislator. This is particularly of great relevance as Germany has reformed 
its law of obligations and included the Consumer Sales Directive into general contract law to avoid 
having separate legal regimes for non-consumer and consumer contracts. However, it remains to be 
seen how the German legislator will react.79 
                                                     
74 Ibid., para. 77. 
75 Reich, "Individueller und kollektiver Rechtsschutz im EU-Verbraucherrecht."  
76 Glöckner, "Von Greeman v. Yuba zu Gebr. Weber und Putz - der EuGH geht den nächsten Schritt auf dem Wege der 
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77 BGH, decision of the 21 December 2011, VIII ZR 70/08. 
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If we look at the final complete remedy, the hybrid nature becomes apparent as it is shaped by 
European and national influence. Despite this strong interference into German law beyond what might 
be expected regarding the principle of procedural/remedial autonomy, the Court of Justice opened the 
possibility for the national courts to set an appropriate limit for the consumer’s right to reimbursement. 
As a result, the Court of Justice shows that it accepts that the different Member States and probably 
also the different courts within the same Member States depending on the facts of the case will reach 
varying conclusions. 
The Janecek case - Introducing a Representative Action into German Law 
The Janecek80 case dealt with the question whether on the basis of Article 7 (3) of the Directive 
96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management an individual can 
require the national competent authorities to draw up an action plan where there is a risk that the 
emission standard as set by European law is exceeded.81 Article 7 (3) of  Directive 96/62/EC provides 
that “Member States shall draw up action plans indicating the measures to be taken in the short term 
where there is a risk of the limit values and/or alert thresholds being exceeded, in order to reduce that 
risk and to limit the duration of such an occurrence.” 
The proceedings before the German courts revolved around the question whether Mr Janecek has a 
subjective right to require the national authorities to set up an action plan under Article 7 (3) of 
Directive 96/62/EC and its German implementation. According to the legal standing rules under the 
German Administrative Process, individuals are only entitled to bring an action before an 
administrative court if they can assert the impairment of an individual subjective right by an act of the 
state.82 In case an individual is affected by an administrative act, which is not addressed to him, he can 
rely on the protective norm theory (Schutznormtheorie). According to the Schutznormtheorie, a 
subjective right is existent if the legal norm on which the claimant relies serves to protect his 
individual/personal interest. The most important criterion to qualify as a Schutznorm is the possibility 
to delimit a specifically protected group of persons that can be distinguished from the general public.83 
Consequently, all actions which are aimed at the objective legality control of administrative decisions 
are foreign to the German Administrative Process - not only popular actions but also representative 
actions and actions of interested parties are excluded. 
The case reached the German Federal Administrative Court, which held that while the competent 
national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to set up action plans, this failure to act does 
not violate the subjective rights of Mr Janecek. The action plans intend to protect the general interest 
                                                     
80 C-237/07, Janecek v. Freistaat Bayern [2008] ECR I-6221. Mr Janecek lives on the Landeshuter Allee on Munich’s 
central ring road. Measurements of an air quality measuring, located 900 m from his home, have shown that the limit 
value fixed for emissions of particular matter PM 10 was exceeded much more than 35 times per year, even though this is 
the maximum number of instances permitted under the Federal Law on combatting pollution. Although an air quality 
action plan exists in respect of the city of Munich, Janecek brought an action before the Administrative Court 
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Landeshuter Allee district in order to determine the short-term measures to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
maximum permitted number of exceeding the limit. 
81 Even though the case revolved around the obligation of the national authorities to set up action plans under Article 7 (3) 
Directive 96/62/EC of 27 September 1996 on ambient air quality assessment and management, it needs to be noted that 
this Directive cannot be seen isolated. The emission limits which have to be complied with according to Directive 
96/62/EC, result from further directives as adopted under Article 4 of Directive 96/62/EC. In that regard, Directive 
1999/30/EC of 22 April 1999 relating to limit values for sulphur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and oxides of nitrogen, 
particulate matter and lead in ambient air, requires that the limit value fixed for emissions of particular matter PM 10 is 
not exceeded more than 35 per year.  
82 § 42 (2) German Administrative Court Procedures Code (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung). 
83W.R. Schenke, Verwaltungsprozeßrecht, 7th ed. (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller Verlag, 2000). 143-45; J. Brandt, Handbuch 
Verwaltungsverfahren und Verwaltungsprozess, 3rd ed. (Heidelberg: C.F. Müller, 2009). 401. C.D. Classen, Die 
Europäisierung der Verwaltungsgerichtbarkeit  (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr Siebeck, 1996). 40. 
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and not the subjective rights of third parties.84  However, even though the Federal Administrative 
Court had a clear view on the issue, it referred the case to the European Court of Justice via the 
preliminary ruling procedure as there have been diverging views and approaches among the lower 
instance courts as well as among legal scholars as to whether third parties are entitled to ask for action 
plans.  
The Ruling of the Court of Justice 
The German Federal Administrative Court asked for clarification regarding the question whether on 
the basis of Article 7 (3) Directive 96/62/EC an individual can require the national authorities to draw 
up an action plan where there is a risk that the limit values or alert threshold may be exceeded. 
According to the Court of Justice, the Directive placed Member States under a clear obligation to draw 
up action plans in the case of a risk that the emission standard may be exceeded. Relying on its 
previous case-law on direct effect, it held that individuals are entitled to rely on the provisions of a 
Directive against public bodies if they are unconditional and sufficiently precise. Moreover, the 
national courts are obliged to interpret national law as far as possible in conformity with the purpose 
of the relevant Directive. If this is not possible, the incompatible national provisions need to be 
disapplied.85  
The Court of Justice confirmed that it would be incompatible with the binding effect of directives to 
exclude the possibility of concerned persons to rely on that directive. Consequently, the Court held 
that “natural or legal persons directly concerned by a risk that the limit value or alert threshold may 
be exceeded must be in a position to require that the competent authorities to draw up an action plan 
where such a risk exists, if necessary by bringing an action before the competent courts.”86 It was 
irrelevant that other courses of actions might be available under national law.  
Regarding the content of the action plan, the Federal Administrative Court asked whether the national 
authorities are obliged to lay down short-term measures to ensure that the limit value is attained, or 
whether they could confine themselves to measures ensuring a reduction in instances of the limit value 
being exceeded or limits on their duration making a gradual improvement possible. By relying on the 
wording of Article 7 (3), the Court of Justice held that “the Member States are not obliged to take 
measures to ensure that those limit values or alert threshold are never exceeded”87 (emphasis added). 
Taking into account all material circumstances and opposing interests, the Member States need to take 
measures, which reduce the risk of a standard being exceeded and the duration of such an occurrence 
to a minimum.88 However, the discretion of the Member States is not unlimited as the measures need 
to be adequate to achieve the objective to reduce the risk of the standard being exceeded, taking into 
account that a balance between that objective and the various public and private interests needs to be 
maintained.89 
The Interplay of the European and National Level 
The proceedings before the German courts illustrate that there are still uncertainties regarding the 
direct effect of Directives.  Direct effect of Article 7 (3) of the Directive was denied since the 
administrative authorities enjoy a wide discretion to decide which specific measures to take under the 
action plan. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union clarified that the wording of Article 
                                                     
84 BVerwG, order for reference of the 29 March 2007, NVwZ 2007, 695, at pp. 696-698. 
85 C-237/07, Janecek v. Freistaat Bayern [2008] ECR I-6221, paras. 34-36. 
86 Ibid., para. 39. 
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7 (3) is clear and unconditional: “Member States shall draw up action plans.” By establishing the 
direct effect of Article 7 (3) of the Directive, the Court of Justice established an administrative remedy 
allowing an individual to bring an action to require the competent national authorities to set up an 
action plan. Consequently, by strengthening the role of the individual, the Court of Justice opened up 
another route of controlling Member State compliance with European air quality measures as 
otherwise only the Commission would be able to take an enforcement action by bringing a case before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union.90 
 
Establishing the direct effect of Article 7 (3) raises the question about who has legal standing before 
the national courts in order to use that newly created administrative remedy.  Generally, under the 
Rewe/Comet line of case-law the conditions for legal standing before the national courts would be left 
to the procedural autonomy of the Member States, being subject to the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence. However, the Court of Justice did not follow this approach and interfered strongly with 
the German legal standing conditions and Schutznormtheorie. As stated in para. 39, “the natural or 
legal persons directly concerned by a risk that the limit values or alter values might be exceeded” can 
rely on Article 7 (3) of Directive 96/62/EC. It becomes clear that a strict application of the German 
Schutznormtheorie conflicts with the European standard of legal protection. The Court of Justice 
established that under European law individually enforceable rights may stand for a broader interest 
than the individual/personal interest as required by German doctrine. Consequently, the Court of 
Justice requires an “upgrading” of the German legal standing conditions in order to ensure the 
effective legal protection of European rights. This means that the German Schutznormtheorie needs to 
be stretched and broadened in case European rights are at stake to be in compliance with European 
law. 
However, while the Court of Justice interfered strongly with the long-standing German 
Schutznormtheorie in order to ensure the legal protection of European rights, in the second part of its 
judgment the Court left considerable discretion to the Member States regarding the substantive content 
of the action plan: The Member States have a wide discretion to determine the adequate measures to 
achieve the objective of compliance with the emission standards. The Member States need to take 
measures, which reduce the risk of a standard being exceeded and the duration of such an occurrence 
to a minimum and consequently, do not need to guarantee that the standard is never exceeded. It is up 
to the Member States to strike a balance between that objective and the various public and private 
interests at stake. Consequently, the Court established a European-national remedy in the sense that it 
is shaped both by European and national input. The legal character of the final complete remedy is 
neither European nor national but bears elements of both legal orders and is therefore considered to be 
a hybrid. 
The discretion left to the national level has been criticized by German scholars, who consider that the 
Court of Justice should have established an action to require an action plan, which safeguards the 
actual compliance with the emission standard. The judgment does not provide at which point in time 
the Member States need to guarantee the actual compliance with the emission standards and allows for 
a gradual improvement without any time-limit.91 Consequently, a higher level of legal protection could 
have been achieved by providing for the substantive content of the administrative remedy to require 
the establishment of an action plan. 
Nevertheless, the Court of Justice is engaging into a balancing act: By challenging the German legal 
standing requirements, the Court of Justice seeks to ensure the availability of a remedy to enforce a 
                                                     
90 Comparing the EU and US air quality control approach, it seems that in the US, the federal level has stronger enforcement 
powers over state agencies as there are for instance fewer hurdles to impose sanctions in case of non-compliance with 
their duties. Moreover, in that regard, enforcement powers in the US are vested in a specifically set up federal agency, 
namely the Environmental Protection Agency, while in the EU, this power is currently left to the Commission, faced with 
the general problem of a lack of resources. For a comparison of the EU and US air quality control, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/cafe/activities/pdf/case_study2.pdf (last visited: 12.07.2012). 
91 K. Faßbender, "Neues zum Anspruch des Bürgers auf Einhaltung des europäisches Umweltrechts," EuR (2009). 
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right derived from European law. However, by leaving a space to be filled up by the Member States, 
the Court of Justice allows for national diversity and contextualization to the circumstances of the 
case.  
The Alassini Case - Shaping National ADR Procedures according to European Principles  
The preliminary ruling procedure in the Alassini92 case concerned the transposition of Article 34 (1) of 
the Universal Service Directive 2002/22/EC into Italian law. Article 34 (1) requires Member States to 
ensure that “transparent, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedures are available for dealing 
with unresolved disputes, involving consumers, relating to issues covered by this Directive.” Italy 
decided to confer the responsibility for out-of-court procedures for the settlement of disputes between 
telecom providers and end-users to the Autorità per le garanzie nelle communicazioni 
(Communications Regulatory Authority).93  However, the dispute settlement rules as adopted by the 
Communications Regulatory Authority provide that “no court proceedings could be brought until the 
mandatory attempt to settle the dispute has been undertaken.”94  
The essential question the Court of Justice dealt with was whether Article 34 of the Universal Service 
Directive and the principle of effective judicial protection preclude a national rule which makes legal 
actions involving claims arising in connection with the Universal Services Directive conditional on a 
prior attempt to settle the dispute out of court, without which proceedings in that regard may not be 
brought before the courts.95 
The Ruling of the Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice held that since neither the criteria set out in Article 34 (1) nor Recommendation 
98/257/EC as referred to in recital 47 of the Universal Service Directive deal with the question about 
the mandatory nature of the out-of-court procedures, Member States are not limited in making out-of-
court procedures for the settlement of disputes mandatory, if it does not affect the effectiveness of the 
Universal Services Directive.96 In that regard, the Court of Justice stressed the importance of out-of-
court procedures in the European Union by holding that the mandatory nature of the out-of-court 
settlement procedure would even strengthen the effectiveness of the Universal Services Directive.97  
Following, the Court of Justice points to the principle of procedural autonomy98 and examined the 
compatibility of the Italian provision with the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and effective 
legal protection. Importantly, it contextualizes the right to effective legal protection in a wider EU 
fundamental rights framework by referring to Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.99 While the Court of Justice accepts that a mandatory 
settlement procedure constitutes an additional step for access to the courts, it points out that 
fundamental rights may be restricted provided that the restrictions further objectives of general interest 
and comply with the principle of proportionality.100 In this regard, the Court of Justice accepted the 
argument of the Italian Government that the quicker and less expensive handling of 
                                                     
92 The case dealt with Mrs Alassini, who submitted a claim to court against an Italian telephone company without making use 
of the mandatory mediation procedure as provided by the Italian telecom authority, modelled according to the criteria set 
out in Art. 34 of the Universal Service Directive. 
93 C-317-320/08 Rosalba Alassini et al. v. Telecom Italia [2010] ECR I-02213, paras. 13-14. 
94 Ibid., para. 16. 
95 Ibid., para. 37. 
96 Ibid., paras. 41-44. 
97 Ibid., para. 45. 
98 Ibid., para, 47. 
99 Ibid., para. 61. 
100 Ibid., para. 63. 
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telecommunication disputes and the lightening of the burden of the court system constitute legitimate 
objectives of general interest. Moreover, it found that a mandatory settlement procedure is 
proportionate considering that a merely optional procedure would not be as efficient to achieve those 
objectives.101  
However, the Court of Justice developed a list of mandatory criteria for out-of-court settlement 
procedures out of Recommendation 98/257/EC. Indeed, the Court pointed to the indirect binding legal 
effects of Recommendation 98/237/EC and held that “the national courts are bound to take 
recommendations into consideration in order to decide disputes brought before them, in particular 
where such recommendations cast light on the interpretation of national measures adopted in order to 
implement them or where they are designed to supplement binding provisions of EU law.”102 
Consequently, in order for mandatory settlement procedures to comply with the principle of effective 
legal protection, the following criteria have to be met: 
 
• The outcome of the procedure is not binding on the parties and consequently, does not 
affect their right to bring legal proceedings.103 
• The settlement procedure does not result in a substantial delay for the purpose of 
brining legal proceedings.104 
• The period for the time-barring of claims is suspended for the duration of the 
settlement procedure.105 
• The settlement procedure should not entail significant costs.106 
• It must be ensured that the settlement procedure may be accessed not only by 
electronic means.107 
• The settlement procedure must allow for interim measures in exceptional cases where 
the urgency of the situation so requires.108 
 
The Interplay of the European and National Level 
The Alassini judgment is an important precedent for all national ADR procedures established under 
European law. The case established the quasi-binding legal effect of Recommendation 98/257/EC and 
six specific criteria for mandatory ADR procedures. The six criteria set out by the Court of Justice in 
Alassini appear to be very strict rules leaving less space for the Member State level to play a role when 
compared to the general principles of Recommendation 98/257/EC. As pointed out by Alexy, 
European rules and principles have a different effect on the national level: Whereas rules demand a 
complete fulfilment, principles allow fulfilment to different degrees depending on a balancing of 
diverging interests and thus allow for flexible solutions.109 However, it needs to be stressed that while 
some of the six “rules” are narrower as requiring the non-bindingness of the settlement outcome, 
others allow for some margin of appreciation since the Member States may determine for instance 
what constitutes a “substantial” delay to bring courts proceedings, what constitutes “significant” costs 
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of the settlement procedure and what circumstances are sufficiently “exceptional” to allow for interim 
measures. 
It is necessary to consider a broader picture to determine the interplay between the European and the 
national level with regard to the shaping of ADR mechanisms. While the Member States need to 
comply with Recommendation 98/257/EC, the principles set out therein leave a wide discretion to the 
Member States, including that they can still freely decide to which body they confer the dispute 
resolution responsibilities and particularly important, whether the participation in the procedure should 
be mandatory or voluntary. However, when the Member States decide to render the procedure 
mandatory, the principle of effective legal protection as fleshed out by Article 47 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights requires them to comply with the six “rules” as set out by the Court of Justice in 
Alassini. 
Consequently, when it comes to shaping ADR mechanisms, the hybrid nature can be recognised again: 
The European level shapes the national ADR mechanisms by requiring compliance with general 
principles as set out in Recommendation 98/257/EC as well as by stricter rules as set out in the 
Alassini judgment but still leaves considerable freedom for intervention by the Member States. 
Conclusion 
The three case-studies are illustrative for the interplay between the European and the national level 
when shaping remedies. The approach in Putz/Weber and Janecek is very similar. To ensure the 
availability of an effective/adequate remedy where a European right granted to an individual is at 
stake, the Court of Justice of the European Union needed to intervene strongly into the German legal 
system. The Court of Justice thereby adopted a functional approach, aiming to ensure the effet utile of 
the respective substantive area at stake, being European environmental law in Janecek and European 
consumer protection law in Putz/Weber – it shapes or upgrades the national legal system according to 
the needs of the European legal order. As a result, the Court of Justice adopts an approach beyond the 
strict adherence to the national procedural autonomy and beyond the minimum approach in its 
Rewe/Comet case-law.  
However, the Court of Justice left considerable space for the Member States to fill out the substantive 
content of the remedy and consequently allows for a contextualization to the specific circumstances at 
stake. Regarding the substantive content of the remedy, the Court of Justice equipped the national 
courts with “guidelines”, appearing to be minimum standards. Leaving space for national intervention 
means that the Court of Justice accepts legal divergences. It does not intend to homogenize the legal 
systems, but to have each of the national legal systems determine itself how it will balance the 
diverging interests at stake.  
While the approach in Janecek and Putz/Weber is similar, hybridity has a different nature in the 
Alassini case. In Alassini, hybridity results from European principles or rules, which have to be filled 
out by the national level. However, the result is similar since the national levels can individually 
decide how to fulfill the European standard. Consequently, in all three cases, the final complete 
remedy is of a hybrid nature as it is constituted by elements of the European and the national legal 
orders.  
Part III: A Constitutional Perspective on the Nature of Hybrid Remedies   
The question that I want to address in this part is how the complex interplay between the European and 
the national level when shaping remedies could be conceptualized. Claims by legal scholars have been 
raised that the term national “procedural autonomy” is misleading and should be replaced by 
“procedural competence”. Legal doctrine is also in a state of flux regarding the question whether the 
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supremacy of European law is sound when it comes to enforcement matters. 110 Proposals have been 
made to understand the interplay of both levels as being governed by a new branch of the principle of 
supremacy, called “structural” or “procedural” supremacy111 to show that the national courts are 
required to do more than simply disapplying national law, they need to shape or upgrade national law 
according to the European standard.112 
The developments regarding the European enforcement structure can be linked to the discussions 
about the constitutional framework of the European Union. The fundamental question is how 
European norms are integrated into the national legal systems? Generally, we can distinguish two 
different basic constellations of the relationship between the European and the national level: one 
being based on hierarchical thinking and the other on co-operation between both levels. Moreover, a 
third constellation, which sees the relationship between both levels as being governed by a diagonal 
dimension, will be introduced. 
Hierarchical Structures 
The relation between two legal systems could be characterised by a hierarchy of norms, meaning that 
one legal system would have priority over the other. Conflicting norms of the lower legal system 
would be replaced by the superior legal system. Firstly, in this regard, the concepts of monism and 
dualism can be distinguished. Under the approach of monism, foreign rules are directly incorporated 
into the domestic legal order by satisfying the validity criteria laid down by the foreign legal system 
from which the rules originate. The incorporation of the foreign rules as well as the place of those 
rules within the hierarchy of norms is an internal decision of the domestic legal system. Under the 
approach of dualism, a foreign norm is only able to enter the domestic legal system by a domestic act 
of incorporation. Consequently, “the effect produced by this norm within the national system shall 
depend exclusively on how it has been transformed and on the state’s sovereign to discard any acts 
within its national legal order that are incompatible with the norm.”113 Under these approaches, both 
legal systems are considered to be separate and autonomous. It protects the principle of autonomy and 
the integrity of each legal system. Consequently, each legal orders is seen as self-referential, meaning 
that only those foreign rules have a normative value that are recognised by that legal order.114   
Secondly, there could be a federal organization between both levels based on a hierarchical multi-level 
structure and characterised by autonomy and interdependence. Under a federal approach, it would be 
not necessary to separate both legal systems from each other since both would form together a 
comprehensive legal order. However, federalism requires the attribution and delimitation of 
competences between both legal orders and requires the creation of a clear hierarchy of legal norms 
granting primacy to one of the legal systems.115  
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The theory of legal pluralism claims that “there is no exclusive relationship between one territory and 
one legal order, but that on the same territory several [autonomous] legal orders do co-exist.”116 Both 
levels are considered to be on an equal footing. There is no hierarchy established between them, but 
both legal orders are co-existing and co-operating. Legal pluralism accepts that legal orders “may 
communicate, dialogue and enter into contact with each other.”117 Nevertheless, the administration 
and courts of the different legal orders are considered to be separate from each other - they can decide 
how they address the norms originating from the other legal system independently.118 From a 
European perspective, according to Azoulai, legal pluralism means that the primacy of EU law would 
lose its relevance and that “it is superseded by a method of reconciliation based on the ‘reasonable’ 
character of the assessments made by the various parties.”119 This could lead to fragmentation and 
individuation if there are no common supra-legal values as reference norms. 
A Multi-level Structure  
The conflict of laws approach as promoted by Joerges and Schmid is based on the multi-level 
governance structure of the EU. While the national as well as the European level are seen as 
autonomous levels, their relationship is characterised by reciprocal dependence. The multi-level 
structure of the EU gives rise to various conflict-constellations about which legal norms apply to a 
given case, termed as “vertical”, “horizontal”, and “diagonal” conflicts. Vertical conflicts arise 
between legal orders at different territorial levels, as between the European and the national level. 
Horizontal conflicts are considered to occur from the differences among the national legal systems and 
represent “the traditional PIL setting”.  Diagonal conflicts arise “if regimes at two different levels that 
apply to a different aspect of a given case make contradictory demands.”120 Joerges and Schmid see 
diagonal conflicts as “a structural characteristic of the European multi-level system.” In those kinds of 
conflicts, the European and the national level need to co-ordinate since the individual levels cannot 
address a specific problem alone. As a result, European law is seen as conflicts law and the rule of 
primacy is used to prevent conflicts of norms “by creating an area for EU norms that national law 
declines to occupy.”121 As pointed out by Azoulai, “there is not strictly speaking any merger of legal 
systems” but merely a “cohabitation within each individual legal order of rules of different origin.” 
Conclusion 
A “black-box model”122, in the sense that the national legal orders as well as the European legal order 
are treated as self-contained and self-sufficient normative wholes, cannot grasp the interplay between 
the European and the national level when it comes to enforcement matters. Both levels cannot be seen 
as separated from each other as the enforcement of European law is based on a system that actively 
integrates Member States and that requires the joint effort of both levels. Also federalism is inadequate 
to conceptualize the European enforcement structure. Contrary to the US, there is no power vested at 
the European level that allows it to introduce common enforcement instruments.  Since the rigid black-
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box model fails to capture many legal phenomena of transnational and European law, legal pluralists 
have documented hybrid legal spaces, where there is an overlap of the legal orders occupying the same 
social field.123 Similarly, Joerges and Schmid recognise diagonal conflicts when the individual levels 
cannot address a specific problem alone but both need to co-operate to find a solution. 
Looking at the case-studies from a legal integration perspective, it becomes clear that theories based 
on hierarchical thinking or seeing the national and European level on equal footing cannot 
conceptualize the interplay between both levels. Seeing the European and the national level on an 
equal footing would deny the force that the European level has in shaping the national level. The Court 
of Justice intervenes strongly into national law to ensure the existence of an effective remedy where a 
European right is at stake as illustrated in the in the Putz/Weber case regarding the seller’s defence of 
absolute disproportionality and in the Janecek case regarding the German Schutznormtheorie. 
However, the Court of Justice did not establish autonomous European remedies but left space for the 
national level to fill out the substantive content of the remedy. Consequently, it becomes clear that the 
European level cannot guarantee the enforcement of European law alone but depends on the co-
operation of the national systems for the enforcement of European law. Both legal orders are closely 
intertwined and are able to frustrate an effective co-operation. 
Part IV: Overall Conclusion  
As shown by the case-studies, the Court of Justice of the European Union moved beyond the standard 
formula of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. It requires a “shaping” of the national 
system in order to guarantee the availability of a remedy when a European right is at stake. The 
national system is “upgraded” in order to ensure the effet utile of the respective substantive area at 
stake.124 This could imply a deep intervention into the national legal order. However, no uniform 
remedies are created among the national legal systems as each national legal order determines 
individually how it shapes its remedies in compliance with the European standard. This particular 
interplay between the European level and the national level cannot be grasped by the conceptual and 
systematizing framework provided by current legal integration theories. Indeed, it has been shown that 
the remedies created by the interplay of both levels are characterised by a hybrid nature.  
Finally, the hybridization processes have to be analysed from a normative perspective. Hybridization 
processes might be the way forward to strengthen the enforcement of social rights granted by 
European law to individuals in line with the principle of effective legal protection as enshrined in 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, the European 
influence on the national level has to be also balanced against other general principles like legal 
certainty and the flexibility advantages of directives.125 Moreover, the existence of hybrid remedies 
could raise even greater implications for the rule of law.126 The rule of European law requires that 
European law is European-wide applied and enforced. Legal remedies have a crucial role for the 
enforcement of European law and the implementation of European rights.  Substantial gaps in 
enforcement matters have the potential to jeopardy upholding the rule of law in the European Union. 
Consequently, ultimately, in view of the different normative values, it needs to be determined whether 
it is possible to conceptualize the appropriate role of the European and the national level in 
enforcement matters and particularly, the appropriate degree of intrusion by one level on the other. 
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EUROPEAN STANDARDISATION IN HEALTHCARE:  
TOWARDS CONVERGENCE THROUGH SELF-REGULATION 
Barend van Leeuwen* 
I. Introduction 
It has become more common for patients to move across borders to receive medical treatment. Under 
the umbrella of the right to freely receive services in another Member State, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“the Court”) has progressively defined a right for patients to receive healthcare 
services in another Member State from the one in which they are affiliated to the healthcare system. 
The scope of this right has been clarified in a series of cases, which have now been codified in the 
2011 Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (“the 2011 Directive”).1 
The 2011 Directive regulates and facilitates the movement of patients. It does not attempt to 
substantively regulate the treatment of patients once they have moved abroad. This is because the 
European Union (“the EU”) only has a limited public health competence.2 The EU has no competence 
to regulate issues of quality of care of medical treatment. It has nothing to say about the number of 
beds which should be available to patients, about the level of training of medical personnel, or about 
the specificities of the after-care provided to patients. These areas are still within the exclusive 
competence of the 27 Member States.3 Nevertheless, the question is whether, after the 
“constitutionalisation” of the right to cross-border healthcare, the movement of patients within the EU 
is going to result in European standards on quality of care. The 2011 Directive already obliges 
Member States to make their national quality standards accessible to service recipients from other 
Member States. Furthermore, it encourages the exchange of national standards.4 This exchange, in the 
context of more cross-border movement of patients, could subsequently lead to the adoption of 
European standards on quality of care. Since legislative action is not possible, such standards would 
have to be adopted through other means.  
This paper will look at the adoption of European quality standards through standardisation. It is 
written in the context of a research project on the regulatory function of private law in the EU. One of 
the vertical projects focusses on the ability on standardisation to realise a degree of convergence of the 
regulation of services in the EU through private law. As such, the European quality standards will 
finally have to be incorporated in contract law and tort law. Because of the lack of legal competence of 
the EU to regulate the delivery of healthcare services, the hypothesis which is being tested in this 
                                                     
* PhD Researcher, EUI. 
1 Directive 2011/24/EU of the European Parliament and the Council on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border 
healthcare. 
2 Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) now provides for a complementing 
competence in the area of public health, and encourages cooperation between the Member States to improve the 
complementarity of their health services in cross-border areas. However, Article 168(7) expressly provides that “Union 
action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member States for the definition of their health policy and for the delivery 
of health services and medical care. The responsibilities of the Member States shall include the management of health 
services and medical care and the allocation of resources assigned to them”. 
3 As confirmed in Article 4(1) of the 2011 Directive. 
4 Article 4(2)(a) and Article 10(1) of the 2011 Directive. 
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paper is whether standardisation, as a bottom-up regulatory tool, can do an effective job in increasing 
the convergence of the regulation of healthcare services in the EU Member States – a job which legal 
harmonisation in this situation cannot do.  
First of all, the context and impact of the right to cross-border healthcare will be introduced. Secondly, 
the paper will look at the theory of convergence. Convergence has been given quite a specific meaning 
in the discussion on the Europeanisation of private law. This definition will be adapted and applied to 
the regulation of healthcare services in the Member States through private law. The next step will then 
be to see what the role of standardisation could be in the context of cross-border healthcare. Finally, 
two case studies will be discussed to link the theory to what is happening in practice. It will be 
submitted that standardisation has potential to increase the convergence of healthcare regulation in the 
EU Member States. However, in order to maximise this potential it is necessary that the medical 
profession accepts European standardisation as a regulatory tool and that public authorities support, or 
at least facilitate, a European standardisation process. 
II. The Context of Cross-Border Healthcare and Convergence 
The Context and the New 2011 Directive 
Traditionally, patients go to their local hospital to see a local doctor. Healthcare has a strong territorial 
element. This is not surprising: patients do not want to travel long distances for medical care, they like 
to build up a relationship with their doctor and they prefer to have quick access to medical care. This 
local, territorial element of healthcare has not gone away. However, some developments in the 
healthcare sector have resulted in a new “type” of patient. The two main developments could be 
described as the “consumerisation” of the patient and the privatisation, or liberalisation, of healthcare 
services. The consumerisation of patients means that patients are becoming more and more like 
consumers. This implies an element of choice, and an element of “shopping for care”. It can no longer 
be assumed that patients will go to the hospital next door – if there is a hospital a few hours away 
which offers specialist care of a higher quality they will often opt for that hospital. This means that 
healthcare services are, to a certain extent, being removed from their territorial nature. Furthermore, 
patients have more access to information about the contents, the risks and the consequences of medical 
treatment. The result of that increase in information is that patients become more demanding towards 
doctors, and will not hesitate to ask for a second opinion if they are not pleased with the diagnosis or 
proposal for treatment. Again, this could mean that patients will travel some distance to obtain a 
second opinion. In parallel to the consumerisation of the patient, there is also a process of 
liberalisation and privatisation in the healthcare sector. A number of Member States have introduced a 
degree of competition in their healthcare systems, and more healthcare services are now being offered 
by private healthcare providers.5 In a way, they profit from the process of consumerisation. Private 
healthcare providers use modern ways of advertising their services. Furthermore, in order to gain entry 
to the market and to compete with public healthcare providers, they frequently offer their services at 
lower prices. This raises questions about the quality of the services offered. Moreover, private 
healthcare providers often operate in a field which is not as strictly regulated as public healthcare. 
Therefore, it has proven difficult to protect patients against dangerous medical treatment of a low 
quality, particularly in a cross-border context. 
As a result of all these developments, the Court has been forced to discuss a number of cases in which 
patients wanted to move abroad to receive healthcare services. The Court included the right to medical 
care within the scope of the free movement of services, which is now found in Article 56 TFEU. It 
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took the Court a good number of cases to define the exact scope of the right to receive medical 
treatment abroad.6 It was recognised that, as a result of the special nature of healthcare services, the 
sector needed a specific legal solution. Therefore, healthcare services were excluded from the scope of 
application of the Services Directive 2006.7 The case law of the Court has now, to a significant extent, 
been codified in the 2011 Directive. It includes articles on the responsibilities of the Member States, 
on the reimbursement of cross-border healthcare and on cooperation between the Member States.8 The 
2011 Directive expressly provides that it remains for the Member States to regulate the quality of 
healthcare.9 Whilst there is facilitation and regulation of the movement of patients, substantive issues 
on the quality of treatment are outside the scope of the Directive. At the same time, Member States are 
encouraged to exchange national standards on quality of care issues. Such an exchange could lead to 
the convergence of national quality standards. This is not too different from the solution adopted in the 
Services Directive 2006. Article 26 of this Directive provides that the European Commission (“the 
Commission”) and the Member States are under an obligation to encourage services providers to take 
voluntary measures to increase the compatibility of services in a particular sector.10 This is because it 
is believed that an increased degree of compatibility of the underlying substantive regulation of the 
services will assist the free movement of service recipients. This is where the theory of convergence 
enters into the arena. Standardisation could then be the tool to increase such convergence. It is 
expressly recognised as a regulatory tool to increase the compatibility of services in Article 26(5) of 
the Services Directive 2006.  
Convergence in the Court’s Case Law 
Before the potential of standardisation as a regulatory tool to increase convergence is assessed, it is 
necessary to look at the impact of the case law on the free movement of patients and at the 2011 
Directive. In which areas has the case law (decided under Article 56 on the free movement of services) 
already resulted in a degree of convergence in the regulation of healthcare services in the 27 Member 
States? 
The series of cases already referred to above have, to a certain extent, opened up a European market 
for healthcare services. Although the Court has been careful not to intrude on the regulatory autonomy 
of the Member States, and to affect the way in which the Member States have organised their 
healthcare systems, the case law has had a convergent effect in a number of areas. The most important 
areas which can be identified are the following: 
                                                     
6 In particular, see Case C-120/95,  Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés, [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-158/96, 
Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie, [1998] ECR I-1931; Case C-368/98, Vanbraekel and others v Alliance nationale 
des mutualités chrétiennes, [2001] ECR I-5363; Case C-157/99, Geraets-Smits v Stichting Ziekenfonds and Peerbooms v 
Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen, [2001] ECR I-547; Case C-385/99, Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge 
Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen and van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO 
Zorgverzekeringen , [2003] ECR I-4509; Case C-56/01, Inizan v Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie des Hauts-de-
Seine, [2003] ECR I-12403 and Case C-372/04, The Queen ex parte Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary 
of State for Health, [2006] ECR I-4325. 
7 Article 2(2)(f) of Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and Council on services in the internal market. 
8 Articles 4-6 (responsibilities of the Member States); Articles 7-9 (reimbursement of cross-border healthcare) and Article 10-
15 (cooperation in healthcare). 
9 Article 4(1) of the 2011 Directive. 
10 Article 26 of the Services Directive refers to certification, labelling, co-operation between professional bodies, independent 
assessments and standardisation. 
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Procedural requirements for prior authorisation of healthcare abroad 
In principle, it is possible for Member States to impose a system of prior authorisation for patients who 
seek hospital treatment in another Member State. However, the Court has made it clear that Member 
States must have transparent procedures for cases in which authorisation can be required. Decisions of 
the decision-making body must be open to judicial review or some sort of quasi judicial review 
proceedings, and they must be taken within a reasonable time frame.11 
Substantive requirements for prior authorisation of healthcare abroad 
Similarly, as a result of the case law, the substantive criteria which Member States use in deciding 
whether or not to authorise treatment in another Member State have to a significant extent been 
converged. The Court held in Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms that the Dutch criterion of whether a 
treatment was “normal in the professional circles concerned” had to be interpreted from an 
international perspective: treatment sufficiently tried and tested by international science.12 Relevant 
(international) scientific literature had to be taken into account. This means that Member States, in 
dealing with a request for prior authorisation, must look at treatments from an international point of 
view, and cannot stick to national medical practice if this is unduly restrictive. The consequence of this 
is that the pallet of treatment options available to patients becomes broader and has to be interpreted 
from an international (and possibly European) perspective. 
Secondly, the criterion that treatment abroad was a medical necessity (which in practice meant that the 
treatment could not be offered without undue delay in the home Member State) was justified as long 
as the decision-making body took all the specific circumstances of the case into account.13 Member 
States are no longer justified in referring to acceptable lengths of national waiting lists as an outright 
justification to refuse authorisation to receive healthcare abroad. They must always make an individual 
assessment based on the current circumstances of the patient. 
The result of these substantive criteria is that Member States are obliged to make individual 
assessment of patients who seek authorisation of treatment abroad, and that Member States are obliged 
to take international medical practice into account. This implies that Member States – at least at the 
level of prior authorisation – can no longer close their eyes for medical practice in other Member 
States. 
Waiting lists 
The individual assessment of the undue delay criterion (or medical necessity) has also had an impact 
on how Member States manage their waiting lists. It is no longer appropriate to refuse treatment 
abroad on the basis that the length of the waiting lists is acceptable. Each case requires an individual 
assessment of the circumstances of the patient. This has obliged Member States to introduce a certain 
flexibility in their management of waiting lists, and where necessary to pro-actively seek cross-border 
treatment options. The Watts case is a very clear example of the impact of EU free movement law on 
the management of waiting lists.14 The result of that case is that the English National Health Service 
(“NHS”) now regularly sends patients to other Member States for treatment.15 
                                                     
11 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms, above n 6, para 90. 
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Transparency of costs of treatment 
Finally, the fact that non-hospital care has to be reimbursed and that prior authorisation can never be 
justified for those cases means that healthcare systems such as the NHS have to make the costs of the 
specific treatments transparent and accessible. Otherwise, it would be difficult or impossible to know 
to what extent treatment abroad will be reimbursed. The result is that Member States must make the 
costs of treatments accessible to patients. 
Convergence in the 2011 Directive 
The 2011 Directive codified the case law on the free movement of patients. The articles on 
reimbursement of healthcare in another Member State from the one in which the patient is affiliated to 
the healthcare system closely follow the rules laid down by the Court. The same is true for the rules on 
prior authorisation. The situations in which cross-border healthcare can be subject to prior 
authorisation are exhaustively listed. An interesting difference is that the definition of hospital 
treatment, which can, in principle, be subject to prior authorisation, is healthcare which involves 
overnight accommodation in hospital.16 As a consequence, it appears that outpatient treatment in 
hospital can no longer be subject to prior authorisation. 
In a number of respects, the 2011 Directive goes further than the case law of the Court.17 As such, the 
Directive attempts to realise convergence through harmonisation in a limited number of areas. It 
should be noted that the Directive has only been adopted in early 2011, and that the deadline for 
transposition in national law is 25th October 2013. Therefore, the actual effect of the Directive in 
practice cannot yet be measured. 
Quality standards 
The Directive obliges Member States to provide cross-border healthcare in accordance with standards 
and guidelines laid down by the Member State of treatment.18 This does not directly encourage any 
convergence of quality standards, let alone the creation of European quality standards, but it does 
mean that Member States must have quality standards in place. Member States which have insufficient 
or no quality standards will be required to adopt such standards for the purposes of cross-border 
healthcare. If national standards are not available, Member States could decide to adopt international 
or European standards. Naturally, the effect of these standards would not be limited to healthcare 
provided to patients coming from other Member States. Article 4(1) of the Directive also provides that 
Member States must take the principles of universality, access to good quality care, equity and 
solidarity into account in providing cross-border healthcare. This could mean that Member States are 
required to provide healthcare of a certain minimum level of quality, and could even be required in 
certain circumstances to adapt their quality standards to provide healthcare of a higher quality. 
 
Accessibility of quality standards 
In addition to having quality standards in place, these standards must also be accessible to patients 
from other Member States.19 Member States must establish information points which can provide 
                                                     
16 Article 8(2)(a)(i) of the 2011 Directive. 
17 For a more detailed analysis, see Stephane de la Rosa, “The Directive on Cross-Border Healthcare or the Art of Codifying 
Complex Case Law”, (2012) CMLR 15-46 and Wolf Sauter, “Harmonisation in healthcare: the EU patients’ rights 
Directive”, TILEC Research Paper, No.6, 2011. 
18 Article 4(1)(b) of the 2011 Directive. 
19 Article 4(2)(a) of the 2011 Directive. 
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patients in other Member States with relevant information on the standards and guidelines which are in 
place in the Member State of treatment. 
Information requirements 
In terms of convergence specifically relating to quality of care, the 2011 Directive goes quite far in the 
information requirements imposed on healthcare providers. Article 4(2)(b) obliges healthcare 
providers to help patients to make an informed choice. This information includes information on: 
a) Treatment options 
b) Availability of healthcare 
c) Quality and safety of healthcare 
d) Prices and invoices 
e) Registration status and insurance of healthcare professionals 
These criteria all go some way towards providing a basis for informed consent. Consequently, the 
2011 Directive protects patients who are considering cross-border healthcare by granting them a 
number of information rights. As such, the protection focusses on the service recipient – the patient in 
this case – and aims as much as possible to make the patient a well-informed consumer. 
Complaints and insurance 
Finally, the 2011 Directive obliges Member States to have transparent complaints mechanisms in 
place for patients.20 Furthermore, the Member State is required to have a system of professional 
liability insurance in place.21 
The Possible Role of Standardisation in Quality of Healthcare Regulation 
Overall, it is clear that both the case law on the free movement of patients and the 2011 Directive have 
realised some convergence in the regulation of healthcare in the Member States.  
The case law of the Court has affected both the procedural and substantive criteria used in assessing 
prior authorisation requests for cross-border healthcare. There has also been an indirect impact on the 
management of waiting lists in the Member States. The 2011 Directive has codified the case law, but 
has also imposed a number of additional information obligations on both Member States and service 
providers. This means that the concept of quality of care becomes more accessible and transparent. 
However, because of the lack of legal competence to regulate quality of healthcare, both the case law 
and the Directive are still based on the presumption that quality is a nationally defined concept. They 
do not directly interfere with the national definition of quality of care. However, patients should be 
informed about national quality standards, and Member States are encouraged to exchange quality 
standards. 
In a European market for healthcare services, such an exchange could subsequently result in a need for 
a European definition of quality of care. This could be in areas in which there is a significant amount 
of cross-border movement of patients, such as aesthetic surgery or preventive health checks, or in 
areas in which the regulation of (private) healthcare services is very different in the various Member 
States. It has become more common for healthcare insurers and public bodies (depending on the nature 
of the Member State’s healthcare system) to conclude contracts with healthcare providers in other 
Member States. In order to be able to assess the quality of these healthcare providers, it would be 
                                                     
20 Article 4(2)(c) of the 2011 Directive. 
21 Article 4(2)(d) of the 2011 Directive. 
European Standardisation in Healthcare 
 147 
helpful to have a European quality standard. Similarly, healthcare insurers or public bodies may in 
certain circumstances refuse prior authorisation of healthcare abroad. Art 8(6)(c) of the 2011 Directive 
provides that concerns about the quality of the healthcare providers are one of the legitimate reasons to 
refuse prior authorisation. Again, therefore, there is an incentive in the Directive for quality to be 
regulated at the European level. Finally, patients considering cross-border healthcare would be assisted 
by knowing that a specific healthcare provider complies with a European quality standard. 
 Standardisation could be one of the tools to regulate quality at the European level. Therefore, the 
standardisation procedure and the standard as a regulatory instrument will have to be critically 
assessed. But before this is done, it is necessary to look at the theory of convergence, to provide a 
definition of convergence of healthcare regulation and to outline the role of private law in increasing 
such convergence. 
III. Convergence of Healthcare Regulation and Private Law 
The Traditional Discussion of Convergence in Private Law 
In the academic discussion on the possibility of convergence in private law, convergence has been 
given quite a specific definition. The discussion on convergence has primarily focussed on the ability 
to converge national contract laws to facilitate cross-border transactions. This focus on the facilitation 
of cross-border transactions was confirmed by the Commission, which published its proposal for a 
Regulation on a Common European Sales Law in October 2011.22 The fundamental assumption on 
which this proposal is based is that unification of national sales laws will result in more cross-border 
activity. It is assumed by the Commission that the uncertainty of not knowing a foreign legal system is 
an obstacle to the use of cross-border transactions. Therefore, the aim of the instrument is to remove 
that obstacle by creating the possibility of a Common European Sales Law which is accessible to all 
parties and effectively removes a transaction from the specific national legal regime in which it takes 
place. Despite the fact that the application of the Regulation is of a voluntary nature, in that parties can 
choose to opt-in and make the Regulation applicable to their transaction, the Common European Sales 
Law represents an attempt to realise an ultimate form of convergence: a European legal framework 
which would effectively replace the use of national legal systems. 
So far the academic discussion of convergence has focussed on convergence of, and through, 
legislation – convergence of legal rules. The strongest method of such convergence in law is 
harmonisation. When the EU harmonises a particular area of law, the various national legal rules are 
replaced by a uniform European rule which is directly introduced in the legal systems of the 27 
Member States. After a process of harmonisation, the wording of that legal rule is the same in the 
various Member States. As such, harmonisation focusses at convergence in law, but does not 
necessarily address convergence in practice. The fact that the wording of the rule is the same in all 
Member States is no guarantee that the rule will be uniformly and consistently applied throughout the 
EU. The possibility of convergence has been described as an ideal, an illusion, by some academics. 
Certain authors would even deny the very possibility of convergence at all. Legrand has argued that a 
legal rule cannot truly and fully transfer from one legal system to another.23 This is because the rule 
will always be received in a different system, with a different legal culture and a different tradition of 
interpreting the law. As a result, according to Legrand, any convergence of legal rules will remain an 
illusion. 24 The law in the books may appear to be similar, but the practical application of these rules 
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will always remain different as a result of the differences in legal cultures. As a consequence, there 
will be no uniformity in the application of the rule at all. Similarly, Teubner has described the 
reception of a foreign legal rule into a different legal system as a “legal irritant”.25 The result of that 
irritation is that the transfer of the legal rule will never serve its purpose and will not realise its full 
potential. The difficulties with attempting to transplant rules from one jurisdiction to another have led 
Smits to argue that our focus should be on the arguments which are taken into account in reaching a 
decision.26 Smits has argued that these arguments, and the process of reaching a decision, are more 
important than whether or not the same rules are applied or whether the same outcomes are reached.27  
The arguments of Smits come closest to identifying the difference between what could be described as 
“top-down” convergence – convergence through harmonisation – and “bottom-up” convergence – for 
example, convergence through standardisation. “Top-down” convergence directly imposes a uniform 
legal rule on the 27 Member States, usually through harmonisation. However, to realise a degree of 
convergence in practice it is not always necessary to directly turn to the adoption of a binding legal 
rule – non-binding instruments could potentially do the job just as effectively as, or perhaps even more 
effectively than legally binding instruments. The advantage of relying on voluntary self-regulation to 
bring about convergence is that self-regulatory instruments are deeply rooted in practice, and that 
convergence would be a “bottom-up” development. This would be very much in line with the strategy 
proposed by Walter van Gerven.28 Although his focus seems to be on “bottom-up” convergence 
through judicial interpretation (the judiciary would be the principal actor), the proposed “Open 
Method of Convergence” could just as well apply to self-regulatory instruments as standardisation. 
And in the end, the judiciary would be relied on to adopt such European standards in private law 
disputes. 
Whilst convergence through harmonisation is a process which imposes a particular rule on the 27 
Member States, convergence through standardisation does not directly impose a rule. Firstly, the very 
reason why a standardisation initiative is started at the European level is because the sector itself 
believes that there is a need for a European standard. As such, the process is very much started 
“bottom-up”, whilst legal harmonisation is a “top-down” process. Secondly, as will be discussed in 
more detail below, the end-result of the standardisation process is not a legally binding rule which has 
to be applied in the various Member States. The standard can be used to decide the appropriate 
standard in a contractual dispute, in a clinical negligence case or in disciplinary proceedings. The 
choice to use a European standard as the contractual or tortuous standard of care would be a voluntary 
choice made by a court or tribunal. The European standard would only be used if it was an 
authoritative document which adequately reflected what standards were required from healthcare 
providers in the 27 Member States. It would have to realistically describe what standards could be 
expected from healthcare providers. Such a standard would only be used in legal proceedings if it was 
a practically workable standard, recognised in all Member States. As a result, a European standard 
would obtain binding legal force through the voluntary choice to incorporate it into national law. 
Convergence through standardisation does not directly change the wording of legal rules, but rather 
provides a European source of law which can be referred to in legal proceedings. This would 
subsequently lead to a converged standard in the 27 Member States – a standard which has not been 
imposed “top-down” but which has been voluntarily incorporated “bottom-up”. 
                                                     
25 Gunther Teubner, “Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences”, (1998) Modern Law 
Review 11. 
26 Jan M. Smits, “Contract Law in the European Union: Convergence or Not?”, Tilburg Institute of Comparative and 
Transnational Law Working Paper No. 2008/1. 
27 Ibid., p 20-21. 
28 Walter van Gerven, “Private Law in a Federal Perspective”, in Roger Brownsword et al. (eds.), The Foundations of 
European Private Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), 337. 
European Standardisation in Healthcare 
 149 
Convergence of Quality of Care Regulation in Healthcare 
In looking at the possibility of convergence in the healthcare sector, the focus will be on issues which 
fall within the domain of quality of care of medical treatment. The result of the lack of EU competence 
is that such issues will never be regulated by EU legislation. The argument that issues of quality of 
care could be regulated under the EU’s internal market competence is difficult to defend.29 This means 
that any regulation of issues of quality of care at the European level will have to be realised through 
other means than legislation – convergence through legal harmonisation is excluded. Self-regulation, 
which is in any event a frequently used tool in the healthcare sector, is one of the alternative 
possibilities.  
There can be no doubt that the regulation of healthcare services is very different in form, or in law, in 
the various Member States. The regulatory frameworks are a complex mixture of public regulation, 
through legislation or public regulations, and private self-regulation. In most Member States there is 
legislation which establishes a general duty of care of healthcare providers. In some Member States 
the details of that duty of care are left to self-regulatory instruments such as codes or protocols, while 
in other Member States the details are also provided by public regulations. Therefore, healthcare 
regulation at the national level consists of both a public and private layer. Healthcare is a sector in 
which it is accepted that the sector itself has more technical and medical knowledge than the public 
sector, which in principle makes self-regulation a legitimate regulatory tool. Convergence of 
healthcare regulation through standardisation would initially aim at convergence of that self-regulatory 
layer of the regulatory framework. European standards would replace national or regional protocols or 
codes. However, it should not be excluded that convergence within the self-regulatory layer could 
eventually result in convergence of the publicly regulated layer as well. This could be because the 
public authorities have participated in the standardisation process, or because a standard is 
subsequently adopted by public authorities in binding legal instruments. Public authorities are already 
getting involved in the standardisation process and in certain circumstances consider standardisation to 
be a useful regulatory tool. The involvement of public authorities in the standardisation process does 
not necessarily result in a hybrid public-private law instrument. A standard will still be a non-binding 
instrument. However, at the same time, this hybridisation of public and private regulation, usually 
referred to as co-regulation, has an impact on the strict borders between public and private regulation 
in the healthcare sector. These borders could become more hybrid and fluid, which could in turn result 
in more potential for convergence through standardisation in both the public and private layer of 
healthcare regulation.30  
It is important to note that the extent to which the national frameworks which regulate healthcare 
services allow for private self-regulation varies significantly across the 27 Member States. It is the 
result of a choice which has been made by the Member States – certain Member States are more 
enthusiastic about self-regulation than other Member States. For example, in France, the regulation of 
healthcare issues, in particular those focussing on quality of care issues, is the responsibility of the 
Haute Autorité de Santé, an administrative body which has been set up by the Government to improve 
the quality of healthcare. Although it is not a Government body, it is governed by public law and 
works closely with governmental bodies.31 Members are appointed by the Government. Similarly, in 
the United Kingdom, the Care Quality Commission is responsible for assessing and monitoring the 
quality of care provided by healthcare service providers. This assessment and monitoring process is 
based on government standards. However, in the Netherlands, the Healthcare Inspectorate is perfectly 
content to leave the regulation of quality of care issues to the sector itself. They choose to adopt these 
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standards and refer to them in their contact with the healthcare service providers. This very brief and 
basic example shows that there are different extents to which self-regulation in the healthcare sector is 
accepted, and autonomous, in the various Member States. 
As a result of these differences, the material scope of self-regulation in healthcare, what I would call 
the margin of operation of self-regulation, varies among the EU Member States. As a consequence, 
the potential for convergence of healthcare regulation through standardisation will depend on how 
wide the margin of operation of self-regulation is. In Member States with more strictly publicly 
regulated healthcare systems, the potential for standardisation to converge healthcare regulation may 
be smaller and may be more dependent on involvement of pubic authorities in the standardisation 
process to encourage the hybridisation of the public and private layers of healthcare regulation.  
Convergence of Quality of Care Regulation through Private Law 
The next step is to describe how quality of care regulation could be realised through private law. The 
private law dimension of this paper is not only that standardisation is an instrument of private law-
making, but also that these standards find their way into private law – in particular, contract law and 
tort law. Similarly to the creation of a Common European Sales Law, private law is being 
instrumentalised to create a better-functioning European market for healthcare services. As a 
consequence, the focus is on the regulation of quality of healthcare services through private law. 
First, quality can be regulated through contractual agreements. Compliance with a European quality 
standard can be made an express term of the contract. Alternatively, the required contractual standard 
of care can be interpreted by reference to a European quality standard. The circumstances in which a 
court or tribunal are more likely to refer to a European standard are those in which cross-border 
movement of patients frequently takes place, or when national standards are out of date or inadequate. 
What are the examples of healthcare contracts which can regulate quality of care? 
(i) Contracts between healthcare insurers/public authorities and healthcare service providers: 
insurers (for example, in the Dutch system) or public authorities (for example, in the English 
system) conclude contracts with healthcare providers. One of the terms of a contract could be 
compliance with a European quality standard. 
(ii) Contracts between healthcare providers and patients: the contractual standard to be expected 
from a hospital or institute can be – expressly or impliedly - determined by reference to a 
European quality standard. 
(iii) Contracts between insurers and patients: the contracts between patients and insurers could 
impose an obligation on the insurer that care provided to the patients will comply with a 
European quality standard. 
(iv) Contracts between healthcare providers and healthcare professionals: for example, consultants 
working in a hospital (whether as employees or self-employed) could be required to comply 
with the training requirements of a European standard. 
Second, the regulation of quality of healthcare could occur through tort law. The standard used to 
assess the conduct of healthcare professionals in clinical negligence proceedings could be a European 
quality standard. Similarly, although not strictly private law, a European quality standard could be 
used to determine the required standard of care of a healthcare professional in disciplinary proceedings 
or complaint procedures against medical practitioners. 
In addition to the scope of self-regulation in healthcare (the margin of operation of self-regulation in 
healthcare), already referred to above, which will determine how common and accepted self-regulation 
is in the healthcare system of a particular Member State, another important element is the quality of 
self-regulation. This is crucial to the potential of standardisation to increase the convergence of quality 
of healthcare regulation. The judiciary in all Member States uses certain qualitative criteria to 
determine whether or not a privately created standard can be incorporated in law in contractual or 
clinical negligence proceedings. Amongst other factors, the quality of a self-regulatory instrument 
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depends on the number of parties which have participated in the adoption of the standard (how 
representative of the sector were the participants?) and the purpose of the standard (does it actually 
serve the public interest or was the standard adopted for purely commercial reasons?). If the standard 
does not fulfil certain quality criteria, it is unlikely that it will be used in contractual or negligence 
cases. As a result, it becomes even more important to closely assess the standardisation process at the 
European level. 
The Substance of Quality of Healthcare Regulation and Convergence 
Finally, it should be helpful to get an idea of the substance of quality of healthcare regulation, and 
which quality criteria could actually be converged through the introduction of European quality 
standards. 
It is important to note that European quality standards aim to introduce minimum quality criteria. The 
standards cannot in any way be compared with maximum harmonisation. The introduction of a 
number of similar minimum quality criteria should guarantee a minimum level-playing field for 
healthcare services in the EU. That level-playing field should increase the safe movement of patients 
within the EU, and guarantee a minimum level of care in all 27 Member States. This means that there 
is no complete “equalisation” of the level of healthcare provided, but simply that providers are 
required to comply with a European minimum standard. Competition and diversity above that 
minimum standard will remain possible. 
A number of quality criteria which can be standardised at the European level can be given: 
1. Education/training: the requirements for the training of medical personnel could be converged. 
Convergence would not necessarily mean that the syllabi of the training would be completely 
similar, but it could mean that for in order to be allowed to perform certain specific medical 
treatments there is a requirement that the doctor has received specialist training over and above 
the general training of doctors.  
2. Facilities: this would include the facilities available to the patient and the instruments used in 
the treatment of patients. Convergence of facilities would result in the use of similar medical 
devices or instruments (an area in which there have already been extensive standardisation 
processes) and in the availability of a number of minimum facilities to patients. One could 
think about the maximum number of patients in one room, or access requirements for 
handicapped patients. 
3. Communication/information: convergence of information and communication requirements 
would mean that there would be a minimum amount of information which the doctor would be 
required to inform the patient about. This could apply to the substance of the treatment as well 
as to the risks associated with the treatment. These requirements would be additional to those 
already required by the 2011 Directive. 
4. Medical treatment: more controversially, a European standard could attempt to standardise 
issues focussing on the actual treatment of the patient. A standard could provide for a 
framework establishing which treatment should take place, and when. As will be seen below, 
such standards appear to be very controversial. 
5. After-care and complaints: the regulation of the care of the patient after the treatment is widely 
divergent in the various Member States. Convergence of after-care would create a number of 
minimum requirements which the healthcare provider would be expected to comply with. 
After-care would include the possibility for patients to complain about their treatment, and the 
adequate facilitation of such complaints by the healthcare provider. 
6. Monitoring of quality: convergence of monitoring requirements would impose a number of 
compulsory checks on healthcare providers. These checks could be both internal (by the 
healthcare provider itself) and external (through an independent assessment or visitation). 
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IV. European Standardisation 
The Location of Standardisation in the EU Regulatory Framework 
Standardisation is a tool of self-regulation to create non-binding standards. This means that a number 
of parties in a sector come together to agree on a set of voluntary standards. These standards are not 
intended to have any binding force “an sich”,32 but aim to guide the actions of parties which are active 
in the sector. Historically, standards have mainly been used in the area of free movement of goods. 
The Court’s judgment in Cassis de Dijon33 had a deregulatory effect, which required a response from 
the goods sector itself. Technical standards were the ideal means to realise a degree of compatibility in 
the sizes, materials and weight of products. Therefore, standardisation has become prominent through 
the free movement of goods. These technical  product standards were adopted in a tight regulatory 
framework which meant that they obtained a quasi-legal status.34 
As part of the Commission’s policy to increase the free movement of services, standardisation is now 
also being used to increase the compatibility of services within the EU.35 Standards on the quality of 
services could increase the incentive for cross-border movement of both service providers and service 
recipients. This is again the rationale on which Article 26 of the Services Directive 2006 is based – 
whilst the facilitation of free movement in the EU is in principle a good thing, some substantive 
regulation of the services will assist in increasing free movement. However, unlike the technical 
product standards referred to above, quality of services standards are not adopted in a clear regulatory 
framework. They do not obtain the quasi-legal force of technical product standards. As a result, the 
“success” of services standards is very much dependent on the willingness of parties in the sector to 
subscribe to them, and on the judiciary to refer to these standards in private law disputes. 
How does standardisation work in practice? Each Member State has its own national standardisation 
organisation. These organisations coordinate national standardisation initiatives. The initiative for a 
process of standardisation is never taken by the standardisation organisation itself. It is usually a 
particular sector which takes the initiative to start a standardisation process. The standardisation 
organisation subsequently takes up responsibility for the coordination of the process, and fulfils a 
mainly administrative role. Invitations are sent out to all parties which could possibly be interested in 
participating in the standardisation process. The determination which parties could be interested is 
made by the standardisation organisation itself. The parties which decide to participate usually have to 
pay a fee, since there is very limited public funding for standardisation.36 This is not surprising given 
the fact that it is in principle a form of private self-regulation. Standardisation can take place both at 
the national level – where national standards are created – and at the European level – where European 
standards are created. There is even an International Organisation for Standardisation, the ISO. 
European standards have to be implemented as national standards and take primacy over any existing 
inconsistent national standards. This is not the same for international ISO standards. If a 
standardisation process takes place at the European level, the European standardisation organisation 
CEN assumes the administrative role as coordinator of the process. First, it is assessed whether or not 
                                                     
32 Although they are in principle non-binding, the specific legal status of a standard in national law differs in the various 
Member States. See Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005), 101-143. 
33 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979] ECR 649. 
34 Directives adopted under the New Approach normally provide that compliance with a technical standard raises a 
presumption of compliance with the requirements of the Directive. References to these technical standards have to be 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union before the presumption of compliance can arise. 
35 See Commission Communication, A strategic vision for European standards: Moving forward to enhance and accelerate 
the sustainable growth of the European economy by 2020, Brussels, 1.6.2011, COM(2011) 311 final. 
36 For example, the fees for participating in the Dutch NEN mirror committee for the project on “Aesthetic Surgery Services” 
are €3000 for professional organisations and public bodies, €2000 for companies and €1000 for NGOs, research 
institutes. 
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there is sufficient support for the initiation of a standardisation process. 37 If this is the case, a CEN 
Technical Committee will be formed with representatives of each Member State. Furthermore, the 
national standardisation organisations will create national “mirror committees” which closely 
scrutinise the progress of the CEN Technical Committee. These mirror committees send 
representatives to the European committee, which effectively exists of delegates of the national mirror 
committees. The task of these representatives is to convey the national position on a particular 
standard, with a view to seek consensus at the European level. This means that the process of 
European standardisation is always led and guarded by national representatives.  
At the European level, there are basically two ways in which a standardisation process can be initiated. 
First of all, the conventional way is for businesses in a particular sector to take the initiative to start 
working on a standard. This is usually described as “bottom-up” standardisation. The second way is 
for the Commission to take the initiative to start a standardisation process.38 In such a case, the 
Commission issues a mandate to the European standardisation organisation CEN to start working on a 
standard in a particular field. This standard could be used to supplement existing or new legislation, or 
to fill the gaps in a legislative instrument. As a consequence, a standardisation process can also be 
initiated “top-down” by a mandate of the Commission. It could be questioned whether a top-down 
approach has less potential to realise convergence in practice, as the initiative to start the process has 
not been taken by the sector itself. However, it should be noted that it is still the sector itself which is 
in charge of the standardisation process. Although the Commission could mandate the initiation of the 
standardisation process, the process itself is still driven and controlled by the sector itself. None of the 
current standardisation processes in the healthcare sector have been mandated by the Commission. In 
the reform process of Directive 98/34 one of the issues which is currently on the table is whether or 
not the Commission shall have the power to mandate standardisation processes in the healthcare 
sector. There are strong voices against such a mandate in the healthcare sector. The result would be 
that standardisation initiatives in the healthcare sector can only be started “bottom-up”. This would 
presumably be to recognise that the EU has no legislative competence in the field of quality of 
healthcare services, and should not even be allowed to initiate self-regulation on quality of healthcare, 
and also because of a lack of political will to encourage European initiatives in the healthcare sector.  
 
The Parties Involved in the Standardisation Process 
With the exception of a mandate of the Commission, each process of standardisation is started by the 
sector itself. This usually means that a process is started because a sector feels a particular need for a 
common response to a problem which is encountered in that sector. Traditionally, this meant that the 
businesses in a particular production industry came together to agree on technical product standards, 
for example on which type of materials to use for a particular product.39 Standardisation was an 
effective means to increase the compatibility of the product, which resulted in a better functioning 
single market for that product and in increased competition. As a result, standardisation was the result 
of a perceived need for convergence in a sector. Therefore, convergence can be considered to be one 
of the underlying values on which the standardisation process is based. 
                                                     
37 By Resolution BT C75/2009, BT approved that both of following criteria are to be met for acceptance of such proposal for 
new work (in new area): 
• A two-thirds majority of the votes cast (abstentions not counted) are in favour of the proposal; 
• Five (or more) Members express commitment to participate. 
38 Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and 
regulations and of rules on Information Society services. 
39 This is not too different from the process described in: Lisa Bernstein, “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: 
Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions”, (2001) 99 Michigan Law Review 1724. 
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At the same time, businesses focus on their own business interests, which were the main motivation to 
start a standardisation process. Historically, the public interest and consumer interests were less 
important in the standardisation process. There is no compulsory involvement of certain organisations 
or bodies which think outside the box of business interests. However, this sole focus on business 
interests is gradually decreasing and consumer organisations are now commonly involved in the 
standardisation process. There is even a European organisation, ANEC,40 which aims to be the voice 
of the consumer in the European standardisation process. Moreover, national public bodies are more 
frequently involved in the standardisation process, by sending representatives to participate in national 
mirror committees. Furthermore, there is an increased amount of public funding for standardisation 
processes in some Member States. These developments all help to improve the legitimacy and 
transparency of the standardisation process. However, at present, there is no coherent and structured 
way of involving public authorities in the standardisation process. 
The institutional implications of the development towards more public involvement are important, as 
they imply that standardisation is taken out of its private context and applied in the public sector. They 
signify a move from “pure” self-regulation towards co-regulation. 41 In effect, the obligation on 
Member States in Article 26 of the Services Directive 2006 to encourage standardisation initiatives is 
taken one step further, and Member States become actively involved in the standardisation process. 
This is evidenced by the recent initiative for a CEN Workshop Agreement on Quality Criteria for 
Health Checks. The initiative for such a Workshop Agreement was taken by the Dutch Ministry of 
Health. Therefore, it appears that public bodies are now using standardisation as a means to protect the 
public interest and to increase consumer protection. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
Which parties are generally involved in a standardisation process in the healthcare sector? It is not 
such a homogenous sector as, for example, the car industry or the construction industry. 
Standardisation of healthcare brings together medical practitioners, insurers, patient organisations, 
private clinics and public (regulatory) bodies, such as inspectorates. This means that the parties which 
are involved in the process may have very different interests, and certainly have very different 
perspectives on the purposes of standardisation. As a consequence, any standards created will be based 
on consensus between all parties involved.  
It should be noted that standardisation through CEN is not a very well-known regulatory tool in the 
healthcare sector. It has been used to standardise the use of medical devices and instruments, but 
issues of quality of medical care have until recently remained outside the scope of standardisation. If 
an attempt is made to agree on quality standards, which include not just the organisational process or 
quality management of care but also the medical treatment of patients, medical practitioners usually 
refer to scientific guidelines. These guidelines are prepared by scientific associations of medical 
practitioners, and are always evidence-based. A consensus-based approach flies in the face of doctors, 
who fear that this approach will lead to an inferior standard of care. They do not want to have to make 
any concessions on medical issues. One solution could be to incorporate existing scientific standards 
in a European standard. Another solution could be to involve European scientific associations in the 
standardisation process and to make them expressly approve of the adopted standard. However, the 
response of medical practitioners is usually that for them a European standard would not have any 
additional benefit. It could be said that this argument misses the point of standardisation, which is to 
bring all parties involved together to work on higher quality of care. In particular, in the healthcare 
sector, it is always the interests of the patient which should be the paramount concern of the 
stakeholders.  
                                                     
40 Association Normalisation Européenne pour les Consommateurs (ANEC), an international non-profit organisation 
established under Belgian Law. 
41 As advocated for by Fabrizio Cafaggi, “Private Regulation in European Private Law” in Hartkamp et al., Towards a 
European Civil Code, (Nijmegen, Ars Aequi Libri, 2012). 
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To conclude, the fact that standardisation is driven by the sector itself has a positive impact on its 
potential to bring about convergence. In a way, convergence in practice is the very aim of every 
standardisation process. However, the healthcare sector poses some particular problems. The change 
from evidence-based to consensus-based guidelines is greeted with scepticism by medical 
practitioners, who fear that the adoption of such standards will lead to lower standards. Since the 
application of standards is voluntary, their success in the healthcare sector depends to a significant 
extent on the willingness of medical practitioners to cooperate in the creation of the standards and in 
subscribing to the standards. As a consequence, it will be crucial to find a modus operandi to 
successfully integrate medical practitioners’ concerns in the standardisation process.  
The Procedure for Standardisation 
Once a proposal has been given the green light after a voting process, a CEN Technical Committee 
starts to work on a European standard. Very often there is already a source document, with the 
structure of a proposed standard, before the negotiations are started. This document is taken as the 
starting point of the future European standard. The national mirror committees control the process of 
European standardisation and send national representatives to the CEN committee. In this way the 
national interests are protected throughout the standardisation process. It is extremely important that 
the national positions are heard and known, since the effectiveness of a standard very much depends 
on the willingness in the various Member States to subscribe to the agreed standards.  
It is not necessary for all Member States to be involved in a standardisation process. It is possible for a 
more limited number of Member States to be actively involved in the creation of a standard – the 
minimum requirement is five Member States. The final standard will have to be adopted as a national 
standard in all Member States and requires the repeal of any inconsistent national standards. 
Nevertheless, it could only have been a small number of Member States that has actively participated 
in the process. The choice to abstain from participation in the standardisation process might well have 
been voluntary, but is likely to have an impact on the subsequent application of that standard in the 
non-participating Member State. 
Importantly, the standardisation process is confidential and not open to the public. Both the CEN 
committee and national mirror committees meet in private. No documentation is made publicly 
available, except for the first draft standard which is published on the website of the national 
standardisation organisations. Parties which are interested in the standard can comment on the 
proposal. Draft standards are usually available online for a couple of months. Announcements inviting 
comments are sent to parties which have previously expressed an interest in the standard or which 
have been selected by the national standardisation organisation as an interesting party to receive 
comments from. Except for a message on the national standardisation organisation’s website, there are 
generally no public announcements inviting comments from the public. 
Despite this short public intermezzo, the curtains of the standardisation process remain very much 
drawn. Therefore, unlike in a legislative process, there is no – or an extremely limited – public debate 
in the process. From an “input” perspective, this affects the democratic legitimacy of the 
standardisation process. This lack of public involvement continues after result of the process: the final 
standard, once published, is not publicly available. It is a product which can be bought by those parties 
which are interested in subscribing to the agreed standard. Again, this favours those parties with a 
substantial amount of money available to buy standards – in particular, commercial parties. Moreover, 
it reduces public awareness of the standard. The fact that a standard becomes a product which is not 
easily accessible constitutes an obstacle to access for both healthcare service providers and for 
patients. From the perspective of healthcare service providers, the process has an inherent bias in 
favour of those parties which have the financial means to participate in the standardisation process 
itself. Moreover, it means that service providers with more significant financial means will more easily 
have access to the standard. From the perspective of patients, if they are thinking about going to 
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another Member State for treatment, they may very well want to be able to know what sort of 
standards are used in that Member State. If a CEN standard has been adopted, but this standard is not 
publicly available, that effectively prevents patients from getting to know an instrument which has 
attempted to increase the convergence between national healthcare regulation in the different Member 
States. If patients had known about the existence of the standard, they could have been more inclined 
to travel abroad. Finally, if a standard is to be used by the judiciary as the standard of care in private 
disputes, it must have earned its status as an authoritative document which adequately represents what 
is happening in practice. The fact that a CEN standard is a product which has to be bought makes it 
more difficult for both healthcare providers and patients to ensure that a standard is broadly and 
voluntarily complied with before it is “upgraded” in private law. 
At the same time, the private and confidential nature of the process could mean that parties are able to 
reach more consensus on the substantive quality criteria. It could be argued that the “output” of the 
process, which should improve safety and quality standards for patients throughout Europe, legitimises 
the relatively limited transparency of the process. But a focus on the output of the process still requires 
the standards to actually reach healthcare providers and patients – they should at least be made aware 
of the existence of the standards. There have been certain developments towards more transparency of 
the standardisation process. A recent example is the CEN Workshop Agreement on Quality Criteria 
for Health Checks, already referred to above. In this particular case, participants are being funded by 
the Commission. One of the requirements of the public funding is that all information and 
documentation on the workshop is available online. As a result, public funding is used to force the 
participants to make the standardisation process – in this example only leading to a Workshop 
Agreement – more public and transparent. This could be an important development to raise public 
awareness, but it still dependent on how easily consumers or patients find their way to the information 
which is available online. Furthermore, public funding remains relatively limited and the current 
project appears to be mainly publicly funded because the initiative came from the public sector, i.e. the 
Dutch Ministry of Health.  
What is the effect of the limited public involvement in the standardisation process and the restricted 
access to the standard on its ability to increase convergence of healthcare regulation in the 27 Member 
States? If convergence is defined as an increasing similarity of the terms used in the substantive 
regulation of healthcare services, is it really necessary that there is a degree of transparency and 
democratic accountability in the process for convergence to take place? Is it necessary and helpful to 
transpose and apply terminology which is normally used in the democratic legislative process to the 
standardisation process? The answer to that question must be that it depends on the circumstances in 
which standardisation is used and the function of the standardisation process. Standardisation in the 
healthcare sector focusses on the protection of patients in a single market for healthcare services. The 
aim is to provide a level-playing field for healthcare services in the EU. The safe movement of patients 
will be improved if patients know of European standards on quality of care issues. The incorporation 
of European quality standards in law relies on the willingness of the sector and the judiciary to refer to 
European standards as the appropriate standard of care in contractual or negligence cases. A lack of 
transparency and accountability could mean that the judiciary is less inclined to refer to such 
standards. 
The End Result: The Instrument “Standard” 
Prima facie standards do not have any binding force in law. As CEN puts it rather eloquently, they 
derive their authority from the fact that they have been created by the stakeholders in the sector 
through a process of consensus.42 As has been described above, standards can find their way into 
private law in a number of ways. Moreover, and more dramatically, standards can also be directly 
                                                     
42 This statement is made in virtually every CEN presentation on what standardisation is and what standards are. 
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incorporated in legislative instruments. This practice of incorporation in legislation has resulted in 
litigation in the Netherlands which focusses on the extent to which incorporated standards should be 
made publicly available to citizens and businesses to enable them to be aware of the content of the 
legislation. The case raises important issues about the legal status of such incorporated standards and 
the application of copyright protection legislation to standards incorporated in public legislation.43 
Traditionally, legal regulation and standardisation operated in different arenas. Standardisation 
enabled businesses to agree on certain specific standards within their sector. The fact that the agreed 
instruments had no binding legal force and remained very much within the sphere of business 
regulation meant that the wording of standards was very sector-specific. These standards were seldom 
the subject of legal disputes, and if they came up in legal proceedings their interpretation was usually 
not too difficult. There can only be minimal disagreement about the meaning of certain sizes or 
materials of a product. As such, it can be said that the standards did not even look like any sort of legal 
instrument, and they were unlikely to be the subject of dispute in legal proceedings. 
Standards on the quality of services are inherently different in nature. They do not use the same 
technical wording. Any attempt to define what quality of care is involves a normative judgment which 
goes beyond mere technical product standards. 44 This poses a real challenge for standards on quality 
of care, and in particular for standards on quality of healthcare. It will be difficult to agree on the 
wording of certain definitions through consensus at the European level. This could be a factor which 
has a negative impact on the ability to improve convergence of national healthcare regulation through 
standardisation. Whilst product standards cannot easily lead to multiple interpretations, standards 
defining quality of care could lead to more disputes about the exact meaning of the provisions.45 If 
national judges were increasingly required to interpret quality of care standards, this could lead to 
different interpretations throughout the EU.  
At the same time, the voluntary nature of standardisation has a positive impact on the potential for 
convergence. The fact that standards are not legally binding means that the parties which are involved 
in the creation of a standard might be inclined to agree on more ambitious standards. If they had been 
agreeing on legally binding regulation, they could have been much more careful. The fact that a breach 
of a standard does not immediately lead to legal proceedings is an important factor in assessing its 
ability to create convergence. In combination with the private nature of the deliberations, the 
stakeholders may be more willing to agree certain criteria which they would otherwise not have 
included. It gives a sector the ability to increase the level of care without the fear of immediate legal 
consequences in cases where parties fail to adhere to a particular standard. If standards are 
subsequently incorporated in law through judicial interpretation, this is because the parties themselves 
have decided that the standards adequately describe the standard of care which can be expected. 
Furthermore, because of their voluntary nature, standards can play an important role in the regulatory 
framework. They can be used to supplement or build on existing legislation. Where a lack of 
consensus has resulted in a legal lacuna, standards could fill the gap in an attempt to provide a more 
complete framework of protection. If convergence cannot be reached through legislative action, 
standardisation serves as a useful alternative. In more controversial policy areas, like healthcare, it 
could sometimes be considered to be a safer option to choose standardisation.  
In conclusion, the voluntary nature of standards has a positive impact on the ability to create 
convergence of national regulation. This is mainly due to the fact that they can be used to supplement 
existing legislation, and that they can be used in areas where there is insufficient public consensus, or 
                                                     
43 The Advocate General of the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court, delivered his Opinion on 30th March 2012: 
LJN: BW0393, Hoge Raad , 11/01017. 
44 Hans-W. Micklitz, “Services Standards: Defining the Core Consumer Elements and their Minimum Requirements”, Study 
Commissioned by ANEC, Brussels, April 2007, p 10. 
45 Lisa Bernstein, above n 39, p 1732-1733. 
Barend van Leeuwen 
 
 158 
simply no competence, to act by way of legislation. Finally, the voluntary nature of standards could 
result in more ambitious standards being set, which would be another incentive for convergence. The 
fact that the wording of standards on quality of care might be more difficult and challenging compared 
to product standards remains problematic, but so long as sufficient time is taken, and sufficient 
consensus is reached by those parties involved in the creation of the standard this should not 
necessarily be an obstacle to convergence.  
V. Healthcare Standardisation in Practice 
Three Categories of Healthcare Standards 
Standardisation of healthcare services is a relatively new phenomenon. The healthcare sector is 
already familiar with standardisation of quality management systems and medical devices, but 
standardisation of the quality of the service itself only started a few years ago. Most standardisation 
projects in the healthcare sector are still ongoing. Furthermore, the number of projects on healthcare 
services is not extremely high: there are about ten quality standards which have been developed or are 
being developed. Therefore, it is difficult to make any definite observations at this moment in time. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish three different categories of healthcare standards. The 
distinction has been made on the basis of the aim of the standardisation project, or the problem which 
it seeks to address: 
Regulating the non-regulated professions:  
A number of professions which are very differently regulated in the 27 Member States have decided to 
create European quality standards. The main examples are chiropractors, osteopaths and hearing aid 
specialists. The levels of regulation of these professions differ widely across the EU. For example, 
osteopaths are a regulated profession in only four Member States. The regulators in these Member 
States have to apply the 2005 Directive on the recognition of professional qualifications46 when 
professionals from Member States in which they are not regulated seek entry to the regulated 
profession. This has created difficulties in assessing the level of training of these professionals. As a 
result, there is a need for a European quality standard. The purpose of this standard, which is currently 
being developed, is to lay down the level of training required in the EU. Although the focus of these 
standards is on education and training, they go further in that they also standardise the delivery of the 
service to the patient. 
Dealing with cross-border healthcare 
A second category of standards aims to deal specifically with the consequences of cross-border 
healthcare. The main examples are a standard for aesthetic surgery services and a workshop agreement 
on quality criteria for health checks. In both sectors patients regularly travel abroad to receive (insured 
or non-insured) care. Frequently, such care is provided in private clinics. It has proven difficult to 
assess the quality of private clinics abroad. Furthermore, there are national differences in how much 
training a doctor should have before they can perform particular treatments. After their move 
“outbound” to receive care patients return “inbound” to their home healthcare system with the results 
(or lack of results) of the care received in another Member State. As such, an additional burden is 
imposed on the healthcare system in the home Member State. The purpose of standardisation in these 
sectors is to enable both insurers and patients to get a better idea of the quality of services abroad and 
to protect the integrity of the healthcare system of the home Member State. 
                                                     
46 Directive 2005/36/EC on the recognition of professional qualifications 
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Solidarity and training in an enlarged EU 
This third and final category contains just one example, which will be discussed in more detail below. 
This was the initiative for a European standard on cleft lip treatment. The purpose of this standard was 
not to facilitate the internal market for healthcare services, but more to deal with the limits of the 
internal market for cleft care. Families with babies born with clefts in the new Member States cannot 
really travel to other Member States for treatment. The purpose of the standard was very much for the 
new Member States to learn from the experience and skills in the old Member States. A common 
European quality standard would assist both healthcare providers and patients in new Member States 
in working towards higher quality of care for babies born with clefts. As such, the initiative was very 
much inspired by solidarity and development aid at the European level. 
Two of the examples described above will now be discussed in more detail. 
Quality Criteria for Health Checks 
In December 2011 an initiative was started for a Workshop Agreement on Quality Criteria for Health 
Checks.47 A Workshop Agreement is more informal than a standard and takes less time to complete.48 
Since the current initiative was only started in December 2011, it is not yet possible to make any 
observations about the substance of the Workshop Agreement. However, the background to the 
initiative offers an interesting perspective on standardisation of healthcare regulation and the 
possibility of convergence of healthcare regulation. First of all, the problem which was faced by the 
Dutch Ministry of Health will be described. Secondly, it will be discussed how the Workshop 
Agreement could assist in dealing with that problem and how that discussion links to convergence of 
healthcare regulation. 
In the era of the “consumerisation” of the patient, health checks are a common phenomenon. Many 
Member States have national preventive screening systems, but these do not always satisfy individual 
patients. They can then go to private institutions that offer individual health checks. They are often 
compensated by their own health insurers for such checks. Many of the health check providers screen 
for cancer, which is most important to the majority of (potential) patients. In the Netherlands, there is 
very restrictive legislation on which service providers can perform individual preventive health checks 
outside the nationally coordinated screening policy.49 Such providers have to obtain a licence if they 
screen for cancer, use ionising radiation or screen for serious diseases which cannot be treated. In all 
these instances a licence is required, which is difficult to obtain. Instead of attempting to obtain a 
licence, health check providers simply establish themselves in a Member State with less restrictive 
legislation. As a result, there are no private health check providers in the Netherlands. The Netherlands 
is the only EU Member State with such restrictive legislation. Because consumers are still curious 
about their general state of health, they travel abroad to undergo health checks, usually to Germany. In 
the other Member States the consumer can be transformed in a patient, if the results of the checks 
establish physical problems or an illness. In such a case, the patient will normally return to the 
Netherlands to seek treatment within the Dutch healthcare system. The experience in the Netherlands 
is that patients frequently return with results of tests which are not trusted or deemed reliable by the 
Dutch healthcare system. As a result, all checks will have to be done again. Moreover, patients 
sometimes return with false positives obtained in their health checks abroad. Both scenarios mean that 
                                                     
47 “CEN Workshop Business Plan: Health Services – Basic Quality Criteria for Health Checks – CEN/WS68”, approved in 
the meeting in the Hague on 2nd December 2011, p 1-2, accessed at www.epaac.org on 28th January 2012. 
48 A Workshop Agreement does not have the same authoritative status as a standard. The procedure is more open, in that 
participants can join until the Workshop Agreement draft is mature. There are fewer physical meetings, and the overall 
duration is 5 to 18 months. A standardisation process usually takes at least 36 months. A Workshop Agreement has a 
validity of three years, after which the participants can decide to use the agreement for a “real” CEN standard. 
49 Wet op het bevolkingsonderzoek (Population Screening Act), Staatsblad 1992, 61). 
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a significant burden is placed on the Dutch healthcare system, which has to perform all necessary 
checks as a result of the lack of trust in the quality of the checks performed abroad. In addition to 
issues of capacity and finances, there are also psychological consequences of a false positive result 
against which the Dutch government would like to protect its citizens. A number of studies have taken 
place in the Netherlands to discuss and investigate the possibilities to deal with this problem.50 
Because of the fact that the Netherlands is the only EU Member State with such restrictive legislation, 
it is in a way isolated and limited in finding a solution. It is against this background that the Workshop 
Agreement for Quality Criteria for Health Checks was started. 
At this early stage of the process, a number of observations can be made. First of all, it should be 
noted that this is a rare example of a national government taking the initiative for a standardisation 
process. The Dutch Ministry of Health has initiated the process and will also be actively participating 
in the creation of the Workshop Agreement. It is a new development that the actual initiative for a 
standardisation process comes from public authorities. It automatically transforms the process from 
self-regulation into co-regulation. It also means that one can question whether such a standardisation 
process could really be described as “bottom-up” standardisation. Although the sector itself will still 
be controlling the process, apparently the need to agree on a standard was not so urgent that the 
initiative came from the sector itself. It seems that the sector needed some encouragement from the 
public authorities. Moreover, it is relevant that the initiative has come from one national government 
which has a legislative framework which is relatively isolated in the EU. It is possible that the Dutch 
government is attempting to protect the underlying motivation of its legislation through the 
standardisation process. This national background to the project could have a detrimental impact on its 
ability to increase convergence at the European level. 
Secondly, the purpose of this project is not to increase the movement of patients. The project is taking 
place in an area in which there is already significant movement of patients – at least from the 
Netherlands to other Member States – who impose an unnecessary burden on their home healthcare 
system on their return. Therefore, the project is intending to protect consumers against false positives, 
and to protect the integrity of the Dutch healthcare system. As a consequence, its dual purpose could 
be described as protection of patients who have received healthcare services abroad and protection of 
the integrity of the national healthcare system. 
Finally, the project is funded by the Commission through EPAAC, the European Partnership for 
Action against Cancer.51 One of the requirements of the public funding is that all documents related to 
the creation should be publicly available. As a result, the current working documents can be accessed 
through the website of EPAAC. At the same time, the final Workshop Agreement will still be a 
product available through the national standardisation organisation. The increase in transparency and 
accessibility of the standardisation process are also caused by the fact that this process is leading to a 
Workshop Agreement. In a Workshop Agreement public participation is actively encouraged until the 
very last stage when the final agreement is being drafted. Although it is in principle a good 
development that all documents relating to a standardisation process are publicly available, one can 
question the additional benefit of a number of links on the website of a not particularly well-known 
European organisation.  
From the perspective of convergence, it is interesting to note that this is a situation in which one 
Member State is attempting to protect its legislation and in a way to export its protective legislation to 
the other Member States. Therefore, any convergence would be between the Netherlands and the other 
Member States. It remains to be seen whether the national – as opposed to European – nature of the 
initiative will have an impact on the ability of the final instrument to converge regulation of health 
                                                     
50 In particular, see Health Council of The Netherlands, Screening: between hope and hype, 2008. 
51 The current documents are published on the website of the European Partnership for Action Against Cancer: 
www.epaac.eu. 
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checks at the European level. At the same time, the active involvement of public authorities in the 
Workshop Agreement process opens up the possibility of the final instrument to extend beyond the 
mere self-regulatory layer of health regulation.  
Cleft Lip 
In January 2011 the European Cleft Organisation (“ECO”), an organisation for patients born with cleft 
lips, submitted a proposal to CEN for a European standard on cleft care. The main purpose of this 
standard was “to ensure every child born with a cleft in Europe has the opportunity of realising their 
full potential”.52 The aim was to address the existing inequalities in the quality of treatment in 
different Member States. In particular, in some Eastern-European Member States parents of babies 
with clefts are frequently advised to abandon their babies. In addition, when babies are treated, they 
often receive inadequate, or even dangerous, treatment. According to ECO, this is one of the 
consequences of the liberalisation of healthcare in the new Member States. A European standard 
“would empower families to ask the right questions and work with professionals, lobbying for 
resources to deliver best practice”.53 To confirm the support for the proposal in the new Member 
States, the Bulgarian standardisation organisation was chosen to lead the standardisation process.54 
In April 2011 representatives of all Member States voted on the proposal. Despite widespread support 
for the proposal, it was rejected on the basis of five Member States’ negative votes.55 In particular, 
France and Spain expressed fundamental disagreement with the proposal. Germany and the 
Netherlands voted against the proposal with more detailed comments. It should immediately be noted 
that the opposition came almost exclusively from the old Member States. ECO organised a meeting in 
November 2011 to try and revive the proposal. The various comments from the Member States were 
discussed, and ECO now intends to organise meetings in France and Spain in 2012. 
First of all, it is necessary to look at what exactly ECO attempted to do. They intended that the 
proposed cleft standard would be written by experts. It should closely follow exiting national cleft 
guidelines, and ECO encouraged national stakeholders to submit such guidelines for consideration at 
the European level.56 ECO expressed the intention to closely follow the UK’s standard developed by 
the Department of Health. They considered the CEN standardisation process as an alternative 
approach to developing best practice, and argued that an agreed CEN standard would carry weight in 
every Member State.57  
It should be emphasised that the ECO proposal was not made with a view to facilitate the Internal 
Market for healthcare services – the focus is not on free movement of patients. The standard would not 
aim to protect patients who move abroad, but could better be described as a development aid tool to 
improve the general quality of care of babies with clefts in the EU. Because of the need for continuity 
of treatment, as the treatment process usually takes a number of years, babies with clefts are not 
usually treated in hospitals in another Member State from the one in which they are living.58In 
addition, in most cases it would be too expensive for parents to seek treatment in another Member 
                                                     
52 “Why a Standard for European Cleft Care?”, presentation by Mr Gareth Davies of ECO, Brussels, 8th November 2011. 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Writing the Standard: Peer Credibility”, presentation by Mr Gareth Davies of ECO, Brussels, 8th November 2011. 
55 Voting Results: “Creation of a new CEN Project Committee on 'Healthcare services for cleft lip and/or palate'”, 
CENBT/8561, Brussels, April 2011. 
56 “What Existing Guidelines Can We Draw From?”, presentation by Mr Gareth Davies of ECO, Brussels, 8th November 
2011. 
57 “Why Use CEN?”, presentation by Mr Gareth Davies of ECO, Brussels, 8th November 2011. 
58 Gareth Davies, Executive Director of ECO, interview with author, Florence, 14th March 2012 
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State. As a consequence, the standard would seek to address a problem which cannot be addressed by 
free movement of patients. 
Why did five Member States vote against the proposal? The conclusions of the meeting in November, 
intended to revive the proposal, shed some light on the concerns in certain Member States.59 The 
strongest opposition came from France. The French position was that patient safety is regulated by 
public authorities and by public regulations. It was within the exclusive competence of the Haute 
Authorité de Santé to adopt recommendations for good practice.60 The Spanish position was very 
similar. In particular, Spain argued that there were already scientific protocols in place. CEN standards 
would generate distortion among medical practitioners, patients and public authorities.61 In both 
France and Spain public authorities have dominated the discussion on the necessity of a CEN standard 
and have used their influence the block the start of a standardisation process. The German rejection of 
the proposal was based on existences of regulations and guidelines in Germany which were deemed to 
be sufficient to regulate quality of care issues. On that basis there was no perceived need in Germany 
for a European standard.62  
Finally, the position of the Netherlands was the most elaborate. The most fundamental objection of the 
Netherlands was that medical issues should be guided by evidence-based guidelines. Consensus-based 
guidelines would not be of any benefit to the patient. Consequently, the Netherlands requested that 
CEN standards be approved by European scientific organisations before coming into force. Secondly, 
it was argued that a European standard could result in a lower quality of care. This would be the result 
of an attempt to reach Europe-wide consensus, which would have an impact on the level of care 
currently provided in the Netherlands. It was very much doubted whether consensus-based CEN 
standards would be the right instrument to deal with problems in the healthcare sector. Thirdly, the 
Netherlands criticised the scope of the proposal. It was proposed that a recent Dutch guideline could 
be shared with European colleagues.63 
A critical assessment of these objections leads to a number of conclusions. First of all, in certain 
Member States, in particular in France, there is public opposition against the use of a private self-
regulatory instrument to regulate quality of healthcare issues. The nature of the proposal is 
significantly more medical than that of other standardisation processes which have been taking place 
in the healthcare sector. The French comments attached to the negative vote indicate that the 
regulation of quality of care – in particular focussing on patient safety – falls within the exclusive 
competence of the Haute Autorité de Santé. Consequently, the objection does not appear to be based 
on a possible conflict with existing public regulations, but more on the issue of competence. This links 
back to the distinction made above between the publicly and privately regulated layers of healthcare 
regulation. The French position suggests that the Haute Autorité de Santé wishes to maintain its 
exclusive competence to regulate quality of care issues focussing on patient safety. Any attempt by 
private regulation to intrude on that competence is blocked by the public authority. One conclusion 
could then be that for standardisation to regulate quality of care issues in France, it is absolutely 
crucial to have the public authorities on board, and that these authorities actively support the 
standardisation process. Another conclusion could be that standardisation should remain outside the 
domain of what in certain Member States is perceived to be within the public competence. The 
proposal for a cleft lip standard has certainly highlighted the fact that at least some degree of public 
acceptance and support appears to be necessary for European standardisation of quality of healthcare 
                                                     
59 “Some conclusions: cleft stakeholder meeting”, presentation by Mr Guido de Jongh of CEN, Brussels, 8th November 2011. 
60 “Formal responses by the Proposer”, document published on  by ECO after the presentations in Brussels on 8th November 
2011, p 5, accessed at www.ecoonline.org on 28th January 2012. 
61 Ibid., p 6. 
62 Ibid., p 5-6. 
63 Ibid., p 7. 
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to be successful. After all, in this case the French authorities have contributed in a significant way to 
the rejection of the proposal.  
The second common objection to the cleft lip standard was that there were already sufficient 
guidelines in place, and these national guidelines would be sufficient to protect the quality of care. In 
addition, any further standards should be evidence-based. This is an objection based on the need for a 
CEN standard: many Member States do not see the need for European regulation, and certainly not for 
a CEN standard. They also fear that any European standards would be inferior to their own. This 
objection misses the point of standardisation: it should provide a minimum standard which would be 
applicable throughout Europe. It would still be possible for individual Member States to go beyond the 
CEN standard. Importantly, the very existence of a standard could lead to higher quality of care in new 
Member States. For the old Member States, the CEN standard would perhaps not always be an 
ambitious way of agreeing on new standards, but it would rather be a way of assisting in ensuring a 
minimum level of care throughout the EU. With more and more free movement of persons, and 
patients, this should in the end be beneficial to all Member States.  
Any objections based on the consensus-based nature of CEN standards could be taken away by 
incorporating scientific guidelines in the CEN standard. In particular, reference could be made to 
certain exiting scientific guidelines to elaborate on medical terms in the standards. Furthermore, a 
CEN standard could be approved by a European scientific organisation to improve its legitimacy from 
the point of view of the medical profession. The point that countries are willing to share their national 
guidelines seems to suggest that any convergence can only take place on the basis of existing national 
guidelines. Therefore, it is essential that in the CEN process all relevant national guidelines will be 
sufficiently taken into account. An exchange of national guidelines should be a compulsory part of the 
standardisation process.  
VI. Conclusion 
Standardisation has potential to increase the convergence of national healthcare regulation. This 
conclusion is primarily based on the voluntary bottom-up nature of the standardisation process in the 
healthcare sector, and on the potential of standards to fill the gaps of legal regulation – in effect, to go 
beyond the reach of legal harmonisation. It is particularly helpful in the healthcare sector in which the 
EU has no legislative competence to act. The bottom-up nature of standardisation in the healthcare 
sector usually means that there is a need in a sector for a European response to a particular problem.  
However, the standards will only really result in convergence if they are subsequently being applied in 
practice. This application is twofold: first, a standard should be applied by the sector itself. It is only if 
the sector itself considers a standard applicable that the judiciary will be willing in private law cases to 
adopt a European standard as the required standard of care. This standard will only be adopted if it 
complies with criteria under national law for self-regulation to be given binding force. Transparency 
and representation are commonly used to assess a self-regulatory instrument. As a consequence, the 
private nature of the standardisation process can act as an obstacle to convergence. CEN standards will 
only be widely used if healthcare providers and patients are aware of them, and actively participate in 
the creation of European quality standards. Therefore, both the process and the result of a European 
standardisation process should be made more public and transparent. It is a good development that 
public authorities are becoming more involved in the standardisation process. Public funding can act 
as a catalyst in realising more transparency.  
The failure to agree on the proposal for a cleft lip standard shows that the CEN process is not yet 
generally accepted as a way of agreeing European standards which deal with quality of healthcare 
issues. The two main challenges are to get public authorities involved in the standardisation process, 
or at least to make them accept that standardisation can be useful to regulate quality of healthcare 
issues, and to make CEN standards as a regulatory tool acceptable to the medical profession by 
Barend van Leeuwen 
 
 164 
incorporating scientific guidelines or by seeking approval of scientific organisations. Such a solution 
would deal with the opposition among medical practitioners against consensus-based, as opposed to 
evidence-based, standards of care. A more conservative solution would be for standardisation to 
remain outside the domain of patient safety in public hospitals, which in certain Member States is 
perceived to be outside the scope of private self-regulation. It remains to be seen whether certain 
Member States persist in their objections against private regulation in matters of quality of healthcare. 
Standardisation initiatives will continue to take place in an increasingly European market for 
healthcare services. The 2011 Directive was adopted only a year ago, and the impact of the Directive 
on the movement of patients and the regulation of national healthcare systems is as yet unclear. It is 
against this background of a European right to freely receive healthcare services in another Member 
State that national healthcare systems will increasingly be confronted with problems which reach 
beyond the safe borders of the Member State. Given that there is no EU competence to adopt 
legislation on quality of healthcare issues, standardisation could be a useful alternative to provide a 
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TOWARDS THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN EUROPEAN REGULATORY PRIVATE LAW (I) 
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES LAW 
Marta Cantero Gamito* 
Introduction 
The purpose of this paper1 is to verify the self-sufficiency of European Regulatory Private Law.2 As a 
result, this paper will be used as a first stage of analysis by displaying a broad picture of the thesis 
topic of my research. I have decided to opt for Telecommunications Services as the model upon which 
the self-sufficiency hypothesis is to be tested. To that end, this paper is focused on the analysis of such 
sector in an exhaustive way, in order to find out whether it can be considered a self-standing order.  
Special attention is to be paid to the analysis of the most important ends concerning scheme, such as 
the shift in consumer protection within regulated markets from an Internal Market approach to a 
Universal Services orientation, going beyond the traditional sphere of Private Law. I am not interested 
in technological issues or aspects related to equipment concerning telecommunications’ unbundling. 
Instead, my research only focuses on the Private Law dimension, i.e. the contractual implications of 
telecommunications law, from a Consumer Law perspective. I am not concerned either with the 
financing of Services of General Economic Interest; rather, I am more attracted to the idea of how the 
European legislator is encroaching in the field of contract law -particularly consumer contracts- 
through vertical rules governing these services.  
Methodologically, this paper begins by providing an idea of what I mean by a self-standing order and 
what this logic involves within the self-sufficiency hypothesis. Despite this paper is about 
telecommunications services, it pretends to be a transversal concept in order to be applied to other 
branches belonging to the European Regulatory Private Law as a whole. Once the idea is developed, 
and taking into account that this research is aimed to be exhaustive and comprehensive, this paper will 
deal with law-making, substantive law, and implementation and enforcement issues.  
First, as to law-making, this paper aims to present a general outlook of the law-making process in the 
case of Services of General Economic Interest and, particularly, in telecommunications services. 
Therefore, here are mentioned –briefly- different aspects related to the competence of the EU (Treaty 
provisions according the approach chosen by the legislator), methods and instruments to regulate these 
services, as well as the institutions involved in this process. In this part, I have firstly introduced a 
section concerning the dual approach pursued by the EU policy in the field of Services of General 
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Economic Interest what might be the causal event for the introduction of private law provisions within 
the sectorial regimes. The purpose of this part is, therefore, to demonstrate how the legislative 
development for private law now involves new methods, instruments and actors as opposed to the 
formation of the traditional private law, which was mainly carried out by the Nation State.   
Secondly, concerning the substantive law, this paper addresses some substantive law provisions 
related to contracts for the supply of telecommunications services. Here lie the achievements of the 
European legislator, who, under the Internal Market configuration of these services, also regulates 
contractual aspects. The dual approach between market oriented (competition, Internal Market) and 
social/welfarist (universal service requirements) objectives, leads to a clash of values within the EU 
policy. Thus, the particular configuration of these markets –pursuing also social/welfarist values 
different from the current European Consumer Law- promotes its autonomy outside the consumer 
acquis and the national private law orders.  
Thirdly, this paper deals with implementation and enforcement issues. The implementation of these 
rules could usefully be analyzed in order to perceive how the EU is setting aside national legal orders 
as a result of the direct application of the EU rules through, for example, overregulation. Here, 
different actors are also involved in the implementation process and, therefore, displacing the role of 
Member States. Thus, the idea of supremacy could be here applied in order to assess the virtual 
independence of these services; created and applied at EU level. Furthermore, as to enforcement in the 
case of telecommunications services, National Regulatory Agencies, and other bodies different from 
Court and the judiciary power, are gaining growing importance in the enforcement of the EU 
legislation, which seems to be moving from judicial to administrative (and soft) enforcement. As a 
result, the aim of this part will be to assess whether we could talk about an autonomous enforcement 
of the EU rules concerning to telecommunications services as opposed to the enforcement of Member 
States’ private legal orders.  
Finally, by analyzing the issues mentioned above, we will –on a preliminary basis- conclude whether 
the telecommunications example really conforms to the self-sufficiency idea upon which this paper is 
built. In other words, the main purpose of this paper will be to test the emergence of a new self-
sufficient European (Regulatory) Private Law different from the general acquis communautaire and -
what is more- independent from the national private legal orders.  
A Self-Standing Order 
This research will look at the extent to which the European legislator is involved in the shaping of a 
new European private legal order which is “self-sufficient” as a result of being composed of different 
“self-standing” sectorial regimes. This seems particularly evident in those areas belonging to the 
European Regulatory Private Law, where the intervention of the legislator is more obvious, as is the 
case of the Services of General Economic Interest.  
In the interaction EU-Member States, new forms of governance are emanating that are replacing the 
traditional ones. Thus, through the promotion of new instruments of law-making, Member States are 
gradually losing their relevance in the legislative development. For example, under the liberalization 
wave of the former public services, the European Union is taking an important role in the law-making 
process. This participation –mainly related to the harmonization of the Internal Market- also affects 
contract law to some extent. In this regard, Kelemen employs the expression “juris touch”, as a 
metaphor of the King Midas’ legend, to illustrate how the European Union transforms into law 
approximately everything that it touches.3 By doing so, the European legislator is regulating not only 
certain areas concerning the establishment of the Single Market, but it is also interfering in the 
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different national private legal regimes. Moreover, the European legalization is increasingly being 
carried out by a high degree of harmonization which also implies less leeway for Member States. This 
“European domination” is also supported by the principle of precedence of the European Union Law, 
which guarantees the superiority of European law over national law.4 Furthermore, as Jansen & 
Michaels point out, ‘Europeanization reduces the importance of the member states and their private 
law because they must yield sovereignty to the European Union’.5 
As a result of the liberalization process, there is a vast amount of rules concerning what we now know 
as “regulated markets”. Besides this European regulatory avalanche, Services of General Economic 
Interest have not been regulated horizontally. Instead, the regulation has been carried out by a sector-
related approach, resulting in different sectorial regulations. This verticalization is due to the 
functionalist approach pursued by the legislator, who “pigeonholes” according to the service 
concerned. Thus, the different sectors (energy, financial services, telecoms, transport, postal services, 
etc.) are regulated in an isolated way and functioning as watertight compartments. The regulation of 
each vertical regime comprises different issues, from the liberalization of the sector, to particular 
provisions affecting contractual matters. This interference in the private law dimension implies its 
virtual independence from the general European acquis, mainly concerning consumer contracts.  
These different sectors could be, therefore, considered self-standing because -perhaps rather 
obviously- they are able to stand by themselves. They are no longer mere set of rules established by 
the European legislator whose enforcement depends heavily on the implementation by Member States. 
Instead, through the meticulous configuration of the Internal Market, the European Union is forging 
complete systems which do not allow national states’ room for maneuver, insofar as the sectorial 
regimes themselves comprise detailed instructions on how to implement and enforce their legal 
provisions. Moreover, the new emerging legal regimes are now implemented and enforced according 
to the instructions given by the European Union, who applies “EU’s dogmas” –if I may say so- under 
a cooperative network at different levels (namely, law-making, implementation and enforcement). 
Thus, via the sectorial regulation raised in pro of the harmonization of the Internal Market, the EU 
seems to have been weaving a spiderweb at various levels. Consequently, as it is observed along this 
paper, we might talk about the rise of a regulatory network, an implementation network and an 
enforcement network aimed at the cooperation among the Members States and the EU in the 
establishment of a proper Internal Market when it comes to Services of General Economic Interest. 
Yet, in this interplay EU-Member States, there is a kind “false” interdependence insofar the EU is 
actually the leading voice in this cooperative relationship. Further, these cooperative networks derive 
mainly from the EU legislation itself.  
The idea of self-standing (autonomous) regimes is also based on the assumption that they are also all-
inclusive legal orders6, including provisions which range from the actors responsible of national 
regulation and implementation, to enforcement issues, passing by the regulation of some contractual 
aspects. They are self-organized sectors. Accordingly, as this paper will attempt to argue, they are a 
legal order which is entirely nourished by European law. From law-making to enforcement, 
telecommunications law (our example) in Europe is European construed and European applied, i.e. it 
is fully Europeanized. 
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Marta Cantero Gamito 
 168 
All of this together, results in the emergence of a self-sufficient system of private law (ERPL), 
embodied in the vertical rules –in our example, the sectorial rules concerning the different Services of 
General Economic Interest- that are paving the way towards its autonomy with regard to the European 
Private Law that we knew so far, and to the national private legal orders. Thus, the new European 
private legal order coming from these areas can be considered self-sufficient since the different 
sectorial regimes constitute integral systems which include particular elements and tools (such as, inter 
alia, access rights) that are not found elsewhere due to the special design of the provision of services 
within regulated markets. More specifically, the provisions concerning consumer protection contained 
in these regimes outdo the horizontal consumer law via the specialization of the consumer protection 
within these markets. Therefore, we can talk about vertical consumer protection to make reference to 
telecommunications users, electricity and gas customers, postal services users, air, train, or bus 
passengers and so forth.  
Between Competition (Autonomy) and the Social (Regulation). The Dual Approach in 
Services of General Economic Interest 
Services identified as Network services -particularly, telecommunications services and the supply of 
electricity, gas, and water7- are included within the concept of Services of General Economic Interest 
(hereinafter, SGEIs).8 Traditionally, SGEIs have been provided by the State. However, since the 
1980s, the European Community has been pressing for the liberalization of these markets, and many 
formerly state-owned companies have been gradually privatized. In addition, in the course of this 
liberalization, national monopolies were broken up and the privileges were drastically reduced, 
making competition possible. The purpose of the liberalization has been to create competition and, 
thus, more cost-efficient services. The relationship with the recipients has, thereby, been transmitted 
from the public to the private law domain. Accordingly, the provision of the service falls within 
private law. Yet, these services constitute economic activities of particular importance to citizens and 
they are thereby subject to public intervention. Its nature as regulated markets services entails, 
therefore, a particular configuration of the contracts for the provision of these services, the freedom of 
contract being, in some way, limited. Hence, the implemented regime pursued the model of the 
regulatory State. In this model, the provision of the immediate service is entrusted to a private 
company, whereas the State guarantees that private providers comply with their supply obligations.9  
For the sake of the Internal Market, the regulation of Services of General Economic Interest is coming 
from the European Union. The provision of such services (i.e. the relationship user-provider) is, thus, 
faced with the particular picture of the European Private Law. In fact, despite several attempts, the 
European Union does not have a single European Contract Law, resulting in the regulation of different 
contracts in an isolated manner. In addition, freedom of contract is not expressly recognized in 
European Union Law. Nonetheless, in spite of this lack of recognition, Basedow observes that the 
principle of contractual freedom can be construed in connection with the protection of competition, as 
a result of its interrelation with the EC Treaty’s postulation of an open, competitively structured 
market.10 In other words, ‘private autonomy as an instrument for allocation of national economic 
resources as long as the participants interact with one another on an approximately equal level –which 
                                                     
7 This paper mainly addresses Telecommunications Services, as part of the Services of General Economic Interest. However, 
I have omitted any further allusion to the classification of the Services of General Economic Interest as this task involves 
a more detailed analysis into the conceptual dimension of such services and this is not the purpose of this paper.  
8 See the Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM(2003) 270 final, p. 7. 
9 Rott, P. (2005), ‘A New Social Contract Law for Public services?–Consequences from Regulation of Services of General 
Economic Interest in the EC’, European Review of Contract Law, 3, pp. 323–345.  
10 Basedow, J. (2008), ‘Freedom of Contract in the European Union’, European Review of Private Law, 16, pp. 901-923. 
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is often not the case’.11 Following the argument of Basedow, when this is not the case, the State –
within the Internal Market, the EU- takes measures to lift the weaker party to a similar level. In the 
case of SGEIs, these measures may consist of, for instance, information duties12 (enhancing 
competence), universal service requirements (protecting the social), or both.  
The market liberalization was envisaged to entail a new outlook for services provided within regulated 
markets as former public services. In fact, as a result of competition, the opening of these markets 
would mean an improvement in the position of services users, as a larger supply creating choice, better 
prices and an increase in quality. With the liberalization, new telecommunications service providers 
have recently flourished which has implied greater competition. Now, telecommunications users are 
able to look for better deals taking advantage of greater competition. However, the reality is that, as a 
result of the market-opening up, there were –and there still are- people who stand outside of these 
markets and Universal Service requirements were, thereby, established. The necessity of preserving 
access conditions in liberalized markets has led to the use of private law principles in combination 
with others traditionally from economic public law or social policy (obligation to contract or tariffs 
control, for instance). The consumer protection on these services is, thus, derived from a combination 
two different approaches. 
Since there was no explicit EU competence in relation to the Universal Service, it had to be created 
out of existing EU Treaty competition rules and the principles and instruments dealing with the 
creation of the Internal Market.13 In fact, the rules that govern these services are mostly based on 
Article 95 EC Treaty (now Article 114 TFEU), related to the establishment and functioning of the 
Internal Market. In this regard, rights such as information duties, right to switch, right to termination, 
cancellation, withdrawal, etc., are oriented to fostering competition. These rights function as a 
counterbalance for consumers and encourage its efficient actuation in the market. Nevertheless, the 
provision of SGEIs is also subjected to public/universal service obligations, due to its character as 
essential services/facilities. These obligations lie at the heart of the human rights dimension, protecting 
the most vulnerable consumers; whereas private law is traditionally considered to encourage the 
functioning of the competitive market under a contractual dimension. As a result, the rules governing 
these services pursue a dual approach: to enhance competition within the Internal Market (Internal 
Market approach), and –at the same time- to protect other social/welfarist values (Universal Service 
approach).14  
With regard to the Internal Market approach, the provision of mandatory rules is intended to empower 
users of SGEIs. Thus, rights such as information, cancellation, choice, termination, withdrawal, 
switching, etc., are oriented to encouraging competition by giving the consumers the necessary tools to 
participate in the market efficiently. 
                                                     
11 Ibidem, p. 904. 
12 In this case, I do not pretend to go further into the debate concerning the real recipients of disclosure regulation and the 
different dichotomies that are part of the Wilhelmsson analysis, in Wilhelmsson, T. (2004a) ‘Varieties of Welfarism in 
European Contract Law Blunt Dichotomies on Contractual Values’. European Law Journal, 10(6), pp. 712-733. 
13 Braun, J.-D. & Capito, R. (2009) The emergence of EC Telecommunications Law as a new Self-standing field within 
Community Law, in Koening, C.; Bartosh, A.; Braun, J.D and Romes, M., EC Competition and Telecommunications 
Law, 2nd edition, Wolters Kluwer, pp. 41-52. See also Davies, J., & Szyszczack, E. (2011) Universal Service Obligations: 
Fulfilling New Generations of Services of General Economic Interest, in E. Szyszczack, J. Davies, M. Andeanes & T. 
Bekkedal (Eds.), Developments in Services of General Interest, The Hague. T.M.C. Asser Press, pp. 155-178.  
14 See Rott, P., (2007). ‘Consumers and services of general interest: Is EC consumer law the future?’ Journal of Consumer 
Policy, 30(1), pp.49-60. 
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On the other hand, there is a more interventionist stream (a clear visible hand) granting other rights 
more in the line with the European social model.15 In this case, market failures cannot be corrected 
only by the establishment of rights and remedies aimed at the promotion of competition; rather, it is 
also necessary to protect the most vulnerable customers. This approach is derived from the premise 
that, unfortunately, the forces of the market are not able to produce a satisfactory outcome all the time. 
Then, room is left to authorities to interfere in order to fulfill the gaps to accomplish with public policy 
objectives. Thus, for example, access rights, affordable access, physical access, continuity, prohibition 
of disconnection, etc., were granted due to the crucial importance of such services which could lead to 
social exclusion. Therefore, it is not an intervention based on the enhancement of competition within 
the Internal Market, but rather a regulatory market interference granting new rights -related to the 
accessibility to the service- nonexistent within the European consumer acquis or the different national 
private legal orders.   
Universal Service is, consequently, an idea introduced by the European Community in order to 
guarantee the effective accessibility of essential services, by maintaining a provider of last resort in 
order to keep services qualified as Universal Services as accessible as they were when provided by the 
State itself. 16 Therefore, the access to the service is achieved by imposing Universal Service 
Obligations (hereinafter, USOs) which are aimed to guarantee that everyone has access to certain 
essential services of high quality and at prices that they can afford.17 Further, according to the 
European Commission, Universal Service is a concept for preventing social exclusion.18 Hence, the 
configuration of a service as a Universal Service implies ‘the right of everyone to access certain 
services considered as essential and imposes obligations on service providers to offer defined services 
according to specified conditions, including complete territorial coverage and at an affordable price’.19 
These assumptions entail interventions within the freedom of contract which go beyond the traditional 
private law. In the telecommunications field, an illustration of this intervention is Article 1.2 Universal 
Service Directive20: ‘[t]his Directive establishes the rights of end-users and the corresponding 
obligations of undertakings providing publicly available electronic communications networks and 
services. With regard to ensuring provision of universal service within an environment of open and 
competitive markets, this Directive defines the minimum set of services of specified quality to which 
all end-users have access, at an affordable price in the light of specific national conditions, without 
distorting competition (…)’. Another example can be found in Article 3 of the Directive 2009/73/EC 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas21, which enable Member States to 
impose public service obligations on undertakings operating in the gas sector, related to security of 
supply, regularity, quality and price. The freedom of contract has, thereby, been strongly limited in 
                                                     
15 The European Social Model was recognized by the Nice European Council 2000. (See Ross, M. (2009), The value of 
Solidarity in European Public Services, in Krajewski; Neergaard; Van de Gronden (Ed.), The Changing Legal 
Framework for Services if General Interest in Europe, pp. 81-100. The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press).  
16 See Communication from the Commission (1996), Services of General Interest in Europe. COM(96) 443 final. Available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/serv_int_gen06_en.pdf.  
17 Ibid. p. 2. 
18 Inter alia, Conclusions of the European Commission Communication on ‘Universal service in e-communications: report 
on the outcome of the public consultation and the third periodic review of the scope in accordance with Article 15 of 
Directive 2002/22/EC, 23.11.2011, COM(2011) 795 final, p. 12. 
19 See Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003) 270, 21.5.2003, paragraphs 50 to 54. See also Micklitz, H.-
W., (2011) Universal Services: Nucleus for a Social European Private Law, in Cremona, M. (ed.), Market Integration 
and Public Services in the European Union, Oxford University Press, pp. 63-102; and Rott, P. (2005).  
20 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users' 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (OJ L 108 , 24.04.2002, pp. 55-77) and now amended 
by the Directive 2009/136/EC (OJ L 337 18.12.2009 , pp. 11-36). 
21 OJ L 211,  14.8.2009, pp. 94-136. 
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favor of the most vulnerable consumers who, if not able to access, could be subject to discrimination 
or social exclusion.  
The different European rules that govern the provision of services in regulated markets comprise both 
private and public law mechanisms. As a result, the mix between private and public instruments, in 
conjunction with the absence of a coherent welfarist values system in the EU regulation, trigger – as 
Wilhelmsson points out- ‘an inherent and inevitable tension in the welfare-state concept itself’.22 So, 
the challenge for the legislator is to successfully combine the enhancement of competition with the 
preservation of Universal Service requirements.23  
All this leads to the existence of rules concerning private relations -such as contracts for the supply of 
a service categorized as Service of General Economic Interest- which establish not only mandatory 
provisions concerning private law, but also make use of the establishment of public/universal service 
obligations –which are more akin to public policy. A clear example of this statement can be found in 
Recital 47 of the Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural 
gas24, which establishes that ‘[t]he citizens of the Union and, where Member States deem it to be 
appropriate, small enterprises, should be able to enjoy public service obligations, in particular with 
regard to security of supply and reasonable tariffs’. These public service obligations are contained in 
Article 3 of the Directive 2009/73/EC, establishing that Member States may impose on undertakings 
public service obligations which may relate to security, including security of supply, regularity, 
quality and price of supplies, and environmental protection, comprising energy efficiency, energy 
from renewable sources and climate protection. Article 3 of the Directive 2009/72/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity25 is drafted in similar terms. Likewise, the 
Directive 2002/22/EC (Universal Service Directive), allocates its entire Chapter II to Universal 
Service obligations.  
In sum, the dual approach in SGEIs is relevant to epitomize the movement towards the self-sufficiency 
of the European Regulatory Private Law. On the one hand, the Internal Market approach yields new 
elements to private law. A clear example could be the right to switch of provider. On the other hand, 
the Universal Service approach has nothing to do with the traditional private law, where the freedom 
of contract was the ultimate rationale. Quite the contrary, the Universal Service approach strives for 
the maintenance of a provider of last resort by imposing obligations to contract as a safety net for 
vulnerable consumers. There is room for social policy elements within the European Private Law, in 
contrast to the private law contained in the 19th Century Codes.26 Thus, the fact that sectorial 
regulation comprises contract law provisions specifically designed for the provision of 
telecommunications services involves that service users’ protection stays out of the horizontal (as 
opposed to the vertical rules) consumer protection. Accordingly, the rules contained in vertical 
regimes concerning consumer protection function independently of the general consumer acquis 
communautaire. This might be induced by the Universal Service approach and the protection of the 
                                                     
22 Wilhelmsson (2004a), p. 715. 
23 This conflict related to the Euroepan social market economy has been addressed by the Court of Justice within the Viking 
case judgment (Case C-438/05, International Transport Worker’s Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. Viking Line 
ABP, OÜ Viking Line Esti), observing that ‘[s]ince the Community has … not only an economic but also a social 
purpose, the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital must 
be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy’ (para. 79). For a deeper analysis see Azoulai, L. (2009) ‘The 
Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy. The emergence of an ideal and the conditions for its realization’. 
Common Market Review, 45, pp. 1335-1355. 
24 OJ L 211,  14.8.2009, pp. 94-136. 
25 OJ L 211,  14.8.2009, pp. 55-93. 
26 Micklitz (2011). 
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vulnerable consumer.27 Otherwise, the mere reference to the General EU Consumer Law (Internal 
Market oriented) by the sector-related rules would have sufficed to govern those rights and remedies 
that this section has accommodated within the Internal Market approach. Accordingly, regulated 
markets’ contract law provisions are isolated from Consumer Law. The self-sufficiency idea causes 
that the provisions concerning consumer contract in this vertical sectors also secede from traditional 
private law insofar measures such as obligation to contract to preserve access conditions are not found 
anywhere within traditional private law which is contained within the different national private legal 
regimes.  
By way of normative thought, this dual (and self-sufficient) approach has -in general terms- benefited 
consumers. It has implied an improvement in the position of both, the average and the vulnerable 
consumer. The former has taken advantage of competition, whereas the latter still maintains 
guaranteed access to (minimum) services.  
Telecommunications Services and Law-Making 
The law-making process is characterized by several features, inter alia, the aim pursued by the 
legislator, the administrative structure of the entity who is competent to create and enforce the law, the 
way in which the law-making process is carried out, the instruments employed, and the competence 
upon which the regulation is based.  
Services of General Economic Interest, in general, and telecommunications services, in particular, 
could be a clear example of Eurolegalism28; a mode of governance through two linked causal 
mechanisms.29 Kelemen refers to the process of deregulation and juridical reregulation linked to the 
creation of the Internal Market. In this regard, he points out that liberalization, together with the 
establishment of the EU Single Market, has weakened traditional approaches to regulation at national 
level. Additionally, this deregulation has been coupled with reregulation at European level, meaning 
that the national regulations which obstructed the functioning of the Internal Market have been 
replaced with European rules.30 Kelemen accuses the latter of not being similar to the national ones 
that they surrogate. Additionally, the second mechanism that leads to this adversarial legalism is the 
‘EU’s fragmented institutional structure and its impact on EU policymaking’.31 
The regulation of SGEIs has been carried out mainly under the Internal Market competence Treaty 
provisions (Article 114 TFEU, former Article 95 EC Treaty). Further, it has been accomplished under 
a sector-related approach which has given rise to the emergence of different vertical sectors. Since the 
EU took the lead of the liberalization process, the harmonization of these services within the Internal 
Market has been the guiding light in the legislative development. This trend, together with the sector-
related approach and linked to the involvement of expertise authorities, has implied the emergence of 
new methods and actors in the regulatory process. Consequently, from a private law perspective, this 
phenomenon has displaced the current law-making process for private law far away from the 
traditional approach where the Nation State was the main -and only- character.  
                                                     
27 The vulnerable consumer is far away from the average consumer, who can be properly protected under the Internal Market 
approach.  
28 Kelemen (2011). 
29 Ibid., p. 8. 
30 Thus, for example, there are more than a hundred of different directives, decisions, regulations, recommendations and 
resolutions concerning telecommunications. 
31 Kelemen (2011), p. 8.   
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European Union’s Competence 
In the case of telecommunications services, the process of liberalization was initiated by the 
Commission in 198732, with the adoption of the Green Paper on Telecommunications33, which led to 
the full liberalization of the sector in 1998. The market opened to competition under Article 86 EC 
Treaty (now Article 106 TFEU). The European legislator has mainly focused on enhancing 
competition and the establishment of the Internal Market. By so doing, the EU legislation reveals its 
reliance on the market. Hence, not only are all the relevant Directives in the field of 
telecommunications based on the internal market competence of Article 95 EC Treaty (now Article 
114 TFEU), but also their content confirms its clear market orientation.34  
As to harmonization, it aims to ensure equivalent regulatory systems and consistent application of the 
European rules in all Member States. Companies should compete on equivalent terms and consumers 
benefit fully from the liberalization of the market. This harmonization has also been achieved under 
the Article 95 EC Treaty, which enables the Council and the European Parliament, upon a proposal 
from the Commission, to adopt legislative measures aimed at the establishment and functioning of the 
Internal Market by harmonizing Member States’ laws.  
 
Liberalization, harmonization and the application of competition rules were, therefore, the three pillars 
of the opening-up and reorganization of the telecommunications services in order to achieve the 
overall objective of European policy in this sector: ‘to develop the conditions for the market to provide 
European users with a greater variety of telecommunications services, of better quality and at a lower 
cost, affording Europe the full internal and external benefits of a strong telecommunications sector’.35  
Instruments and Participants 
As Ogus has pointed out, in an era of so-called ‘de-regulation’, governments have been searching for 
modes of regulatory control which are ‘less onerous, more flexible and draw on the knowledge and 
experience of service providers’.36 In fact, the European Union is making use of new regulatory 
devices –as opposite to the traditional ones- in the law-making process. This new approach includes 
innovative instruments and procedures, like for example co-regulation, co-operation or comitology.37  
According to Micklitz, co-regulation is ‘(…) another regulatory mechanism of the new toolkit, 
launched within the framework of the Internal Market programme. The overall idea is to broaden the 
scope for combining mandatory legislation at EC level and non-binding rules developed by private 
parties and/or organizations’38, for example, codes of conduct or operating standards.39 Co-regulation 
                                                     
32 Communication from the European Commission of July 30, 1987, “Towards a dynamic European Economy: Green Paper 
on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment”, COM (87) 290.  
33 Green Paper on the convergence of the telecommunications, media and information technology sectors, and the 
implications for Regulation - Towards an information society approach, COM (97) 623 final. (Not published in the 
Official Journal). 
34 See Rott (2007). 
35 Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 
290 final, page 3 (Introduction). For a deeper analysis see Queck, R., de Streel, A., Hou, L., Jost, J., & Kosta, E. (2010). 
The EU Regulatory Framework Applicable to Electronic Communications, in L. Garzaniti & M. O’Regan (Eds.), 
Telecommunications, Broadcasting and the Intenet. EU Competition Law & Regulation (3rd ed.), London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, pp. 3-262. 
36 Ogus, A. (2009), `The regulation of services and the public-private divide’, in Cafaggi, F. and Muir Watt, H. (eds.) The 
Regulatory Function of European Private Law; Edward Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) pp. 3-15. 
37 Micklitz (2010). 
38 Ibid. p.11. 
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is thereby characterized by a particular combination of state and non-state regulation. In the 
Commission’s view, ‘co-regulation combines binding legislative and regulatory action with measures 
taken by the actors most concerned’.40 As to telecommunications services, Recital 48 of the Universal 
Service Directive (2002) recognizes that co-regulation could be an ‘appropriate way of stimulating 
enhanced quality standards and improved service performance’.  
In the European telecommunications panorama, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) play a key 
role in the law-making process. Harmonization at European level requires detailed regulatory 
interventions and the NRAs are, among many other competences, responsible for the implementation 
of the principles contained in the harmonization measures. NRAs were introduced in the EU 
legislation with the full liberalization. They are defined as the body or bodies charged by a Member 
State with any of the regulatory tasks assigned by the specific Electronic Communications Regulatory 
Framework.41 In order to carry out their obligations, they have been given broad regulatory powers 
and instruments to intervene, for instance, in the contractual relationships between undertakings for 
the use of the network (wholesale contracts) or in the provision of the service to end-users. However, 
in order to avoid potential conflicts of interests, the EU legislation demanded that NRAs be separate 
from the rest of the national administration.42  
The interplay between the national legislature and NRAs raises the question as to which of them is 
assigned the balancing of the different objectives of the Community regulatory framework. In this 
regard, the CJEU43 –following the opinion of Advocate General Maduro44- has declared that it is clear 
from the provisions contained in Article 8(4) of the Access Directive, Article 17(2) of the Universal 
Service Directive and Article 8 of the Framework Directive that  
‘NRAs are required to promote the regulatory objectives referred to in Article 8 of the Framework 
Directive when carrying out the regulatory tasks specified in the common regulatory framework. 
Consequently, (…) it is also for the NRAs, and not the national legislatures, to balance those 
objectives when defining and analysing a relevant market which may be susceptible to regulation’.  
The co-operation between NRAs is emphasized in the regulatory framework in order to achieve a 
genuine a consistent market for telecommunication in Europe. At the top of the NRA network is the 
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC)45, which has replaced the 
former European Regulators Group (ERG). BEREC is made up of a Board composed of the heads of 
the 27 NRAs and is assisted by a permanent office (hereinafter, the Office). The Office is a 
Community Body managed by a Management Committee in which all NRAs and the Commission are 
(Contd.)                                                                  
39 In this regard, the Article 33(2) Universal Service Directive establishes that ‘[w]here appropriate, interested parties may 
develop, with the guidance of national regulatory authorities, mechanisms, involving consumers, user groups and service 
providers, to improve the general quality of service provision by, inter alia, developing and monitoring codes of conduct 
and operating standards’. 
40 White Paper on European Governance, COM (2001)428 final.  
41 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive), OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p. 33. 
42 Thus, for example, the Framework Directive establishes in its Article 3(2) that ‘Member States shall guarantee the 
independence of national regulatory authorities by ensuring that they are legally distinct from and functionally 
independent of all organizations providing electronic communications networks, equipment or services. Member States 
that retain ownership or control of undertakings providing electronic communications networks and/or services shall 
ensure effective structural separation of the regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or control’.  
43 In the Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 3 December [2009] ECR I-11431 (See paragraphs 90-92). 
44 Delivered on 23 April 2009 (See paragraphs 61-64). 
45 This Body was set up by the Regulation Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
25 November 2009 establishing the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the 
Office, OJ L 337, 18.12.2009, pp. 1-10. 
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represented. The Office is partially funded by the Community.46 It provides a forum of discussion 
between the Commission and the NRAs in order to foster the Internal Market for telecommunications 
services. Further, the BEREC is the body responsible for ensuring a consistent application of the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications.47 The BEREC is, therefore, aimed to be a 
European agency which acts as a meeting point for the co-operation of regulators. Thus, for example, 
according to the Framework Directive (Article 3), Member States shall ensure that NRAs take utmost 
account of opinions and common positions adopted by BEREC when adopting their own decisions for 
their national markets.48 
In addition, in the configuration process of a genuine Internal Market of telecommunications, the 
establishment of common standards is decisive. Standards play an important role in the 
telecommunications industry. They are important to ensure the harmonized provision of electronic 
communication services. According to the Framework Directive49, Article 17(2) establishes that 
Member States shall encourage the use of standards for the provision of services, technical interfaces 
and/or network functions, to the extent strictly necessary to ensure interoperability of services and to 
improve freedom of choice for users. Standardization serves as a basis for encouraging the harmonized 
provision of electronic communications networks, electronic communications services and associated 
facilities and services.50 As a result, an integral part of the EU policy is to achieve the Lisbon goals 
through better regulation and the simplification of the legislation. In this regard, the Framework 
Directive establishes that Member States shall encourage the implementation of standards and/or 
specifications adopted by the European Standards Organizations.51 These European Standards 
Organizations are listed in the Framework Directive: European Committee for Standardization (CEN), 
European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), and European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). ETSI has contributed, for instance, to the EU law by 
producing many harmonized standards to be used in the enforcement of European Directives. In this 
regard, the Commission encouraged the establishment of the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) in 1988.52 For example, ETSI developed the GSMTM standard, which reached 2.5 
billion mobile connections.53 
Comitology is also part of the telecommunications regulatory framework. The Communications 
Committee (Cocom), established under the Framework Directive54, replaced the Advisory Committee 
on the implementation of Open Telecommunications Network Provision (ONP) and the Licensing 
Committee which were set up under the 1998 regulatory package for telecommunications. The Cocom 
assists the Commission in carrying out its executive powers under the regulatory framework. It 
                                                     
46 See Article 11 BEREC Regulation. 
47 Article 1 BEREC Regulation. 
48 Additionally, as is established in the BEREC Regulation, NRAs and the Commission shall take the utmost account of any 
opinion, recommendation, guidelines, advice or regulatory best practice adopted by BEREC. 
49 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a Common Regulatory 
Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework Directive) as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC and Regulation 544/2009. 
50 Article 17 Framework Directive. 
51 Article 17 Framework Directive. 
52 Council Resolution of 28 April 1989 on standardization in the field of information technology and telecommunications (OJ 
C 117/1, 11.05.1989). For a more detailed analysis see Walden, I. (2009). European Union Communications Law. in I. 
Walden (Ed.), Telecommunications Law and Regulation. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-209. 
53 More info available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/GlobalRole/Ourglobalrole.aspx. 
54 Article 25. 
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exercises its functions through 'advisory', and 'regulatory with scrutiny' procedures in accordance with 
the Comitology Regulation.55  
The European Commission has also taken part in the law-making process by making extensive use of 
‘soft law’ measures, both formal Recommendations56 which have no binding legal force and informal 
guidelines and notices.57 These measures are aimed to enhance harmonization within the Internal 
Market, providing a point of reference of good practices for national regulatory authorities.58   
Additionally, not only the aforementioned actors are taking part of the law-making process, but also 
trade and consumer associations are engaged in the legislative development. For example, Article 33 
of the Universal Service Directive59 establishes that NRAs are required to take into account the views 
of end-users, consumers and telecommunications service providers. To this end, Member States are 
responsible of ensuring that NRAs establish a proper consultation mechanism to guarantee that the 
interests of these stakeholders are properly taking into account.  
As aforementioned, the regulatory framework for telecommunications contains contract-related rules. 
The inclusion of private law provisions in the telecommunications has implied a shift in the traditional 
approach of law-making in private law. Traditionally, the regulation of private law was carried out by 
the legislative power in a narrow sense (i.e. the parliament) in combination with some minor 
interventions by the executive. Nonetheless, the regulation of telecommunications services involves 
new instruments and actors as opposed to the traditional ones. As we have just seen, co-regulation, co-
operation and comitology are used as regulatory tools in the telecommunications’ legislative 
development. Accordingly, the legislative power now does not correspond only to a concrete actor 
(individually considered, the legislature), but it lies also on the hands of different actors (NRAs, 
expertise and standardization bodies, committees, stakeholders, etc.). All of them become the new 
private law-maker. 
Substantive Law: Contractual Implications in Telecommunications Services 
Provided that there is a contractual relationship between the user and the service provider, the 
provision of Services of General Economic Interest falls within contract law. Consumer law provisions 
are also applicable to these contracts, insofar as SGEIs users are household customers, i.e. they act as 
consumers.60 As a result of the dual approach pursued by the legislator, the regulation of 
telecommunication services has influenced contracts in two ways. On the one hand, the Internal 
Market approach has developed contractual elements oriented to the empowerment of the consumer. 
On the other hand, the Universal Service approach has strived for the protection of the most vulnerable 
consumers, despite there still being no single definition of what a vulnerable consumer is.61  
                                                     
55 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 laying down the rules 
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The Internal Market has been the driving force behind the European consumer contract law. Thus, as 
Micklitz suggests, ‘contract law in the European Community is just one device among other areas of 
law and politics to foster European integration which means in essence –again and again- to complete 
the Internal Market’. In other words, consumer contract law is turned into a ‘subordinate mechanism 
to contribute to a higher political objective –that of realizing the Internal Market’.62 That is what 
Micklitz means by the Concept of Competitive Contract Law. Competitive contract law implies that 
‘the contract law rules are shape so as to allow effective competition between suppliers in the Internal 
Market’.63  
In the case of Services of General Economic Interest, the EU rules concerning these services are used 
as a Trojan horse to achieve the objective of the Internal Market by opening up markets and creating 
competition. Micklitz labels these rules as “instrumental” and “protective”.64 Protective in the sense 
that they are supposed to protect consumers by keeping certain universal/public obligations to ensure 
minimum accessibility just as when they were still services provided by the State. But, on the other 
hand, the real purpose behind these rules is its instrumentalization to set up a genuine open and 
competitive European market of Services of General Economic Interest. In fact, Wilhelmsson has also 
pointed out that the consumer protection justification has been used by the European legislator to 
strengthen the Internal Market through areas that it lacks of competence. Thus, the rulemaking process 
has been based on an interesting combination of the consumer interest argument and Internal Market 
reasoning.65  
As to contracts for the provision of telecommunications services, by opening the telecommunications 
market, the European legislator is also shaping the content of the contract. Article 1.2 Universal 
Service Directive is a very clear paradigm of this interference in the field of contract law. This article 
states that ‘[t]his Directive establishes the rights of end-users and the corresponding obligations of 
undertakings providing publicly available electronic communications networks and services. With 
regard to ensuring provision of universal service within an environment of open and competitive 
markets, this Directive defines the minimum set of services of specified quality to which all end-users 
have access, at an affordable price in the light of specific national conditions, without distorting 
competition. This Directive also sets out obligations with regard to the provision of certain mandatory 
services’.  
There are, thereby, many interventions in the private law dimension such as: the right to a contract, 
information and transparency duties, right to switch provider, tariff controls, net neutrality, caps on 
roaming tariffs, access, continuity, etc. Accordingly, we can easily note the implications for the private 
law dimension and, in particular, for the freedom of contract. This section will attempt to briefly 
analyze some of these contractual parameters in the telecommunications sphere.  
Access 
As a result of the dual approach pursued by the European legislator in the configuration of Services of 
General Economic Interest, users were granted not only with empowerment rights, but also with 
provisions that take into account the situation of vulnerable customers. Thus, in order to ensure that 
liberalization would not lead to a situation where some social groups would be excluded from basic 
telecommunications services, the legislator also settled legislation granting Universal Service rights, 
such as –for instance- access, affordability, quality and continuity.  By so doing, the European 
                                                     
62Micklitz, H.-W., (2005) ‘The Concept of Competitive Contract Law’. Penn State International Law Review, 23(3), pp.549-
586. 
63 Ibid., p. 555. 
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legislator is encroaching on the field of contract law insofar this concession also interferes in the user-
provider relationship. In particular, the right to access restricts the supplier’s freedom of contract but 
also his freedom to not contract with specific individuals by creating the obligation to contract.66 In his 
article, Basedow points out that interventions in the freedom of supply are more infrequent than 
interventions in the freedom of demand.67 However, the supply of electricity, gas or 
telecommunications services are some examples that may illustrate this intervention within the 
freedom to enter into a contract.  
As for telecommunications, this interference is manifested as a right to contract, being recognized in 
the Universal Service Directive which establishes that ‘Member States shall ensure that, when 
subscribing to services providing connection to a public communications network and/or publicly 
available electronic communications services, consumers, and other end-users so requesting, have a 
right to a contract with an undertaking or undertakings providing such connection and/or services 
(…)’. 68 According to the wording of the Article 3(1) Universal Service Directive, ‘Member States 
shall ensure that the services set out in this Chapter are made available at the quality specified to all 
end-users in their territory, independently of geographical location, and, in the light of specific 
national conditions, at an affordable price’.69 This obligation has, therefore, two implications: 
economic access, on the one hand; and physical access, on the other.70 Economic access refers to the 
accessibility rights of the more economically vulnerable citizens, and physical access entails 
accessibility to the network infrastructure, regardless of the location where the customer is.71 
Concerning the former, economic access is linked also to the idea of affordability, whereas for the 
latter, the use of telecommunications services requires the previous installation of the line in remote 
areas.  
Access rights involves particular implications to the for the private law dimension –specifically 
freedom of contract- not previously addressed by the general consumer acquis. Access rights are 
intended to guarantee a certain level of availability of the service which results in a number of 
obligations for the providers nonexistent outside Services of General Economic Interest’s scope or 
within the national private legal orders. Accordingly, as a result of the universal service idea, all end-
users -who request it- will have a right to a contract for the provision of the services covered by the 
universal service’s scope. This statement entails two effects. First, the service is not provided 
automatically. Interested users will have to specifically demand the supply of the service which only 
will be provided, therefore, under request. And second, the requested service must be listed as a 
universal service to be subject of the granted access rights. Thus, users are not granted with access to 
the service, but rather with a right to the provision of the service upon request. This means that 
network providers designated as having Universal Service Obligations will not be allowed to refuse 
the provision of ‘universal’ telecommunications services to those who request it, regardless their 
geographical location or economic situation.72 In this regard, access rights can be considered a self-
sufficient tool, since provisions ensuring accessibility and right to a contract for the provision of 
telecommunications services come out of the logic of the traditional (autonomy-based) private law.  
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Within the universal service system, tariffs for the use of telecommunications services are to be paid 
by users. However, the universal service idea demands it to be affordable.  Affordability is another 
new concept within the field of contract and consumer law, being the result of the obligations derived 
from the Universal Service approach. Affordable price is  ‘a price defined by Member States at 
national level in the light of specific national conditions, and may involve setting common tariffs 
irrespective of location or special tariff options to deal with the needs of low-income users. 
Affordability for individual consumers is related to their ability to monitor and control their 
expenditure’.73 As a result, Member States have to ensure that prices are not excessive and must 
encourage users to control their expenditure.  
Affordability of tariffs and control of expenditure are regulated in the Universal Service Directive, 
articles 9 and 10 respectively. Considering that prices are entrusted to market forces, as a result of 
liberalization, National Regulatory Authorities are the responsible for the monitoring of the evolution 
and level of retail tariffs of the services falling under the universal service obligations. To this end, 
NRAs will take into account, particularly, in relation to national consumer prices and income.74  
One of the particularities of telecommunications services is the “bill shock”. Excessive bills may 
happen and when the user is not able to face the payment of such bills he may be exposed to 
disconnection, which will distort the aim of universal service requirement. In order to avoid such an 
event, Member States shall ensure that designated undertakings with Universal Service obligations, 
allow subscribers the possibility to monitor and control their expenditure.75 
Continuity 
Access rights are also coupled with the idea of continuity. Thus, continued access to services implies 
that contracts guaranteeing access cannot be easily terminated.76 This is particularly important where 
the termination of a contract exposes the user to risks such as “confinement” or social exclusion as a 
result of the importance of telecommunications services nowadays.77 According to the 2002 Universal 
Service Directive, except in cases of persistent late payment or non-payment of bills, consumers 
should be protected from immediate disconnection from the network on the grounds of an unpaid bill 
and, particularly in the case of disputes over high bills for premium rate services, should continue to 
have access to essential telephone services pending resolution of the dispute. Member States may 
decide that such access may continue to be provided only if the subscriber continues to pay line rental 
charges.78 
Quality 
Quality is a key objective in the Universal Service idea. Unlikely to the former service provided by the 
State, where the good quality was not precisely an essential requirement, here it becomes a crucial 
parameter since quality standards are established by standardization bodies. In this regard, Member 
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States should ensure that Universal Services are made available with the quality specified to all end-
users in their territory.79Pursuant to the Universal Service Directive amendment, ‘[a] competitive 
market should ensure that end-users enjoy the quality of service they require, but in particular cases 
may be necessary  to ensure  that public  communication networks attain minimum quality levels so as 
to prevent degradation of service, the blocking of access and the slowing of traffic over networks’.80  
Quality parameters at European level are established by the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI).81 These are minimum requirements, since additional quality parameters to services 
for disabled end users and disabled consumers can be established at national level by NRAs.82 
However, the establishment of such additional requirements has to be compatible with EU law in order 
to avoid that Member States enacts rules that may affect the provision of the service from other 
Member States on their national territory and disturbing, thereby, the proper functioning of the internal 
market.  
As a manifestation of the importance of quality within competitive markets, the third regulatory 
package includes a right to compensation which applies if contracted service quality levels are not 
met.83  
Transparency and Information 
The tool for the establishment and maintenance of competition on the consumer side is the choice of 
the best service provider.84 But it has to be an informed choice. Information duties are oriented to 
consumers to make qualified decisions and informed choices. Thus, pre-contractual information, 
suppliers’ duties of information, information rights, transparency and so forth are collected in the rules 
governing these services as being important rights and obligations to comply at the time of celebrate 
this kind of contracts. Thus, the accessibility to full, truthful and up-to-date information is a paramount 
to the consumer in order to be able to choose, in an efficient way, the best provider according to its 
needs. Information duties are, therefore, the counterpart for the effective implementation of consumer 
rights. As Prof. Micklitz states, ‘competitive transparency is deeply rooted in competition law’.85  
In the case of telecommunications, the provisions contained in the Universal Service Directive are 
related to the availability of transparent and adequate information on offers and services, as well as 
price and tariffs.86 Additionally, obtaining adequate information on possible limitations or traffic 
management, for example, enables consumers to make informed choices.87 Actually, according to the 
BEREC, the greater part of consumer complaints collected by NRAs are related to the discrepancy 
between advertised and actual delivery speeds for an internet connection.88  
Additionally, telecommunications services providers, according to Article 21(3) must also; 1) provide 
information on tariffs and pricing conditions; 2) inform subscribers of any change to access to 
emergency services or caller location information; 3) inform also about any change to conditions 
limiting access to and/or use of services and applications; 4) provide information on any procedures 
                                                     
79 2002 Universal Service Directive, Recital 7. 
80 2009 Universal Service Directive, Recital 34. 
81 See Annex III, 2002 Universal Service Directive and 2009 Amendment.  
82 2002 Universal Service Directive, Article 11(2). 
83 Universal Service Directive, Article 20(1), f. 
84 Rott (2005), p. 334. 
85 Micklitz (2005), p. 567. 
86 See Universal Service Directive Recital 32 and Article 21(1). 
87 Commission Communication on The open internet and net neutrality in Europe, p. 7. 
88Commission Communication on The open internet and net neutrality in Europe, 19.4.2011, COM(2011) 222 final.  
Towards the Self-Sufficiency in European Regulatory Private Law 
 
 181 
put in place by the provider to measure and shape traffic so as to avoid filling or overfilling a network 
link, and on how those procedures could impact on service quality; 5) inform subscribers of their right 
to determine whether or not to include their personal data in a directory, and of the types of data 
concerned; and 6) regularly inform disabled subscribers of details of products and services designed 
for them. For this purpose, NRAs, if they deem it appropriate, may promote self- or co-regulatory 
measures prior to imposing any binding obligations.  
Considering the importance of information and transparency duties, telecommunications’ users are 
granted with a right to withdrawal, without penalty, upon notice of proposed modifications in the 
contractual conditions, if they do not accept the new conditions. 89  
Right to Switch 
Switching is another necessary tool which contributes to the functioning of competition. 
Complementarily to transparency and informed choice, the right to switch involves a clear 
manifestation of a market perfectly competitive. In the case of network industries, the user-provider 
relationship is usually regulated by long-term contracts. In this regard, long-term contracts present a 
barrier to competition, since competition requires the possibility of changing the provider.90 Hence, the 
different Directives concerning network services provide provisions related to the right to switch 
service provider. 
According to the Commission, effective consumer rights are essential to ensure that liberalization 
successfully delivers real choice and gives consumers the confidence to switch supplier if they wish to 
do so.91 Stimulating consumer interest in alternative supply offers is expected to play a part in creating 
competitive markets as well. Past experience has shown that consumers will only be active on the 
market place if they are confident that their rights continue to be protected, in particular when 
switching operator.92 
As a result, in terms of Private Law, ‘competition shall be fostered by increased information 
obligations and by facilitating the change of service provider’.93 In addition, in order to take full 
advantage of the competitive environment within the electronic communications sector, consumers 
should be able to make informed choices and to change providers when they want.94 Therefore, 
transparency and the right to switch are crucial elements to the functioning of competition. In fact, the 
European Commission in its recent Open Internet and Net Neutrality Communication has also 
expressly recognized:  
The EU regulatory framework aims at promoting effective competition, which is considered the 
best way to deliver high-quality goods and services at affordable prices to consumers. For 
competition to work, consumers must be able to choose between a variety of competing offerings 
on the basis of clear and meaningful information. Consumers must also be effectively able to 
switch to a new provider where a better quality of service and/or a lower price is offered, or where 
they are not satisfied with the service they are receiving, e.g. where their current provider imposes 
restrictions on particular services or applications. In a competitive environment this acts as a 
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stimulus to operators to adapt their pricing and abstain from restrictions on applications that prove 
popular with users, as is the case with voice over IP (VoIP) services. 95 
Moreover, the Commission is of the opinion that the rules on transparency, switching and quality of 
service that form part of the revised EU electronic communications framework should contribute to 
producing competitive outcomes.96 
EU legislation also takes into consideration very practical issues that could prevent customers from 
changing their providers: number portability. Number portability is a ‘key facilitator of consumer 
choice and effective competition in a competitive telecommunication environment’, as confirmed by 
Recital 40 Universal Service Directive. The 2009 package was significant for the switching process. In 
this regard, the Article 30(4) Universal Service Directive establishes that the ‘[p]orting of numbers and 
their subsequent activation shall be carried out within the shortest possible time. In any case, 
subscribers who have concluded an agreement to port a number to a new undertaking shall have that 
number activated within one working day’. Moreover, operators must offer users the possibility to 
subscribe to a contract with a maximum duration of 12 months. The new rules also make sure that 
conditions and procedures for contract termination do not act as a disincentive against changing 
service provider. On the other hand, Recital 24 of the Universal Service Directive amendment states 
that ‘[w]ith respect to terminal equipment, the customer contract should specify any restrictions 
imposed by the provider on the use of the equipment, such as by way of ‘SIM-locking’ mobile 
devices, if such restrictions are not prohibited under national legislation, and any charges due on 
termination of the contract, whether before or on the agreed expiry date, including any cost imposed in 
order to retain the equipment’. 
 
Nonetheless, the provisions concerning the change of provider or its facilitation do not come only 
from the sector-related legislation. These provisions can also be derived from the general consumer 
acquis applicable to these relationships. For example, Article 11 of the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive claims that European citizens shall be effectively protected from being pressurized through 
misleading and aggressive practices97 to, for example, switch operators. In addition, Article 9 of the 
same legal text recognizes that any onerous or disproportionate non-contractual barriers imposed by 
the trader where a consumer wishes to exercise rights under the contract, including rights to terminate 
a contract or to switch to another trader may be qualified as an unfair commercial practice.  
As a result, all the measures introduced by the legislator in this matter are envisaged to enhance 
competition –the aim of the Internal Market- by facilitating not only the change of provider, but also 
the switching process itself, in order to remove possible barriers to the switch procedure if the user 
wishes so. 
Implementation and Enforcement  
The different regimes governing Services of General Economic Interest have also particular features 
concerning the bodies responsible for its implementation into national law and enforcement 
procedures. The analysis of the implementation process and enforcement practices of the EU 
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regulatory framework for telecommunications is here used as an illustration of the features which 
characterize the application of the private law rules contained in the sectorial regimes as opposed to 
the application of the traditional private law contained in the national codes or the consumer acquis.  
Kelemen points out that the fragmentation between the EU and the Member States, linked to the 
scattering of powers between EU institutions, generates problems that encourage the adoption of laws 
with ‘strict, judicially enforceable goals, deadlines and transparent procedural requirements’.98 
Likewise, due to the limited implementation and enforcement capacities of the EU law, the European 
legislator –as understood in a broad sense- has ‘an incentive to create justiciable rights and to 
empower private parties to serve as the enforcers of EU law’.99 
Implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework 
The achievement of a genuine Internal Market for telecommunications involves the participation of 
different bodies from European to local level. Here, a number of actors are involved: Member States, 
National Regulatory Authorities, the BEREC, the EU Commission, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union and National Courts.  
First, the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications is mainly composed by 
Directives which has to be transposed by the Member States. The rules governing network services 
comprise provisions concerning the implementation of the laid down rights and obligations by 
Member States in their national legal orders.100 These tasks correspond, on a shared basis, to NRAs 
and Member States and the different rules contained in the regulatory framework distribute between 
the Member States and the NRAs many competences. Further, to achieve the proper application of the 
Regulatory Framework, it is required the co-operation and co-ordination among the different NRAs. 
Thus, pursuant to Article 7(2) Framework Directive, NRAs have to cooperate between them and the 
Commission in order to guarantee the consistent application of the regulatory framework. In addition, 
NRAs were required to be independent. Thus, when they were introduced into the EU law with the full 
liberalization in 1998, the EU legislation encouraged NRAs to be separated from the national 
administration. And, in order to guarantee that NRAs would exercise their powers in the EU interest, 
an elaborate system of supervision was put in place, whereby NRA draft decisions concerning the 
Significant Market Power (“SMP”) regime are submitted to the Commission for comment; the 
Commission can veto alternative market definitions or SMP assessments.101 Thus, the Regulatory 
Framework entrusted to NRAs the task to ensuring the accomplishment of the EU rules. In this regard, 
NRAs obtain a ‘certain European status’, since that task implies that they turn against their national 
administration in case of breaching of EU provisions.102 They are no longer merely national organs. 
Rather, they serve to the ends of the Internal Market’s harmonization. On the Member States’ side, 
apart from other specific competences, they shall lay down the rules on penalties, including criminal 
sanctions where appropriate, applicable to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant 
to the Universal Service Directive and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are 
implemented. The penalties provided for must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and may be 
applied to cover the period of any breach, even where the breach has subsequently been rectified.103 
Accordingly, the distribution of powers among NRAs and Member States seems to be envisaged to 
mutual monitoring in the implementation of the EU rules for telecommunications.  
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Second, according to the European Commission, one of the missions of the BEREC is to assist the 
Commission and the NRAs in the implementation of the EU regulatory framework for 
telecommunications.104 This body is aimed to improve the harmonization and consistence of the 
application of the telecommunications via the delivering and dissemination of opinions, common 
positions, recommendations, decisions and best practices.105  
Third, the European Commission goes beyond the drafting of legislative proposals and also takes part 
in the implementation process. In addition to the different Directives and Regulations, the EU 
regulatory framework for electronic communications also comprises guidelines and recommendations 
from the Commission. These instruments have specific legal basis in the different directives, such as 
Article 15 of the Framework Directive, which states that the Commission shall adopt 
recommendations on relevant product and service markets and the publication of Guidelines for 
market analysis and the assessment of significant market power within the market adoption procedure. 
Article 19 of the Framework Directive also enables the Commission to issue recommendations to 
Member States on the harmonized application of the provisions contained in the EU rules. Although 
these instruments are not directly binding, these provisions concerning the market adoption and 
harmonization procedures imply that NRAs have to carry out these tasks by taking utmost account of 
this recommendations and guidelines.106 Here, we could mention a really recent example of the 
European Commission pressing for the transposition of the EU rules in a certain way. In fact, it is the 
first time that the Commission has issued a recommendation under Article 7a of the Framework 
Directive (‘Procedure for the consistent application of remedies’). This procedure (paragraph 4) 
enables the European Commission –whose doubts have been previously confirmed by the BEREC- to 
cooperate with the NRA in the implementation process. In the case concerned, the European 
Commission requires OPTA (Dutch NRA) to amend or withdraw a fixed and mobile termination 
rates107 proposal because it would negatively affect consumers in the Netherlands. This decision 
follows a three months investigation by the European Commission, and being its position supported by 
the BEREC. OPTA proposed in 2010 termination rates according to the 2009 Commission 
Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU108. 
However, in August 2011, these rates were overturned by the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals 
Tribunal as a result of an appeal by some telecommunications operators. The new termination rate was 
then –as prescribed by the Dutch Court- fixed under a different methodology that includes costs not 
directly related to call termination. It triggered an investigation by the European Commission109 which 
has concluded by a request of modification of the provisions on termination rates to adjust them to the 
European design.  
Moreover, due to its condition as the guardian of the TFEU, the European Commission, according to 
Article 258 TFEU, is enabled to take legal actions to initiate infringement proceedings against those 
Member States who do not implement -or implement improperly- the EU telecommunications rules.110 
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If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by the 
Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Finally, the Court of Justice of the European Union acts not only as a EU law enforcer, but also plays a 
role in the implementation of the telecommunications’ regulatory framework as the ultimate arbiter of 
European legal instruments.111 Thus, the CJEU may interfere in the implementation of the EU 
telecoms rules under different competences provided by the Treaty: infringement proceedings, judicial 
review proceedings, annulment proceedings and preliminary rulings.  
In this regard, we might conclude that the European Union is overshadowing national and local 
positions. The implementation measures and actions taken by national authorities must be in line with 
the model established by the European Union.112 Otherwise, the measures adopted might run the risk 
to be overruled or amended under European standards. From the Dutch example we even could draw 
that the Commission is above national courts by repealing their decisions.  
Enforcement Issues 
With regard to the enforcement of the EU telecommunications law, there are two particular questions 
which should be mentioned here. On the one hand, there is an ‘EU’s tendency to pursue policy 
objectives through EU’s “rights-based” approaches’. 113  This trend seeks to encourage the private 
enforcement of EU law.114 On the other hand, there seems to be a shift from judicial to administrative 
enforcement115, which is encouraged by the rules concerning SGEIs coming from the EU. In short, the 
EU right-based approach encourages citizens to make use of their “EU rights” but, in turn, these 
claims are increasingly taking place out-of-court by dispute settlement mechanisms. Additionally, the 
Framework Directive provides an ‘organizational structure in which the national regulators are 
integrated into a unitary administrative structure for the enforcement of Union Rules’.116 
Rights and remedies: The EU’s “rights-based” approach 
The EU rules concerning regulated-markets grants rights to private parties. Thus, for example, the 
section devoted to substantive law of this paper exposes the main parameters contained in the 
Universal Service Directive when it comes to the provision of telecommunications services for 
consumers. Here, the most important is the idea of access. As aforementioned, the accessibility to the 
service must be guaranteed at an affordable price and under certain quality conditions. Nonetheless, 
these rights are laid down on a Directive (secondary EU Law) and, therefore, they are not directly 
applicable. They need to be implemented into national legislation.117 To this end, the specific 
Universal Service Obligations (hereinafter, USOs) elements and the rules concerning quality and 
affordability of the Universal Service are laid down in decrees or NRA’s decisions. The justifications 
to such move responds to reasons of adaptability with relatively ease, since the rules and parameters 
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concerning quality and affordability may change.118 Hence, the enforcement of the USOs corresponds, 
in general, to NRAs, who may impose fines when it comes to an undertaking which does not comply 
with its obligations.119 However, the Universal Service Directive itself established certain remedies in 
case of non-compliance. Thus, for instance, the consumer has a right to compensation120 where the 
quality of the service provided does not correspond to the contracted quality levels. Also, the Directive 
makes available a right to withdrawal121 from the consumer contract, without penalty, in case of 
modification of the contractual conditions.  
Yet, amongst the different rules concerning the provision of telecommunications services, there are 
also Regulations which, because of their binding nature, confer rights to citizens without the 
requirement of being transposed into national law. Here, we could talk about “EU’s rights”, since they 
can be directly enforced. We find an illustration of these rights on the example of prices cap for 
Roaming tariffs, which are contained in a Regulation. Therefore, these retail tariffs enjoy direct 
applicability. Despite mobile services are not –by now- included in the Universal service scope, the 
regulation of Roaming is also an important part of the telecommunications EU rules. These rules also 
affect to the content of the contract since rules on Roaming seek to gradually reduce the prices for 
roaming connections. In this regard, the issue of roaming charges gains relevance when EU citizens 
move to another EU Member State. The new proposal on Roaming Regulation, which has entered into 
force on 1st July 2012, establishes new Roaming cap-tariffs for voice –both, make and receive a call- 
and SMS. As to Data Roaming services, the currently in force Roaming Regulation does not set 
maximum retail tariffs. However, by way of minimum regulation, the Roaming Regulation imposes 
transparency obligations on mobile operators concerning those retail tariffs.122 Moreover, the new 
proposed Roaming Regulation already contains maximum retail tariffs –for the first time. The decline 
in the prices of data –as well as in voice and SMS- will be progressive. In addition, people traveling 
outside the EU will receive a text message, email or a pop-up window notifying them of approaching 
to EUR 50 of data downloads or to a previously agreed amount. Once the limit is reached, consumers 
should confirm the approval to continue with data roaming services. In addition, the new European 
Regulation allows mobile phone users to choose a separate contract for roaming with another carrier 
abroad. Thus, a consumer may opt for an alternative operator abroad that offers cheaper prices than 
those already contracted in his country, with the advantage of being able to keep –free of additional 
charges- the same phone number. This possibility will be a reality as of 1st July 2014. Also new in this 
regard is the introduction as an additional measure of access to data services provided directly by the 
operators of the visited country, which will be based on LBO (local break out). This measure allows a 
person to contract only the data to an operator in the country you are traveling, while maintaining the 
voice and SMS with your operator. It is also proposed that the provision of the service shall be very 
simple (without necessarily formalizing a contract, only, for example, buying a card at a kiosk). As a 
result, the LBO will provide that, while on vacation on a European country, any visitor can use, for 
example, the Smartphone and the table, outside but enjoying domestic prices.  
                                                     
118 ‘BEREC Report on Universal Service– reflections for the future’ (June 2010), available at 
http://www.irg.eu/streaming/BoR%20(10)%2035%20BEREC%20Report%20on%20USO_final.pdf?contentId=546910&
field=ATTACHED_FILE; p. 6. 
119 On the different Member States’ systems imposing fines in case of non compliance with the USOs by undertakings see 
‘BEREC Report’ (Ibid.), pp. 28-29. 
120 Universal Service Directive, Article 20(1), f. 
121 Ibid., Article 20 (4). 
122 Ibid. Recital 40. 
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In the field of passengers transport -including transport by air123, sea124, train125, and bus and coach126-, 
the EU has also opted for the use of Regulations. These rules also grant rights to passengers in case of 
delay, cancellation or accident. Additionally, they contain specific provisions concerning the 
enforcement of such rights.   
Procedure. The shift from judicial to administrative (and soft) enforcement 
The EU rules on regulated markets are opting for out-of-court dispute resolution. The EU was not 
competent in the area of Alternative Dispute Resolution (hereinafter, ADR) and, therefore, it 
employed soft law mechanisms to establish minimum-quality criteria on ADR.127 However, with the 
introduction of the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU 
Community extended its competence into the area of civil justice systems.128 Since that time, it has 
been gradually pushing the harmonization in this field.129  
In the case of telecommunications services, out-of-court dispute resolution is encouraged in the 
Universal Service Directive. Thus, according to its Article 34(1), ‘Member States shall ensure that 
transparent, non-discriminatory, simple and inexpensive out-of-court procedures are available for 
dealing with unresolved disputes between consumers and undertakings providing electronic 
communications networks and/or services arising under this Directive and relating to the contractual 
conditions and/or performance of contracts concerning the supply of those networks and/or services’.  
Such a procedure should be available for disputes between users and providers of services under the 
Universal Service Directive and the disputes related to the contractual conditions and/or performance 
of contracts concerning the supply of those network or services.130  The means of initiating such 
procedures should be clearly contained in the subscription contract.131 Independent dispute resolution 
bodies must be established and need to be consistent with the minimum principles established by the 
Commission on the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.132  
The enforcement of these rules is following a tendency towards administrative enforcement by 
National Regulatory Authorities which are now responsible for the enforcement of the rights laid 
down by the EU rules. These authorities act as EU law (administrative) enforcers. Additionally, NRAs 
are responsible for the provision of information concerning out-of-court mechanisms. In fact, they are, 
                                                     
123 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common 
rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of 
flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, (OJ L 46, 17.2.2004, pp. 1–8). 
124 Regulation (EU) No 1177/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 concerning  the  
rights  of  passengers  when  travelling  by  sea  and  inland  waterway  and  amending  Regulation  (EC) No 2006/2004 
(OJ L 334, pp. 1-16). 
125 Regulation (EC) No 1371/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on rail passengers’ 
rights and obligations (OJ L 315, 3.12.2007, pp. 14–41). 
126 Regulation (EU) No 181/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 February 2011 concerning the rights 
of passengers in bus and coach transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 (OJ L 55, pp. 1-12).   
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128  Hodges, C., Benoehr, I. and Creutzfeldt-Banda, N. (2012), Consumer ADR in Europe. Hart Publishing.  
129 The most recent outcome of such harmonization has been the culmination of this harmonization process into the EU 
Proposal for a Directive on Consumer ADR and a Proposal for a Regulation on Consumer ODR. 
130 Queck, de Streel, Hou, Jost, & Kosta (2010). 
131 See Article 20(2) g Universal Service Directive.  
132 These principles are listed in the Commission Recommendation 98/257 of March 30, 1998 on the principles applicable to 
the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.  
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in many cases, even the dispute settlement provider.133 In addition, we must consider the existence of 
sector-related ADR providers, e.g. the Spanish State Secretariat for Telecommunications and 
Information Society. Consumer and business organizations also provide alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, as do other public bodies independent from the NRAs. For example, OFCOM (UK’s 
NRA) adopted a single complaints code of practice in order to simplify the complaints handling 
procedures; in Poland, the Polish NRA provides a consumer information call centre; and in the 
Netherlands complaints can be filled in online134; as well as in through ANACOM135, the Portuguese 
NRA. In short, there is a large catalogue of out-of court mechanisms for disputes in the 
telecommunication sector which is aimed to achieve a prompt settlement in accordance to the celerity 
that the market requires. 
As to this movement towards out-of-court dispute settlement, the CJEU has considered that the 
establishment of a mandatory process of dispute settlement, prior to bringing a judicial action before 
the court, does not infringe the principles of equivalence, effectiveness and the principle of effective 
judicial protection. This was the ruling given by the CJEU in the Alassini Case136, concerning the 
adoption by the Italian Government of a mandatory settlement procedure that had to be followed by 
the parties in the dispute prior to instigating court procedures. In this case the defendants argued that 
the actions against them were inadmissible because the applicants (consumers) had not first initiated 
the mandatory attempt to settle the dispute before the settlement bodies, as required under Italian law. 
Here the Court reasoning –following the Opinion of the Advocate General Kokott137-  was that  
‘that procedure does not result in a decision which is binding on the parties, that it does not cause a 
substantial delay for the purposes of bringing legal proceedings, that it suspends the period for the 
time-barring of claims and that it does not give rise to costs – or gives rise to very low costs – for 
the parties, and only if electronic means is not the only means by which the settlement procedure 
may be accessed and interim measures are possible in exceptional cases where the urgency of the 
situation so requires’.138   
Therefore, by this ruling, the CJEU is contributing to this movement towards out-of-court dispute 
settlement. This matter is relevant for the self-sufficiency hypothesis because through the movement 
towards administrative enforcement, the enforcement of the EU rules comes to fall within the EU 
shadow as long as it becomes part of the enforcement network. This could also be considered a 
manifestation of an emerging “judicial activism”139 coming from the CJEU, because this ruling has 
implied an inflection point in the case law concerning access to justice which aims to fill the 
remaining gaps of the EU law in relation to its implementation within the national private legal orders.  
As a result, the case of telecommunications services could serve as an example of what Prof. Micklitz 
terms de-judicialization140, insofar as the enforcement of the EU law is moving towards softer 
solutions coming from public bodies different from the courts. In fact, the vast amount of cases is no 
longer found in Courts. The new mechanisms of soft-enforcement and self-enforcement foster a shift 
in the traditional litigation scheme. NRAs and Consumer organizations, as well as others bodies –both 
                                                     
133 According to the Commission, in a majority of Member States, out-of-court procedures have been provide by the NRAs 
(Nihoul & Rodford, 2011). 
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independent and public bodies-, are offering new ways to consumers who wants to settle a dispute 
related to the provision of telecommunications services. These practices range from the possibility to 
fill online complaints, to mediation and even arbitration services, and the compliance with their 
outcome is boosted under threat of inclusion into blacklists or publicly available negative ratings, for 
example. It has implied an important step in terms of access to justice for consumers.  
Furthermore, the policy pursued in others sectors seems to chase the same path as telecommunications. 
Thus, the EU rules concerning postal, financial, transport and energy services also promote the 
enforcement of their substantive law via ADR.141  
Conclusions. A Self-Sufficient Order? 
All the sections here examined serve as a starting point for the verification of the self-sufficiency of 
European Regulatory Private Law. Thus, the trends in law-making, substantive law, implementation 
and enforcement contribute to a better understanding of the verticalization and substance of the sectors 
which shape the European Regulatory Private Law.  
The telecommunications sector has become a heavily regulated sector in order to ensure its transition 
to competition. In terms of law-making, in the telecommunications market, which is marked by fast 
changes and many innovations, it seems reasonable to explore instruments that are more flexible than 
the traditional ones. As a result, telecommunications law in the European Union is characterized by 
new and more customizable instruments of law-making in order to serve market demands and the 
increasing number of actors participating in the law-making process. Likewise, the regulation of 
telecommunications is aimed at the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market, which is the 
driving force behind the regulatory development. Accordingly, the legislative power no longer lies in 
the hands of the Nation State alone, and this is particularly important if we consider that the 
telecommunications’ regulatory framework also contains contract-related rules. Law-making now 
takes different forms, private law is manifested in different shapes, and the telecommunications sector 
constitute a vertically emerged legal order, whose creation and evolution –from a private law 
perspective- does not correspond to a traditional pattern. Hence, the self-sufficiency of the ERPL is 
perceived here, since all these features leave, therefore, little room to national states in the legislative 
development of private law.  
The provision of former public services is now carried out by private companies through mandatory 
provisions concerning access conditions. The provision of these services has been, therefore, 
transferred to the market by relying in competition for the resource allocation. In this regard, some 
authors point out that by so doing, and ‘when governments rely on market solutions to problems of 
securing social welfare, reducing the role of the State and using market competition to improve the 
efficiency of the supply of public goods, contracts become both an instrument of trade and an 
instrument of politics’. 142 But not only are contracts becoming an instrument of politics, but also legal 
rules are increasingly becoming policy programmes, especially secondary EU law. Thus, by becoming 
more and more described, European directives are ‘losing their character as legal rules’; this is what 
Prof. Micklitz terms ‘de-juridification process’.143 In addition, through the Internal Market 
configuration and the Universal Service requirements, the European Union is practically regulating 
whole contract’s content and, consequently, leaving little discretion to Member States to do so. As a 
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result, the second Trojan horse would appear, under the Internal Market configuration camouflage, to 
replace national contract law.144  
Concerning the implementation of the EU telecommunications rules, the implication of many 
institutions in the implementation process, linked to the (national, not European) independence with 
which NRAs are required to carry out their activities, mean the narrow accommodation for national 
regulation and for the Nation State. As for enforcement, we must consider four signs that imply a new 
paradigm in the enforcement of the European Regulatory Private Law: first, the promotion of 
administrative enforcement at the expense of judicial enforcement; second, the encouragement 
towards private enforcement by out-of-court dispute settlement mechanisms but also different from 
administrative enforcement; third, the EU “rights-based” approach has also encouraged private parties 
to enforce their EU rights; and last –but not least-, the judicial activism initiated by the European 
Court of Justice to achieve the ends of the EU policy. Accordingly, the telecommunications example 
reveals that, first, the EU is setting the tone in the implementation of the rules for regulated markets; 
and, second, that the enforcement of such rules is moving towards new patters –direct applicability of 
EU rights and soft enforcement via out-of-court dispute settlement.  
In summary, the European Regulatory Private Law -in the telecommunications field- is a regulatory 
intervention justified on factors such as: technological development, innovation, globalization, 
competitiveness, expertise, celerity, markets opening, harmonization of the Internal Market, etc… But, 
on the other hand, it also takes the opportunity to safeguard the access to the service through 
mandatory provisions. Therefore, it is not an intervention based on the enhancement of competition 
within the Internal Market, but rather a regulatory market interference which the European consumer 
law approach –at least, in its current configuration- is not able to achieve. The regulation of 
substantive law provisions concerning the contractual performance of the service provider via 
European rules is particularly striking because the patterns analyzed along the paper seem to suggest 
that we are witnessing to the rise of a new private law regardless the Nation State (substantive law 
without the State)145. At the same time, all the above factors lead to a series of transformation 
processes in the regulation of these sectors that trigger the preclusion of Member States in the 
legislative development. And, finally, the Member States’ leeway for the implementation of the EU 
rules has been undermined by the establishment of a cooperative network which, powered by the EU 
Commission, monitors the proper transposition of EU rules and urges its observance.  
 
The new trends followed in the field of Services of General Economic Interest -particularly in 
telecommunications- in the tested areas, i.e. law-making, substantive law, implementation and 
enforcement, could confirm the emergence of a self-sufficient order different from the national private 
legal orders and, in addition, independent from the general European consumer acquis. Hence, the 
telecommunications example has helped to –preliminarily- conclude that the new patterns listed above 
seem to pave the way towards the self-sufficiency the European Regulatory Private Law, at least when 
it comes to the provision of services within regulated markets.  
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145 See Micklitz and Svetiev’s contributions to this working paper. 
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Section IV: COMMENTS AND INTERVENTIONS 
1) Mapping out the Landscape 
MAPPING OUT THE LANDSCAPE 
Thomas Wilhelmsson*1 
 
I was asked to provide some comments mapping out the research landscape. The aim is to provide a 
meta-map of the maps already provided of the specific issues and parameters. I will not map any 
answers as those are expected from the project. Research is often about finding the right questions 
than the right answers. I am going to map a couple of questions that the discussions and the project 
have made very topical. According to my understanding, the aim of the project is the construction of 
the emergence of a new entity, being European Regulatory Private Law (ERPL). The project seeks to 
analyse the relationship between this new entity, ERPL, and national private law through four 
relationship-parameters.  
The basic question is how we construct the system - the way you design society through thinking. The 
development of the law is constituted by the play between main rules and exceptions.  There are 
different approaches to this issue. In the continental setting, you construct a system by formulating the 
general principles of the system. In the common law setting, you approach the issue from a different 
angle – distinguishing is an important technique of building a system.  
There are many questions concerning systematization. The distinction between local and total 
coherence as analysed by Tuori in his paper becomes relevant. It is not clear to me whether the project 
is about establishing a more totalizing coherence/ideology or local coherence. Sometimes during the 
discussions, ERPL was seen as a new emerging self-standing system, which is locally coherent rather 
than consisting of special rules which have been made for certain services of general interest. There 
are some kinds of systematic generalizing principles, which constitute a local coherent system. 
However, reading the contribution of Micklitz, which criticises the DCFR for not understanding 
European private law, it seems that the project is rather seeking for a re-systematization of the whole 
block of private law. Since it is argued by Micklitz that we have a wrong perspective on private law, 
this raises not only questions about having a new sub-species of local coherence living according to its 
own rules, but also questions about trying to look at the whole area of European private law. 
One perspective is to see ERPL as a locally coherent distinct entity, which does not interact with the 
rest of private law and to analyse the relationship between ERPL and national law according to the 4 
parameters. Or one can also take a broader view and analyse the multi-lateral relationships between 
ERPL and general private law as well as national private law. A web of various relationships arises, 
where one can search for the 4 parameters. 
If one aims for local coherence, the question arises as to the criteria to decide how “locally” you 
delimit the area. Why should we combine the “services” together? Or should we combine “general 
interest” together? Should we include then “financial services”? All services? What is the real locus 
for local coherence? The scope of the locus should be determined by the reasons that we are looking 
for coherence. If we act as researchers, we are interested in regularities of nature, human behaviour 
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and legal behaviour. Then, we should look for issues where we find empirical regularities. There are 
different reasons for coherence. One reason for coherence can be communication. The human 
language is based on coherence. One cannot only communicate single events – one needs broader 
concepts to be able to communicate more information content. However, the project might need 
another dimension of coherence. I imagine that the most efficient way of coherence is that of gathering 
everything on one area as telecommunications and do not mix everything together. Legal certainty is 
ambiguous as to coherence. Certainty is decreasing if you look for broad coherence rather than a 
focused local coherence where every actor involved knows more concretely what is spoken about. Yet, 
as ERPL is intruding in a field where you had general norms before, actors will probably perceive 
strong feelings. There could be a justice argument that like situations/cases/things should be treated 
alike. To sum up, depending on what you are looking for, you might end up with different ways of 
localising local coherence.  
The next question is the perspective that the project takes. The choice of perspective influences the 
relationship parameters. Different actors might have different perspectives. The perspective of a 
researcher is to look for rationality patterns meaning pointing out the central rationality and 
constructing areas based on rationality. If we look at ERPL, does the project expect to find similar 
rationality patterns between telecom, health, financial services etc? Or are the rationality patterns so 
dominant that they are overtaking the traditional rationales of private law?  I have the impression that 
the project seeks for the latter one and thereby is seeking for a more total coherence. The perspective 
of the courts might be very different as they have a problem-based learning approach. Courts might be 
more open towards sectorial systematization, taking together issues which tend to appear in court in 
the same context.  The perspective of the legislator is rather instrumentalist and functionalist. The 
project claims that instrumentalism/functionalism is the basic ethos of ERPL. 
The third question concerns the systematization key. What puzzled me when discussing the dialectic 
between main rules and exceptions is how we pinpoint what are the main rules and what are the 
exceptions. Often it is very poorly explicated on what basis we pick some main rules and decide that 
the rest are exceptions. We seldom explain why we choose some key for the systematization. 
Consequently, why are services of the general interest the systematization key for ERPL? We are 
bound by conceptual traditions and our main rules are the traditional main rules. We need to be forced 
to make explicit the explanation about where we find the main rules. The main rules are found in our 
Begriffshimmel, which is part of our Vorverständnis. However, when we claim that something new is 
emerging which is threatening the old scheme of main rules and exceptions, then we are forced to 
explain why we think that this “new” is so important that it changes the balance of the traditional 
conceptual structure in some way. The project claims that ERPL challenges the traditional conceptual 
structures, which we find for example in the DCFR. How do we determine the systematic importance 
of something new emerging to claim that it overthrows the internal balance of the legal system? Is it 
the number of cases?  Number of legal instruments? Economic importance? The importance for 
ordinary citizens? Can old principles be challenged by one landmark case? I often would like to know 
why this one case changes the whole landscape. What are the reasons for this case being so important? 
We have many cases which are not in conformity with the general principles and any general principle 
can be contested if you dig deep enough. 
The project is claiming that the content of European private law is changing and that there is a clash 
between European private law and national private law. It might be too easy to define national private 
law as the traditional autonomy based Code and to contrast it then to new regulatory rules. There 
would be not so much of a clash if the project redefines national private law as to include such 
elements that you find in regulatory private law. In national private law, we also find regulatory 
instruments, even in the areas which are discussed by the project but they are not necessarily defined 
as part of private law. This also relates to the public/private law divide and what to do with European 
law that does not fit into this divide. It puts more pressure on redefining whole areas. Why is there a 
need to talk about private law at all? When analysing the four relationship parameters, is the project 
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looking at the Begriffshimmel and codifications as counterpart to the ERPL? The DCFR is written in 
the way of the Begriffshimmel. 
The project claims that this new ERPL is based on an instrumental way of understanding the law. 
However, all EU law is based on an instrumental way of understanding the law/rationalities. While 
American law is instrumental in its basic approach, the European legal cultures are rather formalistic 
(both the continental legal systems and the English common law system are formalistic compared to 
the American instrumentalism). However, through European law but also because of other changes in 
approach, the European legal cultures are moving in the instrumentalist direction. 
The relationships parameters are of a different kind and questions arise as to how to measure them. If 
it comes to convergence and hybridisation, the question is about the substance of the law and its 
conceptualisation. It is result-focused as you determine how it looks like in the legal systems. Also 
autonomy and self-sufficiency are content-oriented. However, resistance is a reaction of the actors 
involved and is not about how it looks in the law. Consequently, a different type of analysis is 
conducted and a different type of proof produced. Instead of having these four criteria on a different 
analytical level, I propose to divide them firstly in criteria about how the actors are reacting and 
secondly in criteria about how the result might be.  For example, the actors are resisting and the result 
is a hybrid. 
Lastly, the importance of a global perspective and the need to respond to the global perspective as well 
needs to be stressed. 
European diversity is a good breeding ground for legal learning processes. It is a great advantage to 
have 27 legal systems in countries having relative similar social systems, which means that we can 




2) The Scenarios 
THOUGHTS ON HYBRIDISATION 
Norbert Reich*1 
 
These thoughts are an attempt to build on and re-adapt Kaarlo Tuori’s speech on legal hybrids to the 
specific area of European Regulatory Private Law for the purposes of this research project. According 
to Tuori, at least three levels of legal hybrids can be distinguished, that is individual concepts, legal 
branches and systems. Rather than on systems, the focus of these thoughts mainly lies on individual 
concepts and legal branches, which appear as the most fruitful dimension for the purposes of the 
project. So far hybrids have been presented mainly as horizontal, though in the context of the 
European Union regulatory framework also the vertical dimension should be considered. In light of 
the regulatory objectives of the European order, classical distinctions vanish and traditional individual 
concepts such as contract and tort take novel shapes and functions: in particular, the protecting of 
autonomy loses centrality against new regulatory aims such as non-discrimination, consumer 
protection and so on which are meant to serve the general interest. It is possible to notice interference 
between the private and the public dimension concerning in particular the use of administrative 
remedies for private purposes. A particularly interesting recent case in this sense is Invitel [Case 
C-472/10], which originated from the preliminary reference of a Hungarian Court in a proceeding 
started by the authority which enforces consumer law taking collective actions against unfair contract 
terms. In that occasion, the CJEU has explained that a term which is deemed unfair should be non-
binding for all consumers, including those who were not part of the proceeding. The Court said that 
national courts have by their own motion to ensure that consumers will not be bound by those terms, 
and in this way introduced new remedies which surpass the traditional theories elaborated in many 
national contexts (compare for German law the doctrines of Rechtskrafterstreckung, Einredelösung 
and so on). Public law remedies are digging into contract law as a spill-over effect.  
Another aspect that deserves being addressed in this scenario is the impact of the on-going process of 
constitutionalisation of private law and, particularly, the impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Article 47 of that charter may be particularly important in this sense. There is arguably a strong move 
towards constitutionalisation, which so far has been discussed at the national level (initially in 
German, lately also increasingly in the Netherlands). This aspect may be considered as an aspect of 
ERPL and this consideration leads to the second point: hybridization in legal branches. It is clear from 
Tuori’s presentation that the days of the classical legal black-boxes are gone, and competition law is a 
good example for this. Nonetheless, if ERPL has to be established as a separate branch, what are then 
its specific characteristics, functions and mechanisms? How this interacts with public and private law? 
As a hypothesis, the constitutional move can be an aspect of that interaction. There are indeed links to 
certain constitutional premises in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, where we find principles such as 
consumer protection and rules which have to be implemented by EU or national law such as non-
discrimination. Although these rules have to be counterbalanced by other rights and principles such as 
property, freedom of contract and so on, these represent the constitutional roots which keep together 
the idea of ERPL. 
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What concerns methodology, an aspect that has to be assessed is ‘balancing’. When we consider 
conflicting values which are rooted in different traditions, the classical problem-solving methods 
become somehow inadequate and a new need for balancing arises. This could be the methodological 
focus of the project. Another aspect to be taken in consideration is how the whole hybrid nature of the 
European Union, which has already been explained by Tuori, reflects on substantive community law 






I want to develop a couple of points, building on the papers of Jan Smits and Annetje Ottow and my 
own comments. In the ERPL project the self-sufficiency scenario functions in a dystopian way. It 
seems normatively undesirable but it may be empirically occurring. Jan Smits argued that it could be 
normatively desirable because it would provide stability of norms for private actors. This was also 
mentioned by Annetje Ottow when she referred to legal certainty. However, I am sceptical about the 
normative justification for several reasons. 
First of all, in such a fast-moving field, the idea that you can provide stability for the participants 
through a general set of norms seems illusory. Secondly, because of the interaction between the EU 
and the national level, if you try the self-sufficiency approach, it is likely to produce unintended 
consequences – the opposite of stability. 
What is the emerging architecture of EU regulatory governance? From my perspective, the EU 
regulatory networks and agencies should be understood as frameworks for decentralised elaboration 
and implementation of EU framework rules in which there are systematic mechanisms for feedback 
and revision of rules and procedures via monitoring and peer review of implementation. This is 
experimentalist governance. There can be questions as to how far individual sets of arrangements in 
particular sectors fully fit this model, but we see a significant correspondence to that model in many 
sectors. We can see these governance systems, of which a characteristic is that the national level 
participates in the revision of the rules, as machines for learning from diversity or cross-fertilisation of 
national regulatory systems. I would see this as a mechanism for fruitful hybridisation rather than 
substitution. 
It would be useful to underline one of the points that Yane Svetiev made about the competition 
network. That is that if we ask why the EU develops such an institutional framework, this is not only 
because of a lack of competence, but also because of a lack of capacity. We can see the European 
competition network (“ECN”) as a case in which the administrative overload in the approval of 
restrictive agreements leads to the creation of the ECN. In so far as this is a capacity issue, we should 
expect this to be a more general tendency across different areas of regulation. If we carefully analyse 
the emerging governance arrangements, such as ACER, the whole thing looks like a remarkable 
recursive structure for co-production and co-implementation of the rules governing these sectors. The 
European Commission could not generate those rules itself. BEREC is a weaker version of ACER – it 
is not accumulating substantial powers to substitute for national authorities, even if over time it might 
acquire more power by majority voting and might overrule the decisions of an individual national 
authority. 
If one were to be concerned about self-sufficiency, one would want to look at financial regulation. 
There is a real effort to create a single European rule book, and there is a debate about how far we are 
seeing a continuation of an inadequate nationally dominated system, or a more centralised and uniform 
system which does not leave sufficient scope for national experimentation. The jury is still out on this. 
My view is that a middle position is more justified, in which we should see the new European 
authorities as strengthening pre-existing regulatory networks, but in which national institutions are still 
cooperating with the Commission. I believe that even the uniform EU rules will leave room for 
contextualised interpretation by national supervisors. 
                                                     




I could develop an argument about the case of REACH, which looks like a highly centralised system. 
However, evidence suggests that national authorities are still very involved in which substances should 
be treated as priorities for high levels of regulation. 
I will now make a few comments on the implications for national private law. We should not 
exaggerate the role of European integration. This already happened in the 20th century in areas such as 
labour law due to the inability of generalist judges to resolve technically complex issues through the 
mechanisms of contract and tort. This has been accentuated by the pace of innovation in product 
technologies and business-to-business relations. We can see this just as prominently in the US as we 
do in the EU. It is hard to attribute it to European integration. This point was well developed by Yane 
Svetiev. We should further avoid exaggerating the homogeneity of European systems before European 
integration. I could mention the example of the analysis by Alec Stone Sweet and Kathleen Stranz on 
the Mangold case in the Journal of European Public Policy. This was an intervention by the ECJ in 
internal conflicts in the German judicial system over the recognition of horizontal rights to contest age 
discrimination. 
Finally, I would mention the role of national authorities in implementing EU rules. The examples 
given by Annetje Ottow were very interesting. They could be seen as an example of creative 
hybridisation between EU and national regulation. They could be diffused from one national system to 
another though peer review and ACER. In addition, they could spread horizontally across sectors at 
the national level. 
I will end with the role of local courts. I would like to elaborate on Yane Svetiev’s comments on the 
Hamburg gas case. We could interpret this as a destabilisation mechanism which can be invoked in 
cases of exclusionary decision-making. A safety valve or last resort procedure that can be invoked to 




CONFLICT AND RESISTANCE 
Fernando Gómez*1 
 
I begin with a brief comment on penalty defaults. The virtue of a penalty default is that in equilibrium 
it is never applied. The idea is that the parties behave as they are supposed to behave, therefore, they 
avoid reaching the stage of the game in which the penalty is applied, so even if the result of imposing 
the penalty is undesirable for everyone, given that this lies off the equilibrium path ensures that the 
dismal outcome where everyone loses is avoided. This is something that comes from game theory, 
with interesting applications to public policy, to contract law, and to other areas.  
I proceed now to a number of specific comments about conflict and resistance. To start, I will not 
"resist" the temptation to comment about a couple of issues that I think are incredibly suggestive and 
interesting from both yesterday’s discussion and from the background papers.  
First, I address the idea of how to understand resistance to the development and growth of the ERPL. 
Many would tend to say that looking at the small issues may mean that you lose the broad picture. 
Sometimes, however, if one focuses solely on the broad picture you may get the wrong one. So, I think 
it is important to understand the behaviour and incentives of the relevant actors that are crucial for 
explaining potential resistance and conflict with the emergence of the ERPL. Yesterday we listened to 
examples of resistance by the national judiciaries. Of course we observe a resistance by the Courts or 
by the national legal profession (for example, with regard to the CESL, there have been very critical 
papers from the legal profession in the UK, and other countries). These are just casual observations, 
however important. We do not have comprehensive and real evidence about how those individuals, 
actors and groups actually relate towards EU law and, more particularly, towards the set of European 
rules that bring us here. I think that definitely the national judiciaries are very important, the legal 
profession and also academia are also notably relevant players. The same is true about various interest 
groups: industries, consumers. They need to be analyzed as well as groups with different political 
interests, which vary from country to country. I have the strong feeling that we definitely need to 
understand more about the behaviour and incentives of those relevant actors. And I believe that 
empirical studies (looking at the facts) are the only way to really understand that. 
Second, I was a bit surprised that we did not come up more explicitly yesterday -being a project 
coordinated by Hans Micklitz - with distributional consequences. In the sense that the Project may 
take a normative turn at some point: what explains the emergence of the resistance of the ERPL? I 
think that the distributional consequences are really important. It is not so obvious who is going to win 
or who is going to lose, what are the gains or losses for different economic groups, particularly in 
terms of impact on wealth distribution that some of these measures may have. Therefore, I think that it 
is definitely important to understand what the distributional effects of the process will be.  
There are two important points that were nicely raised by Horatia Muir-Watt’s contribution. One is the 
idea that the ERPL may produce interesting methodological debates. Prof. Muir-Watt mentioned that 
the French Courts were “horrified” by the idea of balancing and using proportionality instruments. I 
think that the suggestion was really very nicely put, and I think that the ERPL is going to have an 
impact on how legal culture is used to address problems. For example, my personal view is that most 
continental lawyers would engage in a very “healthy” exercise by doing more balancing, and that it 
will undermine legal certainty. Because it is a false sense of legal certainty: legal certainty is 
chimerical. So, I believe these methodological issues, though perhaps less important from the point of 
                                                     




view of social welfare consequences, are  intellectually truly interesting, and definitely they may be lie 
in part at the roots of resistance by some groups. The second point that I want to recall, which was also 
raised by Horatia Muir-Watt, is the non-EU perspective. Again, it is very “healthy” to look at things 
from the outside and the outside’s consequences and the outside’s resistances and clashes that it may 
have. How we may “be happy” with the building of an ERPL? Another example would be to look at 
what the World Bank is now doing in terms of legal reform in many countries and imposing a very 
narrow view of what is good facilitative law and good regulation for the purposes of economic growth. 
I think we definitely need to look more at how some of the regulatory measures that are part of the 
package on the ERPL really fit or diverge. My impression is that there is substantial divergence.  
One a different tone, this is something that did not appear in the debate so far, but I think that it is an 
extremely interesting point in Micklitz’s paper. It is about the distinctiveness of rights of the ERPL 
with respect to national private laws in the 19th Century. I would express my doubts to some extent, 
because as Micklitz emphasized concerning the 19th Century codifications, ideas such as autonomy 
and private ordering, but also that of building or creating a nation-state were important. But I think 
that especially for early 19th Century codifications, the idea of building a single (national, not 
European) market was also very important, in addition to creating a national spirit and awareness. 
Then, for those who wanted the French Code or the Spanish Constitution (with the aim of creating a 
single code for Spain and America, for the Spanish colonies, with the first Spanish Constitution in 
1812), one of the basic rationales was not only creating a new national consciousness, it was also the 
elimination of legal fragmentation and legal diversity as serious obstacles to trade. This was also very 
much the rationale behind other 19th century codifications. And some people think this kind of mixed 
motivation is also currently present in the area of EPL (e.g. Hesselink). For example, these 
commentators think that the CESL not only eliminates barriers to trade, but helps to create a European 
citizenship. Thus, it is not so clear that the processes we observe nowadays are in reality so different 




3) The Applications 
APPLICATIONS AND EXAMPLES 
Yane Svetiev*1 
 
In this intervention I comment on the papers providing the applications and examples in the areas of 
remedies, standardisation and telecommunications sectoral regulation.   One common point is to recall 
that the hypothesised parameters, such as hybridisation, convergence, self-sufficiency (“HCS”) are not 
just being investigated in themselves, but as part of an overall hypothesis of the creation of a European 
private law, which distances itself from national private law and which is entirely independent of any 
EU codification exercises pursued in recent years.  The underlying basis of this ERPL is functionalist 
and therefore it may be expected to track changes in the principal objectives of European integration.  
The suggestion is that the sources of this European private law extend beyond the consumer acquis to 
include the contract-related rules in sectorial regulation, the standardisation processes in services 
(which presumably in turn affect service contract provisions and tort liability), remedies involving 
private parties etc.  In my view, these sources should be seen as the principal subjects of investigation 
of the individual projects. Only then, the second question is how to characterise the processes and 
outcomes – both in terms of the resulting private law rules, and in terms of their relationship with each 
other and with national private law. 
Therefore the conceptual parameters (i.e. HCS) need not be understood (at least at this point) as 
normative concepts that need to be defended as such in the separate investigations.  They are just 
possible or hypothesised characterisations of the emergent European private law rules and institutions.  
The different characterisations of these processes may be due to the different channels through which 
remedies, services standardisation and sectoral rule-making affect private law, or it may be due to 
differences in EU competence in the respective areas, or due to some other reason.  Moreover these 
parameters may be complementary with each other (e.g., hybridisation could lead to convergence in 
private law remedies across different MS) or not (hybridisation may not result in convergence in 
remedial law due to the substantial scope of flexibility remaining to MS procedure). The parameters 
could also be inconsistent with each other (self-sufficiency may be viewed at a surface level as 
inconsistent with hybridisation, while apparently consistent with conflict and resistance).  Moreover, 
these relationships are dynamic and may change; so the processes examined in the various examples 
may need to be traced over time to determine how best to characterise them (for e.g., minimum 
standardisation can lead to convergence as an initial outcome as laggards make up ground, but then 
divergence as new innovative solutions over and above minimum standards are experimented with).   
Finally, the normative question (i.e., are these European private law developments in some sense good 
or not) comes last (i.e. once we understand what the developments are and once we have characterised 
them).  To answer the normative question requires adopting a normative yardstick, i.e. how or by what 
criterion do we judge what is “good” or not.  Possible normative yardsticks include (and this is not a 
comprehensive list): coherence2 (a doctrinal concept), efficiency or consumer welfare3 (an economic 
concept), democratic legitimacy4 (political concept) etc. 
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Both in the descriptive and particularly in the normative analysis, the comparative dimension is also 
important.  In this context, it is worth recalling that different institutions may perform different 
functions in different legal systems. As such, rules cannot be viewed in isolation, but we must consider 
that they may operate in combination with other complementary institutions (e.g., administrative 
arrangements, public law regulation, legal education etc.). 
On the issue of normative evaluation, two further points are worth stressing.  In the research project 
from the outset one aim emphasized from the outset is to avoid common (though often unstated) 
preconceptions that researchers in this field depart from. One preconception is that effective 
harmonization of rules (and application) is the key standard by which we judge “success” in European 
integration (the “Europeanist” view), the other is that national law is coherent, stable, legitimate, and 
that these are values requiring protection from an intruding legal order (the “nationalist” view). This 
can be one way to understand the notion of ERPL as “creative destruction”. It suggests that there may 
well be benefits from both central intervention and from allowing MS autonomy, not out of traditional 
sovereigntist concerns, but as a source of policy diversity in a complex world.   
Therefore at this stage the focus is on understanding the underlying processes/mechanisms and how 
they give shape and content to the European private law.  In the various individual projects these 
mechanisms have been identified as remedial institutions (influencing private law remedies), 
standardisation in services (shaping substantive provisions in services contracts and the contract and 
tort liability of service providers), as well as contractual rule-making in sectorial regulation. Part of the 
process of in-depth understanding involves identifying examples that cannot be easily explained from 
the traditional Europeanist or nationalist vantage point.  These examples provide the substratum of the 
ERPL.  Only once those processes and the way they influence private law, both at EU and MS level, 
have been understood, one can hope to characterise them and then to normatively evaluate them.
(Contd.)                                                                  
3 Are consumers better off under ERPL rules or not? What about businesses? Which set of rules promotes technical and 
dynamic efficiency (i.e. innovation)? 
4 Are the emergent rules technocratic or do they reflect substantial input from society? Do they allow for greater self-
realisation of particular communities and individuals? How do they fare by comparison to national rules? What vision of 
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